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Judgment
Since the questions raised in both the petitions are similar and identical, both these petitions were heard together and are disposed of by this
common order.
The petitioners in these petitions are Members of Karekallu Grama Panchayat in Bellary Taluk (hereinafter referred to as ""the Panchayat""). The
said Panchayat has been constituted as provided u/s 4 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as ""the Act""), and it
consists of Karekallu I and II, Byalachintha, Gollaranagenahalli, Tembarahalli and Dasaranagenahalli Villages. The petitioners are persons
belonging to Scheduled Caste. However, it is the case of the petitioners that they were elected to the Panchayat in respect of seats reserved for the
category of women (general) during the election held to the membership of the Panchayat on 26th of March 2000. Subsequently, the first
respondent-Deputy Commissioner, by means of his notification dated 11th of April, 2000, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-C,
notified the reservation of Offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha in respect of 40 Village Grama Panchayats in Bellary Taluk and District.
Insofar as Karekallu Grama Panchayat is concerned, the Office of Adhyaksha was reserved for women (general) and the Office of Upadhyaksha
was reserved for Backward Classes (Category-B) at Serial No. 29 of the notification Annexure-C.
In these petitions, the petitioners have sought for a direction to respondents 1 and 2 to hold election to the Office of Adhyaksha of the Karekallu
Grama Panchayat in accordance with the reservation made by the first respondent by means of his notification Annexure-C; and for a further
direction to respondents 1 and 2 to hold the election to the Office of Adhyaksha of the Panchayat only among the women members belonging to
the category of women (general) and not to accept the nominations of women belonging to other categories.
It is the case of the petitioners that the first respondent, in the meeting held on 11th of April, 2000, had orally announced that all women
members among the Panchayat area can contest for the post of Adhyaksha irrespective of the categories to which they belong. According to the
petitioners, since the post of Adhyaksha was specifically reserved for women (general) by means of notification Annexure-C, it was not
permissible for the first respondent to declare that all women members of the Panchayat can contest to the Office of Adhyaksha. Under these
circumstances, the petitioners apprehending that all women members of the Panchayat irrespective of the categories to which they belong, are
likely to be permitted to contest for the Office of Adhyaksha, have presented these petitions.
However, respondents 1 and 2 and also respondent 3, who had come on record during the pendency of Writ Petition No. 15930 of 2000,
seriously disputed the claim of the petitioners that women belonging to reserved categories i.e., other than women (general), are not entitled to
contest to the Office of Adhyaksha of the Panchayat.
Sri G. Gangi Reddy and Sri Veerappa, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in these petitions, submitted that the first respondent, in
notification Annexure-C, having notified the reservation of the posts of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha in various Panchayats in Bellary Taluk and in
terms of the said notification, the Office of Adhyaksha of the Karekallu Grama Panchayat having been reserved for a woman (general), it is not
permissible for a woman belonging to a reserved category i.e., Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes, to contest to
the Office of Adhyaksha. According to them, since the post of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha has been categorised by making reservation for
women (general), women belonging to Backward Class (Category-A and Category-B), women belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled
Tribes, it is not permissible for a person belonging to one category of reservation made, to contest to the Office of Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha in
respect of the post reserved for other category. In other words, it is their submission that if the Office of Adhyaksha is reserved for women
(general), it is not permissible for women belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes, to contest to the Office
of Adhyaksha reserved for women (general). They submit that the Offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha have been reserved by making
categorisation of various sections of the society and the reservation is required to be rotated from one Village Panchayat to other Village Panchayat
in the State; and this being the scheme under the provisions of the Act and Article 243D of the Constitution, a member of the Panchayat belonging
to one category of reserved class cannot contest to the Office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha if it is reserved for some other category.
Elaborating their submission, they pointed out that while the second proviso given to sub-section (4) of Section 5 of the Act enables a woman or a
person belonging to the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe or Backward Class for whom seats have been reserved in a Grama Panchayat, to
contest for the election from any non-reserved seat in such a Grama Panchayat, similar provision is not provided u/s 44 of the Act which provides
for reservation to the Offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha. Therefore, they submit that when the legislature has consciously made a specific
provision in Section 5 of the Act, which provides for election to the membership of the Panchayat providing that a person belonging to a reserved
class, can also contest to a non-reserved seat to the membership of the Panchayat, and in the absence of similar provision u/s 44 of the Act, it must
be held that a member of the Panchayat belonging to a particular reserved category cannot contest to the Office of Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha if
the said offices are reserved for some other reserved categories. In support of this submission, Sri G. Gangi Reddy relied upon a decision of this
Court in the case of Dasappa Vs. State of Karnataka, , wherein this Court has taken the view that in respect of the post of Adhyaksha reserved
for Backward Classes in a Panchayat, a member of the Panchayat, who is a Scheduled Caste, cannot contest to the Office of Adhyaksha.
Secondly, they also submitted that from the Circular Annexure-C issued by the first respondent, it is clear that the post of Adhyaksha having been
reserved in the Panchayat to a woman belonging to general category; it is not permissible for a woman belonging to any other category other than
general category to contest to the Office of Adhyaksha. It is their submission that when the first respondent, in exercise of the power conferred on
him u/s 44 of the Act, reserved the Office of Adhyaksha to a woman (general) and when the reservation made is clear and unambiguous and in the
absence of the Circular stating that women belonging to other reserved categories than the women belonging to general category, also can contest,
it is not permissible on the basis of the oral instructions of the first respondent to allow a women other than woman (general) to contest for election
to the Office of Adhyaksha.
However, Sri Puttegowda, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondents 1 and 2, and Sri K. Nageshwarappa, learned
Counsel appearing for respondent 3, strongly repelled the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. According to them, the
assumption made by Sri Reddy that the Office of Adhyaksha has been reserved by the first respondent for women (general) in exercise of the
power u/s 44 of the Act, is totally erroneous in law and does not find any support from either the provisions of Section 44 of the Act or any other
provision in the Act or Article 243D of the Constitution of India. They pointed out that the reservation contemplated for the Office of Chairpersons
in the Panchayat at all level under Article 243D of the Constitution, is limited only to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and Women. They
further pointed out that u/s 44 of the Act, reservation is provided both to the Office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of the Panchayat in favour of
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes (Categories A and B) and Women. It is their submission that while classifying women
who fall under different categories, like Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes, women who do not come under the said
categories, are classified as women (general). They strongly urged that while Section 44 of the Act, contemplates one-third reservation to the
Office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha to women, there is no reservation specifically made in favour of women other than Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes. They pointed out that women who do not come under the said three categories, would be the women
who belong to the general category. It is their submission that reservations have been provided for at the level of Panchayat. Municipality and
Corporations to the Membership of the said Bodies and also to the Office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of the said Bodies keeping in mind the
social structure of the society and with a view to provide for a smooth social change in the society. According to them, that could be done by
empowering certain sections of the society who had been neglected all these years, with the political power. Therefore, they submitted that while
interpreting the provisions of Section 44 of the Act and Circular Annexure-C, this Court will have to keep in mind the object of the legislation; and
if the provision is so interpreted, there is absolutely no scope for accepting the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. In support of
their submission they relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kasambhai F. Ghanchi Vs. Chandubhai D. Rajput and Others, .
In the light of the rival submission effectively put forward by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the only question, but of considerable
importance, that would arise for consideration in these petitions, is as to whether a woman member of the Panchayat belonging to a reserved
category (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes-Categories A and B) is entitled to contest to the Office of Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha, which is notified to be filled up among women belonging to general category?
Before dealing with the rival contentions advanced, it may be useful to refer to the relevant provisions of the Constitution and the Act, which
have a bearing to the question that would arise for consideration, and also the background of the Act.
By means of Seventy-third Amendment made to the Constitution of India, present Part DC came to be incorporated into the Constitution by
repealing original Part IX of the Constitution. Part IX of the Constitution provides for the constitution of Panchayats, Composition of Panchayats,
duration of Panchayats, disqualification for Membership of Panchayats, reservation of seats to various classes of persons in the Membership in the
Panchayat and also to the Office of Chairpersons of the Panchayat, and various other matters as set out in detail in the said part. Clause (1) of
Article 243D of the Constitution provides for reservation of seats to the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in every Panchayat
and clause (2) thereof provides that not less than one-third of the total number of seats reserved under clause (1) shall be reserved for women
belonging to the Scheduled Castes or, as the case may be, the Scheduled Tribes. Clause (3) of the said Article provides that not less than one-
third, including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes of the total number of seats to
be filled by direct election in every Panchayat shall be reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in
a Panchayat. Clause (4) of Article 243D provides that the Offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayats at the village or any other level shall be
reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes and women in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide. The
second proviso given to clause (4) provides that not less than one-third of the total number of Offices of Chairpersons in the Panchayats at each
level shall be reserved for women. It is useful to extract clause (4) of Article 243D of the Constitution, which reads as hereunder:
''''(4) The Offices of the Chairpersons in the Panchayats at the village or any other level shall be reserved for the Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled
Tribes and women in such manner as the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide:
Provided that the number of Offices of Chairpersons reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in the Panchayats at each level
in any State shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total number of such offices in the Panchayats at each level as the
population of the Scheduled Castes in the State or of the Scheduled Tribes in the State bears to the total population of the State:
Provided further that not less than one-third of the total number of offices of Chairpersons in the Panchayats at each level shall be reserved for
women:
Provided also that the number of offices reserved under this clause shall be allotted by rotation to different Panchayats at each level"".
In the light of the provisions made in Part IX of the Constitution as amended by Seventy-third Amendment, the State of Karnataka has enacted
the Act. Section 4 of the Act provides for the declaration of Panchayat Area and establishment of Grama Panchayats. Section 5 of the Act
provides for the Constitution of Grama Panchayat. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act provides for reservation of seats in a Grama Panchayat
for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Sub-section (3) thereof provides for reservation of seats in a Grama Panchayat for Backward
Classes. Sub-section (4) of Section 5 provides for reservation of not less than one-third of the seats reserved in each category for persons
belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes and other women. The proviso given to sub-section (4) makes it clear
that nothing contained in Section 5 shall prevent a woman or a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or Backward
Classes for whom seats have been reserved in a Grama Panchayat, from standing for election to any non-reserved seat in such Grama Panchayat.
The said sub-section reads as hereunder:
(4) Not less than one-third of the seats reserved in each category, for persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
Backward Classes and of the non-reserved seats in the Grama Panchayat shall be reserved for women:
Provided that the seats reserved under sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) shall be allotted by rotation to different constitutencies in the Panchayat area:
Provided further that nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to prevent a woman or a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes or Backward Classes for whom seats have been reserved in a Grama Panchayat from standing for election to any non-reserved
seat in such Grama Panchayat"".
While Section 5 of the Act provides for the Constitution of a Grama Panchayat and reservation of seats to the membership of Panchayats among
various categories of persons, Section 44 of the Act provides for the election of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha in a Grama Panchayat. It is useful
to extract Section 44 of the Act, which reads as hereunder:
Election of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha.--(1) Every Grama Panchayat shall, within one month from the date of public cation of names of
elected members under sub-section (8) of Section 5, choose two members of the Grama Panchayat to be respectively, Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha. In the event of occurrence of any vacancy by reason of death, resignation, removal or otherwise in the Office of Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha, the Grama Panchayat shall choose another member to be the Adhyaksha or the Upadhyaksha, as the case may be.
(2) Subject to the general or special order of the State Election Commission, the Deputy Commissioner shall reserve,--
(a) such number of offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Grama Panchayats in the State for the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and
the number of such offices bearing as nearly as may be the same proportion to the total number of the offices in the State as the population of the
Scheduled Castes in the State or of the Scheduled Tribes in the State bears to the total population of the State.
(b) such number of offices of Adhyakshas and Upadhyakshas of the Grama Panchayats, which shall as nearly as may be, one-third of the total
number of offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha in the State for the persons belonging to the Backward Classes: Provided that out of the offices
reserved under this clause eighty per cent of the total number of such offices shall be reserved for the persons falling under category ''A'' and the
remaining twenty per cent of the offices shall be reserved for the persons falling under Category ''B'':
Provided further that if no person falling under Category ''A'' is available, the offices reserved for that category shall also be filled by the persons
falling under Category ''B'' and vice versa;
(c) not less than one-third of the total number of Offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Grama Panchayats in the State from each of the
categories which are reserved for persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes and of those which are
non-reserved, for women:
Provided that the offices reserved under this sub-section shall be allotted by rotation to different Grama Panchayats;
Explanation.--For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the principle of rotation for purposes of reservation of offices under this section
shall commence from the first election to be held after the commencement of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993"".
From the reading of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Act, it is clear that reservations have been provided to the Offices
of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Grama Panchayats in the State for the Schedules Castes and Scheduled Tribes and also for persons belonging
to the Backward Classes. Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of the said section further provides that not less than one-third of the total number of
offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of the Gram Panchayats in the State from each of the categories, which are reserved for persons
belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes ""and of those which are non-reserved"" shall be reserved for women. The
proviso given to clause (c) of sub-section (2) further provides that the offices reserved under sub-section (2) shall be allotted by rotation to
different Grama Panchayats.
Now, the question is that merely because reservations have been provided under clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 44 of
the Act providing for reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes, in respect of the Offices of Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha; and one-third of the offices reserved for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes and of those which are non-
reserved, shall be reserved for women, whether a woman belonging to Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe or Backward Class is prevented from
contesting to the Office of either Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha if the said offices are reserved to a woman who does not belong to anyone of the
said categories. No doubt, the reading of clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 44 makes it clear that one-third of the total number of seats in a
non-reserved category should be reserved for women who do not belong to the category of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward
Classes. However, I am unable to accede to the submission of Sri G. Gangi Reddy that in respect of one-third of the seats reserved for women
falling under general category in a Grama Panchayat, the persons, who are belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward
Classes are not entitled to contest for the election to the Office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha in the Grama Panchayat. Now, it is well-settled
principle of law of interpretation that if the language used in a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the Court to construe the statute in
its ordinary sense and give to it its full effect. It is only when the language is capable of giving meaning more than one, the Court will have to
harmoniously construct the various provisions in the statute and interpret the provision in the statute keeping in mind the object of the legislation. In
Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, while considering the general principles of interpretation, at page 29, it is stated thus:
Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation can hardly be said to arise. ""The decision in this case"", said
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in a revenue case, ""calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. The
desirability or the undesirability of one conclusion as compared with another cannot furnish a guide in reaching a decision. Where, by the use of
clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or
contrary to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the
Court as to what is just and expedient: words are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning as embracing or excluding cases merely because
no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded. The duty of the Court is to expound the law as it stands, and to ""leave the
remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others"".
Similar is the principle stated by Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition. At pages 64 and 65, it is stated thus:
The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts
themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in
their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the lawgiver. ""The Tribunal that has to
construe an Act of a legislature, or indeed any other document, has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. And in order to
understand these words it is natural to inquire what is the subject-matter with respect to which they are used and the object in view"". In 1953 Lord
Goddard, C.J. said: A certain amount of common sense must be applied in construing statutes. The object of the Act has to be considered:
Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for in that case the words of the
statute speak the intention of the legislature"".
In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, at pages 33 and 34, it is stated thus:
When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous, i.e., they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Courts are bound to
give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. The rule stated by Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case is in the following form: ""If the
words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and
ordinary sense. The words themselves do alone in such cases best declare the intent of the lawgiver. The rule is also stated in another form: ""When
a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.
The results of the construction are then not a matter for the Court, even though they may be strange or surprising, unreasonable or unjust or
oppressive. ""Again and again"", said Viscount Simonds, L.C., ""this Board has insisted that in construing enacted words we are not concerned with
the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used"". And said Gajendragadkar,
J.: ""If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the Courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on
the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act"".
In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Bangalore Vs. J.H. Gotla, Yadagiri, , the Supreme Court, at paragraph 46 on page 1708, has
observed thus:
Where the plain literal interpretation of a statutory provision produces a manifestly unjust result which could never have been intended by the
legislature, the Court might modify the language used by the legislature so as to achieve the intention of the legislature and produce a rational
construction. The task of interpretation of a statutory provision is an attempt to discover the intention of the Legislature from the language used. It is
necessary to remember that language is at best an imperfect instrument for the expression of human intention. It is well to remember the warning
administered by Judge Learned Hand that one should not make a fortress out of dictionary but remember that statutes always have some purpose
or object to accomplish and sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.
Keeping in mind the above principle of law regarding interpretation of statutes, let me now examine what is the interpretation that is required to
be placed on Section 44 of the Act, referred to above. No doubt, as noticed by me earlier, reservations have been made to the persons belonging
to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes and also to women belonging to the said categories under clauses (a), (b) and (c)
of sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Act. Similarly, clause (c) of sub-section (2) makes it clear that one-third of the seats among non-reserved
category should be reserved for women. Therefore, while reserving the seats for women who are Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
Backward Classes, clause (c) provides that one-third of the seats should be reserved for other women who does not belong to the said reserved
categories i.e., in respect of the non-reserved seats. Therefore, the reservation contemplated for women in addition to the reserved class of
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes, is in respect of non-reserved seats. In this situation, on plain reading of Section 44 of
the Act, I am unable to accept the argument of Sri G. Gangi Reddy that there has been a clear cut compartment of reservation made for women
who do not belong to any reserved category and in respect of the seats reserved for women belonging to non-reserved categories i.e., women
(general). A combined reading of clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 44, it appears to my mind, shows that while reservations
have .been made to the Office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes and also to women
belonging to the said categories to the extent of not less than one-third of the total number of Offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Grama
Panchayats in the State, the reservation for women to the extent of one-third of the total number of Offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of
Grama Panchayat in the State has been made ""of those which are non-reserved"". The language employed in clause (c) of sub-section (2) of
Section 44 while providing for reservation for women belonging to reserved category, makes it amply clear that there is no reservation made for
women belonging to non-reserved category. The reservation contemplated under the said clause is to provide reservation for women. It is not
limited or confined to reservation made in favour of women belonging to non-reserved category only. Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 44
which provides for reservation to women belonging to reserved category and for women in general, cannot be understood as providing special
reservation only to women belonging to general category i.e., non-reserved category; and as such, the women belonging to reserved category
cannot contest to the Office of Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha when it is notified that the Office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha is reserved for
women (general). No doubt, as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, there is no provision similar to the one provided u/s 5 which
enables the persons belonging to reserved categories to contest in respect of the seats left open to general category. From that itself, it is not
possible to draw an inference that in respect of the Offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha, women belonging to reserved categories are
prevented from contesting to the seats set apart for women belonging to general category. The language employed in clause (c) insofar as
reservation made for women is concerned, states that not less than one-third of the non-reserved seats of Adhyakshas and Upadhyakshas of
Grama Panchayats in the state shall be reserved for women. As noticed by me earlier, the language employed in clause (c) of sub-section (2) of
Section 44 does not state that one-third of reservation is made to women belonging to the categories other than Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes and Backward Classes. The language used is ""for women"". The words ""for women"", in my considered view, include women belonging to all
categories of persons including Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes. Therefore, from the plain reading of clause (c) of
sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Act, in respect of one-third of the seats reserved for women, all women irrespective of the category to which
they belong, whether any reservation has been made in their favour or not, are entitled to contest to the Offices of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha.
Further, even if the language employed in clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Act is not very clear and having regard to the
object of the Act and the constitutional scheme, it is not possible to place the interpretation as suggested by the learned Counsel appearing for the
petitioners. It is because, while reservations are provided for the election to the membership of the Panchayat, the same principles should normally
be made applicable to election to the Office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha unless such an inference is made not permissible by reading the
provisions of the Act.
The preamble to the Constitution guarantees to all its citizens, justice - social, economic and political; and equality of status; opportunity, and
dignity of the individual. Justice, in the sphere of social status, economic and political, cannot be guaranteed or ensured to its citizens in a country
on account of social, cultural, historical and various other factors, inequality in all spheres of life, is writ large, unless political power is conferred at
least for some time on such weaker sections of the society, who did not have the opportunity of occupying position in political activities of the
country. Therefore, an amendment was made to the Constitution by means of Seventy-third Amendment providing for reservation in election to the
office of the Membership and Chairperson of the Panchayats and Municipalities. It cannot be disputed that the whole object of the Constitutional
Amendment made by means of the Seventy-third Amendment by incorporating Parts IX and IX-A of the Constitution is to empower political
power on those sections of the society who are denied of an opportunity to share political power at grass root level of the State Administration i.e.,
at the Local Board level. In the light of the amendment made to the Constitution providing for reservation, as stated above, the Act also has made
provision for reservation. Section 5 of the Act provides for reservation to various categories of persons to the Membership of a Panchayat and
Section 44 of the Act provides for reservation to the Office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of the Panchayat. Article 38 of the Constitution
requires the State to strive for promoting the welfare of the people by securing and promoting effectively as it may, a social order in which justice
social, economic and political is provided. Clause (2) of Article 38 inserted by means of Forty-fourth Amendment made in 1978 further requires a
State to strive to minimise inequalities among other things in status, facilities and opportunities among various groups of people. Article 40 of the
Constitution requires the State to take steps to organise Village Panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary
to enable them to function as units of self-Government. Article 46 of the Constitution mandates the State to promote with special care the
educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to
protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. In a country managed by democratic Government and where there are inequalities
in social status, economic condition and lack of opportunities for employment at all -levels, it is needless to state that empowerment of weaker
section of society with political power would go a long way to improve overall development of certain sections of the people who have been
placed in a disadvantageous position all these years on account of various factors. Therefore, if the object of the reservation made in the Act is
understood in the backdrop of the preamble given to the Constitution and amendments made to the Constitution by means of Seventy-third
Amendment, referred to earlier, and the provisions contained in the Directive Principles of State Policies, I am of the view that there is no escape
for me to take a view other than the one holding that the persons belonging to reserved categories i.e., Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
Backward Classes and women (general) are entitled to contest to the Office of Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha in respect of the general seats. It is
also necessary to point out that if the argument of Sri Gangi Reddy so attractively advanced is accepted, it would lead to a situation that even in
respect of seats left to be filled up by non-reserved categories, women and other reserved categories will not be entitled to contest. That cannot be
the object of reservation provided u/s 44 of the Act. The object is to provide the minimum guarantee to the reserved sections of the society. It
cannot be understood as taking away the benefit provided in a legislation. If one-third of the seats are reserved for women for the post of
Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha, it means that all women irrespective of the category to which they belong, are entitled to contest for the Office of
Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha. However, if the interpretation suggested by Sri G. Gangi Reddy is accepted, the persons belonging to the reserved
category though they have the support of the majority of the members of the Panchayat to get them elected as Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha of the
Panchayat, they will be deprived of the opportunity and they will have to be satisfied with the minimum guarantee provided to them. I am of the
view that if such an interpretation is placed, it would do greater harm and injustice to the weaker sections of the society for whose benefit
reservations have been provided both under the scheme of the constitutional provisions and under the Act. Further, there cannot be any doubt that
the provisions contained in the Act which provide for reservations, are the provisions intended to benefit the weaker sections of the society. Under
these circumstances, the Court while interpreting the said provisions, must keep in mind the object of the provisions of the law and the purpose for
which such a provision has been made. The observation made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Kasambhai, supra, at paragraphs 14,
16 and 17 of the judgment strongly relied upon by Sri Puttegowda, supports the view I have taken above. It is useful to extract the observations
made in paragraphs 14, 16 and 17, which read as hereunder:
The idea of providing reservation for the benefit of the weaker sections of the society is not only to ensure their participation in the conduct of
the affairs of the municipality but it is also an effort to improve their lot. The reservation ensures that the specified minimum number of persons
belonging to that category become members of the municipality. If because of their popularity a larger number of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes, Backward Classes or women get elected to the municipality than the number of reserved seats that would be welcome. When the idea is to
promote the weaker sections of the society, and to improve their lot, it would be a contradiction in terms if members belonging to that section are
debarred from standing to the office of the President because such a candidate is popular enough to get elected from a general constituency. It is a
fundamental principle of democratic election that a person who is more popular is elected, popularity being measured by the number of votes
which the person gets. The language of various legal provisions do not in any suggest, expressly or by necessary implication, that even though a
person who belongs to a reserved category and is popular enough to get elected from a general constitutency should be barred from contesting the
election of the President when that office is to be filled only a reserved category person.
Neither the provisions of Article 243T nor of Section 10(5) of the Haryana Act seem to suggest to us that Rule 70(4), which provides that
offices of the President of Municipalities must go on rotation to members belonging to to specified categories, must necessarily mean ""that the
elected members concerned of the municipal committee must have got elected to the seats available to general category candidates or Scheduled
Castes category candidate or Backward Classes category candidate or general women category candidates by rotation. ""There seems to be no
warrant for such compartmentalisation and nor do the words of the Act or the Rules indicate that the concept of rotation presupposes that for the
contest of President it is to be from amongst the members elected from a particular category from the seats reserved for that category. This
inference which is sought to be drawn does not flow from the plain language of Article 243T or from the provisions of the Act or the Rules framed
thereunder and it also does not promote the object of reservation. The legal provisions provide that office of the President of the municipality
should go by rotation to members belonging to specific category and no more. These provisions do not provide that those members, though falling
in the category of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes or women must be only those who have been elected from the seats
reserved for that category of persons. Reservation is with reference to the category/caste to which the person belongs and not the nature of
constituency from which he/she was elected.
The Act and the Rules provide for reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes and women. No reservation or
classification is made ward wise. To put it differently all members of the Scheduled Castes, for example, will be regarded as belonging to one class
irrespective of the fact whether they had been elected to a reserved seat or to a general seat. Similar is the position with regard to the backward
classes, Scheduled Tribes and women. The law does not contemplate or provide for any further sub-classification of the type which has been
suggested by the respondents. Just as all members of the municipality, irrespective of the fact whether they had been elected to a reserved seat or
not, are eligible for election to the post of the President when it falls in the general category, similarly when as per the roster the President is to be
one who, say, belongs to the category of Scheduled Caste then all members of the municipality who are Scheduled Caste, irrespective of the seat
to which they had been elected, would be eligible to stand for election. Neither the Act nor the rules stipulate that it is only such a member who has
been elected to the reserved seat who would be eligible to stand for election to the post of President when it is the turn of that category of
candidate to become the President of the municipality"".
Insofar as the decision of this Court in the case of Dasappa, supra, relied upon by Sri G. Gangi Reddy is concerned, I am of the view that the
said decision has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case, the question that came up for consideration was as to whether in
respect of the Office reserved to a person belonging to a Backward Class, a person belonging to Scheduled Caste can contest? Since the
reservation to the Office of Adhyaksha was made to a person belonging to Backward Class, this Court took the view that a person belonging to
Scheduled Caste cannot contest to the said post. That is not the situation in the present case. Therefore, the said decision is of no assistance to the
petitioners.
Insofar as the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that since the Government Circular specifies that the Office of Adhyaksha is
reserved for women (general), the women, who are belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes, are not entitled to
contest, is concerned, it is necessary to point out that the Circular cannot go beyond the provisions of Section 44 of the Act. Reservation is
required to be made for women in terms of clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Act. The words (general woman) employed in
Circular Annexure-C must be understood, in the background of the reservation made for women who are Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes
and Backward Classes. The Circular cannot be understood as meaning that reservation has been made to the Office of Adhyaksha in Annexure-C
in favour of such of those women who are not Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes in whose favour reservation has been
made under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 44 of the Act. If such an interpretation is placed as contended by the learned Counsel for the
petitioners, in my view, the Circular, to that extent, requires to be declared as illegal and void as being contrary to clause (c) of sub-section (2) of
Section 44 of the Act. When a rule or a Circular runs counter to the provisions of an enactment, the Court, instead of striking down the rule or the
Circular, will have to interpret such a Circular or rule as giving full meaning to the provisions of the enactment and to make the Circular/rule valid if
it is possible to do so while placing such an interpretation. Therefore, I am of the view that the reservation made in Circular Annexure-C to the
Office of Adhyaksha in the Panchayat relates to women as a whole. Therefore, I am unable to accede to the submission of Sri G. Gangi Reddy
that in Circular Annexure-C, a categorisation has been made reserving the Office of Adhyaksha to women who are not Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes and as such, the persons belonging to such categories are not entitled to contest in the election to the
Office of Adhyaksha in the Karekallu Grama Panchayat.
Since it is brought to my notice that the election to the Office of Adhyaksha has not yet been held, I am of the view that it is necessary to direct
respondents 1 and 2 to proceed to hold election to the Office of Adhyaksha of the Karekallu Grama Panchayat in accordance with law.
In the light of the discussion made above, I make the following:
ORDER
(i) These petitions are dismissed. Rule is discharged.
(ii) Respondents 1 and 2 are directed to proceed to hold election to the Office of Adhyaksha of the Karekallu Grama Panchayat in accordance
with law, as expeditiously as possible and at any event of the matter, not later than four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
(iii) However, no order is made as to costs.