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13 paragraphs · 1,101 wordsM.R. Sharma, J.—One Indu was the tenant of the premises in dispute under the Respondents He died in 1969 leaving behind his son Ram Kishan and Mangli Petitioner-his widow. The Respondents filed on application for adjectment against Ram Kishan on the ground that he being the son of the statutory tenant was not entitled to inherit the tenancy right- left by Indu. This suit was decreed.
Mangli Petitioner has now filed a suit for permanent injunction against the Respondents on the ground that she being the widow of Indu was entitled to remain in possession of the premises in dispute under the provisions of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 19/3 (hereinafter called the Act). She applied for an ad interim injudction(sic) which was declined to her by both the learned Courts below. In this petition, it has been argued before me that u/s 2 (h) of the Act the word "tenant" has been given an enlarged definition and Section 24 of the Act gives protection of the earlier law to the proceedings which are already pending at the original stage or at the appellate stage. Since the Petitioner was not a party to any proceedings which might have been instituted prior to the coming into force of the Act, she could not be ejected from the premises in dispute save in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
On behalf of the Respondents, it has been urged that the provisions of the Act do not have retrospective operation and it has been so held in a large number of cases decided by this Court. Reference in this connection is made to Civil Revision No. 1258 of 1974, Parma Nand and Ors. v. Manohar Lai C. R No. 1258 of 1974, decided by P. S. Pattar, J. On November 7, 1974. In that case a regular suit for possession of the premises in dispute had been filed against the heirs of the statutory tenant prior to the coming into force of the Act. The learned Judge held that the suit was cognizable by a Civil Court because Section 24 of the Act had conferred a vested right on the Plaintiffs in that case
The second case relied upon on behalf of the Respondents is Dev Raj Bawa v. Om Parkash Gupta (1974) 77 P Lk 648, decided by Muni Lal Verma, J. The facts of this case are also distinguishable. The landlord had filed a suit for possession of the shop in dispute against the heirs of the statutory tenant and for mesne profits on the ground that after the death of the statutory tenant the heirs were only trespassers The learned Judge held that the rights of the landlord were protected u/s 24 of the Act.
The third case relied upon by the Learned Counsel for the Respondents is S. A. O. No. 8 of 1975, Bhim etc. v. Murti Sat Narain Bhagwan SAO No. 8 of 1975, decided by me on September 15, 1975. The facts of this case are also distinguishable. A civil suit was already pending when the Act came into force end (he Respondent claimed that because of the enlargement of the definition of the word " tenant" the civil suit could not proceed. I rejected this contention by following the above two cases decided by P. S. Pattar, J and Muni Lal Verma, J. respectively.
Since the Petitioner was not a party to any proceedings instituted by the landlord which were pending at the time of the coming into force of the Act, she would prima facie have to be regarded as a tenant because she is one of the relations of Indu deceased which were mentioned in the Schedule to the Act. The suit filed by her, if otherwise proper, would have to proceed for the simple reason that no proceedings were pending against her at the time when the Act came into force. Section 21 only affords protection to the landlords in case of proceedings which were instituted by them prior to the enforcement of the Act. This section reads as under ;-
Section 24. Repeal and Savings:
The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1959 (East Punjab Act No. 3 of 1949) is hereby repealed.
Provided that such repeal shall not affect any proceedings pending or order passed immediately before the commencement of this Act which shall be continued and disposed of or enforced as if the said Act had not been repealed.
Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the Act so repealed (including any rule, notification or order made) which is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act as if this Act was in force at the time such thing was done or action was taken, and shall continue to be in force, unless and until superseded by anything done or any action taken under this Act
When the proviso has to be literally interpreted, it shows that where a landlord had instituted proceedings under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1959, they would continue to be governed by that Act in spite of its repeal. The words "anything done or action taken " appearing in the proviso show that only the rights contested in the suit or proceedings instituted earlier would be governed by the old law For instance, if a tenant had filed an action for claiming amenities attached to the tenancy, the landlord could not turn round and say that he be allowed to file a civil suit to eject the tenant because the old law had been repealed during the pendency of the proceedings instituted by the tenant. The reason is simple. A step taken by a tenant to forestall the wrongful action of the landlord does not ipso facto vest the latter with the right to eject him.
For the rersons mentioned above, I am prima facie of the view that balance of convenience lies in favour of the Petitioner and she is entitled to have interim injunction during the pendency of the suit filed by her. I, therefore, set aside the orders passed by the learned Courts below and grant a temporary injunction in favour of the Petitioner to the effect that she will rot be dispossessed save in accordance with law during the pendency of the suit filed by her.
Nothing said herein shall be taken to have finally decided the rights of the parties by the learned Courts below. No costs.
