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Judgment
Varadarajan, J.—This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order of
the Labour Court, Madras, passed in C.P. No. 517 of 1976, dismissing that petition which had been filed for computing tie reliefs claimed in that
petition at Rs. 6,653 on the ground that the writ Petitioner is not a workman as per the definition contained in Section 2(s) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, but the Petitioner is only a teacher and not an employee in any industry.
The Petitioner''s case is that she has been employed as a workman-teacher in the service of the second Respondent, the Western India Match
Company Limited, Thiruvottiyur, Madras-19, having been appointed by the factory manager of the second Respondent. She has been given all the
benefits and privileges which have been enjoyed by the other workman ever since her appointment in 1946. Though the second Respondent
receives grant from the Government for making payment to the teacher-workman employed in its school, they are paid according to the sale of the
second Respondent, which is different from the scale of pay of teachers employed in private management schools and Government Schools. She is
the last ore in the category of the teacher-workman in the service of the second Respondent. Now the other teachers working in the Wimco
School are being paid only the actual amount drawn as their salary from the Government. The Petitioner has been paid bonus ever since the date of
her employment like any other workman of the second Respondent till 1974, while the other teachers working along with her in the same school
were, not paid any bonus. She is also a member of the Wimco Employees Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society Limited. As per the bye-law of
the said society only the workmen can become the members of that Society. In her capacity as a member of that Society she has taken loans from
the Society recoverable from her salary by the second Respondent as in the case of other workman. She is a shareholder of the Wimco Workers''
Co-operative Stores (Regd.) and, as such, she has purchased stores from the co-operative stores in accordance with the order of appointment
dated 19th June, 1946, which specifically states that she is allowed to purchase provisions at pre-war prices as allowed to the other employees of
the factory. She is also a member of the Wimco Factory Workers'' Union, which has been duly recognized by the second Respondent. As a
workman, she has been allotted Quarters No. 516 by the second Respondent. The school in which she is employed is being run only for the
benefit of the children of the workmen of the second Respondent and for no others. As a workman of the second Respondent she has been
directed to act as the Women Checker at the main gate to check the women workers when they go home and she had acted in such capacity on
many occasions and no special allowance was given to her for that item of work done by her now and then. She filed a claim petition No. 517 of
1976 against the second Respondent before the first Respondent u/s 33-C(2) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, for computation of certain
benefits due to her from the second Respondent. The benefits claimed by her included bonus, difference in the scale of pay, annual increment,
merger of special dearness allowance with basic pay, and increased dearness allowance commonly called as Bombay Allowance. That petition
was dismissed on 30th March, 1978 holding that she is not a workman as per the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act. This petition has
therefore teen filed for quashing the said order.
In the counter-affidavit of the Regional Manager of the second Respondent company filed against this petition it is contended that the Petitioner
is an employee of the Wimco Elementary School an educational institution run for the benefit of the children of the locality in general and of the
employees in particular, The school is a separate institution having nothing to do with the management of the factory. The school is a recognized
private school under the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools Act, 1973. The administration and running of the school are vested with a
Committee called Wimco Elementary School Committee which has been constituted under the provisions of that Act. The Petitioner is employed
as a teacher in that school and her salary is paid by the said school and she is in no manner connected with the management of the factory. The
school is not an industry as contemplated by Industrial Disputes Act, since it does not carry on any commercial activities akin to an industry. The
Petitioner being a teacher could not in any sense be a workman. If the Petitioner had any grievance, she would have to take recourse under the
provision of the aforesaid Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools Act, 1973. She is not entitled to move the Labour Court u/s 33-C(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Under the provisions of Section 23 of that act of 1973 the remedy of the Petitioner is only to move the authorities
constituted under the act if her rights had been violated. The allegation that the Petitioner was being given all the privileges and bonus which were
being given to the workmen of the management is denied. The Petitioner is being paid by the school whatever is legally due to her. She was being
paid only ex-gratia amounts at the discretion of the management and not any bonus as per the Payment of bonus Act, 1972. The Petitioner''s
membership in the Wimco Employees Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society Limited has nothing to do with the Management of the factory and
cannot be binding on the Management. The fact that the Petitioner is a member of the Wimco Factory Workerss Union also is irrelevant, as the
membership of that Union is not controlled by the Management. The management is not bound to run any school by any statutory provisions. The
Petitioner has not established that the work of checking women employees was entrusted to her as part of her duty as a teacher in the school. The
Petitioner is not entitled to the various benefits claimed in the petition.
The Petitioner has filed a reply affidavit contending that the Wimco School is a limb of the company and not a separate institution by itself
having, nothing to do with the factory. She has reiterated her contentions urged in the main affidavit that she is a workman under the second
Respondent.
The Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Madras the first Respondent, found that the Petitioner is not a workman as per Section 2(s) of the
Industrial Disputes act and that the petition filed u/s 33-C(2) of that act is, therefore, not maintainable and he accordingly dismissed the petition as
not maintainable is law and directed the parties to bear their respective costs.
The only point arising for consideration is whether the Petitioner is a workman as per Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
According to that section:
(s) ""Workman"" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical
or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this act
in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a
consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person:
(i) who is subject to the Army Act, 1950, or the Air Force act, 1950, or the Navy (Discipline) act, 1934 ; or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison ; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity ; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensm or exercises, either by the nature of
the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.
The Petitioner has been appointed as an Assistant Mistress in the second Respondent''s school on a salary of Rs. 28/-. per mensem on three
months probation by the order exhibit P-1, dated 19th June, 1946 signed by the Madras Factory Manager. According to that order the Petitioner
is allowed to purchase provision and stores at pre-war prices as allowed to other employees and it is stated in that order that if her services are
found to be unsatisfactory during the probationary period, her services will be terminated without any notice. The school, which is being run by the
second Respondent-factory has come to be recognized by the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools Act, 1973 and is managed by a Managing
Committee as per the provisions of the act. It is represented that the Petitioner is a member of that Committee and that the control of the school is
by the Managing Committee and not by the factory. It is also represented that the Government of Tamil Nadu gives a grant for paying the salary to
the teachers employed in that school. Though it has been contended in the counter affidavit that the school is run by the company for the benefit of
the children of the public pf the area in general and of the employees of the second Respondent''s factory in particular, it is admitted before me that
the pupils of the school are only children of the workman employed in the factory and that the children of persons who are not employed in the
factory are not admitted in the school. The school is run exclusively for the benefit of the children of the employees of the factory. Though the
school is now governed by the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools, Act, 1973, it has been admitted by the learned Counsel for the second
Respondent that the Petitioner, who had been appointed as an Assistant Mistress under exhibit P-1, dated 19th June 1946 has not ceased to be an
employee of the factory. Therefore, I find that the Petitioner is an employee of the second Respondent factory.
It was contended on behalf of the second Respondent that though the Petitioner may be held to be an employee of the second Respondent-
factory, she is not a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes act. Under By-law 5 (1-A) of the Western India Match
Factory Employee''s Co-operative Thirft & Credit Society Limited, the Petitioner is entitled to the benefits of purchasing goods in the Co-
operative Society of the second-Respondent''s factory. It is seen from that By-law that only employees of the Western India Match Factory would
become eligible to the membership in the said Co-operative Society. There is no dispute that the Petitioner was receiving bonus from the second
Respondent''s factory until the year 1974. It has only been contended that it was an exgratia payment. The Petitioner had been asked on some
occasions to perform the duty of checking women workers going out of the factory, which is seen from exhibit P-2 and P-4 exhibit P-2 is the
factory''s letter, dated 21st May, 1954 requesting the Petitioner to be at the factory at 11-45 a.m. and at 4-45 p.m. to check the female workers
as usual while going out of the factory on working days on the ground that the Nurse and Midwife were on sick leave. It is no doubt stated in that
letter that it was only a temporary arrangement. In exhibit P-4, dated 22nd May, 1969 the Petitioner has been requested to come to the main gate
of the factory to search the women workers on that day at 12 Noon and 5 p.m. It is common ground that the Petitioner was not paid any special
allowance for doing this work in addition to her usual work as a teacher in the school.
The learned Counsel for the second Respondent submitted that the school is not an industry, that the Petitioner is not an employee of the
factory, that even, if the school is an industry, the teacher is not a workman as per Section 2(s) of the Act, that the fact that she had been asked on
some occasions to do the work of checking the women employees of the factory while going out of the factory will not make her a workman as
per that section and that at per Section 23 of the act of 1973 the Petitioner has to seek her remedies only if the forum prescribed by that act. It has
already been found that the Petitioner, who has been appointed as an Assistant Mistress by the factory under exhibit P-1 had not ceased to be
employee of that factory, though the school has come to be managed as per the provisions of the said act of 1973. Mr. J. Samuel, the learned
Counsel for the Petitioner relied strongly upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A.
Rajappa and Others, , where it has been observed in paragraph 77 that monetary consideration for service is not an essential characteristic of
industry in a modern State. Therefore, the fact that the factory does not derive any profit by running the school for the benefit of its employees will
not make the school run by it anything other than an industry. In paragraph 83 of that judgment it has been observed as follows:
If education and training are integral to industrial and agricultural activities, such services are part of industry even if high browism may be unhappy
to acknowledge it. It is a class-conscious, in egalitarian outlook with an elitist aloofness which makes some people shrink from accepting
educational institutions, vocational or other, as industries. The definition is wide, embraces training for industry which, in turn, ensconces all
processes of producing goods and services by employer-employee co-operation. Education is the nidus of industrialization and itself is industry.
On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the second Respondent relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in J.K. Cotton Spinning and
Weaving Mills Co., Ltd. Vs. Badri Mali and Others, . In that decision a teacher employed in a primary school run by a factory had been held to be
not a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes act. But this decision has been specifically overruled by the later decision of the
Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa and Others, . Though this decision has been overruled by the
Supreme Court on 21st February, 1978 itself, the learned presiding Officer of the Labour Court Madurai had relied upon this decision in his order
dated 30th March, 1978. The learned Presiding Officer of the Labour Court has also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in University
of Delhi and Another Vs. Ram Nath, . That decision also has been specifically over ruled by the Supreme Court in the said decision in Bangalore
Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa and Others, . No doubt, the second Respondent is not running the school for the benefit of its
employees under any statutory provision compelling the same, unlike the provision for running a canteen for the benefit of the employee of the
factory. In J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co., Ltd. Vs. Badri Mali and Others, the Supreme Court has held that a gardener employed
to attend to the maintenance of a garden in the officer''s quarters in a factory is a workman. The garden it being maintained by the factory in the
interests of the health of the workmen and other employees working in that factory. Similarly the school run for the benefit of the children of the
employees is in the interest of the employees, and the teachers employed in that school have to be held to be workman within the meaning of
Section 2(s) of the Act. Section 23(b) of the Tamil Nadu Recognized Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973, relied upon by the learned Counsel
for the second Respondent does not help the second Respondent. Section 23(b) lays down:
Section 23--
Any teacher or other person employed in any private school--
(b) whose pay or allowances or any of whose conditions of service are altered or interpreted to his disadvantages, by any order, may prefer an
appeal against such order to such authority or officer as may be prescribed; and different such authorities or officer as may be prescribed for
different classes of Private schools.
Section act 14 of that Act provides for an appeal against the orders of the competent authority and Section 45 provides for revision by the
Government of any order passed by the appellate authority u/s 41 of the act. Section 23(b) of the act is not attracted in the present case, for no
condition of service is alleged to have been altered or interpreted to the disadvantage of the Petitioner by any order passed by the second
Respondent-factory. In these circumstances following the decision of the Supreme Court in J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co., Ltd. Vs.
Badri Mali and Others, and Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. A. Rajappa and Others, and having regard to the various facts
mentioned above, I hold that the Petitioner is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the act and allow the writ Petition with costs.