Smt Nirmala Agrawal and Ram Kumar Netam vs State of Chhattisgarh

Hon''ble Mr. T.P. Sharma, J.—Since Cr. M.P. No. 173/2006 and Cr. M.P. No. 410/2007 are involved common question, they are being disposed of by this common order. Cr. M.P. No. 173/2006 filed on behalf of petitioner Smt. Nirmala Agrawal & Cr. M.P. No. 410/2007 filed on behalf of petitioner Ram Kumar Netam for not taking any coercive step amounting to harassment on the basis of First Information Report registered in Crime No. 21/2006 by Anti-Corruption Bureau & Economic Offences Bureau, Raipur for the offence punishable under Sections 420, 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(1)d, 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Shri Chandresh Shrivastava, Advocate for the petitioners and Shri Arvind Shukla, P.L. for the State/respondent are heard.

Copy of First Information Report, copy of other documents relating to Revenue proceedings and copy of Power of Attorney perused.

As per copy of First Information Report, one Ashalata @ Asharani resident of Pensal Bidha, United State of America had executed limited Power of Attorney in favour of present petitioner on 28/8/2003 for selling the agricultural land bearing Khasra Nos. 59/1 & 262/5, situated at Pulgaon, District Durg. As per provisions of law, Power of Attorney executed it abroad has required to produce before the Collector of Stamp within 3 months before use in terms of Article 48 read with Section 23 of the Stamps Act, it further requires Stamp Duty with a view to commit aforesaid offence in connivance with Petitioner Ram Kumar Netam Sub-Registrar & present petitioner Smt. Nirmala Agrawal had not produced limited Power of Attorney before the Collector of Stamp for payment of proper Stamp Duty of Rs. 6,08,115/- and had executed sale deed on the basis of aforesaid documents in connivance with the petitioner Ram Kumar Netam.

Learned counsel for the petitioners Shri Chandresh Shrivastava submits that present petitioner Smt. Nirmala Agrawal has not committed any offence punishable under Sections 13(1)d, 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 even she is private person and legally it would not be possible to commit such offence which could be committed by only Public Servant.

Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that even otherwise Government is required to recover deficit Stamp Duty, non-payment of such Duty is not an offence.

On the other hand, learned P.L. for the State/respondent opposed the petitions and submits that on the basis of prima-facie material for commission of cognizable offence, First Information Report has been registered against present petitioners i.e. Smt. Nirmala Agrawal & Ram Kumar Netam. Present petitioners are liable for commission of offence of conspiracy in terms of Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code and by registering offence, Registering Authority has not committed any illegality. Investigating Officer has not filed any charge sheet against the petitioners therefore, petition is liable to be dismissed and even otherwise petition is premature.

Scope of Section 482 of the Code is very limited. In all cases of illegality or irregularity High Court is not required to exercise its inherent jurisdiction. It should be used sparingly in an exceptional circumstances, while dealing with exercise of power u/s 482 of the Code in the matter of State of Punjab v. Kasturi Lal the Supreme Court has held thus:-

Exercise of power u/s 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.

In case of petition for quashment of First Information Report or any relief relating to First Information Report interference at the threshold with the First Information Report is to be in very exceptional circumstances and First Information Report can be quashed only where the First Information Report does not disclose commission of an offence without anything being added or subtracted from the recitals of First Information Report.

While dealing with the question of putting any rider upon any inquiry on the basis of First Information Report in case of State of Maharashtra v. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri in which Supreme Court has held that Court would not embark upon any inquiry in a case where the First Information Report discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, to find whether some person was actually involved in that case or not. This is the function purely entrusted to the Investigating Officer of Police and the Court will not assume the jurisdiction of the Investigating Officer to arrive at a conclusive and to give a finding which normally a Police Officer is supposed to give in terms of Section 169 of the Code of Criminal Procedure even as held in case of Manohar M. Galani v. Ashok N. Advani, Supreme Court that quashement of First Information Report and investigation after elaborate discussion of the merits of the case is not proper and pre-judging the prosecution case by examining its weakness and contradictions is not permissible for quashing the First Information Report.

While dealing with the stage of quashing the First Information Report in case of State of W.B. v. Narayan K. Patodia in which Supreme Court has held that High Court cannot quash the First Information Report when the Police is not commenced the investigation and no proceeding at all is pending in any Court in pursuance of First Information Report and First Information Report should be quashed only in rarest of rare case where a prima-facie case is disclosed in First Information Report then there is no question of quashing the same. In the present case, First Information Report clearly discloses the commission of offence punishable under Sections 420, 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 13(1)d, 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 by present petitioner Smt. Nirmala Agrawal in connivance and conspiracy with petitioner Ram Kumar Netam, Public Servant, I do not find any case for quashment of First Information Report or putting any rider in the proceedings initiated on the basis of First Information Report. Consequently, petitions (Cr. M.P. Nos. 173/2006 & 410/2007) are liable to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed.