Smt. Pinky vs Bimal Kumar and Others

N.K. Kapoor, J.—This is tenant''s revision petition against the order of appellate authority dated 8.2.1995 whereby the appeal filed by the landlady has been accepted thus ordering eviction of the petitioner from the premises in his occupation. Smt. Sushma Rani, now represented by the respondents, filed an application u/s 13 of the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act seeking eviction of the petitioner on the ground of non-payment of rent and bonafide necessity for herself and for her two married sons. This claim was resisted by the petitioner- tenant firstly on the ground as to the rate of rent and secondly that the plea raised by the landlady that she needs the accommodation is mala fide. On the pleadings of parties a number of issues were framed relating to the relationship of landlord and tenant, rate of rent and whether the petitioner required the premises in dispute for her bona fide personal necessity.

Since there was no written note with regard to the terms of tenancy, oral evidence was led with regard to the rate of rent and the period of default. Rent Controller on the basis of evidence found substance in the plea of the petitioner that the rate of rent of premises in dispute is Rs. 100/- per month instead of Rs. 450/- per month as claimed by the respondent-Smt. Sushma Rani. However, with regard to the period of which default has been committed, the version of the landlady was accepted. The Rent Controller also came to the conclusion that premises is not required for the personal necessity either for herself or for her two sons. Resultantly, the application was dismissed. Two separate appeals were filed, one by Smt. Sushma Rani and the other by the petitioner. Smt. Sushma Rani challenged the order of eviction whereas the tenant challenged the order of the Rent Controller wherein she was held to be the tenant of Smt. Sushma Rani. Initially both these appeals were heard by Shri S.S. Tiwana, the then learned-appellate authority and order of eviction was passed on 24.8.1991. An objection was raised that since Smt. Sushma Rani has expired, without impleading the legal representative of the deceased-Smt. Sushma Rani such an order cannot be passed. This objection was brushed aside and the order was passed on 24.8.1991. A revision was filed before this Court and was disposed of with a direction to the appellate authority that same be decided afresh after impleading the legal representatives of Smt. Sushma Rani. The matter was once again examined by the appellate authority. The appellate authority after carefully considering the matter came to the conclusion that petitioner-the tenant''s revision petition is devoid of any merit. It was held that the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that the relationship of tenant and landlord exists between the parties. Reliance was placed upon the statement of Smt. Sushma Rani as well as to the statement of Narinder Kumar, her real brother, who concurred with the version of his sister. Thus, the finding of the Rent Controller that relationship of tenant and landlord exists between the parties was affirmed. Examining the other findings of the Rent Controller with regard to the rate of rent, the appellate authority agreed with the findings of the Rent Controller and for its reason also i.e. that in view of year poor financial position of the tenant, it was not believable that he agreed to pay the rent at the rate of Rs. 450/- per month as claimed by the landlady. However, examining the evidence with regard to the bonafide requirement of the landlady, the appellate authority reversed the findings of the trial Court and came to a firm conclusion that landlady (since dead) required the premises bona-fidely for herself as well as for the use of her married sons. It was also held that the landlady and her sons did not possess any residential house in the area of municipal limits of Ludhiana nor they had vacated any such house. As per evidence, they were living in the house of her brother as licencees, which accommodation was not sufficient for their residence.

The primary challenge by the present petitioner is to this later finding of the appellate authority wherein it has been held that Smt. Sushma Rani bona-fidely required the premises for her occupation and for her two married sons. Assailing the correctness of the findings recorded by the appellate authority, the learned counsel for the petitioner, firstly dwelt upon the averments made in the application, reply filed by the petitioner-the tenant and the evidenceied by the parties in support of their respective contentions. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, it was the case of the respondent that earlier the property in dispute was owned by her mother and on her death the same was inherited by her alongwith other class one heirs. Thus, at best she was a co-sharer and in the absence of any relinquishment deed, there was no basis for the authorities to come to the conclusion that she had become the full owner of the property and had right to seek eviction of the petitioner. Averment that other heirs had relinquished their right in the property could hardly be construed as a proof of relinquishment of rights of the other owners. In the alternative even if it be taken that there was relinquishment in favour of Smt. Sushma Rani by the other owners yet there was no good ground for both the authorities to arrive at a conclusion that she was the landlady of the premises in dispute as admittedly the same was let out to the petitioner by her brother Narinder Kumar. I find no substance in both these please. As has come in evidence that Smt. Sushma''s brother Narinder Kumar let out the premises to the petitioner on her behalf which fact is also admitted by the petitioner. Similarly, there is no substance in the petitioner''s contention that in the absence of any relinquishment deed Smt. Sushma Rani could not maintain the eviction application. It is well settled position in law that even one of the co-owners can file an eviction application and in the present case, both the authorities on the basis of evidence have come to the con- l elusion that Smt. Sushma Rani was the landlady of the petitioner.

It has next been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on account of death of Smt. Sushma Rani, the petitioner''s eviction could not be ordered on account of alleged bona-fide requirement of the landlady. According to the counsel, such a ground was a more available and in any case eviction on the ground of requirement for his or her own occupation (under Section 13.3(a)(i) and for residence of his or her son who is married (as per Section 13.3.(iv)(a) & (b) are different and separate in its ambit. In the instant case, Smt. Sushma Rani sought eviction on the ground of personal bona fide requirement which ground ceased to exist on account of her death and so the order of the appellate authority is liable to be reversed. I find that objection also to be without any merit. In the present case the eviction was sought on the ground of personal necessity wherein specific mention has been made that she requires the premises for the personal necessity of his sons as she and her married sons infact had been living with her brother. This precise point was considered by the appellate authority, who after examining the evidence led came to the conclusion that neither Smt. Sushma Rani nor her married sons owned or possessed any other house within the municipal limits of Ludhiana. Their present occupation was as that of a licencee who could be ordered to be evicted at any time. On this premise, it was held that even on the death of Smt. Sushma Rani, both the married sons (now legal representatives) require the premises bona fide for their occupation. Somewhat similar point came up for consideration before the apex Court in Shantilal Thakordas and Others Vs. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala, i.e. as to whether in case of an eviction suit on the ground that the landlord requires the premises as a residence for himself and for member of his family, after the death of the landlord right to sue survive to the members of the deceased-landlord''s family. The apex Court differing with its earlier view in Phul Rani and Others Vs. Sh. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia, held that on the death of original landlord the senior member of his family takes his place and is well competent to continue the suit for eviction for his occupation and the occupation of the other members of the family. In the present case, even initially Smt. Sushma Rani filed the eviction application on the ground that she requires the same for herself and for her married sons. Thus, the eviction of the petitioner was sought on account of need of accommodation for her married sons also. Thus, there was no ambiguity in the pleadings of the respondents seeking eviction of the petitioner on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. Whether it is a case of bona fide need or is a mere desire is another point which has been highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. According to the learned counsel, it is a mere case of wish or desire and has no element of need. This plea is also without any basis. There is no denial to the emphatic assertion of the respondents that they are presently residing with their maternal uncle and have no other residential accommodation within the bounds of Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana. The respondents are also not owners of any other residential accommodation within the, Ludhiana township. Thus, the element of need is clearly present in the present case. Present case is not a case of mere desire. The appellate authority after carefully examining the evidence led by the parties has come to this conclusion. I find no ground to interfere with this well considered finding of the appellate authority. Resultantly, the present revision petition is devoid of any substance and same is accordingly dismissed. Since two months time granted by the appellate authority to deliver back the vacant possession to the present respondents has almost expired, I grant another two months time to the petitioner to vacate and deliver back the possession to the respondents subject to, however, the petitioner''s paying/depositing all the arrears of rent including the rent for these two months.