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Judgment
61 paragraphs · 1,089 wordsThis second appeal has been preferred under Section 100 of Civil
Procedure Code by the appellants/defendants against the judgement and
decree dated 19.12.2016 passed in civil appeal no. 2700098/2016 by
the Court of Ist Additional District Judge, Katni arising out of Civil
Suit No. 3-A/2014 decided on 26.07.2016 by the Court of IInd Civil
Judge,Class II, Katni.
It is not in dispute that the ancestor of appellant late Kamal was
the tenant of the respondent in suit premises for non-residential
purpose. After his death the appellants became tenants of the suit
premises.
The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit against appellants under
Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(f) of the MP Accommodation Control Act.
The Trial Court decreed the suit, for eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of
the Act and dismissed the suit under Section 12(1)(a) of the MP
Accommodation Control Act. The appellant Court also confirmed the
judgement of Trial Court.
In this case, there is clear and cogent evidence on the side of the
respondent/plaintiff that his bonafide need for disputed premises to
carry business. He has no alternative accommodation for starting his
business. He is the best judge to choose which accommodation is more
appropriate or comfortable to his need. Attempt by the
appellant/defendants to establish otherwise has been found to be totally
unacceptable to the learned Trial Court as well as by the first Appellate
Court. The burden has been successfully discharged by the
respondent/plaintiff by examination of PW-1/Suraj Prasad and PW-2 /
Jwala Prasad.
This Court is not in a position to reverse the finding of facts
recorded by the first appellate Court on the issue of non-existence of
bonafide need of the respondent/plaintiff for the suit premises. In case
of Guruvachan Kaur Vs. Salikram [(2010) 15 SCC 530] , the Hon''ble
Apex Court has held as under -
"It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Proceudre, the High Court in second appeal cannot interfere with finding of fact recorded by first Appellate Court which is final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse."
This Court finds no substantial question involved in this appeal.
However, application of principles settled by High Court or general
principles would not amount to substantial question of law. Unless
finding recorded by trial Court by ignoring evidence on record or
erroneous and perverse as held in the case of Venkatesh Construction
Company Vs. Karnataka Vidyut Kakhar [AIR 2016 SC 553] and
Syeda Rahimunnisa Vs. Malan Bi & Anr. [(2016) 10 SCC 315] which
reads as under-
"to constitute substantial question of law there must be pleading regarding question of law involved in the matter and such legal question should emerge from sustainable findings of fact recorded by courts of fact recorded by courts below. Substantial question of law means question of law having substance, essential, real, of sound worth or considerable. Fairly arguable question of law, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where court thought is necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views then such question would be substantial question of law."
In case of Damodar Lal Vs. Sohan Devi & Ors [(2016) 3 SCC
78), Hon''ble Apex Court has held that the High Court in second appeal
was not justified in upsetting the finding which is a pure question of
fact. The strained effort made by the High Court in second appeal to arrive at
a different finding is wholly unwarranted apart from being impermissible under
law.
In the aforesaid cases, the Hon''ble Apex Court relying on the
principle laid down in case of Kulwant Kaur Vs. Gurdial Singh
Mann [(2001) 4 SCC 262 ] has held as under -
"34.Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second
appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-?-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication -- what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. In this context reference be had to Section 103 of the Code which reads as below: "103. Power of High Court to determine issues of fact - In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,-- (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate court or by both the court of first instance and the lower appellate court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in Section 100 ." The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law."
In the light of the above principles laid down by the Hon''ble
Supreme Court, it is not proper and legally justified to interfere with
the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by learned Trial Court and the
First Appellate Court on a pure question of fact.
Keeping in view the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts
below, which are based on proper appreciation and assessment of
evidence on record, I do not find any substantial question of law arising
for adjudication in the present appeal.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
