Smt. Rani vs State of Karnataka and Others

Anand Byrareddy

Heard the learned counsel for the parties. The facts briefly stated are as follows:

The petitioner claims that her grand mother, Parvathamma, owned lands in Survey No. 60/3 of Nagasetty Halli, Bangalore North Taluk, Bangalore District, measuring 2.02 acres. The petitioner along with others, claims to have succeeded to the estate of her grand mother, on her demise.

It is stated that the Bangalore Development Authority (Hereinafter referred to as ''the BDA'' for brevity) had, through the State Government, sought to acquire large extents of land in Nagasetty Halli and Bhoopsandra for the formation of the II Stage Rajmahal Vilas Extension layout, under the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1982. A Preliminary Notification dated 3-1-1977 was issued in this regard.

It transpires that the State Government had simultaneously issued another notification u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (Hereinafter referred to as '' the LA Act'', for brevity) dated 15-1-1978, seeking to acquire lands in Nagasetty Halli and Bhoopsandra for the benefit of the Karnataka Dairy Development Corporation (KDDC). This was followed by a Declaration u/s 6(1) of the LA Act declaring the Scheme, dated 9-3-1978.

It is stated that the BDA in turn, had got issued a final notification dated 2-8-1978, pursuant to its Preliminary Notification of 3-1-1977.

Thus, the subject matter of two distinct acquisition proceedings overlapped.

The latter notification dated 15-1-1978 was challenged by two housing co-operative societies namely, Shri Vinayaka Housing Society and NTI Housing Society, in writ proceedings before this court in WP 4697 and WP 4495/1978, respectively. Those writ petitions were allowed and the notifications dated 15-1-1978 and 9-3-1978 were quashed. An appeal having been filed against the same in WA 363 and 364/1980, the appeals were dismissed by an Order dated 29-10-1980.

The BDA, on the other hand, had claimed to have taken possession of the lands which were the subject matter of the former notifications, as on 31-5-1983.

The State Government, in turn, had decided to confer certain lands to KDDC in Chikkabommasandra, culled out of lands in Survey No. 50, 51 and other Survey numbers measuring 26.29 acres in terms of Annexure-J to the writ petition.

It is the contention on behalf of the petitioner that there was no notification u/s 16(1) of the LA Act, authorizing the designated officer to take possession and make over the land to KDDC. There was also no notification u/s 16(2) evidencing the possession of the lands having been taken.

It is contended that it was after a lapse of 12 years that the Karnataka Co-operative Milk Producers Federation (KMF) had sought to assert its claim over the land, on the footing that the land had been acquired for its benefit. The Tahshildar is said to have denied its request to have its name entered in the revenue records.

Incidentally, the State Government had sought to acquire 36 items of land, situated in the proximity of lands covered under the above said notification dated 15-1-1978 including land in Survey No. 7/1A &B, for the purpose of establishment of a Mother Diary project, which is a unit of the KMF by a preliminary notification dated 13-3-1979. This notification was challenged in writ proceedings before this court in WP 4845/1980. The said writ petition was allowed on 18-6-1987.

It is further stated that the BDA issued a notification, dated 18-4-1995 u/s 48(1) of the LA Act de-notifying some of the lands acquired by it in Nagasettyhalli including the land of the petitioner. It is hence contended that the KMF or KDDC cannot lay claim to the petitioner''s lands. However, KMF had got its name entered in the revenue records on the basis of acquisition proceedings, which did not confer any right on KMF. And further KMF had proceeded to lease the lands in question to a Nandi Farmers Welfare Trust, proceeding on the basis it had a right over the lands.

The learned Senior Advocate Shri S.P. Shankar, appearing for the counsel for the petitioner would therefore contend that the EDA, which alone proceeded with its purported acquisition and urged the State to pass the award, had also issued de-notification dropping certain lands from acquisition. Few of such lands de-notified are comprised in Sy. No. 59/1, 59/2, 59/3, 59/4, 60/1, 60/2, 60/3 and 60/4 of Nagasetty Hally and Bhoopasandra villages. It is also a matter of record that State did not take possession of these lands by authorizing the competent authority, namely, an Assistant Commissioner in-charge of a Sub-Division of a District to take possession. The Land Acquisition Act as extended in the State of Karnataka by Act 17 of 1961 contains Sec 3(c) to say that the words "Deputy Commissioner" the words "The Assistant Commissioner in-charge of sub-division of a district" be substituted. Therefore the officer, who can take possession or who can be authorized to take possession u/s 16(1) of the Act is the Assistant Commissioner in-charge of a Sub-division of a District and not the Deputy Commissioner. In this behalf, it is contended that when a statute provides that a particular thing or deed shall be done in a particular manner, it shall be done in that manner alone or not at all.

The resultant position is that the petitioner who holds land measuring 2 acres 3 guntas in Sy. No. 60/3 continues to be the lawful owner and in possession of the land, in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bombay and Others Vs. Godrej and Boyce, and in view of de-notification of the land.

By reason of the above narration of events, it is contended that acquisition by BDA failed to take effect in so far as the above lands are concerned. And that the petitioner continues to be in lawful possession and hence it is necessary to protect her right, and possession of the lands.

It is contended that in view of the law declared in State of Bihar Vs. Dhirendra Kumar, 1995 SC 1955, a civil suit is not maintainable in respect of the proceedings taken out under the LA Act. The only remedy is to seek judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Hence the present writ petition.

On the other hand, the learned Senior Advocate Shri Udaya Holla, appearing for the learned counsel for the fourth respondent contends as follows :

The bona fides of the petitioner is highly questionable as the petitioner is seeking the quashing of Notifications issued for the benefit of the fourth respondent after nearly 30 years. The petition has to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches alone. The delay in seeking the reliefs at this point of time is not explained in the petition and hence the petition has to be rejected as belated and bereft of merits.

It is further contended that the Government of Karnataka issued Notifications for acquisition of 26 acres and 14 Guntas of land in Nagashettyhalli and Bhoopsandra Villages of Bangalore District for and on behalf of the KDDC in the year 1978 under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The possession of lands u/s 16(2) of the Act had been taken on 15.4.1978 and awards in respect of the said lands had been passed in the year 1979 itself, A majority of the landowners had already drawn the compensation amount due to them.

The respondent could not develop the lands acquired for its benefit due to a series of litigation which came to be filed by some of the erstwhile landowners, purchasers and others challenging the said acquisition proceedings pertaining to these lands. It is contended that the litigation either before this Court wherein writ petitions were filed challenging the acquisition proceedings or before the Civil -Courts where suits were filed seeking injunctory reliefs, had hampered the development of these lands by the respondent.

Further, pursuant to the Notifications, the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore Sub-Division, had issued a Notice u/s 9 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 to the erstwhile khatedar Smt. Parvathamma. The copy of the said notice is produced and marked as Annexure-R1. The Special Deputy Commissioner, by his order dated 26.6.1979, in LA No. 47/78-79, after enquiry had determined the award to be paid to the erstwhile Khatedar and passed the award vide his order bearing No. LAQ(1) CR.412/78-79 and deposited the amount in the Civil Court u/s 30 and 31 of the LA Act. A copy of the proceedings in LAC 47/78-79 is produced as Annexure-R2. It is contended that subsequently notice u/s 12(2) has been issued on the erstwhile khatedar, Smt. Parvathamma, which is acknowledged by her. A copy of the said 12(2) Notice and its receipt by the erstwhile Khatedar is produced as Annexure-R3.

It is contended that by accepting the notice u/s 12(2), the erstwhile Khatedar has accepted the award amount and had acknowledged the acquisition proceedings and now it is not open to the petitioner, who is her alleged granddaughter to question the same. This aspect has been suppressed by the petitioner in the writ petition and the petition has to be dismissed on the ground of suppression of material facts above. The petitioner has no locus standi to question the legality of the acquisition:

It is contended that the Government took over possession vide Mahazar dated 15.4.1978 and handed over the possession to the respondent on 17.4.1978. The copies of the mahazar and the certificate for handing over the possession are produced and marked as Annexure-R4 and Annexure-R5, respectively.

It is contended that the erstwhile landowners, purchasers and others had filed nearly 100 Civil Suits. A brief synopsis of the series of such petitions and Suits is produced as Annexure-R6. Those proceedings were initiated immediately after acquisition of the said lands in the year 1978, first of them was filed by the N.T.I. Society and Vinayaka House Building Society who approached this Court challenging the acquisition notifications in WP No. 4697/78 and 4495/78, which came to be allowed quashing the entire acquisition proceedings. Against which, the State had preferred writ Appeals in W.A. No. 363 and 364/1980. A Division Bench of this Court while affirming the decision of the Single Judge restricted the scope of the order to lands in so far as the petitioners, namely, NTI Society and Vinayaka House Building Society were concerned and set aside the order of the Single Judge in so far as it quashed the entire notification. Hence the order was modified and restricted to the petitioners therein.

Further, this was followed by a batch of Writ Petitions in the year 1981 by the landowners challenging the Acquisition Proceedings which was to the benefit of the fourth respondent in W.P. Nos. 20407 to 20414/1981 connected with W.P. No. 34232/1982. There was stay of acquisition Proceedings. Those Writ Petitions came to be dismissed in the year 1988 with the withdrawal of the petitions.

It is contended that this was followed by another batch of writ petitions filed by four petitioners challenging the said ''notifications in the year 1989 in W.P. No. 17903 to 17906/1989 which came to be dismissed on 12.12.1989 as the petitioners therein had drawn the compensation amount, a copy of which is produced as Annexure-R9. Taking advantage of the pendency of proceedings in various Court of Law, the erstwhile land owners had put up unauthorized sheds and were resisting the attempt of the fourth respondent to develop the lands in question. When the respondent tried to get the trespassers evicted, innumerable Civil Suits for injunction were filed.

First of the said Suit was filed in the year 1989 in O.S. No. 4438, 4439, 4440 of 1989 before the Court of the Civil Judge, Bangalore seeking injunctory and declaratory reliefs in respect of the lands. Those suits came to be dismissed and were followed by another batch of suits in the year 1992, which also came to be dismissed. Then one more suit came to be filed in the year 1997, which was also dismissed. The copies of said orders and list of cases filed by the land owners, purchasers and others are produced as Annexures-R10, R11 and R12, to the statement of objections.

It is contended that a series of suits numbering 55 came to be filed in the year 1998 pertaining to the very lands seeking injunctory reliefs. The applications for temporary injunction filed by the plaintiffs being rejected, Miscellaneous First Appeals were preferred'' before this Court, wherein temporary injunction had been granted. The fourth respondent preferred Special Leave Petitions against those orders and the Supreme Court granted status quo order, confining the order to structures, till the disposal of suits. Majority of those suits have been dismissed for default as the plaintiffs in those suits have shown no interest in prosecuting the same. Those proceedings which started in the year 1998 have been taken upto the Supreme Court in the year 2001 and the suits were dismissed in the year 2004.

It is further contended that W.P. No. 2243-2250/1998 came to be filed challenging the acquisition notifications issued for the benefit of the fourth respondent and the same was later withdrawn by the petitioners therein on 18.2.1998 after the matter was heard at length. The lands under the impugned notification were also acquired by BDA for R.M.V.II Stage in the year 1978. So there was overlapping of acquisitions for the same piece of land. Later the notification pertaining to RMV II Stage in so far as the lands in Nagashetty Hally and Bhoopsandra were concerned came to be withdrawn u/s 48(1) of LA Act in the year 1995 on several representations and request by this respondent. In other words, the lands acquired for the benefit of this respondent continued. The petitioner is trying to play mischief over the same as the lands which were once de-notified, have been in possession of the fourth respondent. The RTC for the lands is said to be in the name of the fourth respondent.

It is contended that a civil suit in O.S. No. 5121/1998 filed by the erstwhile khatedar, Smt. Parvathamma, came to be dismissed for default on 31.2.2002 and a Miscellaneous application came to be filed for restoration and even that was dismissed on 8.7.2003 along with other suits. It is hence contended that the petitioner despite having the knowledge of acquisition never questioned the same. It is only at this point of time that the petitioner is questioning the Notifications while suppressing the filing of the earlier suits against the fourth respondent, and receiving the award notice u/s 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act. This clearly speaks for the want of bona fides of the petitioner, who is trying to unsettle issues that are concluded.

It is contended that the respondent is a State-owned Corporation, having many programmes and projects to strengthen the rural economy of the State of Karnataka. The objects and aims are laudable. It requires lands for these programmes and projects which fall under the ambit of public purpose. The contention of the petitioner that the land remained unutilized all these years is not acceptable as already it is demonstrated how the pendency of litigation has hampered the development: Farther the lands acquired are not diverted for any other purpose, but are used for a public purpose and related to the respondents activities and hence it cannot be said there is a colourable exercise of power.

The learned Government Pleader would contend on behalf of the State as follows :

The writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. The Preliminary Notification dated 15.01.1978 and Final Notification is dated 08.03.1978 and was duly gazetted on 09.03.1978. The writ petition is filed in the year 2008 after a lapse of nearly 30 years. Therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

It is contended that the land in Survey No. 60/3 of Nagashetty Halli has been notified along with certain other lands vide Preliminary Notification dated 15.01.1978 gazetted on 23.02.1978, issued u/s 4(1) read with Section 17 of the LA Act, invoking emergency provision, measuring 2 acre 2 guntas for the public purpose for KDDC. Smt. Parvathamma, wife of Doddakrishnappa was the notified khatedar as per the revenue records as on the date of issuance of Preliminary Notification. The Final Notification dated 08.03.1978, 09.03.1978 issued u/s 6 read with Section 17(1) of the LA has been duly gazetted. Notice u/s 9(1) and 10 of the LA has been issued to the notified khatedar and the same has been served on the notified khatedar on 31.03.1978. The notified khatedar had not filed any objection to the above acquisition proceedings. Thereafter, an award has been passed on 05.06.1979 and the same has been approved by the Spl. Deputy Commissioner on 26.06.1979. The award amount has been deposited in the Civil Court on 22.01.1980. The possession of the land in question has been taken on 15.04.1978. The possession of the land has been taken before passing the award in view of the acquisition was made by invoking emergency provision u/s 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. The possession of the land in question has been handed over to the fourth respondent on 17.04.1978 A copy of the Preliminary Notification dated 15.01.1978, a copy of the Final Notification dated 08.03.1978 gazetted on 09.03.1978, a copy of the Award dated 05.06.1979, a copy of the Notice issued u/s 9 and 10 of the LA Act, A copy of the Mahazar for having taken possession of the land and a copy of the document for having handed over the possession to the fourth respondent, are produced as Annexure R1 to R6.

The fourth respondent has deposited a sum of `17,30,000/- towards the acquisition cost of land in question and other lands on 09.02.1979. The fourth respondent, by its letter dated 06.01.1984, had requested the State to transfer the balance amount to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board,(hereinafter referred to as ''the KIADB'' for brevity) for the acquisition of land under the KIADB Act. In view of the same, a refund voucher dated 16.01.1984 has been issued and the said amount of Rs. 8 lakh has been transferred to the Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB. The compensation amount in respect of the land in question is concerned the same has been deposited in the Civil Court after service of notice u/s 12(2) of the LA Act to the said notified Khatedar and the award amounts in respect of the other acquired land have been paid to the respective land owners.

It is contended that the acquisition made by the BDA in respect of the land in question, that is Survey No. 60/3 is concerned, since the lard in question had been acquired by the State Government under the aforesaid notification for a public purpose and for the benefit of the fourth respondent, the BDA has not proceeded further in the acquisition of the land in question and in view of acquisition of the said land by the State Government, a Notification u/s 48(1) of the LA Act has been issued to nullify the final notification issued u/s 19 of the BDA Act.

The present writ petition seeks to question acquisition proceedings initiated against the petitioner''s grand mother, Parvathamma, as the khatedar of the land bearing survey No. 60/3 of Nagasettyhalli, Bangalore North Taluk, Bangalore District, measuring 2 acres and 2 guntas. The preliminary notification u/s 4 (1) read with Section 17 of the LA Act was dated 15-1-1978 and was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 23-2-1978 and the Final Notification u/s 6(1) of the Act was dated 8-3-1978 and was published in the Karnataka Gazette on 9-3-1978.

The beneficiary of the acquisition proceedings was the Karnataka Dairy Development Corporation Limited, the predecessor of the fourth respondent.

It is not in dispute that the Bangalore Development Authority acting u/s 17 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1982, had issued a preliminary notification, dated 3-1-1977, proposing to acquire certain lands including the land which is the subject matter of this petition for the formation of the Rajmahal Vilas II Stage residential layout. The BDA had also issued a Final Notification dated 2-8-1978 u/s 19 of the said Act.

However, it was pursuant to the proceedings under the LA Act, which were initiated later, that a notice u/s 9(1) and 10 of the Act was issued to the Khatedar, which is shown to be served on her on 31-3-1978. An Award is said to have been passed on 5-6-1979 and the same had been approved by the Special Deputy Commissioner on 26-6-1979. The award amount is said to have been deposited in the Civil Court on 22-1-1980. The possession of the land is said to have been taken prior to the passing of the Award, as on 15-4-1978, in view of the emergency provision in terms of Section 17 having been invoked. The possession of the land is said to have been handed over to the beneficiary on 17-4-1978.

It is only as on 16-4-1996 that a notification u/s 48(1) of the LA Act was issued seeking to withdraw the acquisition proceedings initiated earlier under the BDA Act. As the dual acquisition proceedings did overlap in respect of the lands sought to be acquired thereunder.

In the above background the contentions urged by the petitioner are to be considered.

The argument canvassed that the KDDC, for whose benefit the land was acquired, did not find the land suitable and opted for other lands acquired at Chikkabommasandra, through the medium of the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board in terms of Annexure J to the writ petition, in view of the deposit of the cost of acquisition deposited by the beneficiary in respect of the acquisition pursuant to the 1978 acquisition under the LA Act, having been diverted, in February 1982, to meet the cost of acquisition of lands at Chikkabommasandra - would lead to a presumption that the earlier acquisition was virtually abandoned - cannot be accepted. Pursuant to the acquisition proceedings it is seen that there were innumerable proceedings initiated challenging the same. This would explain the fact that the beneficiary has not taken further steps to implement its intended programme to utilize the land acquired. This is a matter of record. In the mean while other lands being acquired elsewhere or its funds being transferred to facilitate the same cannot be conclusive proof of such alleged abandonment. The additional documents sought to be produced along with an application in IA -1/2012, dated 7-8-2012, can hardly be cited in support of such a contention. The State Government having stated that the fourth respondent had deposited a sum of Rs. 17.30 lakh as on 9-2-1979. And that the request in 1984 to transfer the balance amount to the Special LAO, KIADB in respect of the land acquired under the KIADB Act and the sum of Rs. 8 lakh being transferred is not inconsistent with the stand of the State that the award amount in respect of the lands in question having been deposited in the Civil Court as on 22.1.1980, which is not disputed by the petitioner.

The contention that the land, sought to be acquired pursuant to the 15-1-1978 notification, not being either waste or unarable land and hence on the ground that invoking Section 17 of the LA Act was inappropriate etc., or the fact that some writ petitions viz., WP 4495/1978 & 4697/1978 had been allowed on that ground is not a contention that can be entertained at this remote point of time.

In the opinion of this court, keeping in view the law as declared by the Supreme Court in Sri Radhy Shyam (Dead) through L.Rs. and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, and reiterated in Devendar Kumar Tyagi v. State of UP (2011) 9 SCC 164 to the following effect:

From the analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and interpretation thereof by this Court in different cases, the following principles can be culled out:

(i) Eminent domain is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate property belonging to citizens for public use. To put it differently, the sovereign is entitled to reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of the State including private property without its owner''s consent provided that such assertion is on account of public exigency and for public good - Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay Vs. The Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. and Others, ., Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, and Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar, etc. etc. Vs. State of Gujarat and another, etc. etc., .

(ii) The legislations which provide for compulsory acquisition of private property by the State fall in the category of expropriatory legislation and such legislation must be construed strictly - DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana, State of Maharashtra v. B.E. Billimoria, and Dev Sharon v. State of U.P.

(iii) Though, in exercise of the power of eminent domain, the Government can acquire the private property for public purpose, it must be remembered that compulsory taking of one''s property is a serious matter. If the property belongs to economically disadvantaged segment of the society or people suffering from other handicaps, then the court is not only entitled but is duty-bound, to scrutinise the LA Action/decision of the State with greater vigilance, care and circumspection keeping in view the fact that the landowner is likely to become landless and deprived of the only source of his livelihood and/or shelter.

(iv) The property of a citizen cannot be acquired by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities without complying with the mandate of Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the LA Act. A public purpose, however, laudable it may be does not entitle the State to invoke the urgency provisions because the same have the effect of depriving the owner of his right to property without being heard. Only in a case of real urgency, the State can invoke the urgency provisions and dispense with the requirement of hearing the landowner or other interested persons.

(v) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers extraordinary power upon the State to acquire "private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even a few weeks or months. Therefore, before excluding the application of Section 5A, the authority concerned must be fully satisfied that time of few weeks or months likely to be taken in conducting inquiry u/s 5A will, in all probability, frustrate he public purpose for which land is proposed to be acquired.

(vi) The satisfaction of the Government on the issue of urgency is subjective but is a condition precedent to the exercise of power u/s 17(1) and the same can be challenged on the ground that the purpose for which the private property is sought to be acquired is not a public purpose at all or that the exercise of power is vitiated due to mala fides or that the authorities concerned did not apply their mind to the relevant factors and the records.

(vii) The exercise of power by the Government u/s 17(1) does not necessarily result in exclusion of Section 5A of the LA Act in terms of which any person interested in land can file objection and is entitled to be heard in support of his objection. The use of word ''may'' in sub- section (4) of Section 17 makes it clear that it merely enables the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5A would not apply to the cases covered under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17. In other words, invoking of Section 17(4) is not a necessary concomitant of the exercise of power u/s 17(1).

(viii) The acquisition of land for residential, commercial, industrial or institutional purposes can be treated as an acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section 4 but that, by itself, does not justify the exercise of power by the Government under Sections 17(1) and/or 17(4). The court can take judicial notice of the fact that planning, execution and implementation of the schemes relating to development of residential, commercial, industrial or institutional areas usually take few years. Therefore, the private property cannot be acquired for such purpose by invoking the urgency provision contained in Section 17(1). In any case, exclusion of the rule of audi alteram partem embodied in Sections 5A(1) and (2) is not at all warranted in such matters.

Though the above could very well have been urged to challenge the acquisition proceedings at the appropriate point of time, the petitioner or her predecessor in title not having done so it would be futile to urge the same in retrospect.

The primary contention of the petitioner turns on the disputed question whether as required u/s 16(1) of the LA Act, the Assistant Commissioner in-charge of the sub-division of the area who is to take possession of the land u/s 16 (1) and cause publication of the notification u/s 16(2) of the Act, which would serve as proof of taking possession and that there is no compliance of this aspect in the present case on hand.

Even if it can be demonstrated that there was an infirmity in this regard, namely, that possession of the land has not been taken in the manner stipulated under the LA Act, this court refuses to interfere on the sole ground of delay and laches. The laconic reason assigned by the petitioner to explain the delay in approaching this court at a belated point of time is neither tenable nor acceptable. The contention that there was no threat of dispossession in view of BDA having withdrawn from the acquisition proceedings - the petitioner had not taken any steps is belied by the fact that the petitioner''s grand mother was aware of the acquisition proceedings and had even questioned the same in proceedings before the court. This is suppressed. The petitioner is hence disentitled to any relief on that ground as well.

The petition is hence dismissed.