AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Dr. Satish Chandra, J.—The present appeal has been filed u/s 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for enhancement of the compensation, against the judgment and award dated 18th October, 2010 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Lucknow in Claim Petition No. 104 of 2006, whereby a compensation of Rs. 2,02,000/- alongwith interest was awarded. The brief facts of the case are that on 17th January, 2006, at about 10.00 a.m., deceased Mohd. Hameed was going to Jagdishpur on his motor cycle No. U.P. 45-A/2544. When he reached near Enhona Bazar, Thana Shiv Ratanganj (Rae-bareilly), a Tata Qualis No. DL 3CO 455 was coming from the opposite side hit the motorcycle of the deceased. The driver of Tata Qualis was driving the vehicle negligently and carelessly. The deceased was admitted to the Indo Gulf Hospital, where he died. At the time of incident, the deceased did not wear the helmet. So, in the postmortem report, head injuries were shown as main cause for his death. The claimant filed the claim petition, where a total compensation of Rs. 4,04,000/- was awarded. Treating the accident as contributory negligence, 50% of the total award i.e. 2,02,000/- was awarded in favour of the claimants. The said award also includes the funeral expenses, loss of consortium and loss of estate. Being unsatisfied with the award, the claimants have filed the present appeal.
With this background, learned Counsel for the appellants submits that the deceased was working in M/s Premier Agro Industries, Jagdishpur, Sultanpur as Supervisor. His salary was Rs. 4,500/- per month, but the Tribunal has taken the notional income of Rs. 3,000/- per month.
Learned Counsel further submits that it was not the contributory negligence, so the entire award will have to be given in favour of the claimants-appellants.
On the other hand, learned Counsel for the opposite parties relied on the impugned order.
After hearing both the parties and on perusal of the materials available on record, it is evident that the deceased was not working on the post of supervisor in the M/s Premier Agro Industries, as claimed by the learned Counsel for the appellants as to this effect, no evidence was ever furnished before the Tribunal or even before this Court to support this argument. None appeared on behalf of M/s Premier Agro Industries before the Tribunal. No evidence in any form was submitted before the Tribunal that the deceased was an employee of the said industry.
In these circumstances, we find no reason to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal that the deceased was working as labour at the rate of Rs. 100/- per day. The Tribunal has taken the income of the deceased @ Rs. 3,000/- per month. By deducting 1/3rd for the self expenditure, the Tribunal has taken Rs. 24,000/- for the purpose of computation. The Tribunal had applied the multiplier of 16 by looking the age of the deceased. Thus, the total compensation comes to Rs. 3,84,000/-. In addition to it, funeral expenses, loss of consortium; and loss of estate total Rs. 20,000/- was also awarded. Thus, the total claim was accepted by the Tribunal for Rs. 4,04,000/-.
It may be mentioned that it is true that perfect compensation is hardly possible and money cannot renew a physique frame that has been battered and shattered, as stated by Lord Morris in West v. Shepard, 1964 A.C. 326. Justice requires that it should be equal in value, although not alike in kind. Object of providing compensation is to place claimant as far as possible in the same position financially as he was before accident. Broadly speaking, in the case of death basis of compensation is loss of pecuniary benefits to the dependents of the deceased which includes pecuniary loss, expenses, etc. and loss to the estate. Object is to mitigate hardship that has been caused to the legal representatives due to sudden demise of the deceased in the accident. Compensation awarded should not be inadequate and should neither be unreasonable, excessive, nor deficient. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring value of human life and measure of damage cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculation; but amount recoverable depends on broad facts and circumstances of each case. It should neither be punitive against whom claim is decreed nor it should be a source of profit of the person in whose favour it is awarded. Upjohn L.J. in Charter House Credit v. Jolly, (1963) 2 C.B. 683, remarked, ''the assessment of damages has never been an exact science; it is essentially practical''.
The damages for vehicular accidents are in the nature of compensation in money for loss of any kind caused to any person. In case of personal injury the position is different from loss of property. In the later case there is possibility of repair or restoration. But in the case of personal injury, the possibility of repair or restoration is practically nonexistent. In Parry v. Cleaver, 1969 (1) All. E.R. 555, Lord Morris stated as follows :
To compensate in money for pain and for physical consequences is invariably difficult, but...no other process can be devised than that of making monetary assessment.
The main principles of law on compensation for injuries were worked out in 19th Century, where railways accidents were becoming common and all actions were tried by Jury. Though the cases have antiquated air it is still useful to refer to them. The necessity that damages should be ''full'' and ''adequate'' was stressed by the Court by Queen''s Bench in Fair v. London and North-Western Railway Co., (1869) 21 LT 326). The word ''compensation'' is derived from Latin word "compensare" meaning "weigh together" or "balance". In Rushton v. National Coal Board, (1953) 1 All. E.R. 314, it was observed :
Every member of this Court is anxious to do all he can do to ensure that the damages are adequate for the injuries suffered, so far as they can be compensated for an injury, and to help the parties and others to arrive at a fair and just figure.
It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is required to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to be ''just''. It has to be borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales. Bodily injury is nothing but a deprivation which entitles the claimant to damages. The quantum of damages fixed should be in accordance to the injury. An injury may bring about many consequences like loss of earning capacity, loss of mental pleasure and many such consequential losses. A person becomes entitled to damages for the mental and physical loss, his or her life may have been shortened or that he or she cannot enjoy life which has been curtailed because of physical handicap. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But, at the same time, it has be to be borne in mind that the compensation is not expected to be a wind fall for the victim.
Statutory provisions clearly indicate the compensation must be "just" and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit but the same should not be a pittance. The Courts and Tribunals have a duty to weigh the various factors and quantify the amount of compensation, which should be just. What would be "just" compensation is a vexed question. There can be no golden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the value of human life or a limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend upon the particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted for assessing compensation has to be considered in the background of "just" compensation which is the pivotal consideration. Though by use of the expression "which appears to it to be just" a wide discretion is vested on the Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wild guesses and arbitrariness. The expression "just" denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness, and non-arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just. (See Helen C. Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, AIR 1998 S.C. 3191 : 1999 (1) T.A.C. 1 (S.C.).
The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of R.D. Hattangadi Vs. M/s. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others, , laying the principles posited:
Broadly speaking, while fixing the amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are capable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant : (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far as non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters, i.e., on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life.
In the instant case, it appears that the accident occurred in the mid of the road and it was the case of head collusion. Therefore, the Tribunal observed that this is a case of contributory negligence. During course of arguments, no evidence was furnished or any argument was advanced to rebute the said finding of the Tribunal. Therefore, we are of the view that the Tribunal has rightly awarded 50% of the total compensation, which comes to Rs. 2,02,000/-. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the same appears genuine and reasonable. Hence, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal.
The same is hereby sustained.
In the result, the appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed. Let L.C.R. be returned to the Court below.