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Judgment
P. Jyothimani, J.—Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Special Government Pleader appearing for the respondents
1 and 2 and also Mr. V. Selvaraj, learned Counsel appearing for the impleading respondent, viz., R.3.
The impleading petitioner in M.P. No. 2 of 2008 is the President of Hindu Baktha Jana Sabha, Salem District Committee, who appears to have
made certain complaints of irregularities regarding the maintenance of Arulmighu Chendrya Perumal Thirukoil, Pagalpatti, Omalur Taluk, Salem
District, in which the writ petitioner claims to be the hereditary trustee. The impugned order dated 16.5.2008, is one by which the first respondent,
by invoking the powers u/s 53(4) of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,1959 (for short, ''HR & CE Act'') has placed the
petitioner under suspension pending disciplinary proceedings against her. In view of the fact that it was on the complaint of the impleading party,
the impugned order came to be passed, the impleading petition stands ordered.
In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition the writ petitioner admits that prior to her, her husband was the hereditary trustee and was
removed on various charges. It appears that after various proceedings, by virtue of the order dated 29.11.2004, the Government has given
direction that the petitioner should be appointed as hereditary trustee and it is stated that by virtue of the said order, the petitioner has been
continuing in the said capacity. The first respondent has issued a show-cause notice to the petitioner on 27.2.2008 framing eight charges. It is the
case of the petitioner that she has given her reply to the said charges on 24.3.2008. There was a second show-cause notice issued on 26.3.2008
for which, it is stated, a reply has been submitted on 7.4.2008. On 5.5.2008, by virtue of the third show-cause notice five additional charges were
framed against the petitioner and the petitioner gave a reply on 15.5.2008. When the final decision was pending on the charges, the impugned
order came to be passed by the first respondent by suspending the petitioner in public interest as well as in the interest of the temple. In the
impugned order a wrong provision viz., Section 53(3) of the HR & CE Act has been quoted, but a reading of the entire order shows that the
purport of the order was to invoke Section 53(4) for the purpose of passing an order of interim suspension of the petitioner from the post of
hereditary trustee in maintaining the temple. Law is well settled that the mere wrong quoting of provision will not change the proceedings if the same
is otherwise in order.
Even though the learned Counsel for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the petitioner has given various replies to the charges and the
same have not been considered before passing the order of suspension, it is relevant to refer to various charges (eight in number) and the reply
given by the petitioner with reference to the original charge memo dated 27.2.2008. One of the charges is that in respect of 11.77 acres of land
belonging to the temple, where illegal encroachment has been made by third parties, the petitioner being the hereditary trustee, has not taken any
steps to prevent the same. The other charge is in respect of 80.06 acres of land belonging to the temple, when third parties illegally obtained patta,
even after repeated directions given, the petitioner being the hereditary trustee of the temple has not taken any steps to get the properties of the
temple. A more serious charge is that out of 300 acres of land originally belonged to the temple, due to the improper administration of the
petitioner, as on date only less than 150 acres of land is available with the temple and the petitioner is stated to be responsible for allowing others
to get patta in respect of about 150 acres of land.
In the additional charges framed on 5.5.2008, it is seen that in spite of charges having been framed and explanation having been called for, the
petitioner has been evading to give explanation and she has not even chosen to appear before the enquiry authority. One of the additional charges
framed is that the petitioner having admitted not submitting the accounts in respect of income of the temple has been repeatedly asking for
extension of time. The further charge is that the petitioner has not chosen to effect audit of the accounts of income of the temple. It is also stated in
the additional charges that this Court in W.P. No. 14609 of 2007 has directed the petitioner to fix rent of the tenants who are occupying the
temple properties and the petitioner has not taken any steps in this regard. Besides the abovesaid charges other charges are also not trivial in
nature.
The most astonishing factor in this case is that though the learned Counsel for the petitioner would vehemently submit that the petitioner has
submitted her explanation to the charges, but a reference to the explanation makes it clear that the petitioner has not chosen to give explanation and
only promised to rectify the defects. In fact, in one such explanation dated 24.3.2008, the petitioner has stated in a reckless manner that she has
filed the documents in civil Court and after the documents are received, she will take steps for rectifying the various irregularities. She has taken
various stands one of such is about submission of explanation to the first respondent authority on the basis that some function is going on in her
house and it is seen that the petitioner has impliedly admitted that some of the properties of the temple were sold to her relatives. It is not as if the
first respondent has not given sufficient opportunity to the petitioner either to give explanation or to appear for enquiry.
It is seen that on 17.4.2008 the first respondent directed the petitioner to appear for enquiry on 23.4.2008, for which the petitioner has chosen
to state as if her counsel was on summer vacation, but the fact remains that the summer vacation fell in May of that year. These are all some of the
instances to show the careless and lethargic way in which the petitioner has taken the charges. The petitioner has even chosen to state in one of the
replies that the non-submitting of accounts is not a very serious matter. She has further stated that she is prepared to submit accounts at any point
of time.
A reading of the impugned order and explanation of the petitioner shows that as to how the petitioner has been purposely evading to give reply
and also to appear for the enquiry. In such view of the matter, it is not possible for this Court to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for
the petitioner that the charges are very trivial and the petitioner has been always willing to give proper explanation. The learned Counsel for the
petitioner would also rely upon the judgment of this Court in P.K. Soundararaja Mudaliar Vs. The Deputy Commissioner for Hindu Religious and
Charitable Endowments, and submit that even before exercising the power u/s 53(4) of the HR & CE Act in passing temporary suspension, the
enquiry authority should take into consideration all the reply and other factors. That was a case where the charge framed against the party was that
he has not submitted budget estimates and has not submitted the particulars about the properties of the temple. It was, considering the said aspect,
this Court having held that the jurisdiction conferred upon the authority to suspend a trustee pending disposal can never be questioned, but opined
that in such circumstances the authority should take into consideration the interest of the temple and while deciding the same, the nature of charge
should also be taken into consideration. The operative portion is as follows:
There is undoubted jurisdiction conferred upon the authorities to suspend a trustee pending disposal of the charges against him. In the instant case,
though the charges were framed in January, 1961, the authorities do not seem to have taken the view that the continuance of the trustee in charge
of the temple was not in any way detrimental to the interests of the temple. After the enquiry had been posted and re-posted to several dates, and
more than six months after the framing of the charges against the trustee, the Deputy Commissioner purported to place the petitioner under
suspension in exercise of his powers u/s 53(4). One is entitled to take note of the underlying purpose of the power that is conferred by this
provision upon the Deputy Commissioner. It is that in proper cases the interests of the temple should not be jeopardised by a person who had
been found to have committed acts which would endanger the interests of the temple; for instance, suppose the charge against the trustee had been
that he had failed to obtain permission for absenting himself, or some such trivial ground, it would be impossible to accept the position that pending
the enquiry into such a charge, it would at all be necessary looking at the matter from any point of view, to place the trustee under suspension. The
purpose underlying this provision is therefore, that the authorities are entitled to see that the temple is looked after properly during the period when
the charges are under enquiry and it is in that context that one had to examine the action of the Deputy Commissioner in the present case. As I
have stated, the charges are only that he failed to prepare certain accounts and nothing more serious than that. It is, no doubt, true that it is not
within the province of this Court to measure the gravity of the charges. But, looking at the matter in the light of the need for this particular provision,
it is difficult to see what grounds the Deputy Commissioner thought existed which made it necessary to deprive the petitioner of his charge of the
temple during the conduct of the enquiry. As I have said, more than six months had elapsed from the date on which the charges had been framed
and before the date on which an order of interim suspension was made. Though the Deputy Commissioner is not bound to give his reasons, the
fact that the order of interim suspension was made after such considerable delay would, to my mind, require the existence of some supervening
reasons which necessitated such a course. Nothing is stated either in the order suspending the trustee or even in the counter affidavit to show that
any circumstances justifying the suspension of the trustee had come into existence, in the management. The counter affidavit reads as if the
respondent is under the impression that in every case where the charges are framed against a trustee, the Deputy Commissioner is entitled to, or
even obliged to, under the provisions of the law, place the trustee under suspension. This view of the relevant provision is grossly erroneous.
A reference to Section 53(4) of the HR & CE Act which is as follows;
Section 53. Power to suspend, remove or dismiss trustees.-
(1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) x x x x
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of [the Joint Commissioner or the Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be], under Sub-section (3) may,
within one month from the date of receipt of the order by him, appeal against the order to the Commissioner.
certainly gives the power to the authority viz., the first respondent to place a trustee under suspension and even to appoint a person as a fit person
to discharge the duties as trustee pending disposal of the disciplinary proceedings in which charges had been levelled against the trustee.
Even in the judgment cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the decision was that the authority should exercise discretion in a proper
manner and certainly if the charges are trivial in nature, the authority can be expected to see the interests of the trustee as well as the temple, but,
the facts of the case, as I have enumerated above, especially few of the charges which I have narrated, make it very clear that the charges can
never be treated as trivial in nature and they are certainly serious in the maintenance of the temple and the correctness or otherwise of the charges
are to be decided in the full-fledged enquiry. It is not even the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has not been given adequate opportunity for
defending herself in the enquiry conducted by the first respondent. In such view of the matter, I am of the considered view that the impugned order
does not suffer from any illegality on the face of it even in the light of the judgment relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and taking
into consideration the interest of the temple, the action taken by the first respondent in placing the petitioner under suspension pending enquiry is
perfectly in order.
In view of the same, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed as it is not possible to interfere with the impugned order passed by the first
respondent. However, taking into consideration that the petitioner had made her reply in respect of various charges and the first respondent has
been issuing several notices for enquiry, the first respondent is directed to give sufficient opportunity to the petitioner, conduct proper enquiry and
pass appropriate orders on merits and in accordance with law in respect of the charges levelled in the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the
petitioner, expeditiously, in any event, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. It is made clear that the
petitioner shall co-operate with the first respondent in conducting the enquiry.
With the above direction, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs. M.P. No. 2 of 2008 is ordered. In view of dismissal of the main writ petition,
connected miscellaneous petition, viz., M.P. No. 1 of 2008 is also dismissed.