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Judgment
The petitioner before this Court has filed the present petition being aggrieved by the orders dated 28.11.2016, 05.09.2016 & 31.03.2016 (Annexure-P/1
P/2 & P/3) passed by the respondents discontinuing the services of the petitioner, and thereafter, dismissing her appeal.
The facts of the case reveal that the petitioner was appointed as Anganwadi Worker and has served for almost 19 years. A notice was issued on
14.03.2016 to show cause in respect of certain alleged irregularities and the petitioner categorically denied the allegations leveled in the show cause
notice dated 14.03.2016. However, based upon some ex parte inquiry, which took place without the participation of the petitioner, the impugned order
dated 31.03.2016 was passed. The petitioner, thereafter, preferred an appeal and the same was dismissed on 31.03.2016.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued before this Court that the order passed by the respondents is bad in law in light of the policy issued by
the State Government. The respondents should have to issue charge-sheet or should have to conduct a departmental inquiry in light of circular dated
10.07.2007.
On the other hand, learned Government Advocate has argued before this Court that a proper show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and after
conducting inquiry, her services have been put to an end. However, he has failed to demonstrate before this Court any inquiry took place with the
participation of the petitioner, meaning thereby, by issuing a show cause notice, petitioner’s services have been put to an end in an arbitrary
manner. The petitioner has worked for almost 19 years and the respondents, who have discontinued her from services, have not conducted any inquiry
with participation of the petitioner, as provided under the policy dated 10.07.2007.
Learned counsel for the petitioner at the very outset drawn the attention of this Court towards the judgment delivered in the case of Kansa Vs. State
of Madhya Pradesh & Ors 2015 (3) JLJ 29. The Judgment delivered in the case of Kansa (supra) reads as under:-
“In India there is no statute which prescribes the minimum procedure which administrative agencies or quasi judicial bodies must follow while
taking decisions which affect the rights of the individuals. Nonetheless, they are bound by the principles of natural justice. The principles of natural
justice signify the basic minimum fair procedure which must be followed while exercising decision making powers. Natural justice forms the very
backbone of a civilized society.
The wheels regarding the application of principles of natural justice to administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings started turning from 1963 when the
House of Lords in the United Kingdom delivered the landmark and oft-quoted judgment of Ridge v. Baldwin [1963] UKHL 2. An order for dismissal
of a Constable was quashed because he was not provided any opportunity to defend his actions. Presently, in our country, the principles of natural
justice are applicable in totality to administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings. This is consistent and in line with the rapidly increasing role, functions
and jurisdiction of such bodies in a welfare state like ours.
The below-mentioned passages by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uma Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. AIR 2009 SC 2375 exhaustively
explain natural justice and deserve to be quoted in full in the context of the current dispute:
“6. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into
the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and
human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a
formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form.
The expressions “natural justice†and “legaljustice†do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be
secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves
legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord
Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants’ defence.
The adherence to principles of natural justice asrecognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on
determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The
first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the
first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for
the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity,
the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed
against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play…..
Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual
against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those
rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice.
Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on thesubject. The most important of them is the Board of Education v. Rice (1911 AC 179:80 LJKB
796), where Lord Loreburn, L.C. observed as follows: “Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have originated, the practice of
imposing upon departments or offices of State the duty of deciding or determining questions of various kinds. It will, I suppose usually be of an
administrative kind, but sometimes, it will involve matter of law as well as matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law alone. In such cases, the
Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not and that in doing either they must act in good faith and
fairly listen to both sides for that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as
though it were a trial....The Board is in the nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a Court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals from the determination
either upon law or upon fact. But if the Court is satisfied either that the Board have not acted judicially in the way I have described, or have not
determined the question which they are required by the Act to determine, then there is a remedy by mandamus and certiorariâ€.
Lord Wright also emphasized from the samedecision the observation of the Lord Chancellor that the Board can obtain information in any way they
think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties to the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial
to their viewâ€. To the same effect are the observations of Earl of Selbourne, LO in Spackman v. Plumstead District Board of Works (1985 (10) AC
229:54 LJMC 81), where the learned and noble Lord Chancellor observed as follows:
“No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to how the person who is to decide is to proceed, law will imply no more than that the substantial
requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he must give the parties an opportunity of being
heard before him and stating their case and their view. He must give notice when he will proceed with the matter and he must act honestly and
impartially and not under the dictation of some other person or persons to whom the authority is not given by law. There must be no malversation of
any kind. There would be no decision within the meaning of the statute if there were anything of that sort done contrary to the essence of justiceâ€.
Lord Selbourne also added that the essence ofjustice consisted in requiring that all parties should have an opportunity of submitting to the person by
whose decision they are to be bound, such considerations as in their judgment ought to be brought before him. All these cases lay down the very
important rule of natural justice contained in the oft-quoted phrase ‘justice should not only be done, but should be seen to be done’. 15. Concept
of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a statute or
in rules framed thereunder. They may be implied from the nature of the duty to be performed under a statute. What particular rule of natural justice
should be implied and what its context should be in a given case must depend to a great extent on the fact and circumstances of that case, the frame-
work of the statute under which the enquiry is held. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away. Even an
administrative order which involves civil consequences must be consistent with the rules of natural justice. Expression ‘civil consequences’
encompasses infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its wide
umbrella comes everything that affects a citizen in his civil life.
Natural justice has been variously defined bydifferent Judges. A few instances will suffice. In Drew v. Drew and Lebura (1855(2) Macg. 1.8,
Lord Cranworth defined it as ‘universal justice’. In James Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen (1877-78(3) App.Case 614, 623 JC) Sir
Robort P. Collier, speaking for the judicial committee of Privy council, used the phrase ‘the requirements of substantial justice’, while in Arthur
John Specman v. Plumstead District Board of Works (1884-85(10) App.Case 229, 240), Earl of Selbourne, S.C. preferred the phrase ‘the
substantial requirement of justice’. In Vionet v. Barrett (1885(55) LJRD 39, 41), Lord Esher, MR defined natural justice as ‘the natural sense of
what is right and wrong’. While, however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local Board of Health (1890 (24) QBD 712), Lord Fasher, M.R.
instead of using the definition given earlier by him in Vionet’s case (supra) chose to define natural justice as ‘fundamental justice’. In Ridge
v. Baldwin (1963(1) WB 569, 578), Harman LJ, in the Court of Appeal countered natural justice with ‘fair-play in action’ a phrase favoured by
Bhagawati, J. in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978 (2) SCR 621). In re R.N. (An Infant) (1967 (2) B 617, 530), Lord Parker, CJ, preferred to
describe natural justice as ‘a duty to act fairly’. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secretary to State for Environment (1976 WLR 1255) Lord
Russell of Willowan somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as ‘a fair crack of the whip’ while Geoffrey Lane, LJ. In Regina v.
Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex Parte Hosenball (1977 (1) WLR 766) preferred the homely phrase ‘common fairness’.
How then have the principles of natural justicebeen interpreted in the Courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a
process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-
judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair-play and
justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is ‘nemo judex in causa
sua’ or ‘nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua’ as stated in (1605) 12 Co.Rep.114 that is, ‘no man shall be a judge in his own
cause’. Coke used the form ‘aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa quia non potest esse judex at pars’ (Co.Litt. 1418), that is, ‘no
man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party’. The form ‘nemo potest esse simul
actor et judex’, that is, ‘no one can be at once suitor and judge’ is also at times used. The second rule is ‘audi alteram partem’, that
is, ‘hear the other side’. At times and particularly in continental countries, the form ‘audietur at altera pars’ is used, meaning very much
the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely ‘qui aliquid statuerit
parte inaudita alteram actquam licet dixerit, haud acquum facerit’ that is, ‘he who shall decide anything without the other side having been
heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right’ (See Bosewell’s case (1605) 6 Co.Rep. 48-b, 52-a) or in
other words, as it is now expressed, ‘justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done’.
What is known as ‘useless formality theory’ has received consideration of this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1999(6) SCC 237). It
was observed as under:
“Before we go into the final aspect of this contention, we would like to state that case relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all
facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief
can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of ‘real substance’ or that there is no substantial possibility of his
success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed (See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn: (1971)2 All ER 1278, HL) (per
Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University: (1971) 2 All ER 89; Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority: (1980) 2 All ER 368, CA)
and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R v. Ealing Magistrates’ Court, ex p. Fannaran (1996 (8)
Admn. LR 351, 358) (See de Smith, Suppl. P.89 (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be ‘demonstrable beyond doubt’ that the
result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v. McMohan (1987 (1) All ER 1118, CA) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in
certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant (1959 NZLR 1014) however goes halfway when it says that
(as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is ‘real likelihood-not certainty- of prejudice’. On the other hand,
Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn. 1996. pp.271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side
of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66, HL), Megarry, J. in John v. Rees (1969 (2) All ER 274)
stating that there are always ‘open and shut cases’ and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but
for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the ‘useless formality theory’ is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice
must be followed. His Lordship observed that ‘convenience and justice are often not on speaking term’. More recently, Lord Bingham has
deprecated the ‘useless formality theory’ in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p. Cotton (1990 IRLR 344) by giving
six reasons (see also his article ‘Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?’ 1991 PL. p.64). A detailed and emphatic criticism of the
‘useless formality theory’ has been made much earlier in ‘Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow’ by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see
1975 PL.pp.27-63) contending that Malloch (supra) and Glynn (supra) were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn. 1996, p.323),
Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn. P.596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De
Smith (5th Edn. 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the
court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn. 1994, pp.526-530) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to
the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of
opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can
prove a ‘real likelihood’ of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that
even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their
‘discretion’, refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet
another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (1996 (3) SCC 364), Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. (1996 (5) SCC 460) that even
in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and
where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived.
We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the ‘useless formality theory’ and leave the matter for decision in
an appropriate case, inasmuch as the case before us, ‘admitted and indisputable’ facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed by
Chinnappa Reddy, J.â€
Natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. The purpose of following the
principles of natural justice is the prevention of miscarriage of justice.â€
With regard to the disputed nature of the useless formality test as discussed in the M.C. Mehta case (see supra), it is important to note that in the
instant petition, the petitioner and other similarly placed petitioners, were dismissed by a cyclostyle order. The order for dismissal for the Anganwadi
workers is identical word by word in all the 84 cases. Only the name of the village has been changed in the orders. In such circumstances, this Court
is of the view that following audi alteram partem will most definitely not be a useless formality.
The principles of natural justice are firmly grounded in Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees
equality before law and equal protection of law. Through the process of interpretation, procedural safeguards have been read into Article 14 by the
Courts. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Union, AIR 1991 SC 101, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that “the audi alteram
partem rule, in essence, enforce the equality clause in Art 14 and it is applicable not only to quasi-judicial bodies but also to administrative order
adversely affecting the party in question unless the rule has been excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule.†Not giving any hearing results in
decisions which are arbitrary in nature. Arbitrariness and equality are antithesis of each other. Similarly under Article 21 of the Constitution, no person
can be deprived of his life or liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Audi alteram partem forms a part of the procedural due
process under the Indian Constitution. Procedure established by law must be just, fair and reasonable and not oppressive, unreasonable or arbitrary.
The present case reflects a very sorry state of affair in respect of functioning of the Department. By a common order about 84 Aanganwadi workers
have been terminated. The petitioner is having a family to support. She has not committed any misconduct and is serving with the Department without
any blemish.
This Court keeping in view the fact that the respondents have not followed the prescribed procedure is of the considered opinion that the impugned
order dt. 9/3/2015 has to pave the path of extinction.
Resultantly, the impugned order dt. 9/3/2015 is hereby quashed. The Writ Petition is allowed. The petitioner shall be entitled for backwages and all
consequential benefits flowing out of this order. The petitioner shall also be entitled for a cost of Rs.2000/-. Cost be paid to the petitioner within 30
days from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
In the light of the aforesaid, all the connected Writ Petitions are allowed. The petitioners therein are also entitled for a cost of Rs.2000/-.
It has also been brought to the notice of this Court that the respondents are not paying salary to the petitioner and identically placed petitioners. The
respondents are directed to ensure payment of arrears of salary within 10 days from today and payment of regular salary also.
The cost will be paid by the respondents, however, the respondent State shall be at a liberty to fix the responsibility upon the officer on account of
whose action the State Government has been made to pay the cost in the present case. It is further made clear that the respondent State shall, after
affording an opportunity of hearing to the concerned officer shall be free to recover the cost by following the due process of lawâ€.
In light of the aforesaid judgment, as there was no inquiry conducted at any point of time with the participation of the petitioner and the petitioner’s
services have been put to end by a single stroke of pen in spite of the fact that she was having unblemished service record of 19 years, this Court is of
the opinion that the impugned orders dated 28.11.2016, 05.09.2016 & 31.03.2016 (Annexure-P/1, P/2 & P/3) deserve to be set aside and are
accordingly set aside.
The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in the service forthwith and the petitioner shall be entitled for 50% of backwages/emolument.
With the aforesaid, the petition stands allowed.
Certified copy as per rules.