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Judgment
Manmohan Singh Liberban, J.—In this appeal briefly the facts are that:-
The Plaintiff brought a suit for permanent injunction and claimed that the order of suspension dated 2.6 1978, passed by Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 as the President and Secretary of the Managing Committee of Defendant No. 1, was illegal and without authority and the Plaintiff had a right to continue as the Headmistress of the Dhanwantri Arya Girls High School, Rohtak. The election of Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 held on 24.5.1975 was challenged as void, it was held inviolation of the rules. Defendant No. 1 was a registered Society managing the school through its Managing Committee. The school was a Government-aided school. The Haryana Aided Schools (Security of Service) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), was applicable. The Plaintiff further claimed that she joined the school as teacher in 1965 and was confirmed as such in 1968. She was appointed as Headmistress in 1969. She continued to work as Headmistress from 1969 to 1978. It was averred that on account of the change in the State Administration on coming into power of the Janta Government she had been victimized being the daughter in-law of Ch. Maru Singh, the Congress Minister in the previous Government.
The Defendants controverted the said allegations. It was contended that she was not only suspended bat Utter on a show-cause notice was issued, imputing various charges against her, an enquiry was held and on finding her guilty of the charges attributed to her. She was removed from service. Another teacher was appointed who started working w.e.f. 27,6,1978. Numerous other objections were also taken.
The trial Court found that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the relief of injunction as another teacher had already taken over and no relief could be granted as she had asked for permanent injunction alone no declaration had been sought Lastly, it was found that the Defendant society was not a statutory body and therefore, the relief of injunction could not be granted to the Plaintiff and only damages could be claimed. Thus the suit was dismissed although it was held that the civil court had the jurisdiction to try the suit and the order of termination was found to be in contravention of the Act.
The Plaintiff preferred an appeal. The lower appellate Court found that the election of Defendants Nos. 4 and to be void and therefore held that the order of suspension was without jurisdiction. The I were appellate Court came to the conclusion that since the Defendant-society was not a statutory body and the Plaintiff had been relieved on 2.6.1978, it would be unrealistic to grant the injunction restraining the Managing Committee from interfering with her discharge of duties. It was further found, after relying on a Supreme Court judgment in Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and other v. Lakshmi Narain AIR 1976 S.C. 888, that a declaration for the specific enforcement of a contract of service cannot be granted except in the following exceptions:
(i) where in case of public servant the order is violative of Article 311 ;
(ii) where the reinstatement is sought under the Industrial Disputes Act ;
(iii where statutory body or person acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provision of law ;
Another exception found was where the institution was a local or public authority.
It was further found that the Plaintiff had failed to make out special circumstances for granting her the relief of injunction. The appeal was dismissed.
The Plaintiff has come up in second appeal. It is contended that the Plaintiff had challenged the order of her removal before the authorities under the Act, wherein a declaration was granted to her that the order of her removal was bad. Resultantly, she joined the service on 25.9.1986 and worked upto 3l.12.1987, when she was relieved on her own request and she had joined Government service on 1.1.1988.
Counsel for the Respondents states that in view of the above facts the suit has become infructuous.
It is contended by the counsel for the appellent that the suit has not become infructuous but the relief has to be moulded in terms of the circumstances which have come into existence during the pendency of the suit It is contended that the Court may grant a declaration where it may not be possible to grant an injunction.
It is not disputed at the Bar that while granting a declaration the Court can grant damages.
It has been observed in Rameshwar v. Jot Ram1, that the rights of the parties have to be determined on the date of the suit and Defendants cannot be permitted to defeat the right of the Plaintiff after the suit. The only impact of the subsequent events which can be taken notice of is its bearing on the right of action and the nature of relief or on its potency to create or destroy the substantive right It was observed that the party claiming a relief or change of relief must have same right from which either of the two remedies that is the changed relief or the relief earlier sought may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be continutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have already vested in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change in the law and it is made applicable at any stage. It was further observed that the Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them shape the reliefs but cannot deny rights. No Court will countenance a party altering by his own manipulation a change in situation and plead for a relief on the altered basis.
It is not disputed that the lower appellate Court found the election of Defendants Nos. 4 and 5 as illegal and void and in violation of the Memorandum of the Society Defendant No. 1. The said finding has not been challenged seriously before me. It is further not disputed that the order of her removal was passed during the pendency of the suit in violation of the Act and it was so found by the authorities under the Act. The said finding has been accepted as final by Defendant No. 1.
Counsel for the Respondents contends that the Plaintiff cannot be made unduly rich by awarding her the salary for the period for which she had not worked. Alternatively, another person had been working to whom the salary had been paid. If the relief of awarding compensation for the period she had not worked is granted, it will adversely affect the educational institution financially. The Defendant No. 1 is a charitable institution and is imparting education. He relies upon Vaish Decree College v. Lakshmi Narain (supra).
Keeping the facts and circumstances stated above in view, I am of the considered opinion that the ends of justice will be squarely met by granting a token damages of Rs. 5,000/- against Respondents Nos. 1, 4 and 5 jointly and severally. Modifying the relief claimed in the suit, I grant a declaration that the Plaintiff shall be entitled to a taken damages of Rs. 5,000/- in full and final settlement of her claim against Respondents Nos. 1, 4 and 5.
In view of my above observations the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above and the suit is decreed as stated above. No order as to costs.