Smt. Vijaya Nahata vs Raipur Development Authority and Another

T.P. Sharma, J.—This second appeal is directed against the judgment & decree dated 10.11.1994 passed by the Sixth Additional District Judge, Raipur, in Civil Appeal No. 22-A/94 affirming the judgment & decree dated 14.8.92 passed by the Third Civil Judge Class-II, Raipur, in Civil Suit No. 69A/88 whereby learned Third Civil Judge Class-II has granted decree of alternate relief of return of money.

Brief facts leading to filing of this appeal as per pleading of the parties is that, Respondent No. 1-Raipur Development Authority has invited applications for allotment of the lands for shops under Devendra Nagar Wholesale Cloth Market Scheme No. 32. The Appellant applied for such allotment of plot vide her application dated 27.6.1978 and has deposited a sum of Rs. 500/- towards registration fee. On 5.5.1981, Respondent No. 1 had issued one letter of proposed for allotment of plot No. G-8, area 785 Sq.ft. on payment of total Rs. 7350/- after deducting Rs. 500/- as registration fee. The Appellant has deposited Rs. 7350/- on 5.6.1981. The Appellant/Plaintiff severally requested to Respondent No. 1 for registration of plot and delivery of possession, but same was not replied by Respondent No. 1 till 1988. The Appellant was ready and willing to perform her part, but Respondent No. 1 has failed to perform its part. Suit for specific performance for allotment of plot and possession was filed by the Appellant/Plaintiff. During the course of pendency of the suit, the Appellant came to know that Respondent No. 1 has illegally allotted the suit plot to Respondent No. 2, then by subsequent amendment, the Appellant has impleaded Respondent No. 2 as party Respondent/Defendant. Respondent No. 1 has denied adverse allegation of the plaint and specifically pleaded that the Plaintiff has failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the proposal. She failed to get executed agreement and document in her favour. On the ground of non-compliance of terms and conditions of the proposal, the proposal was cancelled by Respondent/Defendant No. 1 and finally, land was allotted to Respondent No. 2 after following the procedure prescribed. Respondent No. 2 has also denied adverse allegation of the plaint and has specifically pleaded that the land in question has been allotted by Respondent No. 1 to him after following the procedure prescribed and he is in possession of the suit land.

On the basis of averments made by the parties, issues were framed, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the parties, suit for specific performance of contract was dismissed, but decree of alternate relief of return money was granted.

Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the decree, the present Appellant has preferred an appeal before the Sixth Additional District Judge, Raipur. Same was also dismissed by the judgment and decree impugned.

For the decision of the present appeal the following substantial questions of law and additional substantial question of law have been formulated vide orders dated 14.9.1995 & 12.10.2007:

Whether the Lower Appellate Court erred in law in holding for the allotment made in favour of the Plaintiff/Appellant was validly cancelled by the Respondent No. 1?

Whether the Lower Appellate Court erred in law in holding that the land was validly allotted in favour of Respondent No. 2?

Whether the Courts below committed an error in holding that since the Respondent No. 2 was allegedly a bonafide purchaser without notice of the title of the Appellants the above aspect could be ignored?

ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW:

Whether both the Courts below erred in refusing specific performance of contract under Section-16(C) of the Specific Relief Act upon a finding that the Appellant/Plaintiff had failed to prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the essential terms of the contract?

I have heard learned Counsel appearing for the parties and perused the judgment impugned and records of the Courts below.

Learned Counsel for the Appellant vehemently argued that applications were invited by Respondent No. 1 for allotment of the land for shops. The Appellant has filed an application for allotment of the land for shop on 27.6.1978 and deposited Rs. 500/- as registration fee. After receiving money, Respondent No. 1 has allotted the plot No. G-8 for construction of shop vide its allotment order/memo (Ex.P/4) with a condition that the Appellant shall deposits Rs. 7350/- after deducting registration charge of Rs. 500/- on or before 5.6.81. In compliance of the order/memo (Ex.P/4), the Appellant has deposited Rs. 7350/- and Rs. 126 as annual Nazul rent vide receipt (Ex.P/5) on 4.6.81. The Appellant has also deposited Rs. 1,000/- for construction of shop vide Ex. P/3. The Appellant regularly made request to Respondent No. 1 since 1982 to till 1988 for construction of shop and allotment vide its request (Exs.P/6 to P/17) and finally the Appellant has requested that if construction of shop is not possible then plot be allotted to her. The Appellant/ Plaintiff was ready and willing to perform her part of the contract, but Respondent No. 1 has failed to allot the plot and perform its part of the contract. She finally filed civil suit. Learned Counsel further argued that Respondent No. 1 was not authorized to cancel the allotment of the Appellant or allot the land to Respondent No. 2 without following the procedure prescribed. Respondent No. 1 has not followed the procedure prescribed in making the allotment of shop to Respondent No. 2. Learned Counsel also argued that order of cancellation of allotment has not been served upon the Appellant. The question of limitation has been decided by the Courts below as negative and no substantial issue has been framed for decision of this appeal, therefore, the Respondents cannot raise issue of limitation before this Court.

Learned Counsel placed reliance in the matter of Kirpal Singh Vs. Mst. Kartaro and Others, in which the High Court of Rajasthan has held that in the suit for specific performance of the contract it is the duty of the Plaintiff to aver and prove that he was ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract. Learned Counsel further placed reliance in the matter of Surya Narain Upadhyaya Vs. Ram Roop Pandey and others, in which the Apex Court has held that the Plaintiff deposited the balance of sale amount in Court and pleaded readiness and willingness is sufficient to prove readiness and willingness in case of specific performance of contract. Learned Counsel also placed reliance in the matter of A. Abdul Rashid Khan (Dead) and Others Vs. P.A.K.A. Shahul Hamid and Others, in which it has been held by the Apex Court that in case of an agreement by one joint owner relating to joint property, other vender and joint-owner are bound at least to the extent of the share of the said joint-owner. Learned Counsel also relied the matter of Sakhahari Parwatrao Karahale and Anr. v. Bhimashankar Parwatrao Karahale, (2002) 9 SCC 608 in which it has been held by the Apex Court that in second appeal, scope of interference is limited and concurrent findings of facts of the two courts below cannot be disturbed without any issue relating to said finding. Issue not framed in appellate Court is not permissible at the stage of second appeal.

On the other hand, learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 argued that Respondent No. 1 has complied with the law applicable for allotment of the land for shop. Applications for allotment of the land for shops were invited. The Appellant has also applied for allotment of the land/plot and on the basis of her application, proposal for allotment of the land was given to the Appellant vide Ex. P/4. The Appellant has deposited Rs. 7350/- as required by memo (Ex.P/4). She was under obligation to contract to Respondent No. 1 for execution of deed of allotment of the land, but the Appellant has failed to comply with the procedure prescribed for allotment of the land. Without any demand or direction, the Appellant has deposited Rs. 1000/-. The claim was for allotment of plot and not for shop or construction of shop. Letters (Exs.P/6 to P/1 7) filed by the Appellants reveal that she has requested for construction of shop and handing over of the possession of the shop which was not under the scheme, therefore, any construction of the shop or allotment of shop was not possible by Respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 1 has neither proposed for construction of shop nor for any construction of shop, therefore, he was not under obligation to construct and deliver the shop to the Appellant. Proposal (Ex.P/4) has been served upon the Appellant on her given address and when the Appellant failed to comply with the provisions then cancellation of proposal was also sent to the Appellant in the same address, but same has been returned back with an endorsement that addressee is not traceable. In case of any change of address, the Plaintiff/Appellant was under obligation to intimate Respondent No. 1 of his change address. In the absence of any new address, letter written in the given address by the Appellant/Plaintiff shall be presumed the service of notice. Learned Counsel further argued that the present suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. Respondent No. 1 has allotted the land to Respondent No. 2 after following procedure prescribed, therefore, the present Appellant is not entitled for any relief as claimed by her.

Learned Counsel placed reliance in the matter of Mayawanti Vs. Kaushalya Devi, in which the Apex Court held that while suit for specific performance there must be a valid and binding contract between the parties in respect of which parties should be consensus ad idem. Burdon of proof is on Plaintiff seeking specific performance of the contract. Opposite party may take any defence available under law.

Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 2 vehemently argued that the Plaintiff/Appellant has utterly failed to perform her part of the contract. According to Exs.P/6 to P/17, she has requested several times to Respondent No. 1 for construction of shop and delivery of possession, but not for allotment of the land. There was no valid contract between the Plaintiff and Respondent No. 1 for construction and delivery of possession of the shop and in the absence of any contract, any construction of shop or delivery of possession of shop was not legally possible. In the year 1988 after canceling the proposal for allotment of the Appellant/Plaintiff after following the procedure prescribed, Respondent No. 1 has allotted the plot to Respondent No. 2.

Learned Counsel placed reliance in the matter of Smt. Sandhya Rani Sarkar Vs. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi and Others, in which the Apex Court has held that in case of inordinate delay on the part of the Plaintiff to perform his contract, the decree for specific performance may be refused. Learned Counsel further placed reliance in the matter of N.P. Thirugnanam (D) by L.Rs., Vs. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao and others, in which it has been held by the Apex Court that ready and willingness to perform the part of contract by the Plaintiff must be proved. In the absence of such ingredients, dismissal for suit for specific performance is justified. Learned Counsel also placed reliance in the matter of Citi Bank N.A. Vs. Standard Chartered Bank and Others, in which it has also been held by the Apex Court that novation, rescission and alternation of contracts, can be done only with the agreement of both the parties and not unilaterally. Learned Counsel relied upon the matter of V. Raja Kumari Vs. P. Subbarama Naidu and Another, in which it has also been held by the Apex Court that notice dispatched by sender by post with correct address on it, it can be deemed to be served on sendee unless he proves that it was not really served. Learned Counsel placed reliance in the matter of M/s. Madan and Co. Vs. Wazir Jaivir Chand, in which it has also been held by the Apex Court that once notice is dispatched by registered post, the same is presumed to have been delivered to the tenant. Even if the notice returns to the landlord due to non-availability of the tenant or person authorised by the tenant, landlord has no further obligation to get it affixed on the demised premises. Learned Counsel further placed reliance in the matter of State of M.P. Vs. Hiralal and Others, in which it has also been held by the Apex Court that notice sent to the addressee returned with postal remarks "not available in the house", "house locked" and "shop closed" must be deemed to have been served on the person. Learned Counsel also placed reliance in the matter of Shri Ravinder Kumar Sharma Vs. The State of Assam and Others, in which it has been held by the Apex Court that without filing any cross-objection or cross-appeal, the Defendant/Respondent can contest and attack upon the finding on which the part of decree against him was based. Learned counsel relied upon the matter of Banarsi and Others Vs. Ram Phal, in which it has been held by the Apex Court that if the decree is partly in favour of the Appellant and partly in favour of the Respondent, then filing of appeal or cross-objection against that part of decree which is against him is necessary. Learned Counsel placed reliance in the matter of Ganesh Shet Vs. Dr. C.S.G.K. Setty and Others, in which it has also been held by the Apex Court that decree of grant of relief of specific performance is discretionary relief and in case of different between contract, pleaded and proved, the Court should not exercise its direction to grant a decree for specific performance. Learned Counsel further placed reliance in the matter of Manjunath Anandappa Urf. Shivappa Hanasi Vs. Tammanasa and Others, in which it has also been held by the Apex Court that averment of readiness and willingness to perform the part of contract is statutory requirement of making and proving.

In the present case, the Appellant has lost her case before the trial Court as well as before the first appellate Court for specific performances of contract. The document which has been pleaded and proved by the Appellant/Plaintiff as Ex. P/4 which reveals that Respondent No. 1 has proposed for allotment of plot No. G-8 to the Appellant on complying the following conditions;

(i) payment of Rs. 7350/-on or before 5.6.81,

(ii) annual Nazul rent of Rs. 126/- per annum. This document (Ex.P/4) has been relied upon by both the parties. In compliance to the document (Ex.P/4), the Appellant has deposited Rs. 7350/- and Rs. 126/- vide Ex. P/5 on 4.6.1981. It clearly shows that the Appellant has complied with the condition of Ex. P/4. Ex. P/4 clearly revels that the Appellant shall pay the aforesaid amount and secured her allotment of the plot. The contents of the document clearly reveal that this is a counter proposal on the basis of proposal made by the Appellant vide her letter dated 27.6.1978. After accepting the counter proposal, execution of agreement or document of concluded contract was necessary.

Admittedly, Respondent No. 1 is the State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and expressed contract by or against the State or its instrumentality is sine qua non in accordance with the provisions of Article 299 of the Constitution of India. Article 12 and 299 reads as under:

Article 12. Definition.--In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, "the State" includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States, and all local or other authorities within the territory of Indian or under the control of the Government of India.

Article 299. Contracts.--(1) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive power of the Union or of a State shall be expressed to be made by the President, or by the Governor of the State, as the case may be, and all such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that power shall be executed on behalf of the President or the Governor by such persons and in such manner as he may direct or authorise.

(2) Neither the President nor the Governor shall be personally liable in respect of any contract or assurance made or executed for the proposes of this Constitution, or for the purposes of any enactment relating to the Government of Indian heretofore in force, nor shall any person making or executing any such contract or assurance on behalf of any of them, be personally liable in respect thereof.

Chhattisgarh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Vikasit Bhoomiyo, Griho, Bhavano Tatha Anya Sanrachanao Ka Vyayan Niyam, 1975 (in short ''Niyam, 1975'') deals with the disposal of the land. Rule 3 of Niyam, 1975 provides that no Government land vested in or managed by the Authority shall be transferred except with the general or special sanction of the State Government given in that behalf. Rule 5 of the Niyam, 1975 provides the mode of transfer. Rule 6(1) and (2) of the Niyam, 1975 deals with the disposal of land by direct negotiations. Sub-rule (8) of Rule 6 of Niyam, 1975 makes the provisions that the lessee is required to deposit registration charges and cost of map and shall make good the deficiency, if any at the time of registration.

Rule 33 of the Niyam, 1975 provides that when the plot becomes ready for delivery and it is so notified by the Authority, the purchaser shall obtain permission of the plot within 60 days of the receipt of notice and shall obtain sale deed from the Authority. The purchaser shall bear all costs of getting it duly registered. Rule 34 of the Niyam, 1975 provides that in all cases, the stamp duty payable for its registration in respect of lease deed and the cost of the maps annexed to the lease deed as may be fixed by the Authority shall be payable by the lessee. The lessee shall attend the office of the Authority and the office of the Sub-Registrar for the execution and registration of the lease deed when required by the Authority or by the Government in case of Nazul plots either in person or through an agent having valid power of attorney empowering him to execute the lease and present it for registration or admit its execution on Ms behalf. Rule 51 of the Niyam, 1975 deals with the cancellation of lease in case of lessee failed to comply with the provisions.

Much stress has been given by the Appellant upon the notice/request (Exs. P/6 to P/17A) sent by the Appellant to Respondent No. 1. From perusal of Exs.P/6 to P/10, it reveals that the Appellant had specifically claimed that Respondent No. 1 shall construct the shop and hand over the possession. It also reveals that other shops have been constructed, but Respondent No. 1 has not started construction over her plot. Ex. P/11 reveals that Respondent No. 1 has not complied with the terms of memorandum (Ex.P/4). Exs. P/12 to P/17 are also substantially related to the aforesaid demand. Power of Attorney Holder of the Appellant Chandanmal Nahta (PW-1) who is husband of the Appellant has specifically deposed that he has written the aforesaid letters in connection with the memorandum (Ex.P/4). Document Ex. P/4 is plain unambiguous counter proposal/memorandum relating to the allotment of the plot for construction of the shop. Respondent No. 1 has not made assurance in Ex. P/4 that it will construct shop upon the plot allotted to the Appellant. The Appellant has not adduced any document to show the execution of other agreement between the Appellant and Respondent No. 1 for construction of shop over plot No.G-8. Respondent No. 1 has not replied Exs.P/6 to P/17 written by the Appellant or has not admitted in any document that they have agreed to construct the shop over the said plot. All notices/letters written on behalf of the Appellant clearly show that the Appellant has not written any letter or notice to Respondent No. 1 for performance of her part of contract, inter alia, Chandanmal Nahta (PW-1) has specifically admitted in para 13 of his evidence that other businessmen whom plots were allotted had constructed the shop, but contract of the Plaintiff with Respondent No. 1 was of special kind that RDA will construct shop for the Appellant/Plaintiff.

This is not a case where representative of the Appellant has never visited the office of Respondent No. 1. Rule 33 and 34 of the Niyam, 1975 provides the mode of registration of deed and lessee was required to attend the office of the Authority and the office of the Sub-Registrar for the execution and registration of the lease deed when required by the Authority. Rule 33 of the Niyam, 1975 also provides within 60 days of the receipt of notice and, the lessee is required to obtain sale deed from the Authority. The Appellant is resident of the same city where the office of Respondent No. 1 is situated. The Appellant has written several letters through her attorney or representative and has contacted to Respondent No. 1 basing her case upon Ex. P/4 alleged counter proposal, but has specifically claimed construction of shop. The Appellant has placed reliance upon one receipt Ex. P/3 which reveals that Rs. 1000/- has been received by Respondent No. 1 from the Appellant for construction of shop at Devendra Nagar 32, but the Appellant has not adduced any evidence to show that why she has deposited Rs. 1000/- for construction of shop when the money was not demanded by Respondent No. 1. The Appellant and Respondent No. 1 have not agreed to construct shop upon plot No. G-8 or any other plot and in the absence of any agreement for construction of shop or demand by Respondent No. 1, receipt (Ex.P/3) is of no use to the Appellant.

Much stress has been given by Respondent No. 2 relating to service of notice. While placing reliance in the matter of State of M.P. (supra), the Apex Court has held that notice sent to the addressee returned with postal remarks "not available in the house", "house locked" and "shop closed" must be deemed to have been served on the person.

In the present case, notices have been issued by Respondent No. 1 to the Appellant, but the same has been returned back with an endorsement that addressee not traceable (? ?). Both the Courts below have arrived at concurrent finding that notice sent by Respondent No. 1 has not served upon the Appellant. No substantial question of law has not been framed relating to service of notice. In the absence of substantial question of law relating to service of notice and considering the concurrent finding of fact of two Courts below, I am unable to accept that notices have been served upon the Appellant.

Both the Courts below have arrived at finding that the present Appellant was not ready and willing to perform her part of contract for last 8 years, therefore, she is not entitled for any decree for specific performance of contract. According to Rule 33 and 34 of Niyam, 1975, the Appellant was under obligation to attend the office for execution of concluded contract. The Appellant is resident of Raipur where the office of Respondent No. 1 is situated. The Appellant has sent several letters through her attorney or agent which are Exs.P/6 to P/17.

This is not a case where contract with Respondent No. 1 was not possible on account of any cause or the Appellant has tried her level best to attend Respondent''s office for execution of concluded contract but Respondent No. 1 had denied for execution of such concluded contract. In the present case, reason best known to the Appellant, the Appellant has not attended the office of Respondent No. 1 even knowing well that others allottee have started construction over the plots adjoining to the suit plot for execution of concluded contract on the basis of counter proposal (Ex. P/4), but has written letters to Respondent No. 1 for construction of shop. It shows that the present Appellant was never ready and willing to perform her part of contract for last 8 years and finally Respondent No. 1 has cancelled the plot and allotted the plot to Respondent No. 2. Substantially the claim of the Plaintiff/Appellant was for specific performance of contract and Respondent No. 2 has been made party on the ground that Respondent No. 1 has allotted the plot to Respondent No. 2.

As held by the Apex Court in the matters of Banarsi & Ravinder (supra), without filing any cross-objection or cross-appeal, the Defendant/Respondent can contest and attack upon the finding on which the part of decree against him was based.

In the present case, the Courts below have passed the alternate decree for recovery of return of money on the basis that notice has not been served upon the Appellant. Main claim of the Appellant has been denied by the Courts below, but substantial decree of return of money is against Respondent No. 1. In these circumstances, it was necessary for Respondent No. 1 to file cross-appeal, appeal or cross-objection against such part of decree which is substantially against him.

This is not a case where the decree is entirely in favour of Respondent No. 1 though an issue has been decided against Respondent No. 1. This is a case in which the decree is partly in favour of the Appellant and partly in favour of Respondent No. 1. While dealing with the question of necessity of filing of cross-appeal or cross-objection, the Apex Court in the matter of Banarsi (supra) has held that if the decree is partly in favour of the Appellant and partly in favour of the Respondent, then filing of appeal or cross-objection against that part of decree which is against him is necessary. Para 10 & 11 of the said judgment reads thus:

The CPC amendment of 1976 has not materially or substantially altered the law except for a marginal difference. Even under the amended Order 41 Rule 22 Sub-rule (1) a party in whose favour the decree stands in its entirety is neither entitled nor obliged to prefer any cross-objection. However, the insertion made in the test of Sub-rule (1) makes it permissible to file a cross-objection against a finding. The difference which has resulted we will shortly state. A Respondent may defend himself without filing any cross-objection to the extent to which decree is in his favour; however, if he proposes to attack any part of the decree he must take cross-objection. The amendment inserted by the 1976 amendment is clarificatory and also enabling and this may be made precise by analyzing the provision. There may be three situations:

(i) The impugned decree is partly in favour of the Appellant and partly in favour of the Respondent.

(ii) The decree is entirely in favour of the Respondent though an issue has been decided against the Respondent.

(iii) The decree is entirely in favour of the Respondent and all the issues have also been answered in favour of the Respondent but there is a finding in the judgment which goes against the Respondent.

In the type of case (i) it was necessary for the Respondent to file an appeal or take cross-objection against that part of the decree which is against him if he seeks to get rid of the same though that part of the decree which is in his favour he is entitled to support without taking any cross-objection.

The law remains so post-amendment too. In the type of cases (ii) and (iii) pre-amendment CPC did not entitle nor permit the Respondent to take any cross-objection as he was not the person aggrieved by the decree. Under the amendment Code of Civil Procedure, read in the light of the explanation, though it is still not necessary for the Respondent to take any cross-objection laying challenge to any finding adverse to him as the decree is entirely in his favour and he may support the decree without cross-objection; the amendment made in the text of Sub-rule (1), read with the explanation newly inserted, gives him a right to take cross-objection to a finding recorded against him either while answering an issue or while dealing with an issue. The advantage of preferring such cross-objection is spelled out by Sub-rule (4). In spite of the original appeal having been withdrawn or dismissed for default the cross-objection taken no any finding by the Respondent shall still be available to be adjudicated upon on merits which remedy was not available to the Respondent under the unamended Code of Civil Procedure. In the pre-amendment era, the withdrawal or dismissal for default of the original appeal disabled the Respondent to question the correctness or otherwise of any finding recorded against the Respondent.

In the absence of any appeal, cross-appeal or cross-objection, any claim of dismissal of suit against the Respondents is not possible.

While dealing with the question of willingness of purchaser to pay consideration, the Apex Court in the matter of Surya (supra) has held that after paying the cost of land failure of purchaser to pay sufficient Court-fee does not disentitle the purchaser for suit for specific performance of the contract.

In the mater of A. Abdul (supra), the Apex Court held that in case of agreement by one joint-owner for Sale of the land, other joint-owner/joint-holder are bound to execute the sale deed and perform the part to the extent of the share of said joint-holder, but in the present case concluded contract was required to be executed between the Respondent-authority and the Appellant in accordance with rule and rule provides that allottee shall approach to the office of Respondent No. 1 for execution of such concluded contract but the present Appellant has not attended and approached the Respondent''s office for last 8 years for execution of concluded contract and in the absence of any concluded contract, grant of decree in favour of the Appellant would not be possible. Facts of the case of A. Abdul (supra) is distinguishable on the facts of the present case.

In the matter of N.P. Thirugnanam (D) (supra), the Apex Court has held that purchaser has required to show ready and willing to perform his part of contract, but in the present case purchaser has not proved the fact that even she was ready and willing to perform her part of contract.

In the matter of Ganesh (supra), the Apex Court has held that grant of relief of specific performance is discretionary and even on the prove facts, grant of such decree is not necessary. In the present case, the Appellant has not proved her ready and willingness to perform her part of contract.

Grant of decree for specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief and even on the proved case, the Court is not under obligation to grant such relief if such grant would cause hardship to any party or cause any injury.

In the present case, Respondent No. 1 is authority and juristic person and is under obligation to follow and comply with the rules prescribed. The present Appellant has not proved her, ready and willingness for execution of concluded contract for last 8 years and after lapse of such longtime, grant of decree for specific performance of contract has been rightly denied by the Courts below. The Courts below have rightly decreed the suit for return of money along with interest of 12%. The Courts below have held that Respondent No. 1 has rightly cancelled the allotment and has validly allotted the plot to Respondent No. 2. The Courts below have also held that Respondent No. 2 is a bonafide alottee in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the absence of readiness and willingness on the part of the Appellant, Courts below have not erred in holding that Respondent No. 1 validly cancelled the proposed counter made in favour of the Appellant and have not erred in holding that the land was validly allotted in favour of Respondent.

In the present case, question of bonafide purchaser or validly of allotment to Respondent No. 2 is not substantial dispute of this case, but the evidence shows that Respondent No. 2 was a bonafide purchaser.

On the basis of aforesaid discussion, substantial questions of law and additional substantial question of law formulated for decision of this appeal are decided as negative.

As a result of finding on substantial questions of law, the appeal is liable to be dismissed and it is hereby dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. Advocate fee as per schedule.

Decree be drawn up accordingly.