Smt. Wali vs Dolu

R.S. Pathak, C.J.—This is a landowner''s second appeal u/s 104 of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Land Reforms Act arising out of a proceeding u/s 11(1) of that Act.

The Respondent applied u/s 11 of the aforesaid Act for the acquisition of proprietary rights in the land in dispute. The Appellant, who is the landowner of the said land, resisted the application on the ground that she was a widow and had no other means of livelihood and was therefore entitled to the benefit of Section 11(2) of the Act. The Compensation Officer allowed the Respondent''s application and made an order granting proprietary rights on payment of compensation. An appeal by the landowner has been dismissed by the learned District Judge. And now this second appeal.

The learned District Judge has held that the Appellant has failed to prove that she had no other means of livelihood and that therefore she was entitled to the benefit u/s 11(2) of the Act. It appears that the Appellant admitted that she had land in villages Soja and Bhatwari, but nowhere did she allege that the land in dispute was the only land owned by her in village Soja nor did she produce any evidence to indicate what was her income from the land in village Bhatwari. It seems that during the proceedings she admitted at first that the income from the land was sufficient, but subsequently changed the statement and said that her income was not sufficient. The burden of proving that she came within the exception carved out by Section 11(2) of the Act lay on her, and after admitting that she was the owner of land apart from the land in dispute she was plainly obliged to disclose what was the quantum of income derived by her from those lands. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contends that the expression in Section 11(2) of the Act "no other means of livelihood" must be construed as referring to property other than agricultural land and, it is urged, even though the Appellant could be said to own land other than the land in dispute those lands could not be taken into consideration for determining whether she had other means of "livelihood". Learned Counsel relies on Ghunli v. Puran 1970 D.L.T. 433. I have been taken through the judgment in that case, but I am unable to see how it supports the contention of learned Counsel. The expression "other means of livelihood" in Section 11(2) of the Act is capable of the widest meaning and must be construed to refer to all sources of income on the basis of which one''s livelihood may rest. It is not possible to accept the proposition that agricultural land cannot constitute a means of livelihood. In fact, Section 11(2) itself contemplates that it can, when it refers to "other" means of livelihood. It implies that the agricultural land in dispute is itself a means of livelihood and that for the purposes of Section 11(2) it has been excepted. That is the only contention raised before me, and as it fails this appeal must be dismissed.

The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances there is no order as to costs.