AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Both the petitions are preferred by the same petitioner challenging the two FIRs filed against her, being similar in nature is taken up together for
hearing and disposed of by this common order and judgment. Heard Mr. J. Borbhuiya, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A. M. Mojumdar,
learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent and also Mr. A. M. Borah, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3.
Necessary facts to decide the matter in issue, without narrating all details as averred in the petition can be discussed as below.
The petitioner herein is working as a Deputy Superintendent of Excise at Gohpur, Sonitpur and prior to that she was working at Margherita. Raising
certain allegations of molestation etc. against the respondent No. 3, the petitioner filed a complaint on 19.05.2011, before the Director General of
Police, Assam which was subsequently got registered as CID P.S. Case No. 95/2011 under Section 341/354/506 IPC. It is stated by the petitioner that
the respondent No. 3 also filed an First Information Report(FIR) on 30.08.2011, as a counterblast against the petitioner which was registered as
Karimganj P.S. Case No. 483/2011 under Section 120 B/384/385/389/353 IPC read with Section 66 A of the Information and Technology Act, 2008.
But ultimately both the cases ended at final report. The petitioner has challenged the final report that was filed in her case by way of filing protest
petition and the learned Court, however, accept the final report submitted in her case challenging the same, she preferred revision before the
Hon’ble High Court, which is pending. The respondent No. 3, however, did not challenged the final report that was filed against case.
The petitioner feeling humiliated for the case filed by the respondent No. 3, which has ruined her name and fame in the society, she filed a
Defamation Case bearing Civil Suit vide Title Suit No. 70/2015 against the respondent No. 3, seeking appropriate relief for bringing false and fictitious
allegations against her. The learned Court had issued summon to the respondent No. 3, to appear before the Court and on her prayer the Court also
allowed to serve the notice by way of Dasti Service for causing personal service of the summon upon him fixing the next date on 03.02.2016.
Accordingly with a view to serve the notice upon the respondent No. 3, she went to the Dhubri on 19.12.2015, where the respondent No. 3 was
working as a Superintendent of Police, Dhubri, along with her counsel to cause service of summon in connection with the said case. But on her
approach to the Office of the respondent No. 3, she was detained forcefully by the Police authority at the behest of the respondent No. 3 and instead
of receiving the summon by misusing his power, respondent No. 3 had lodged two Nos. of FIRs through his subordinate constables on 19.12.2015, vide
Dhubri P.S. Case No. 1589/15 under Section 120 B/352/353/448/294/509/506 IPC and Dhubri P.S. Case No. 1590/2015 under Section 120
B/447/294/352/353 IPC, dated 20.12.2015. Challenging the aforesaid two First Information Reports(FIRs) as false and fictitious, the present two
Criminal petitions have been filed with a prayer for quashing the said First Information Report(FIR).
The sole contention that has been raised by Mr. J. I. Borbhuiya, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the two impugned FIRs are false and
vexatious and the same has been lodged as a weapon for institution of defamation case vide Title Suit No. 70/2015, against respondent No. 3, with a
view to cause unnecessary harassment upon the petitioner and to take revenge under the influence of the superior officer, i.e., the S.P., Dhubri.
Further it has been argued that none of the offence is attracted as against the present petitioner and the same has been filed basing on some imaginary
allegation, where there is no any legal evidence and prima facie material to constitute the offence alleged. Accordingly, it has been submitted that by
invoking the power under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, this Court should couched the abuse of power which has been malafidely
used by the superior officer through the subordinate employee to file false and fictitious FIR. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has
relied upon the following decisions -
(1) 2009 (9) SCC page-682, M. N. Ojha & Ors. Vs. Alok Kumar Srivastav & Anr.
(2) 2009 (14) SCC page- 466, Shakson Belthissor Vs. State of Kerala & Anr.
(3) 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors.
(4) 2005 (13) SCC Page-540, State of Orissa & Anr. Vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo.
(5) 2013 (10) SCC page- 465, Subramanjan Swamy & Ors. Vs. Raju through member, Juvenile Justice Board & Anr.
(6) SLP (Crl) 008937/2017 Sunanda Pushkar Case. Delhi High Court.
(7) W.P. (Crl) 1938/2017 & Crl. MAs. â€" 11712/2017 Subramaniam Swami page- 18.
(8) Simranjit Singh Vs. Union of India & Anr. decided on 16/9/1992.
In M. N. Ojha (supra) it has been held that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot go into the truth or
otherwise of the allegations and appreciate the evidence if any available on record. Normally, the High Court would not intervene in the criminal
proceedings at the preliminary stage, when the investigation/enquiry is pending. Interference by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. can only be where a clear case for such interference is made out. Frequent and uncalled for interference even at the preliminary
stage by the High Court may result in causing obstruction in progress of the inquiry in a criminal case which may not be in the public interest. But at
the same time the High Court cannot refuse to exercise its jurisdiction if the interest of justice so required where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no fair minded and informed observer can ever reach a just and proper
conclusion as to existence of sufficient ground for proceeding.
Similar view has been endorsed in all the cases referred by the petitioner that the Court can invoke the provision of Section 482 only when the
allegation in the complaint petition/the FIR does not make out a prima facie case for proceeding.
The learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Borah, has however vehemently opposed such contention of the petitioner that there is nothing to show
that the FIR was filed at the behest of the superior officer and bare reading of the FIR, certainly make out a prima facie case that the accused
person/the petitioner has committed the offence.
Mr. Bora further contended that the investigation is at the initial stage and there is sufficient evidence in support of the case of the informant and
the falsity of the case cannot be assessed at the stage which is a subject matter of trial. Simply because of the claim of the petitioner that the case has
been filed out of grudge, the Court should not interfere into the investigation while a strong prima facie case has been made out against the petitioner.
As per the FIR, relating to the Dhubri P.S. Case No. 1585/15, the plea of the petitioner is that she simply went to the office of the S.P./respondent
No. 3 to serve the summons upon the respondent No. 3, but she could not serve the summon and had to return without serving the notice and she did
nothing. But there is ample evidence in support of the case of the informant that as soon as the employee of the office, that is, the informant requested
the petitioner to wait till the permission of the S.P. is taken, then the petitioner became aggressive and physically assaulted the informant and also
abused her in bad language and thereafter forcefully entered into the office chamber of the S.P. and thereby debarred the informant from discharging
her official duty. Such an averment in FIR, stated by witnesses, prima facie make out an offence as alleged in the FIR, according to the learned
counsel for the respondent.
On the next, it is submitted the petitioner herself failed to make out any ground as to why after the said incident in the office of the S.P. on day
time, she went to the house of the respondent No. 3 at night. The petition is silent on the aspect so the mere challenge to the subsequent First
Information Report(FIR), dated 20.12.2016, is not sustainable. It has been pointed out the petitioner went to the house of the respondent No. 3, at night
at about 10 o’clock and forcefully tried to enter his house at 2 o'clock at night, to which the women constable on duty had to debar her from such
forceful entry then and at this the petitioner by pushing the constable on duty entered into his house illegally, when she was arrested. With the above
facts, another FIR was filed, registered as Dhubri P.S. Case No. 1590/15. It contends that there is nothing on the part of petitioner to rebut the
allegation as against the content of the First Information Report(FIR), save and expect the denial of the incident.
It is a well established principle that every Court has inherent power to act ex devito justitiae to do the real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone it exist or to prevent abuse of process of Court. While exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the Court does not
concern as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction of the Court though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and only when such
exercise is justified by test specifically laid down in the Section itself, i.e., (i) to give effect to an order under the Code (ii) to prevent abuse of process
of Court (iii) to otherwise secure ends of justice. The exception is applied only when it is brought to the notice of the Court that great miscarriage of
justice committed if the trial is allowed to proceed, where the accused would be harassed unnecessarily if the trial is allowed to linger, when prima
facie it appears to Court the trial would ended in acquittal. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution.
The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is wide and if it is exercised judiciously and consciously, can take care of almost of all situations where
references by the High Court became necessary on account of delay in proceeding or any other reason amounting to oppression or harassment in any
trial and the Court can also examine whether there is legal evidence justifying conviction.
In Bhajan Lal (supra) certain guideline has been formulated when the power under Section 482 can be invoked to quash the FIR which is
mentioned below â€
102……………………
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section
155 (2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absured and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with
circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or
genuineness or other wise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary
jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.
The same principle relating to the exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the complain/criminal proceeding has been reiterated by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in several other pronouncement some of which can be mentioned below-
(1) Rupan Deol Bajaj Vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 194: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059
(2) CBI Vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., reported in (1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045
(3) State of Bihar Vs. Rajendra Agrawalla, reported in (1996) 8 SCC 164 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 628
(4) Rajesh Bajaj Vs. State NCT of Delhi, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401
(5) Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. Vs. Biological E. Ltd., reported in (2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615
(6) Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma Vs. State of Bihar, reported in (2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786
(7) M. Krishnan Vs. Vijay Singh, reported in (2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19
While according to the learned counsel for the petitioner present criminal proceeding has been initiated with malafide for wreaking vengeance of
the accused out of personal grudge of the respondent No. 3 but according to the learned counsel for the respondent, such an aspect cannot be
established at the stage whereas the allegations made in the FIR itself constituted prima facie offence against the petitioner. The Court cannot embark
upon enquiry as to the genuineness of the allegation made in the FIR in view of the above guideline. It contends that this case does not fall anyone of
the categories formulated above calling for exercise of extra-ordinary or inherent power of the Court to quash the FIR.
The sum and substance of all the decisions is based on the same principle that has been pronounced in the Bhajan Lal case.
It has been reiterated that the Court in exercise of his jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C., cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations and
appreciate the evidence if any, by the Court meticulously. Normally High Court should refrain itself from interfering in the criminal Proceeding when
the investigation is pending and cannot embark into an enquiry as to the allegations. In Pratibha Rani Vs. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370 it has been
held that for the purpose of exercising its power to quash an First Information Report(FIR), the High Court would have to proceed entirely on the
basis of the allegations made in the complain by the documents accompanying the same par se. It has no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or
otherwise of the allegations. Similarly in Saroj Kumar Sahu (supra), it has been held that when the investigation is incomplete it is impermissible for the
High Court to look into the materials acceptability of which is essentially a matter of trial.
Due consideration has been given to the rival contention of the parties and the legal proposition ennulciated on the power and scope of invoking the
provision of Section 482 Cr.P.C. This Court also carefully gone through the materials in both the case diaries pertaining to the aforesaid cases that
have been placed before this Court for proper appraisal of the matter. It is to be noted in both the cases sufficient witnesses has been examined by the
I.O. who has supported the contention raised by the respective informants, to constitute a prima facie allegation against the present petitioner. The
allegation made in the complaint, in my considered opinion do clearly constitute cognizable offence justifying the registration of the case and an
investigation thereon and the cases does not fall anyone of the category of cases formulated above calling for exercise of extra-ordinary or inherent
power of the High Court to quash the FIR itself. The authenticity of the dispute cannot be examined by this Court which is essentially subject matter
of the Trial Court.
The power of quashing criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that to in the rarest of rare cases, the
extra-ordinary or inherent power do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims. The Court will not justify in
embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in the FIR or complaint. In Minu Kumari & Anr. Vs.
State of Bihar & Ors reported in 2006 4 SCC 359, it has been held that inherent jurisdiction though wide but exercise of such jurisdiction is justified by
the case specifically laid down in Section 482. Such power to be exercised to prevent the process of the Court but not to be exercised stifle a
legitimate prosecution. Further it has been held that Section 482 of the procedure does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the
inherent power which the Court possessed and it envisage three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (I) to
give effect to an order under the Court, (II) to prevent the abuse of process of Court (III) to otherwise secure ends of justice. While exercising such
power, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision.
Exercise of powers under the Section would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds the initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of
process of Court or quashing of this proceeding would serve the ends of justice.
Turning to the matter in hand, as has been discussed above the learned Trial Court has rightly taken the cognizance on the basis of the evidence on
record and does not suffer from any sort of illegality or impropriety, continuance of which can be held as abuse of process of law nor the order of the
Revisional Court is improper, which may necessitate the interference into the matter by invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction u/s 482 Cr.P.C.
For the reasons mentioned above and the legal proposition laid down in the above decisions, it can be held that it is not fit case to invoke the
inherent jurisdiction of the Court, as sought for. Resultantly, both the petitions stands dismissed. Return the LCR along with the CD.