S.N. Sharma vs State of H.P.

H.S. Thakur, J.—The Petitioner has filed this petition for the expunction of certain remarks made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Solan and Sirmaur Districts at Nalagarh, in case No. 3-NL/10 of 1982.

The relevant facts may be stated. The Petitioner was posted as Food Inspector for the area comprised in District Solan, and during the course of discharging his duties as such he took a sample of goat milk from one Shri Karam Chand of Tehsil Nalagarh. On analysis, the sample was found adulterated and a complaint against Karam Chand was filed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. The learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Nalagarh, by his order and judgment dated 28th August, 1979, found the accused guilty and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- failing which to undergo further simple imprisonment for three months. The accused preferred an appeal against the said judgment and the learned Additional Sessions Judge on July 24, 1982, accepted the appeal and acquitted the accused. In the course of his judgment, the learned Additional Sessions Judge made the following observations:

In the case in hand what appears is that the Food Inspector simply found out a short cut to make a statement as to the manner the sample was taken and sealed. This appears to have been done intentionally by the Food Inspector for the simple reason that when Ex. P. 6 as to taking of the sample had more details to some extent and in conformity with Rule 16, why he did not depose on those lines in the Court. He to my mind was in league with the accused and wanted the convict Appellant to get the benefit of the discrepancies in his statement.

Such like person does not deserve to be vested with the powers of Food Inspector because the intentional acts and omissions generally play havoc with the health of the society.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge consequently made an order that the copy of the said order be sent to the Director of Health Services, Shimla, to do the needful at his end for the betterment of the society and the public health.

It is pointed out by Mr. M. C. Mandhotra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, that the remarks made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge are not justified. It is pointed out by him that at the time when the Petitioner�s statement was recorded by the trial Court, he was not acting as a complainant since he had been transferred to Anr. place and was in fact summoned as a witness. It is contended that he was examined by the then Food Inspector Shri B. L. Jasta as a witness. It is further pointed out that the questions were put to the Petitioner by the then Food Inspector in the examination-in-chief and he correctly replied to those questions. The next contention of Mr. Mandhotra is that all the relevant documents had been, properly proved and exhibited by him in the case and no defect has been found therein. It is emphasised by Mr. Mandhotra that it was in fact the duty of defence counsel to cross-examine the Petitioner if there was any irregularity or illegality in the evidence. It is also contended that u/s 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, it may be presumed by a Court that the judicial and official acts have been properly performed. If it is so, no deliberate omission on the part of the Petitioner can be inferred.

Yet Anr. contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that disparaging remarks are made against the Petitioner without affording any opportunity to him.

I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also examined the record. The basic principles for making disparaging remarks against a person were considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in The State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Mohammad Naim, The relevant obser vations may be extractd :

...If there is one principle of cardinal importance. If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair-play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very qurpose for which they are made. It has been judicially recognized that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before Courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consid er (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the Court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognized that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve.

The Division Bench of this Court also in M.L. Ahuja and Others Vs. The State of Himachal Pradesh, has observed as under:

It is abundantly clear that a trial Court is expected to give only such remarks which are necessary to sustain a judicial finding. In other words, only such remarks need be made in the judgment which are in furtherance of the ends of the justice and not to fulfil any other object except deciding the case in a correct perspective so that appropriate finding is given. It is undisputed that the remarks should be borne out from evidene and must not be pure surmises and conjectures made by the Court. If the intention is to harm any public servant, or even if that intention is missing but the remarks made are reckless and are likely to jeopardise the interest of public service and endanger the prospect of a public servant and even injure his reputation or harm his official career, such remarks require to be expunged as they are no longer necessary. In other words, the remarks made by the trial judge should be bona fide and should be directed only to one and the only end, namely the dispensation of justice in trial.

A perusal of the record of the trial Court shows that the complaint was filed by the Petitioner as a Food Inspector but before his statement could be recorded, he was transferred to some other place and Anr. Food Inspector Shri B.L. Jasta took over as such, in his place. The prosecution of the accused was being conducted by Mr. Jasta. The Petitioner was examined as a witness on 7-11-1978. Since the Petitioner was examined as a witness, it can be presumed that his examina-tion-in-chief was conducted by Mr. Jasta. The Petitioner had to answer the questions put to him during the course of his examination-in-chief. The Petitioner was expected to reply to the questions put to him. No doubt, the Petitioner could explain all the details but perhaps he forgot to do so. Such a conduct on his part cannot be termed as intentional or mala fide. Moreover, the appeal could otherwise be also disposed of without making disparaging remarks against the Petitioner. There is also nothing on record to show that the Petitioner was given any opportunity to justify his conduct.

For the foregoing reasons, and bearing in mind the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions, I am of the view that there is no justification to retain these remarks. Under the circumstances, it is directed that the above-noted remarks be expunged and removed from the judgment. It may, however, be observed that the expunction of the aforesaid disparaging remarks from the judgment is without prejudice to the merits of the cate. The petition is accordingly allowed.