Sohan Singh vs Maiku Lal Gupta and Others

K.C. Agrawal, J.—By this petition Sohan Singh, who was the tenant of shop in premises No. 19 Johnstonganj, Allahabad, has challenged the orders of the Prescribed Authority dated 19-7-1973 and 17-4-1974. By these orders, the Prescribed Authority rejected the applications made by Sohan Singh for permission to serve interrogatories on Respondent No. 1 for discovery of certain facts.

The facts are these:

Premises No. 19 Johnstonganj, Allahabad, belongs to Maiku Lal, Respondent No. 1. It was allotted to the Petitioner in 1948 under the U.P. Act No. II of 1947. The Petitioner is carrying on the business of Chemist and Druggist in the said premises since 1948. On coming into force of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the new Act), the Respondent No. 1 filed an application u/s 21 of the said Act against the Petitioner for his eviction from the shop. Respondent No. 1 alleged that he had to support a big family and as the earnings made from the small shop run by him on the foot-path and the staircase was not sufficient for the livelihood of his family members hence he was intending to open a new shop in the premises in the tenancy of the Petitioner. The application was registered by the Petitioner. He denied that the shop was needed by Respondent No. 1 for his personal use alleging that the application was filed by Respondent No. 1 on frivolous, fabricated, manufactured and mala fide allegations.

Being advised that further facts were required to be brought to the notice of the Prescribed Authority for a proper and correct decision of the application made by Respondent No. 1, the Petitioner filed an application and sought leave of the Prescribed Authority to serve the interrogatories attached to the application. According to the Petitioner, the interrogatories were with regard to the facts peculiar to the special knowledge of Respondent No. 1 having vital and important bearing on the facts of the case.

The Prescribed Authority rejected the application on 19-7-1973 holding that Section 34(1)(d) of the new Act gave power to the court to take steps as provided in the CPC requiring the discovery and production of documents and that it did not confer any power on a party to serve interrogatories of certain facts. The Petitioner filed an appeal before the District Judge against the aforesaid order of the Prescribed Authority. The learned II Additional District Judge dismissed the appeal on 22-12-1973. He, however, made certain observations in the judgment to the effect that the word discovery used in Section 34(1)(d) did not necessarily mean discovery of documents alone, but it included discovery by interrogatories as well. Emblodened by the aforesaid observation of the learned District Judge, the Petitioner filed another application for leave to serve interrogatories on Respondent No. 1. This application was also rejected by the Prescribed Authority on 17-4-1974. Aggrieved by the aforesaid two orders of the Prescribed Authority, the Petitioner has come to this Court.

The question which arises for decision in the present case is about the scope and ambit of Section 34(1)(d) of the new Act. Section 34(1)(d) reads as under:

The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or any appellate authority shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:

(d) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

Two other provisions, which have bearing on the controversy in issue are contained in Rules 22 and 23 of the Rules framed under the new Act.

Order XI of the CPC deals with the discovery and inspection. After the issues have been framed each party is required to prove his case. For the purpose of proving his case, each party has been made entitled by Order XI of the CPC to serve questions on the adversary for the purpose of knowing their answers from him. This has been permitted by the CPC as the facts required to be answered are within the exclusive knowledge of the other party. Service of questions by a party on his adversary is known as discovery by interrogatories. Discovery of interrogatories is dealt in Rules 1 to 11 of Order XI of the Code of Civil Procedure. There is another kind of discovery, which is with regard to documents. This is known as discovery of documents. Discovery of documents has been provided in Rule 12 of Order XI of the Code of Civil Procedure. Procedure to discover documents has been, thereafter provided in various other rules of the same Order. Discovery of documents is followed by inspection and production of documents, which has also been dealt with in this very Order. The net result of the above discussion is that Order XI of the CPC deals with two types of discoveries, one discovery by interrogatories, and the other discovery by documents.

The question before me in this case is whether Section 34(1)(d) of the new Act provides for the discovery by interrogatories as well. The argument of the learned Counsel for the contesting Respondents was that Section 34 of the new Act dealt with discovery and production of documents alone and as the discovery by interrogatories had been deliberately excluded, therefore, the discovery by interrogatories could not be permitted in the instant case. The heading of Order XI of the CPC itself is ''Discovery and Inspection''. It appears to me that the word ''discovery'' has not been used in the instant case for the purpose of confining the discovery by documents alone. The word ''discovery'' was used in Section 34 in a wide sense covering discovery by interrogatories and discovery by documents. It was for the sake of convenience that in Section 34(1)(d) of the new Act the word ''discovery'' alone was mentioned instead of specifying the same by providing for discovery by documents and discovery by interrogatories. The legislature applied the CPC given in Order XI in the present proceedings. It may be relevant to point out that the proceedings under the new Act are generally of a nature where the discovery by interrogatories are likely to serve more purpose than the discovery by production of documents inasmuch as from the very nature the disputes raised under the new Act are not those where much of the documents would be required to be looked into or considered. The scheme of the Act indicates that the legislature intended to provide for a summary and expeditious remedy given by the Act. The object of the Act of providing summary remedy can be achieved by finding that the word ''discovery'' used in Section 34(1)(d) of the new Act should not be given a restricted or narrow meaning and that it should not be confined to discovery by documents alone. It is needless to point out that the purpose of providing the procedure of discovery by interrogatories is to shorten the litigation and to save the expenses. It enables a party to obtain an admission from his opponent, which nukes his burden of proof easier. Looking at the scheme of the Act and taking the context in which Section 34(1)(d) has been enacted, I find that the discovery provided for by Section 34(1)(d) of the new Act has to be given a wider meaning including discovery by interrogatories as well.

The argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondent that the word ''and'' used in Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the new Act necessarily means that discovery is meant for documents alone, does not impress me. It is true that the word ''and'' is normally used in conjunctive sense but there have been occasions when the word ''and'' have been used in a disjunctive sense whereas the word ''or'' has been used in a conjunctive sense. The rule of interpretation requires that the words should be given the meaning which makes the provisions workable and not absurd. In order to give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature as disclosed from the context in the present case, it is necessary to find that the word ''and should be read as ''or'' in the instant case. The Supreme Court had to deal with the above controversy on two occasions (1) In A.K. Gopalan Vs. The State of Madras, and (2) S. Krishnan and Others Vs. The State of Madras, . The Supreme Court held that the word ''and'' used in Article 22 of the Constitution being an enabling provision should be understood in a disjunctive sense. In order to give correct meaning to Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the new Act it is, therefore, necessary to read the word in a disjunctive sense in the present case.

It may, however be made clear that the whole of the provisions of Order XI of the CPC would become ipso facto applicable to the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority once it is held that the discovery by interrogatories is permissible in the proceedings under the new Act. This would empower the Prescribed Authority to scrutinise the questions which are served by a party on his opponent for being answered by the latter. The Prescribed Authority would be entitled to grant leave to serve only those questions on the opponent which are relevant for deciding the controversy. In this context it was pointed out that the procedure of service of interrogatories is often abused and results in delaying the proceedings. The Prescribed Authority, however, has ample power under Order XI CPC to strike off irrelevant or useless questions which may not have any bearing on the controversy involved in the case. In the present case as well, I find that the list of questions served by the Petitioner on Respondent No. 1 contains 40 questions. On being asked, learned Counsel for the Petitioner conceded that some of these questions might not be relevant. But, as it is not possible for me to go into the relevancy of the questions in these proceedings, I have refrained myself from doing so. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has, however, given me to understand that the Petitioner would reduce the number of interrogatories sought to be served on Respondent No. 1 to the minimum. I have no doubt that he would carry out the undertaking.

In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The orders of the Prescribed Authority dated 19-7-1973 and 17-4-1974 are quashed. The stay order is discharged. The parties to bear their own costs.