Sohan Singh vs Punjab and Haryana High Court

Tejinder Singh Dhindsa, J.—The petitioner has invoked the extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and prays for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing of the order dated 19.4.2012, Annexure P3, passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Ludhiana whereby his services while under probation have been dispensed with. Further challenge is to the order dated 16.11.2012, Annexure P4, whereby his service appeal against the order of discharge has been rejected. The petitioner was appointed as Clerk purely on temporary basis vide order dated 21.5.2010, Annexure P1. As per terms and conditions of the letter of appointment, the petitioner was to remain on probation for a period of two years. He was placed under suspension vide order dated 5.4.2012 and thereafter served with a charge sheet dated 10.4.2012 under Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970 read with Rule 12, Chapter 18-A of High Court Rules and Orders, Volume-I raising a specific article of charge. The charge sheet contained the statement of imputation as also the list of witnesses and list of documents. Prior to the petitioner having responded to the charge sheet, the impugned order dated 19.4.2012 has been passed dispensing him from service holding his work and conduct to be not satisfactory during the period of his probation. Insofar as his suspension period is concerned, the same has been directed to be treated as "non duty".

Mr. G.C. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that the impugned order is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and suffers from the vice of arbitrariness. It is contended that once the charge sheet had been issued levelling allegations of misconduct, it was incumbent upon the respondent-Authorities to have afforded a chance to the petitioner to furnish a response thereto and to conduct an enquiry into the allegation prior to forming an opinion to dispense with his services. It has been argued that the action of dropping the enquiry in the light of passing of the impugned order actually amounts to a methodology of having adopted a "short-cut" and such action is impermissible in law. That apart, it has been argued that on the face of it, the impugned order refers ostensibly to certain penalties that were imposed upon the petitioner and as such, the same is not an order of discharge simpliciter, but the same is stigmatic.

Per contra, Mr. Ashok Bhardwaj, Advocate for the respondents, would state that the petitioner was on probation and his work and conduct had not been found to be satisfactory and his services have been dispensed with strictly as per terms and conditions of the appointment letter dated 21.5.2010. Learned counsel further states that after the issuance of the charge sheet dated 10.4.2012, a report regarding the work and conduct of the petitioner had been called from the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ludhiana vide letter dated 11.4.2012. In response thereto, the concerned Judicial Officer had reported that the work and conduct of the petitioner is not satisfactory. It is submitted that, accordingly, the action of dropping of the enquiry proceedings was fully justified. Learned counsel would even refer to the impugned order of discharge wherein specific instances had been cited whereby the petitioner had been fined Rs. 500/-, Rs. 2000/- and Rs. 1000/- on different occasions vide order dated 1.6.2011, 14.7.2011 and 16.3.2012 respectively, under the provisions of the Punjab Courts Act for dereliction in duty. It is submitted that such facts would be a clear pointer towards the work and conduct of the petitioner being not upto the mark during the period of probation. Under such circumstances, learned counsel would argue that no case for interference against an order of discharge of a probationer is made out.

Learned counsel for the parties have been heard at length.

In Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satvendra Nath Bose National center for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and Others, it was held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court that the question as to whether an order of termination of a probationer is punitive or not depends as to whether the allegations which are the cause of the termination are the motive or foundation.

In Chaitanya Prakash and Another Vs. H. Omkarappa, the Apex Court had observed that even if an order of termination refers to unsatisfactory service of the concerned employee, the same could not be treated as stigmatic.

Adverting to the facts of the present case, a perusal of the impugned order would reveal that certain facts with regard to penalties having been imposed upon the petitioner for not having discharged his duties satisfactorily have been mentioned. This per se cannot be made the basis of holding the impugned order as stigmatic.

There is, however, another aspect of the matter. Admittedly, the petitioner had been issued a charge sheet levelling the following specific article of charge:

I, Gobinder Singh, District and Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, do hereby, charge sheet you, Sh. Sohan Singh, Addl. Ahlmad of the court of Dr. Balwinder Kumar Sharma, Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Ludhiana, that 1. Sh. Ranjit Kumar Jain, Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, vide his letter No. 1. Spl. Dated 05.04.2012 reported that he visited Ahlmad rooms of many courts. During the visit, he went to the Ahlmad room of Dr. Balwinder Kumar Sharma, Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Ludhiana and he found one Varun, Clerk of Advocate Sh. Yashbir Chaudhary, working with you (Sh. Sohan Singh).

Thus, you are prima facie guilty of grave negligence and conduct of unbecoming of a government employee.

Even though the respondent-Authorities have chosen not to go ahead with the enquiry that was initiated in terms of the charge sheet issued vide charge memo dated 10.4.2012, yet it would be pertinent to note that the same very allegation as contained in the charge memo has weighed heavily with the Punishing Authority while issuing the order of discharge. It would be useful to re-produce hereunder the relevant extract of the impugned order in this regard:

To have a check over the ministerial as well as other staff of this Sessions Division, a committee consisting Sh. Ranjit Kumar Jain, Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Ludhiana and Sh. Vikrant Kumar, Civil Judge (Jr. Divn), Ludhiana was constituted, in the month of April, 2012.

Under these delegated powers, Sh. Ranjit Kumar Jain, Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Ludhiana, vide his letter No. 1. Spl. Dated 05.04.2012 reported that he visited Ahlmad rooms of many courts. During the visit, he went to the Ahlmad room of Dr. Balwinder Kumar Sharma, Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Ludhiana and he found that one Varun Clerk of Advocate Sh. Yashbir Chaudhary, was working with Sh. Sohan Singh, Addl. Ahlmad.

Consequently, Sh. Sohan Singh, was placed under suspension, vide this office order dated 05.04.2012. Simultaneously, he was charge-sheeted, vide this office letter No. 3164/G dated 10.04.2012. A report about the work and conduct of Sh. Sohan Singh, was received from Dr. Balwinder Kumar Sharma, Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Ludhiana, whereby he observed that work and conduct of Sh. Sohan Singh is not satisfactory.

The same very allegation has worked to the prejudice of the petitioner even at the stage of rejection of the service appeal vide order dated 16.11.2012 on the administrative side by this Court which would be apparent from the following observations contained in the order:

During this period, it was noted by the Competent Authority that many a times, fine was imposed on him because of dereliction of duty and even without any authority, he was getting work from Clerk of some Advocate for his seat.

I am of the considered view that the impugned order of discharge dated 19.4.2012 is based upon a mis-conduct and there was, in fact, a live connection between the allegation of misconduct and discharge and which, in turn, would amount to a punishment for which a departmental enquiry was imperative. Reference in this regard may be made to the decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Anoop Jaiswal Vs. Government of India and Another, and Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan Vs. Mehbub Alam Laskar, It would have to be held that the allegation of grave negligence and conduct of unbecoming of a Government employee in the light of the specific article of charge as contained in the charge memo dated 10.4.2012 was not merely a motive, but was the foundation of the order of discharge. The impugned order, as such, cannot sustain. Even otherwise, there has been a negation of the principles of natural justice. The enquiry proceedings having been initiated against the petitioner by virtue of issuance of a charge sheet, it was incumbent upon the respondent-authorities to have taken the same to its logical end. An opinion as regards retention of the petitioner in service or discharge therefrom could have been made thereafter.

For the reasons recorded above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 19.4.2012, Annexure P3, discharging the petitioner from service is set aside. The petitioner is re-instated in service with all consequential benefits. The respondent-Authorities are, however, not precluded from conducting and holding an enquiry against the petitioner but strictly in accordance with law. Writ petition allowed in the aforesaid terms.