Sohan Singh vs State of Haryana

Harbans Lal, J.—This is a Petitioner u/s 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, (hereinafter called the Code), for quashing First Information Report No. 59 dated March 1979, registered in Police Statin Bhuna, District Hissar, at the instance of one Mohinder Singh.

According to the allegations made in the said first information report, Mohinder Singh after selling his land for Rs. 30,000/-on January 9. 1978, in favour of one Karnail Singh, purchased truck No. PUK.-286, (hereinafter called the truck, in a question), from Sohan Singh, accused Petitioner. for Rs. 64.000/, on January 4, 1978, when Rs. 26,00O/-wora paid out of the sale consideration Thereafter, the two instalments of Rs, 1,700/- were paid by him to the said Sohan Singh On June 1. 1978, when the accused Petitioner got this truck from Mohinder Singh on the plea that he needed the same for filing the earth at his own house At that time, all the relevant papers regarding the ownership as well as the affidavit showing the transfer of the truck, registration papers, routes, permit nsurance papers etc Were also in the said truck As the truck was not delivered to Mohiader Singh according to the premise, Mohinder Singh, in the presence of some persons whose names are mentioned in the first information report, approached. Sohan Singh for the return of the same and also all the papers relating there to. Sohan Singh however, put off the return of the truck and the said papers, on one plea or the other. Towards the end of the first information report, the allegations made is in the following words:

Sohan Singh stated to the Petitioner that the papers be made in his favour otherwise he will destroy the writing was given to the prtitioner regarding purchase of truck" On the basis of these; allegations, the case was registered against the Petitioner, under Sections 406 and 420, Indian Penal Code.

Mr. Harbhagwan Singh, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, has strenuously urged that from a mere perusal of the first information report, no offence what sover, is made out against the Petitioner, and, therefore, the first information report deserves to bo quashed. Emphatic reliance in support of this proposition has been placed on Dr. Shankar Singh Ganda Singh v. State of Punjab (1954) 56 P.L.R. 54 and R.P. Kapur Vs. The State of Punjab,

In Dr. Shankar Singh''s case (supra), it was held by Falshaw, J., (as he then was), that the High Court will ordinarily interfere u/s 561-A, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, only in such circumstances where the prosecution allegations even if true, do not disclose any offence, or even if the allegations if true do disclose any offence, but there is no evidence to support them.

In R P Kapur''s case (supra), it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the proceedings can be quashed in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court if there appears to be some manifest legal bar against the Institution of the proceedings ; if the first information report or the complaint, even when taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute any offence and no question of appreciating evidence Arises ; and even if the allegations made against the accused do constitute some offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced in support of the allegations, or the evidence clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. It was also held,

In exercising its jurisdiction u/s 361-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate, and ordinarily, It would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court''s inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a returnable appreciation of the evidence, the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained.

As against this, reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the State on two judgments of their Lordships of the Supreme Court which are discussed below.

In Jehan Singh Vs. Delhi Administration, it was held that where at the date of the filing of the petition for quashing the proceedings, no charge-sheet or a complaint has been laid in the Court and the matter is only at the stage of investigation by the police, the Court cannot, in the exercise of the inherent jurisdiction, interfere with the statutory powers of the police to investigate into the alleged offence and quash the proceedings. It was also held that the Court at that stage cannot appraise the evidence collected by the police during investigation.

In Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 Cr. L. T. 383 the law was laid down as under:

Inherent powers do not confer can arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to bo exercised sparingly, with circumspection in the rarest of rare cases. Thus, the High Court in exercise of inherent powers u/s 482, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot quash a first information report more so when the police bad not even commenced the investigation and no proceeding at all is pending in any Court in pursuance of the said F.I.R.

From a close perusal of the two decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jehan Singh''s cases (supra) and Kurukshetra University and Anr. v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 Cr. L. T. 383 (supra), it is evident that the High Court should not quash the proceedings in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction so long as the case is under investigation.

Mr. Harbhagwan Singh, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, however, contends that even when the investigation has not been completed, the proceedings can be quashed if a case can be made out that the process of the Court is being misused by the prosecution. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed o State of U.P. Vs. Kapil Deo Shukla, and the State of Karnaiaka v. L. Muniswamy 1978 Ch. L.R. 39 (S.C).

In Kapil Deo Shukla''s case (supra), the accused had been kept in suspense of a trial under Sections 408 and 477-A, Indian Penal Code, for more than 20 years and the High Court quashed the pending proceedings holding that it would be an abuse of the process of the Court if the trial protracted for 20 years was to be allowed to go on particularly in view of the impossibility of furnishing to the accused copies of statements recorded by Police during investigation, depriving the accused of his right to effectively cross-examine the prosecution witnesses.

L. Muniswamy''s case (supra), was not a case for quashing the procedings during investigation. A number of accused had been committed for trial in a murder case before the Court of Session. The Sessions Court at the stage of framing the charge discharged some accused and framed charge against others. Revision was filed by those against whom the charge had been framed and the order of the Sessions Judge framing the charge was challenged. The High Court at that stage, came to the conclusion that the order of the Sessions Judge could not be sustained after perusing prosecution evidence on the record This conclusion of the High Court was affirmed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court.

After perusing all the decisions relied upon on both sides, it can be sefely concluded that normally the proceedings during investigation should not be quashed so as to bar the normal process of I the investigation as provided under the Code However, if a foolproof case is made out that by protracted investigation, the process of the Court is being abused and the same was likely 10 result in depriving the accused of his valuable right to defend the case or to cross examine the witness etc., the extreme step of quashing the proceedings can be taken. In the present case, undoubtedly, the first information report was registered on March 12, 1979. The present petition was filed on August 10, 1979(sic), but the investigation in the case had not been stayed. Normally, it was expected that the prosecution agency would have put up the challan in the Court by this time. It does appear that snme delay has been caused in completing the investigation and in putting in the challan in court, but the delay is not such that it is possible to come to the conclusion that a case of the abuse of the process of Court is made out. The learned State counsel has undertaken that the challan in this case will be put in the court within a fortnight. When the challan is put in, the Petitioner will be within his right to persuade the trial Court on the basic of the evidence on the record that no criminal case was made out against him and even if the trial Court passes some unsustainable order, the same would be open to challenge in the High Court in accordance with law. However, if the challan is not put in within a fortnight inspite of the under taking as it would be an abuse of the process of the Court and the first information report shall stand quashed.

In view of the above discussion, the present petition is dismissed.