Somasundaram Mudaliar and Others vs K.S. Rajappa Mudaliar

Ramesam, J.—This second appeal arises out of a suit for enforcing the registration of a portion of a certain document. The Subordinate

Judge dismissed the suit. The District Judge decreed it. The defendants appeal.

The document in question is a partition-deed between the plaintiff and the first defendant who are brothers. The whole document except

paragraph 8 was registered. The suit relates only to paragraph 8. Defendants 2 and 3 are the sons of the first defendant. Paragraph 8 of the,

document runs thus:

Since we have allowed our aunt, Kuppanni to enjoy for her maintenance 41 acres 31 cents of land purchased by our natural guardian and

grandmother Muthanni in her name in Singalanthi, Pandi and other villages in the Thiruthuraipundi Taluk, we shall divide the said property between

ourselves in moieties after her death.

Befbre I discuss the question of law I will clear up the further facts necessary for deciding this case. The plaint after alleging that the grandmother

of the parties purchased certain lands, Has got a schedule annexed to it in which the lands are specifically described. In the schedule, survey

numbers are given, the villages are mentioned and they are Singalanthi and Pandi and no other, and the total extent is given which slightly differs

from the extent in the partition deed and the extent in the sale-deeds. But whatever variation there may be in the extent, this amounts to an

allegation on the part of the plaintiff that the lands purchased by the grandmother and described as 41 acres 37 cents in the partition-deed are the

lands which are given in the schedule to the plaint though described as a slightly different area and no other. The defendants in their written

statement do not allege that the grandmother purchased lands in other villages than Singalanthi and Pandi nor do they plead that there are other

lands besides the lands mentioned in the plaint schedule so purchased by her. We must take it therefore that the defendants admit that the lands

mentioned in the plaint schedule are the lands purchased by their grandmother. It would appear that the sale deeds taken by the grandmother were

filed in the first Court but were not formally exhibited. This is what the District Judge says about them:

The documents under which the lands were purchased were filed in the Lower Court. But as there was no dispute about it the documents were not

formally exhibited. They were also produced in this Court though no special petition was put in to exhibit them in the case here. As even in this

Court there is no dispute about the documents I do not exhibit them.

The statement of the District judge that there was no dispute about the purchase either in the first Court or in the Appellate Court has not been

contradicted before me by affidavit and I must take it that there is really no dispute that these are the three documents under which the

grandmother purchased the properties. The three documents which were looked into by the District Judge are now formally exhibited by me as

Exs. B, B-1 and B-2. A reference to these three sale-deeds supports all the statements made by the District Judge, that is, they show that the lands

purchased were all situate in Singalanthi and Pandi and no other. Their extent omitting one number (201-e). as given in the sale-deed is 39 acres

54 cents. The extent of the Survey No. 201 (e) was not given in the sale-deed, It is a thrashing floor. The parties possess only certain rights in it

along with others. Its extent is now given in the plaint as I acre and 17 cents. The total would then be 40 acres 71 cents, but in respect of one of

the plots there is a discrepancy between the extent given in the plaint schedule and that extent given in the sale-deeds, i.e., 201 (e), whereas Ex. B

(1) gives it as 4 acres 27 cents, the plaint gives it as 4 acres 97 cents. Adding this difference of 70 cents the extent as given in the plaint schedule

comes to 41 acres 41 cents, the variation as compared with the partition deed being only 4 cents. If once it is conceded that these are the lands

purchased by the grandmother and their survey numbers are all known from the sale-deeds and the plaint schedules, the variation of the extent

seems to be an absolutely immaterial factor in this case, for it is absolutely clear from the document Ex. A that all the lands purchased by the

grandmother in these two villages under these three sale-deeds were intended to be settled as maintenance for the aunt. It does not matter what

their extent is really. It might not have been known to the parties. It might have been incorrectly stated by them. This does not matter.

The above being the facts of the case as found by the District Judge and as restated by me for being more intelligible, what is the law that is

appliable to the case? First it seems to me u/s 21(1) of the Registration Act the description of the properties should be sufficient to identify the

same. To carry out the policy of Section 21(1), Clauses 2 and 3 are also enacted. Clause (3)says whenever it is practicable survey numbers are to

be given. It is clear that the word ""practicable"" was used with reference to the parties. Here the parties thought it is not practicable. Therefore the

clause loses its apparently compulsory nature by the use of the words ""whenever it Is practicable."" But to remedy this defect and to add to the

degree of compulsoriness the Local Government Has made rules u/s 22(1) saying that survey numbers are to be given where the la,nds are

surveyed. Pausing here the question arises what is the effect of this rule. Section 22(2) deals with the effect of such a rule made by the Local

Government u/s 22(1). It says non-compliance with such rules shall not disentitle a document to be registered if the description of the property to

which it relates is sufficient to identify that property unless otherwise provided by Rule 26. I understand this exception to mean the rule itself while

saying the property shall be described in a particular way should also say if it is not so described if should not be registered and where the latter

part is not in the rule, the document may still be registered provided the description is sufficient to identify the property notwithstanding the

particular direction in the rule. This is the view which the Judges who decided the decision in Appalacharyulu v. Ramachandracharyulu (1922) 16

LW 287 were inclined to take though it was not necessary to decide in that particular case. Notwithstanding the breach of the direction to give the

survey numbers, that the description is sufficient to identify the property is clear not only from the facts as given above but also from the view of the

Local Government from Rule 17, Ch. VI of its rules which says:

If property is described in a document by a specific reference to an instrument which has been already registered... and if that instrument contains

the particulars required by Rule 16 and such a description of the property as is required by the rules in force, the description need not 6e repeated

in the document.

This rule says that where a reference to other registered document is given not only the description is sufficient to identify the property but it is a

compliance with rules in force making a certain kind of description necessary. This is the view taken by me and Spencer, J., in the decision

reported in Krishna Aiyar v. Ponnappa Nadar. Mr. Bhashyam Aiyangar contends that the meaning of the Exception 22 is wherever there is a rule

making a particular description necessary without any further statement as to the breach of the rule, that itself disentitles the registration of the

document. I do not agree with this view. I come to this conclusion even without relying on Rule 17 which further enforces my conclusion. The result

is the District Judge''s decision is right and the second appeal is dismissed with costs.