Sonu Rupani vs State Of Madhya Pradesh

Being aggrieved by delay in trial of S.T. No.567/2011 pending before Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Indore, the petitioner has come before this

Court.

The grievance of the petitioner is that since 2011, the trial Court is repeatedly issuing process to secure presence of the witnesses; which are being

repeatedly return by the police making a note that the witnesses are not found on the address given in the process. Thus, the trial is not moving an inch

since last 7 years. Their request is not paid heed to by the learned trial Court and it is the view of the trial Court that it is helpless to do anything or to

take any action in this regard.

Factual status of the Sessions Trial as stated in the petition is that Crime No.219/11 under Sections 420, 467, 468 of IPC was registered against the

petitioner along with some other accused persons on 09/04/2011 and after investigation, the police filed a charge-sheet. Charges were framed against

them under Sections 420/34, 467/34 & 468/34 of IPC on 11/08/2011. The trial programme was submitted by the prosecution on 23/08/2011. The case

was fixed for prosecution witnesses but adjourned due to non-appearance of the witnesses on 20/09/2011, 21/09/2011, 17/10/2011, 18/10/2011,

08/12/2011, 09/12/2011 & 06/02/2011. On 07/02/2012 an application was filed by the prosecution to adjourn examination of prosecution witnesses until

report of handwriting expert is received, which was allowed on 21/03/2012. From 21/03/2012 to 02/05/2016 no such report was produced by the

prosecution. After 25 dates of hearing, on 03/05/2016, the report was received. On 16/06/2016, summons to the witnesses were issued however, since

then no witness has been examined by the prosecution.

In the present case there was inordinate delay of more than 7 years. It took more than 4 years (from 21/03/2012 to 02/05/2016) to collect the report

of the finger print expert and the petitioner has no contribution to such inordinate delay.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently recognised the right of the accused for a speedy trial. A callous and inordinately prolonged delay,

which does not arise from the default of the accused or is otherwise not occasioned by any extraordinary or exceptional reason clearly violates the

constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and is an abuse of the process of the Court.

Hon'ble the Supreme Court has time and again held that keeping a person in suspended animation for several years without any cause at all cannot

be with the spirit of the procedure established by law (Srinivas Pal Vs. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (Now State)

AIR 1988 SC 1729).

In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 : (1994 Cri LJ 3139) the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble the Supreme Court unequivocally

construed the right of speedy trial as a fundamental right. We can refer relevant paragraphs from this celebrated decision:

The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under

our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages,

namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable

delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the

constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (AIR 1979 SC 1360) while dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of

India has observed thus:

No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There

can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the

fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a

person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in

violation of his fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed from the charge levelled against him on

the ground that trying him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental right

under Article 21.

The Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R. S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225 : AIR 1992 SC 1701 underscored that this right to speedy

trial is implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in Section 309 of the Cr.P.C., 1973; and that it encompasses all stages, viz.,

investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial.

It is stated in Hussain and Anr. v. Union of India AIR 2017 SC 1362 that speedy trial and timely delivery of justice is a part of human rights. Denial

of speedy justice is a threat to public confidence in administration of justice. Judicial service as well as legal service are not like any other services.

They are missions for serving society. The mission is not achieved if the litigant who is waiting in queue does not get his turn for a long time. Five

years time to disposed of case by any standard is quite a long time for a case to be decided in first court. There are obstructions at every level in

enforcement of right of speedy trial - vested interests or unscrupulous elements try to delay proceedings. In spite of all odds, determined efforts are

required at every level for success of mission. Ways and means have to be found out by constant thinking and monitoring. Presiding Officer of a court

cannot rest in state of helplessness. High Courts to monitor functioning of subordinate courts to ensure timely disposal of cases.

Again in Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2012) 2 SCC 688 : (AIR 2012 SC 642) it was observed that long delay has the effect

of blatant violation of rule of law and adverse impact on access to justice which is a fundamental right. Denial of this right undermines public

confidence in justice delivery.

Where the criminal case is pending for more than 5 years, the trial Court is to take immediate effective steps for their disposal. It is incumbent

upon the Trial Courts to find ways and means by taking steps to ensure the disposal of criminal trials. In Thana Singh v. Central Bureau of Narcotics

(2013) 2 SCC 590 : (AIR 2014 SC (Supp) 856) the Hon'ble Apex Court directed that liberal adjournments must be avoided and witnesses once

produced must be examined on consecutive dates.

Coming back to the case in hand, I think that if the status of trial is like that as submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, then it is a very

sorry state of affair. The trial Court is master of the trial. He has each and every power and right to take stern action against the erring officials. Fate

of the trial cannot be simply left on the mercy of the police officers/serving agency. No one should be permitted to play with process of the Court as

per their wish or to make mockery of the system particularly when the processes are being issued on the address provided by the concerned police

itself in the charge-sheet. Every citizen is entitled for the presumption of innocence until proved contrary similar is the situation of the person facing

trial.

Nobody can be permitted to torture him on any account by prolonging his trial for more than the period necessary for just and proper reasons. It is

failure on the part of the presiding officer. The presiding officer has to be vigilant and must have full control over the trial. The trial Court is neither a

post office nor a puppet in the hands of the police/serving agency. The Trial Judge has expressed his helplessness in the matter due to persistent non

service of the process. But the Court is not so helpless. To ensure the attendance of the witnesses, it can adopt coercive method.

However, without entering into detailed calculation in this regard and after looking into the proceeding of the case as mentioned in the petition, it

appears to this Court that the major part of the delay during the last 2 years of the pendency of the case is attributable to the carelessness of the Court

and not to the acts and conduct of the accused.

It is true that in some cases the proceedings have been quashed by the High Court on the ground that trial had not made much headway; even

though in the present case looking to the seriousness of the allegations, nature of the offence alleged to have been committed, proceedings of the

Court and in the other facts and circumstances of the case, I am not inclined to exercise inherent jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner and to quash

the proceedings on this ground alone.

However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I think it fit and reasonable that a time schedule should be fixed and the learned trial Court

should be directed to conclude the trial within the time so fixed. Having regard to the facts, it is directed to conclude the trial within a period of six

months from the date of communication of this order. I also think it just and proper and in accordance with equity to direct that trial of the accused not

to adjourn further without any serious intervention of the presiding officer.

The Sessions judge shall seek a report from the concerned Court regarding delay in the trial and transmit it to the Principal Registrar of this Bench

with his comments with a view to fix responsibility for the delay within 15 days from the date of communication of this order. The Principal Registrar

shall place this report with his comments within two weeks on administrative side.

A copy of this order be communicated to the learned Trial Court as well as to the concerned Sessions Judge for compliance and report.

With the aforesaid, the petition stands disposed off.