Soodalai Ammal vs Sachidanandam Pillai and Ors

V. Ratnam, J.—This civil revision petition arises out of proceedings under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act

(LVIII of 1961) as amended, hereinafter referred to as the Act. In the course of the enquiry held by the Authorised Officer it was found that the

petitioner was in possession of an extent of 24.651/2 ordinary acres equivalent to 22.007 standard acres as on 15th February) 1970 and that an

extent of 1.963 standard acres was in surplus. The petitioner had also indicated that four items of properties viz. S. No. 143/5--0.77 cents; S. No.

125/4--1.06 acres; S. No. 180/2--0.12 cents and S. No. 1.91--0.411/2 cents in Kulamani village may be declared as surplus lands. The first

respondent raised an objection with reference to the items sought to be surrendered by the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner has only a

life interest and that he is entitled to the remainder in two items of properties viz., S.F. No. 125/4 and S.F. No. 143/5 and therefore, these two

items must be included within the ceiling area of the petitioner. This objection was rejected by the Authorised Officer, who passed an order to the

effect that the compensation amount for these two items of properties will be kept in deposit and that the interest thereon will be given to the

petitioner for her lifetime and the compensation amount will be paid to the first respondent after the death of the petitioner. Aggrieved by this, the

first respondent preferred an appeal in (C.M.A. No. 36 of 1975 to the Land Tribunal) Principal Subordinate Judge), Tiruchirapalli. By order dated

15th Aprill, 1976,the matter was remanded by the Land Tribunal to the Authorised Officer for fresh disposal. Pursuant to this, the matter was

again reconsidered by the Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Tiruchirapalli. By order dated 25th June, 1977, the Authorised Officer held that

under the provisions of the Act, a landowner having absolute or limited ownership in the land can offer any land as surplus and that the only basis

on which the land so offered can be rejected is that the land is not capable of easy and convenient enjoyment or its utility had otherwise been

diminished by the wilful act of the landowner. Therefore, the objections put forth by the first respondent herein were again regatived and the

Authorised Officer directed the preparation of the final statement and the publication thereof. Against this order, the first respondent preferred

C.M.A. No. 13 of 1977 to the Land Tribunal (Principal Subordinate Judge), Tiruchirapalli. The Land Tribunal, by its order dated 29th July, 1978,

purporting to apply the decision of this Court in Krishnaswami Mudaliar Vs. The Authorized Officer (Madras Land Reforms) Cuddalore, . and

holding that if the lands agreed to be surrendered by the petitioner are treated as surplus, the first respondent will be deprived of those lands but

that he will be entitled only to the money compensation after the lifetime of the petitioner, directed that S.F. No. 125/4 and S.F. No. 143/5 of

Kulamani village be included within the ceiling area of the petitioner. It is against this order the petitioner has come up in revision before this Court

contending that the choice of lands to be surrendered by an ""owner"" within the meaning of the Act is unfettered and that it is not open to the first

respondent to object to her surrendering any lands in which he may be any interest as a remainderman.

When this civil revision petition came up for hearing before one of us, having regard to the importance of the question raised, namely, whether

the interest of a remainderman can be reached under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act, while applying them to the case of a limited owner,

the matter was directed to be posted before a bench in order to have an authoritative pronouncement on this question and that is how the matter

comes up before us.

The principal contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that having regard to the scheme and provisions of the Act, a person

in the position of the petitioner who is a ""limited owner"" for purposes of the Act has a right to surrender whatever lands she thinks fit and that her

choice in that matter cannot be restricted or otherwise fettered merely because another person has also an interest in those properties as a

remainderman. Per contra the learned Counsel for the first respondent strenuously contends that the effect of recognising an unfettered right on the

part of the petitioner to surrender lands would be to deprive the remainderman of the property in specie and that money compensation certainly

cannot be equivalent to the property itself at a time when the property falls into possession of the remainderman.

In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to advert to some of the definitions in the Act as well as other related provisions

therein, as a decision on the question has to be rested solely on specific statutory provisions in this regard and not oh general considerations in law

applicable to a situation like the present. Section 3(33) of the Act defines an ""owner"" thus:

Owner"" (a) means

(i) any parson holding land in severally or jointly or in common under a ryotwari settlement or in any way subject to the payment of revenue direct

to the Government; or

(ii) a landholder as defined in the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908(Madras Act I of 1908), or a ryot as defined in that Act; or

(iii) an inamdar not being a landholder defined as aforesaid; and

(b) includes....

(i) Full owner or limited owner, or

(ii) the lessee of any lease-hold village or his heirs, assignee, legal representatives or persons deriving rights through him.

It is thus obvious that for purposes of the Act an ""owner"" would include a full owner or a limited owner. The expression ""full owner"" has been

defined u/s 3(16) of the Act as meaning a person entitled to the absolute proprietorship of land. Section 3(28) defines ""limited owner"" as any

person entitled to a life estate in any land and includes persons deriving rights through him. An explanation has been appended to this definition by

Tamil Nadu Act XXXIX of 1972 to the effect that a person who has a right to enjoy the land during his life time shall be deemed to be a limited

owner notwithstanding that he has no power of alienating the land. According to Section 3(19) of the Act, ""to hold land"" with its grammatical

variations and cognate expressions means to own land as owner or to possess or enjoy and as possessory mortgagee or as tenant or as

intermediary or in one or more of those capacities.

Section 3(14) defines a family thus:

family"" in relation to a person means the person, the wife or husband, as the case may be, of such person and his or her.

(i) minor sons and unmarried daughters and, (ii) minor grandsons and unmarried granddaughters in the male line, whose father and mother are

dead.

Explanation I--For the purpose of this clause in the case of persons governed by Hindu Law, ""minor sons"" and ""miner grandsons"" shall not include

sons or grandsons.

(i) between whom and the other members of the family, a partition by means of a registered instrument has taken place; or

(ii) in respect of whose family properties a preliminary decree for partition has been passed before the notified date;

Explanation II-- For the purpose of this clause ............

(a) in the case of persons governed by Hindu Law, ""unmarried daughters"" and ""unmarried grand-daughters"" shall not include ""unmarried daughters

or ""unmarried grand-daughters""..

(i) in whose favour any land had been voluntarily transferred by either of whose parents or grand-parents on account of natural love and affection;

or

(ii) in whose favour a preliminary decree for partition has been passed before the notified date;

(6) in the case of persons governed by any law other than Hindu Law ""minor sons"" ''''unmarried daughters"", ""minor grand-sons"", and ""unmarried

grand-daughters"", shall not include ""minor sons"", ""unmarried daughters"", ""minor grandsons"" and ""unmarried grand-daughters ""........

(i) in whose favour any land has been voluntarily transferred by either of whose parents of grand parents on account of natural love and affection;

or

(ii) in whose favour a preliminary decree for partition has been passed before the notified date.

A ""person"" for purposes c f the Act is defined by Section 3(34) as under:

Person"" includes any company, family, firm, society or association of individuals, whether incorporated or not; or any private trust or public trust;

Section 5(1)(a) of the Act states that the ceiling area in the case of every person and every family consisting of not more than five members shall be

25 standard acres. u/s 7 of the Act, it is provided that on and from the date of commencement of this Act, no person, shall, except as otherwise

provided in this Act, but subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII, be entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. There is no dispute in the

present case that what is held by the petitioner is ""land"" as defined in Section 3(22) of the Act. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner is entitled

or to enjoy the properties in question for her lifetime, though without powers of alienation and that the first respondent is a remainderman.

Undoubtedly, therefore, the petitioner will be within the definition of a ""limited owner"" u/s 3(28) of the Act. Since u/s 3(33)(b)(1),""owner"" includes

a ""limited owner"" as well, Section 3(19) of the Act Would apply and take in within its scope cases of persons holding land as a limited owner like

the petitioner, with a right to enjoy the land for her lifetime and subject them to the provisions of the Act. The fixation of a ceiling u/s 5 of the Act

also points out that except as otherwise provided in the Act, no person shall be entitled to hold lands in excess of the ceiling area. It may also be

mentioned that there is no provision in the Act as such to permit a person (a limited owner as in this case) to hold lands in excess of the ceiling area

on the ground that another person has interest therein as remainderman. The contention of the learned Counsel for the first respondent is that by

reason of Section 5(6) of the Act, the lands in which a person has rights as limited owner as defined u/s 3(28) are totally outside the purview of the

Act. At first blush, it may appear that this argument is attractive and acceptable, yet, on a closer scrutiny, it is at once obvious that there is no merit

in it. If the Act recognises a person in the position of the petitioner as a person ""holding lands''"" as ""owner"" then, as stated already, there is no

provision in the Act which exempts either such persons or the holdings by such persons or the interest of the remainderman from the operation of

the provisions of the Act. But, on the other hand there are several provisions in the Act which indicate that even lands held by persons like the

petitioner are also as much subject to the provisions of the Act as any other land. In the instant case, though at the stage of the computation of the

ceiling in the hands of the petitioner, ostensibly the Act does not purport to affect the interest of persons who are remaindermen yet the scope of

the Act and the provisions thereof are such that in the process of the application of the provisions of the Act to lands owned by a ""limited owner

and subjecting him or her to a ceiling, the Act contemplates the interests of such remainderman as well falling within the ambit of the Act. It must be

borne in mind that what is proceeded against under the provisions of the Act is ""land"" as such in the hands of ""limited or a full owner"" as defined in

the Act as the case may be and not merely against the interest of such person in the land. u/s 8 of the Act, any person holding lands in excess of the

ceiling area is enjoined to furnish a return containing details of the holding, the particulars of the land which such person desires to retain within the

ceiling area as well as that which he desires to be declared as surplus etc. On a consideration of the returns so filed u/s 8 and such other

information as may be collected u/s 9, u/s 10 the Authorised Officer is empowered to hold an enquiry and to prepare a draft statement in respect

of each person holding or deemed to have held land in excess of the ceiling area. Sections 10(1)(viii), 10(1)(x) and 10(1)(xii) are important.

Section 10(1)(viii) states that the draft statement should contain the particulars of the land desired to be retained within the ceiling area, while

Sections 10(1)(x) and 10(1)(xii) state that the draft statement should also include the particulars of the Land and which may be comprised within

the ceiling area and particulars of lands proposed to be declared as surplus. Section 10(3) provides that if a person had failed to specify the

particulars of the land which he desires to retain within his ceiling area, the Authorised Officer shall, as far as practicable, specify in the draft

statement, the land which is capable of easy and convenient enjoyment as the land to be retained by such a person within his ceiling area. Section

10(4) further provides that if the particulars of the land which a person desires to retain within his ceiling area have been specified, the Authorised

Officer shall, as far as practicable, declare the same as the land comprised within his ceiling area. These provisions also indicate that the choice of

either retention or surrender of surplus lands rests entirely with the person against whom proceedings under the Act are taken without reference to

the interest of any other person in those lands. Statutorily, therefore, the person who is proceeded against under the provisions of the Act is the

person who is given the choice to specify the land to be retained as well as the land to be surrendered. In this, the provisions of the Act, as they

now stand, do not permit the remainderman to object to the retention or surrender of a particular item. This again further indicates that irrespective

of the nature of the interest of the remainderman in the properties held by a limited owner to whom the provisions of the Act are applied, such

limited owner can even surrender properties in which the remainderman has an interest. This position is further strengthened by Section 52 of the

Act. That section relates to the compensation payable in respect of the lands acquired by the application of the provisions of the Act to a ""limited

owner"". Thereunder, the compensation payable in respect of the surplus lands held by a ""limited owner"" should be kept in deposit before such

authority as may be prescribed and the interest accruing thereon has to be paid over to those persons entitled to the possession of the land. The

first proviso to Section 52 further contemplates a case where an encumbrance has been created over the interest of a limited owner and provides

for the apportionment as well of the interest to the encumbrancer as well as the limited owner. In such cases, the interest earned by the investment

of the compensation shall be paid to the encumbrancer to the extent to which the encumbrancer is entitled and the balance is payable to the person

or persons who would, for the time being, have been entitled to the possession of the said land. Section 52(2) further brings out very clearly that

persons with interest in lands similar to that of the petitioner in the instant case are also subject to the Act, as otherwise the provisions for payment

of interest and the time during which the compensation should remain in deposit will be wholly out of place. Apart therefore from the definitions and

provisions in the Act referred to already, Section 52 is a clear pointer to the intention of the legislature that lands, as in the present case, can also

be subjected to the law of ceiling in respect of which compensation is deposited and the interest alone is made available to the person who is

entitled to remain in possession, but for the deprivation of such possession by the application of ceiling law. In other words, the limited owner is

compensated by payment of interest for deprivation of possession by the application of the Act, while the remainder-man is given the benefit of

compensation deposited, when the estate falls into possession or he becomes entitled to the same and such compensation obviously is in lieu of the

land in which he has an interest as reminderman and which is lost to him by the application, of the provisions of the Act to a person who falls within

the definition of a limited owner as defined in Section 3(38) of the Act. As seen above, the provisions of the Act do trench upon the interest of the

remainderman. In the light of the other provision of the Act referred to earlier, it cannot be claimed that such interest cannot be touched by the

provisions of the Act or in other words the interest of the remainderman is wholly outside the scope of the Act. The extreme contention of the

learned Counsel for the first respondent that u/s 5(6) of the Act a remainderman is totally outside the scope of the Act cannot be accepted. Unless

there is an exemption of such interest from the purview of the provisions of the Act, it cannot be assumed that in process of applying the provisions

of the Act to lands in the holding of the ""limited owner"" under the Act, the interest of the remainderman should be left untouched. AT Stated

already, the Act deals with and imposes a ceiling on land without reference to the subordinate or lesser interest therein created in favour of different

persons. If, lands in which another person has interest as a remainderman, can for purposes of the Act, be treated as land comprised in the holding

of a limited owner we do not see how such land can cease to be land for purposes of surrender. The effect of Section 5(6) is that in computing the

extent of land owned by any person, that extent which may revert to such person immediately after the death of any limited owner, be excluded. It

means no more than that in considering whether the remainderman would be subject to the provisions of the Act, the extent of the lands in which he

has interest as a remainderman need not be taken into account during the lifetime of the limited owner. It must also be remembered that a

remainderman is neither a full owner nor even a limited owner as defined in the Act and he does not also claim through a ""limited owner"". Till the

actual determination of the interest of the ""limited owner"" and the falling into possession of the remainder, the holder of such an interest does not

become a full owner of the lands. The reason behind a provision like Section 5(6) is at once apparent. Inasmuch as the lands in a holding in excess

of the ceiling in which another person has interest as a remainderman can be subjected to the provisions of the Act even in the hands of a person

who does not answer the description of a ""full owner"", such lands need not be included or taken into account in computing the holding, if any, of

the remainderman, during the lifetime of the limited owner. After the application of the provisions of the Act to the limited owner and the

declaration of a surplus, the lands in the permitted holding of the limited owner in which the remainderman may have an interest, will again, after the

termination of the life interest, along with the other lands, if any, of the remainderman, be subjected to the ceiling law. It is therefore quite

conceivable that the ""limited owner"" in the first Instance and later the remainderman as ""full owner"" may be subject to the provisions of the Ceiling

Act; but that is no ground to say that the ""limited owner"" or remainderman as such, are totally outside the Act. In our view, Section 5(6) cannot be

construed in such a manner as to result in such a wholesale exclusion as there are clear provisions in the Act that the interest of the limited owner

and the remainderman in the land would be subjected to the Act. In the absence of any specific statutory provision, it cannot be a matter of

assumption that the interest of a remainderman would not be within the scope of the ceiling Act. The consideration that the remainderman is likely

to be deprived of the property in specie on the application of the provisions of the Act to a holding in the hands of a limited owner and that he may

be entitled only to a monetary compensation in lieu thereof cannot be a ground to hold that the remainderman has got rights in the property taking

advantage of which he can object to the surrender by the limited owner of lands in which he has a vested remainder. The payment of compensation

to the remainderman on the termination of the interest of the limited owner may be poor consolation so far as his interests are concerned as his

claim to the land as such is not given effect to, but that is the result of the operation of the provisions of the statute. We are therefore clearly of the

opinion that as per the provisions of the Act as they are, the interest of a remainderman can, by the application of the provisions of the Act to a

limited owner, be interfered with, though the remainderman by himself or herself may not be the person to whom the provisions of the Act are

applied. In order to exclude the two items of properties in which the first respondent claims interest as a remainderman from the lands to be

surrendered, the Land. Tribunal had relied upon the decision in Krishnaswami Mudaliar Vs. The Authorized Officer (Madras Land Reforms)

Cuddalore, . In that case, the petitioner prayed before the Authorised Officer (Land Reforms), Cuddalore that the land which he purchased from

one Papayee Ammal may be included within the ceiling area of the said Papayee Ammal. The land had been purchased by the petitioner on 21st

November, 1962 long after the notified date viz., 2nd October, 1962. The plea of the petitioner to include the extent so purchased by him from

Papayee Ammal was not accepted by the Authorised Officer as the sale in favour of the petitioner was after the notified date and that such a

transaction cannot be recognised. Therefore, the request of the petitioner to include that extent within the ceiling area of Papayee Ammal was not

accepted. In dealing with the question whether a person who had purchased the property even after the notified date will have an interest in the

land and as such, entitled to notice u/s 10(5), Kailasam, J. (as he then was) held that the intention of Section 10(5) is to hear the objections and to

pass orders after considering their interests and in that view, the Authorised Officer would be well within his powers, if he allots the land that had

been assigned to a third party after the notified date for valuable consideration within the ceiling area of the person submitting the return. The

question in the present case is very different from that case. We are not concerned with any alienation after the notified date and any attempt by the

vendor or the purchaser to retain the extent of land sold within the ceiling of the vendor. It is not the complaint of the first respondent that he did

not have notice of the proceedings. Indeed, he has had more than an ample and adequate opportunity to agitate his claim that the two items of

properties should not be included in the lands offered by the petitioner for being surrendered to the Government as surplus. The objection that has

been raised and persisted in by the first respondent to the effect that the two items of properties in which he has an interest as remainderman should

not be included in the surplus lands of the petitioner at all, as pointed out already, cannot be accepted, particularly in view of the provisions of the

Act already referred to. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that the reliance by the Land Tribunal on the decision of Kailasam, J., as he

then was, referred to earlier, cannot in any manner advance of the case of the first respondent. We may also point out that Section 10(4-A) of the

Act now specifically provides for the inclusion of the property transferred within the ceiling area of the transferor or the person effecting the

partition as the case may be, as if no transfer or partition had taken place. This provision has been made only with a view to safeguard the interest

of the alienees like the petitioner in the decision of Kailasam, J., as he then was, referred to above. But as has been pointed out already, the

position in the present case is very different. For the aforesaid reasons, the order of the Land Tribunal has to be set aside and that of the

Authorised Officer restored. Consequently, the civil revision petition will stand allowed. No costs.