High CourtsSingle Bench(2018) 10 BOM CK 0013

Sou. Gita Vijay Somankar vs Divisional Commissioner, Nagpur And Others

Bombay High Court · Decided on 3 October 2018

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.B. Shukre, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No.2791 of 2018

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Judgment

44 paragraphs · 937 words

[1] Rule. Heard finally by consent of the parties.

[2] The petitioner has been disqualified by the impugned orders respectively passed by the Collector, Gadchiroli and Additional Commissioner,

Nagpur under Section 14(1)(g) of the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1958 [for short, 'Act of 1958']. The reasons being that the

petitioner, a member of the Gram Panchayat, Yeoli, has been found to be indirectly interested in the rent agreement executed between the

Gram Panchayat, Yeoli and the husband of the petitioner in respect of giving of the shop block belonging to Gram Panchayat, Yeoli to the

husband of the petitioner on rent.

[3] According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the impugned orders are patently illegal  for the reason that there is no contractÂ

executed between the Gram Panchayat and the husband of the petitioner and what has been done in between them is execution of only a rent

agreement. According to him the word “contract†used in 14(1) (g) of the Act of 1958, has a restrictive meaning and he submits that

this word “contract†has to be understood as referring only to those contracts which have been awarded by the Gram Panchayat for execution

of some work of the Gram Panchayat.Â

[4] The learned AGP for the respondent nos. 1 and 2 and learned Counsel for respondent no.3, however, disagree. They submit thatÂ

there is no such restriction placed either in Section 14 or anywhere in the Act of 1958 itself.

[5] The learned AGP and learned Counsel for respondent no.3 are right. The word “contract†has not been clarified anywhere in the Act

of 1958 or in Section 14 of this Act by laying down that the word has to be understood only in the context of particular type of the contracts and not in

relation to other contracts including the rent agreement. Here the term “contract†must be understood by the definition of the contract given in

Section 2 (h) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and considering this definition, there can be no doubt about the fact that the rent agreement executed

between the Gram Panchayat and the husband of the petitioner is a contract within the meaning of the Indian Contract Act. Therefore, I find the

argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner in this petition is misconceived and it is rejected.

[6] The next submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner being the only wife of one of the parties to the contract could not

be said to be  having indirect interest in the contract executed between her husband and the Gram Panchayat. The learned Counsel places

his reliance upon the view taken by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Dhurpadabai Laxmanrao Mhaske vs Additional

Commissioner, Amravati and others, reported at 2015(4) Mh.L.J. 509, wherein, it has been held that mere relationship of the petitioner with her son

would not attract disqualification under Section 14(1)(g) of the Act of 1958. I do not think that there is any scope for me to take any

different view from what has been held by the learned Single Judge in the case of Dhurpadabai (supra). Mere relationship, by itself would

not determine the extent of the interest or disinterest in a contract and something more is required to be proved against the member of the Gram

Panchayat. In the present case, the petitioner herself has admitted that from the income earned from the business carried out from the rented

premises that her family is maintained. So, it is clear that the petitioner has interest in carrying on the business from the firm Shriram

Krushi Kendra, which has taken on rent the shop belonging to the Gram Panchayat, Yeoli and therefore, the rent contract of such a firm would

have to be treated as a contract in which the petitioner is having interest. This admission of the petitioner would make her case evenÂ

worse and it would convert it into a case of her having a direct interest, instead of indirect interest. The argument is, therefore, rejected.

[7] In fact, a Full Bench of this Court while dealing with a similar provision, which is the provision of Section 16 (1) of the Maharashtra

Municipalities Act, 1965 (Act 40 of 1965) which is almost in pari materia with Section 14(1)(g) of the Act of 1958, has held that where the

wife of an elected candidate is employed as a headmistress of a municipal school, such elected candidate has direct or indirect interest in the

contract with, by or on behalf of, or employment with or under the panchayat within the meaning of Section 16. The Full Bench has also held that

although mere relationship of an employee of the municipality with the elected candidate by itself would not justify an inference that the

elected person has interest, direct or indirect, in the employment under the municipalities, the issue has tobe decided by looking into all the

accompanying facts and circumstances and one of the facts which would be relevant would be the wife having been employed with the

municipality and staying in the same house with such elected candidate. Such fact, has been found by the Full Bench of this Court as clinching

the issue in favour of the municipality and against the elected candidate. The Full Bench judgment thus supports the view already taken by me in the

matter.Â

[8] In view of the above, I find neither any illegality nor any perversity in the impugned orders. There is no merit in the petition. The petition

stands dismissed.

[9] Rule stands discharged.