Soumya K.M vs P.R.Somasekhara Kurup

P.B.Suresh Kumar, J.

The tenant in a proceedings for eviction under Sections 11(3) and 11(4)(ii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (the Act) is the petitioner in this revision petition filed under Section 20 of the Act, challenging the decision of the Appellate Authority in granting an order of eviction to the landlord under Section 11(3) of the Act, reversing the decision of the Rent Control Court.

The eviction petition was initially dismissed by the Rent Control Court and the said decision was affirmed in appeal by the Appellate Authority. The aforesaid decisions were, however set aside by this Court in R.C.R. No.73 of 2007 and the eviction petition was remitted to the Rent Control Court to consider the claim of the landlord for eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act as also the claim of the tenant that she is entitled to the protection of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act afresh, after confirming the remaining findings rendered by the authorities.

After the remand, the eviction petition was amended by the landlord and the tenant has filed an additional objection to the amended eviction petition. Both landlord and tenant adduced further evidence thereafter. Considering the materials on record, the Rent Control Court dismissed the eviction petition again on the ground that the landlord has not established that the need put forward by him is bona fide. The claim of the tenant that she is entitled to the benefit of the second proviso to Section 11(3) of the Act was, however, rejected by the Rent Control Court. The landlord took up the matter in appeal and the Appellate Authority ordered eviction of the tenant under Section 11(3) of the Act, reversing the decision of the Rent Control Court. The tenant is aggrieved by the said decision of the Appellate Authority and hence this revision petition.

Heard the learned counsel for the tenant.

The  learned counsel for the tenant vehemently contended that there is absolutely no reason for the Appellate Authority to interfere with the decision of the Rent Control Court. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that the eviction petition was instituted alleging that the landlord is a qualified computer professional and he intends to establish a business relating to computers as also an institute to impart computer education. According to the learned counsel, no evidence whatsoever was let in by the landlord to prove that he has any qualification in the field of computers or information technology. It was also the contention of the learned counsel that the tenanted premises is a tiny one having an area of about 80 sq. ft. and the need set out by the landlord to establish the business and institute in the said premises is an impossible one and that the Appellate Authority ought not have, therefore, accepted the case of the landlord. It was also argued by the learned counsel that all throughout the proceedings, the landlord was working abroad and the same would also negative the case put forward by him that he intends to conduct business in the tenanted premises. According to the learned counsel, if one evaluates the materials on record harmoniously, it could be seen beyond doubt that the attempt of the landlord is only a ruse to evict the tenant.

It is seen from the materials on record that the landlord is an Ex-Navy person who went abroad after the duration of his career in the Navy to earn his livelihood and it was while so, he instituted the eviction petition. The specific case of the landlord is that even while working in the Navy, he was engaged in some work relating to information technology and that his job abroad thereafter is also one relating to information technology, and it is in the said circumstances that he proposed to conduct a business relating to computers in the tenanted premises. The tenant does not seriously dispute the case set out by the landlord that he was doing some work relating to information technology in the Navy and his job abroad thereafter was also one relating to the information technology. In the circumstances, even assuming that the landlord does not have any qualification in the field of information technology, we do not think that the same would in any manner affect the bona fides of the landlord in the claim set out by him. True, the area of the tenanted premises is only about 80 sq.ft. The argument is that the business proposed by the landlord cannot be conducted in such a confined place. As noted, the case of the landlord is only that he intends to do a business in computers and to establish an institute to impart computer education in the tenanted premises. It is for the landlord to decide as to how the available space is to be utilized for the business proposed by him. The space available may or may not be sufficient for the business, but that does not mean that he does not intend to start the proposed business. Once the court is satisfied that the landlord intends to start a business in the tenanted premises and that his attempt is not a ruse to evict the tenant from the premises, merely for the reason that the tenant feels that the business proposed by the landlord cannot be conducted in the premises, it cannot be said that the claim is not bona fide. According to us, so long as it is not established that no part of the business proposed by the landlord can be conducted in the premises, it does not affect the bona fides of the landlord. In the said view of the matter, we do not find any reason to interfere with the decision of the Appellate Authority.

However, having regard to the peculiar facts of this case, especially the fact that the tenant is running a business in the premises for quite a long time, we deem it appropriate to grant some time to the tenant to surrender vacant possession of the premises.

In the result, the revision petition is dismissed. However, the tenant is granted six months' time to vacate the premises on condition that she shall file an unconditional undertaking before the Rent Control Court within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy this order to vacate the tenanted premises within six months and also that she shall pay the arrears of rent, if any, within the aforesaid time limit and continue to pay the monthly rent on or before the tenth day of every succeeding month till she vacates the premises.