AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
No AI summary yet
Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.
Judgment
6 paragraphs · 747 wordsNainar Sundaram, J.—The Defendant in Original Suit No. 636 of 1972 on the file of he Additional District Munsif, Pudukottai is the Appellant in the second appeal. The Respondent herein is the Plaintiff in the said suit. The Plaintiff filed the suit for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent against the Defendant on the ground that the Defendant was a tenant under the Plaintiff and after termination of the tenancy, the Defendant is liable to be ejected. The Defendant resisted the suit denying the title of the Plaintiff. The Defendant pleaded that the suit property was purchased benami in the name of the Plaintiff by the husband of the Defendant, who was none else then the son of the Plaintiff and the Defendant is in possession of the property in her own right. The Plaintiff valued the suit at Rs. 120 representing one year''s rent for possession u/s 43(2) of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. Besides, she has separately valued the suit for recovery of arrears of rent.
The question of tenancy pleaded by the Plaintiff was gone into by the first Court and incidentally it also went into the question of title. The first Court found that the tenancy pleaded by the Plaintiff is not true and accordingly it non-suited the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff appealed and the appeal in Appeal Suit No. 97 of 1977 was heard and disposed of by the Subordinate Judge, Pudukottai. The lower appellate Court held that though the tenancy is not established yet in view of the title of the Plaintiff to the property and as the Defendant has no title to the property, the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree for ejectment and she is entitled to possession of the property. In this view, the lower appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the first Court and decreed the suit of the Plaintiff for possession. The present second appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court. At the time of the admission of the second appeal, the following question of law was mooted out for consideration:
The suit having been filed only on the basis of tenancy, whether the lower appellate Court was right in granting a decree for possession on the basis of title after disbelieving the Plaintiff''s case of the tenancy?
In Balasidhantam v. Perumal Chetty (1914) I.L.W. 641, a division Bench of this Court, consisting of Seshasiri Aiyar and Kumaraswamisast Riar JJ. held that in a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent, the suit having been valued upon one year''s rent only, the Court will not go into the question of title. When the Plaintiff files the suit expressly proceeding on the basis that the Defendant is a tenant under him and wants the relief of possession alleging that the tenancy has been validity determined and pays the court-fee on that basis, the Plaintiff could get the relief of possession only, if he proves the tenancy. If on a plea by the Defendant a question of title arises, it can be gone into only for the purpose of determining as to whether the relationship of tenancy subsisted between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. It is it to be found that the relationship of tenancy between the Plaintiff and the Defendant does not subsist, the Plaintiff must fail in the suit as instituted by him and the suit cannot be converted into a suit for declaration of title and for recovery of possession on the basis of the title. This principle has found recognition by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Gobindakumar Sur v. Mohinimohan Sen ILR [1939] Cal. 349.
Mack J., in K. Gopalu Mudali Vs. A. Venkatesu Mudali and Others, following the decision in Balas dhantam v. Perumal Chetti (1914) I.L.W. 641 held that the question of title cannot be gone into in a suit for rent.
The legal position being clear as above in my opinion, the lower appellate Court erred in decreeing the suit of the Plaintiff for possession as it did. Accordingly, the second appeal is allowed setting aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court and restoring those of the first Court dismissing the suit of the Plaintiff. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and further more the Plaintiff being none else than the mother-in-law of the Defendant, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs throughout.
