South India Estate Labour Relations Organisation vs The State of Madras and Others

Venkatarama Aiyar, J.—The substantial question that is raised in this application is whether it is competent to the Government to refer a

dispute concerning wages to adjudication by a Tribunal u/s 10, In-Dustrial Disputes Act, 14 of 1947, after there had been a fixation of minimum

wages under the provisions of the Minimum wages Act 11 of 1948. The petitioner is the South India Estate Labour Relations Organisation, an

association representing 180 plantation estates in South India. On 25-9-1950 the Govt. of Madras appointed u/s 5(l)(b), Minimum Wages Act, a

Committee for fixing minimum wages in plantation and acting on their report, fixed minimum wages by G.O. No. 1093 dated 20-3-1952 to take

effect from 25-3-1952. While the above committee was carrying on its investigation, disputes arose between employers and employees in various

estates. At a meeting of the staff of these estates held on 20-5-1951 a resolution was passed demanding an increase in the basic salary and

dearness allowance and threatening, that in a case of non-compliance within fourteen days, a strike ballot would be taken. Vide Ex. A annexed to

the reply affidavit in support of the petition.

A copy of this resolution was sent to the owners of all the estates. On 7-6-1951 the petitioner replied that with a view to secure an agreed

settlement the estates had agreed to accept the union as entitled to make demands and ""failing redress, to proceed to secure adjudication by an

Industrial Tribunal without further reference to this organisation""; and that therefore the union should withdraw the notice and work for settlement,

Ex. B. To this, the union replied by Ex. C dated 14-6-1951 that no action would be taken on their notice, Ex. A till 15-7-1951. Meantime on 10-

6-1051, the Malabar District Estates Workers'' Union passed a resolution demanding an increase in wages, Ex. P. The Government thereupon

started conciliation proceedings and on 29-9-1951 the petitioner received notice that there would be a conference of the employer and employees

on 16th and 17th October at Coonoor and on the 19th at Valparai. The parties met but failed to reach an agreement and on 6-11-1951 the

Labour Commissioner sent his report Ex. G in which he stated ""As the union is maintaining a sustained agitation over these matters, a settlement is

possible only by adjudication.

It was after this that the Government took action u/s 10(1)(c), Industrial Disputes Act, and referred the disputes to the adjudication of an Industrial

Tribunal by G.O. No. 1240 dated 24-3-1952. The annexure sets out the matters so referred and they include fixation of wages for field workers,

kole maistries, factory workers and pluckers; and bonus for the year 1949-50. On 25-6-1952 the Government issued a memorandum No. 59079

amending the reference dated 24-3-1952 under G.O. No. 1240 by adding some more matters under annexure No. 2. In pursuance of these

references the matter is now pending adjudlcation as Industrial Disputes No. 8 (special) 1952 before the Industrial Tribunal, Coimbatore. It is at

this stage that the present application was filed for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the reference both under G.O. No. 1240 dated 24-3-52

and under the memorandum dated 25-5-1952.

Mr. K. Rajah Aiyar, the learned advocate for the petitioner urged the following points in support of the petition:

The reference to the Industrial Tribunal in so far as it relates to fixation of wages is without jurisdiction as the same had been already fixed under

the Minimum Wages Act, 11 of 1948;

The reference is incompetent in so far as it relates to maistries and kole maistries, as they are not workmen as defined under the Industrial

Disputes Act 14 of 1947.

The reference in so far as it relates to bonus is bad as that had already been the subject of a settlement and there was no dispute about it.

The memorandum No. 59079 dated 25-6-1952 is illegal as it purports to amend G.O. No. 1240 dated 24-3-1952, there being no power in

the Government to amend a reference.

_ 1. This is the point that has been most strongly pressed upon us. The contention of Mr. K. Rajah Aiyar, the learned advocate for the petitioner is

that the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 is a statute dealing with Industrial Disputes in general, whereas the Minimum Wages Act 11 of 1948

deals with one of the topics comprised therein; the fixation of wages in the trades specified in Part I of the schedule to the Act; that, being a later

enactment dealing with a particular matter, Act 11 of 1948 supersedes ''eo extanti'' the earlier enactment, Act 14 of 1947; and that fixation of

wages cannot therefore be a matter of reference under the latter Act. The question for determination then is whether Act 14 of 1947 can be held to

have been repealed by implication by Act 11 of 1948.

The rules of construction bearing on this point are well settled end may thus be stated:

(1) Law does not favour repeal by implication and It is only in the last resort that courts hold that one enactment is repealed by another, even

without express words. ""A sufficient Act"" ought not to be held to be repealed by implication without some strong reason"" per Lord Bramwell in --

''G. W. Rly. Co v. Swindon and Cheltenham Rly. Co.'', (1884) 9 AC 787 (A). ""Unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other, that effect

cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be implled as per A.L. Smith J. in -- ''Kutner v. Phillips''; l8912 QB 267 (B). ""If It is

possible, it us my duty so to read the section as not to repeal of the earlier Act per Farwell J. in--Chance, In re'', 1936 Oh 266 (C). Repeal by

implication which, whenever it occurs, is the consequence of Inconsistent legislation, is never to be favoured and should not be Imputed to

Parliament"". Halsbury Laws of England, Vol. 31, page 561, para. 759 .(Hailsham''s Edn.)

(2) ""If the provisions of a later Act are so Inconsistent with or repugnant to those of an earlier Act, that the two cannot stand together, the earlier

stands impliedly repealed by the later. ''Leges Posteriores Priores contrarias abrog-ant''"". Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., page

Vide also Halsbury''s Laws of England, Vol. 31, page. 561, para. 759.

The following passages from the judgment of Dr. Lushington in ''The India'', (1864) 33 LJ P. M. & Adm. 193 (D) contain what has become a

classic statement of the law on the subject: ""What words will establish a repeal by implication it is impossible to say from authority or decided

cases. If, on the one hand, the general presumption must be against such a repeal on the ground that the intention to repeal, if any had existed

would have been declared in express terms, so, on the other, it is not necessary that any express reference be made to the statute which is to be

repealed. The prior statute would, I conceive, be repealed by implication if its provisions were wholly incompatible with a subsequent one; or if the

two statutes together would lead to wholly absurd consequences; or if the entire subject-matter were taken away by the subsequent statutes.

One application of this rule is where there is first a general enactment and later a law relating to one or some of the matters included therein. The

law is thus stated in Craies on Statute-Law, 5th Edn.:

If one statute enacts something in general terms, and afterwards another statute is passed on ''the same subject'' which, although expressed in

affirmative language, introduces special conditions and restrictions, the subsequent statute will usually be considered as repealing by implication the

former.

It will be noticed that it is an essential condition for the application of the rule of implied ''repeal that there should be identity of subject-matter in the

two enactments.

Bearing the above principles in mind, we may now proceed to examine the nature and scope of the provisions in the two enactments. The object

of the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 is ""to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. ""Under Section 2(h)

industrial dispute is defined as meaning ""any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or

between workmen and workmen which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions

of labour of any person.

The power of the Government to refer a dispute to a Tribunal arises u/s 10 ""If any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended"".

The Tribunal hearing -references under the Act acts judicially; Section 11 of the Act makes several provisions of the CPC applicable to the

proceedings before it; and its decision was, prior to the enactment of the Industrial Disputes-(Appellate) Tribunal Act 48 of 1950, open to

consideration by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and after that Act, it is open-to appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The award,

when final, is binding on both the employer and the employees u/s 15 (2) and Section 18 (a) and their representatives u/s 18 (c) and (d) for such

period as may be specified by the Government u/s 19 (3). During that period Section 23 prohibits the employer from declaring a lock out; and the

employees from going on a strike; and S, 26 prescribes penalties in case of breach.

Turning now to the Minimum Wages Act-11 of 1948, its genesis is to be found in certain resolutions passed at the ""Minimum Wage Fixing.

Machinery Convention"" held at Geneva in 1928. These resolutions are embodied in Article Nos. 223; to 228 of the International Labour Code,

Vol. I, pages 167 to 174. The object of these resolutions was to fix minimum wages in industries ""in which no arrangements exist for the effective

regulations of wages by collective agreement or otherwise, and wages are exceptionally low."" Article 224(l), page 169. The Minimum Wages Act

was passed for giving effect to these resolutions The preamble to the Act states that ""It is expedient to provide for fixing minimum rates of wages in

certain employments""; and they are specified in Part I of the schedule. As remarked in ""Industrial Awards in India, an Analysis

The Act alms at making provision for the statutory fixation of minimum rates of wages in a number of industries wherein ''sweated labour is most

prevalent or where there is a big chance of exploitation of labour"".

Thus the object of the Act is to provide for fixation of wages in trades in which labour is not. organised and that will be clear from the list of trades

enumerated in part I to the schedule. The employer as defined in Section 2(e) will include a person who employs even one person. The fixation of

wages under the Act is not on the application of the employee nor is it dependent on the-existence of any dispute. The Act caste on the

Government the duty of fixing minimum wages in the trades specified in Part I; and such action has in fact been taken with reference to Tobacco-

and Beedi under G.O. No. 5257 dated 17-12-1950; Woollen carpet making and shawl weaving under G.O. No. 710 dated 25-2-1952; stone

breaking or stone crushing under G.O. No. 1093 dated 15-3-1952; and employment under local authority under Q. O. No. 1355 dated 29-3-

1952. u/s 5 the fixation of wages is to be made by the Government, after considering the advice of a Committee to be appointed u/s 5(1)(a) of the

Act, or the representations that may be made in the matter u/s 5(1)(b), and such fixation is final.

The Government has the power to revise the-rates from time to time. Section 22 provides that any employer who pays less than the minimum

wages fixed under the Act shall be liable for certain penalties. Section 25 enacts that any contract whereby an employee relinquishes or reduces

this right to minimum wages under the Act shall, to that extent, be null and void.

It will be seen from the foregoing summary of the statutory provisions that there are vital differences between the two enactments, both as

regards their purpose and their scope. The object of Act 14 of 1947 is to prevent strikes and lock outs, so that production might not suffer and

consistently with that object, a reference under the Act could be made only when there is a dispute actual or apprehended. On the other hand, the

object'' of Act 11 of 1948 is to protect unorganised and dumb labour from being exploited and for achieving that object the Government is to take

action suo motu and fix wages within the time mentioned in the statute. While the adjudication of disputes tinder Act 14 of 1947 is to be by a

Tribunal exercising judicial functions, the fixation of wages by the Government under Act 11 of 1948 is administrative in character. While an award

under Act 14 of 1947 was subject to judicial review by the High Court prior to Act .48 of 1950 and is under that Act open to appeal to the

Appellate Tribunal, the fixation of wages under Act 11 of 1948 is final

While an award under Act 14 of 1947 is binding on all the parties during the period specified in Section 19(3) of the Act, the fixation of wages

under Act 11 of 1948 is binding on the employer and not on the employees. The differences noted above are substantial in character; and if the

''contention of the petitioner is correct, it must follow that the rights of the parties under Act 14 of 1947 have suffered a material diminution under

Act 11 of 1948. No reason has been suggested why there should have been such a sharp change of policy by the Legislature within a year. It is

therefore difficult to agree with the petitioner that Act 11 of 1948 was intended, ''eo extanti'', to repeal Act 14 of 1947 and. to take its place as a

substitute.

Mr. K. Rajah Aiyar contends that in spite of the differences aforesaid between the two enactments, so far as fixation of wages was concerned,

the position would be the same, whether it had to be done by the Tribunal under Act 14 of 1947 or by the Government under Act 11 of 1948; that

u/s 5, Minimum Wages Act, the Government was to be guided by the advice of a Committee; that u/s 9 the Committee was to consist of equal

number of representatives of employers and of employees as well as independent persons; that they are to hold enquiry and send their report; that

their report could not be different from the award which a Tribunal could make under Act 14 of 1947; that in substance therefore there was no

difference between wages as fixed under Act 11 of 1948, and wages as adjudged under Act 14 of 1947; and that there was identity of subject-

matter between the two enactments.

He further contended that if the determination of wages under Act 11 of 1948''is not invested with the character of finality, any action taken under

that Act would become useless and in-fructuous; that if the next day after wages are fixed, the workmen could raise a dispute over it and the

matter could be referred for adjudication to a Tribunal under Act 14 of 1947,- ho purpose would be served by action being taken under Act 11 of

1948; that it could not have been Intended that there should be two enquiries into the same question, one by the Committee u/s 5 of Act 11 of

1948, and another by the Tribunal under Act 14 of 1947 with the ''possibility of conflicting decisions; and that therefore the reason of the thing

required that the jurisdiction under Minimum Wages Act should be exclusive and final.

Mr. K. Rajah Aiyar further referred to various anomalies that would arise in case Act 14 of 1947 is held not to have been repealed ''eo extanti'' by

Act 11 of 1948. What would happen, he asked, if after minimum wages are fixed under Act 11 of 1948 the Tribunal fixes a different figure? Does

the fixation under Act 11 of 1948 become automatically null and void? If so, where is the statutory provision for it? Suppose again, he asked, the

Government takes action u/s 10 of Act 11 of 1948 and revises the rates after the Tribunal has fixed wages in a reference under Act 14 of 1947,

which of them is to prevail? The award will be binding under Act 14 of 1947 for the period specified in Section 19(3) of the Act; therefore during

that period the revision u/s 10 cannot take effect; and the result is to render Section 10 inoperative. All this conflict can be resolved, it is argued, by

holding that the jurisdiction conferred under Act 14 of 1947 is ousted in matters to which Act 11 of 1948 applies.

The argument of the petitioner in support of the repeal by implication can be summed up in the following passages from Maxwell on

Interpretation of Statutes: .

Again if the co-existence of two sets of provisions would be destructive of the object for which the later was passed, the earlier would be

repealed by the later""; 10th Edn., page 168;

and again:

A later Act which conferred a new right would repeal an earlier right, If the co-existence of such right would produce inconvenience for the Just

Inference from such a result would be that the Legislature intended to take the earlier right away."" 10th Edn., pages 168-169.

The assumption underlying the contentions of the petitioner is that the principles on which the enquiry is to proceed and wages are to be

determined are the same under both the Acts. That, however, is not the true position. The scope of an enquiry under Act 11 of 1948 is to fix

minimum wages""; whereas in a reference under Act 14 of 1947, what the Tribunal has to determine is the ""wages"" that are to be paid to

workmen, and the two are not identical. In ""Industrial awards in India, an Analysis"" it is pointed out that in determining minimum wage three criteria

might be adopted: (1) a living wage; (2)'' a fair wage; and (3) a wage that is within the capacity of the industry to pay (page 19). In the report of

the Central Pay Commission ""living wage"" is correlated to ""poverty line"" which it is stated

may be drawn at the line below which ah Individual would be undernourished or it may be drawn well above the nutritional minimum, at a''point

where a choice of diet and the chance of some cultural life or recreation will also be possible"";

and then follows the conclusion that ""at present we can only aspire to rise above the poverty line in the first sense"" (Report dated 1947, page 31).

The Committee of Fair Wages also expressed the opinion that

the fixation of a minimum wage on the basis of a living wage which ensures not merely a bare physical subsistence but also the maintenance of

health and decency, a measure of frugal comfort and some Insurance against the more important misfortunes may not be possible immediately"".

(Report dated 1949, page 32).

Prom these passages it will be clear that the tendency was to fix minimum wages at the level of ""living wage"". It is this view that is reflected in the

Minimum Wages Act.

Section 4(1) of the Act which deals with this matter is as follows:

Any minimum rate of wages fixed or revised by the appropriate Government in respect of scheduled employments u/s 3 may consist of;

(I) a basic rate of wages and a special allowance at a rate to be adjusted, at such Intervals and in such manner as the appropriate Government may

.direct, to accord as nearly as practicable with the variation in the cost of living index number applicable to such workers (hereinafter referred to as

the ''cost of living allowance''); or (ii) a basic rate of wages with or without the cost of living allowance, and the cash value of the concessions in

respect of supplies of essential commodities at concession rates, where so authorised; or

(iii) an all-inclusive rate allowing for the basic rate, the cost of living allowance and the cash value of the concessions, if any.

It will be seen that the rate of wages under the Act must differ as it might be determined under one or another of the three categories mentioned

in the section and in Section 4(1)(ii), it is expressly provided that it may or may not include the cost of living allowance. The scheme of the Act is to

fix a basic wage which can only mean in the context living wage, and the award of anything more is optional and problematical. Mr. K. Rajah-

Aiyar quoted Article 232 (1) in the Labour Code as supporting his contention that the ""minimum wages"" in Act 11 of 1948 meant fair wages. It

runs as follows:

For the purpose of determining the minimum rates of wages to be fixed, the wage fixing body should in any case take account of the necessity of

enabling the workers concerned to maintain a suitable standard of living"" (Vol. 1, pages 175-176).

But that is only a recommendation to the members to undertake legislation on those lines. We must look to the actual legislation to find out the

meaning of ""minimum wage"". Indeed the reports of the Pay Commission and of the Committee for Fair Wages were, as already seen, against the

ad-option of such standard at that stage.

Turning now to Act 14 of 1947, when A dispute regarding wages is referred to the adjudication of a Tribunal, the-question that has to be

decided is, what is the fair wage to be awarded; on the facts of the particular case. The minimum wage is not, as such, the basis of the decision,

though it might in the actual investigation an) out to be a fair wage. It is true that ""the living wage basis of minimum wage fixation was given greater

emphasis in the earlier awards"" (Industrial Awards In India, page 20) but It was not by reason of any statutory provision binding the Tribunal to

award wages at that level. As observed later at page 22 ""considerations of a capacity to pay"" have also latterly entered into the calculations.

In view of these fundamental differences in the object and in the scope of the two enactments, it is not possible to apply the rule of repeal by

implication. On the other hand, the true rule to apply here is what is thus expressed by Maxwell

The language of every enactment must be construed as far as possible in accordance with the terms of every other statute, which It does not in

express terms modify or repeal"" (Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edn., page 160).

So construing the two statutes the position that emerges might thus be stated. The object of Act 11 of 1948 is to ensure the payment of living

wages to workmen. The fixation is made from'' the point of view of the workmen. The capacity, of the-employer does not enter into the

calculation. It may be that he cannot afford to pay at the rate fixed and may even be obliged to close down; but so long as he continues to employ,

he cannot "" pay less. Vide Section 22. A rate fixed under those conditions has to be the ""minimum""; and that is why its determination is entrusted to

administrative authorities. After wages are fixed under Act 11 of 1948, It may happen that the workmen are content to accept them, in which case

no further question would arise. But if they do not accept it and ask for more, then there is an industrial dispute; and u/s 10 of Act 14 of 1947, the

Government gets jurisdiction to refer it for adjudication by a Tribunal.

The point for decision by the Tribunal is as to fair wages payable to workmen and that must depend on the facts of each case. The minimum wages

fixed under Act 11 of 1948 will be the starting point. The Tribunal cannot reduce it; obviously fair wage cannot be anything less than the living

wages. That would also give full weight to Section 22 of Act 11 of 1948. There is nothing to preclude the Tribunal from affirming the rate fixed

under Act 11 of 1948, if on investigation it turns out to be a fair wage; the fact that the Government has made a reference u/s 19 of Act 14 of 1947

does not involve the conclusion that the minimum wage fixed under Act 11 of 1948 is not fair wage. But the Tribunal is not tied down to that rate,

and if on a consideration of all the circumstances including the capacity of the industry to pay more than living wage, it decides that it should be

increased, it has ample power to do so. As the subject-matter of adjudication is a dispute between the parties, it is entrusted to the decision of a

tribunal and the award is made binding on all the parties.

Thus, it will be seen that the scope of the two enactments is different; the respective spheres in which they operate are different and no such

conflict can arise in their working as was envisaged by Mr. K. Rajah Aiyar, if his contention that Act 14 of 1947 is by implication repealed by Act

11 of 1948 were not to be upheld. On the other hand, it is its acceptance that will lead to anomalous results. If, as is contended by the petitioner,

Act 14 of 1947 is repealed by Act 11 of 1948 by implication, what is the position with reference to disputes that might arise in the industries

specified in Part I in the Schedule to Act 11 of 1948 between the coming into force of '' that Act which was on 15-3-1948 and the fixation of

wages thereunder which was mostly on various dates in 1952? Which is the authority that could take action in respect of them? None. Could that

have been intended?

Mr. K. Rajah Aiyar, realising this difficulty, sought in the course of the argument to modify his position by contending that the bar to make a

reference would arise only on the fixation of wages under Act 11 of 1943. But that is not compatible with the theory o� an implied repeal. A

later enactment can provide when and how far an earlier enactment should stand repealed; and then the repeal will take effect in accordance with

those provisions. But such a situation is not possible where the repeal is by implication. The repeal must take effect as and when the later statute

comes into force; or not at all. And there are other difficulties as well in accepting even the limited contention of the petitioner that it is the fixation

of wages under Act 11 of 1948 that takes the subject-matter out of the operation of Act 14 of 1947. Suppose a reference is made u/s 10 of Act

14 of 1947 before wages are fixed under Act 11 of 1948; but that such fixation takes place while the reference is pending, does that oust the

jurisdiction of the Tribunal to proceed with the enquiry?

Mr. K. Rajah Aiyar concedes that on his contention it does. But it is an anomalous conclusion to reach for which there is no warrant in the statute.

The above considerations are sufficient to show that the fixation of wages under Act 11 of 1948 does not deprive the Government of its power to

take action u/s 10 of Act 14 of 1947; and that the reference cannot be assailed as without jurisdiction. We may add that a somewhat similar

contention that the Industrial Tribunal constituted under Act 14 of 1947 had no jurisdiction to hear disputes relating to payment of '' wages by

reason of there being a special legislation relating thereto, Payment of Wages Act 4 of 1936, was repelled by the Federal Court in ^-- AIR 1949

150 (Federal Court) and by this Court in -- The Electro Mechanical Industries Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal No. 2 for Engineering Firms and Type

Foundaries and Another, .

It was also contended by Mr. K. Rajah Aiyar that the reference u/s 10 of Act 14 of 1947 was not, on the facts of this case bona fide. It is

difficult to follow this contention. There was undoubtedly an industrial dispute; and the Government had to refer the matter for the adjudication of a

Tribunal. The argument of Mr. K. Raiah Aiyar is based on the fact that the reference to the Tribunal was made by G.O. No. 1240 dated 24-3-

1952 within four days of the fixation of minimum wages under G.O. No. 1093 dated 20-3-1952 before there was any time to see how i worked.-

But that is to forget the history behind the reference.

As already stated, disputes between the management and the employees had started early in 1951. On 20-5-1951 there was a resolution by the

Staff Union demanding increase of wages; and on 10-6-1951 the workers'' union passed a similar resolution. There was an attempt to settle the

matter by negotiation; and there were conciliation proceedings on 16th, 17th and 19th October 1951; but they ended in failure; and on 6-11-1951

the Labour Commissioner reported to the Government that the matter could be settled only by adjudication by a Tribunal; and the reference in

question was made in pursuance of this report. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that the action of the Government in making a

reference is either illegal or unfair. In the result, we hold that the inclusion of the dispute regarding wages in the reference to the tribunal under G.O.

No. 1240 dated 24-3-1952 is valid and not open to any objection.

The next contention that is urged is that the reference is illegal in so far as it relates to maistries and kole maistries. The argument is that they are

not workmen as defined in the Act and that there is no jurisdiction to refer the disputes of persons other than workmen for adjudication by the

Tribunal. Section 2(s) defines workmen as meaning

any person employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward"".

It is argued that the duties of maistries and the kole maistries do not involve any work, manual or clerical, skilled or unskilled and that, therefore,

they are not workmen as defined in Section 2(s) of the Act.

But whether a particular person is or is not a workman is a question that has to be decided on proof of the nature of the work which he is to

perform and that is a question of fact. It is for the Tribunal to come to a conclusion on the evidence whether having regard to the nature of their

duties, maistries and kole maistries are workmen as defined in the Act. Vide In Re: M.K.P. Kadar Moideen, Manager M.K.P. Rice and Oil Mills

Manjakollai, Negapatam, . If the Tribunal decides that maistries and kole maistries are not workmen, then it will not make any award with

reference to them. It is not for this Court now to decide whether they are workmen or not. That jurisdiction is vested in the Tribunal. See -- ''Rex,

v. Fulham'', 1951 2 KB 1 (H).'' (17) This relates to the question of bonus for the period 1949-1950. In paragraph 12 of the affidavit'' in''support

of the petition, it is stated that this question was settled at a meeting of the employers and workmen on 4-4-1951, that the unionhad withdrawn this

demand and that that is also acknowledged by the Labour Officer, Polsachi, in his reference No. 204 of 1952 dated 13-3-1952. It is contended

that there is no juris-fiction to refer this matter as there had been a attlement and there was no dispute concerning it. paragraph 9 of the counter

affidavit filed on half of the Government it is stated that as the settlement took place on 4-4-1952, the reference rich was made on 24-3-1952

could not be said be illegal. Thus the faetum of settlement accepted. The further statement that it took face on 4-4-1952 is admitted to be a

mistake. The reference must accordingly be quashed as regards bonus for 1949-50.

The last point urged is that the Government had no Jurisdiction under Act 14 of 1947 to amend a reference made u/s 10, of the Act and that''

accordingly the Memorandum No. 59079 dated 25-6-1952 amending the reference made on 24-3-1952 is without Jurisdiction. The objection is

one of form and is without substance. It would have been open to the Government to make u/s 10 an Independent reference concerning any matter

not covered by the previous reference. That it took the form of an amendment to the existing references & not an additional reference is a mere

technicality which does not merit any interference in these proceedings.

In the result, there will be an order quash ing the reference so far as bonus for 1949-50 is concerned. Save as aforesaid, the petition will be

dismissed with costs, of the workers'' advocate fee Rs. 250.