AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
Raju, J.—The assessee is the petitioner in the above tax revision case. The assessee was carrying on business in chemicals and for the
assessment year 1977-78, though he returned a total and taxable turnover of Rs. 43,99,134 and Rs. 29,09,064, respectively, on the basis of the
materials secured on a surprise inspection of the shop, the accounts were rejected and making an addition, a best judgment assessment was made
determining the total and taxable turnover of the assessee at Rs. 33,62,653 and Rs. 33,52,031, respectively. Penalty u/s 12(3) of the Tamil Nadu
General Sales Tax Act, 1959, hereinafter referred to as ""the Act"", was also levied. Aggrieved, the assessee filed an appeal before the appellate
authority, namely, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, what was disputed by the assessee was
the quantum of addition of Rs. 3,82,572 on the basis of the materials secured from the inspection. The appellate authority, after considering the
various contentions raised, while sustaining the addition and repelling the challenge to the turnover assessed by the best judgment assessment,
cancelled the penalty levied u/s 12(3) of the Act.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a further appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and the Tribunal, though, repelled the challenge to the
best judgment assessment made, reduced the turnover by Rs. 1,23,224 by adopting an average rate of Rs. 2 per kilogram as against Rs. 3 per
kilogram adopted by the assessing officer in quantifying the turnover said to have been suppressed. In respect of a further submission made by the
assessee that sodium nitrate sold by them falls under item 21(5) of the First Schedule and, therefore, was liable to tax at 3 1/2 per cent instead of 8
per cent as adopted by the assessing authority, the Tribunal rejected the claim on the ground that such a point was not raised before the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner who is the first appellate authority and that having regard to the decision of this Court reported in [1980] 46 STC 341
[Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] the assessee cannot raise such a point for the first time before the Tribunal. At any rate in
respect of a portion of the turnover to the tune of Rs. 86,400, which was the subject-matter of dispute before the first appellate authority as well as
the Tribunal, the rate of 3 1/2 per cent as claimed was allowed to be raised and sustained. Not satisfied with the order of the Tribunal, the above
tax revision case has been filed.
Mr. D. Pramod Chopda, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the addition made on the basis of the materials secured on
an inspection was not warranted. In addition, it was contended that the quantum of addition as made was excessive and unjustified. Learned
counsel further contended that the fact that the point relating to the rate of taxation applicable was not raised before the first appellate authority
does not really matter and that the assessee was entitled to raise it even before the Tribunal for the first time. Reliance for the petitioner was placed
on the decisions reported in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Arulmurugan and Company, , State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Pyarelal Malhotra, , The Associated
Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Another, and Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited Vs. State of Tamil
Nadu, .
The learned Additional Government Pleader (CT), referred to the decision reported in [1963] 14 STC 861 (State of Madras v. Voltas Limited
Madras : No. 2) of a Division Bench of this Court and further contended that the decision reported in Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) Vs. G.
Govindaraju Chettiar, squarely governs the issue in favour of the Revenue and the other decisions relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner are
not only distinguishable and besides the point, but have no force of a binding a precedent.
In Universal Radiators Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, , the assessee disputed the levy of tax in respect of a portion of a turnover on the ground
that they really represented works contract and not transactions of sale both before the assessing authority as well as the first appellate authority.
When a further appeal was filed before the Tribunal, in the memorandum of grounds of appeal, the assessee raised the only question whether the
transactions were works contract or not. Later, at the time of hearing of the appeal, the assessee filed an application for leave to file the additional
grounds that even if the turnover is held to represent the contracts of sale, the assessee having procured C forms from the purchasing dealers, he
was entitled to the benefit of the concessional rate of tax. The Tribunal declined to grant leave to raise the additional grounds on the ground that it
was filed beyond the time fixed for filing an appeal. When the matter came up before this Court, the view expressed was that the limitation
prescribed u/s 36 of the Act was only for filing appeals and it is not as if the assessee sought to bring a new or fresh turnover for attack by raising
an additional ground. It was further held that in view of the fact that the assessee only sought to raise an additional ground in respect of a turnover
which has already been questioned by him, this Court considered that the additional ground should have been allowed to be raised, and relegated
the matter to the Tribunal for consideration afresh of the claim based on the additional ground based on the production of the C forms.
In Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) Vs. G. Govindaraju Chettiar, the assessee, who was a dealer in cotton and cotton-seeds was assessed to tax
on best judgment. An addition of Rs. 50,000 was made towards the omission of sales of cotton-seeds. In the appeal before the Appellate
Assistant Commissioner, the dispute related only to the addition of Rs. 50,000 and also the penalty that was levied in a sum of Rs. 1,326 and not
in respect of any other turnover. The appeal was dismissed and thereupon the assessee filed an appeal before the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, the
assessee disputed the two items of turnover assessed, viz., (1) the sum of Rs. 1,33,858.18 being the value of the closing stock as on March 31,
1963; and (2) the estimated addition towards suppression of cotton-seeds to the tune of Rs. 50,000. So far as the challenge relating to the sum of
Rs. 1,33,858.18 is concerned, the Tribunal pointed out that u/s 4 of the Act read with the Second Schedule thereto, the assessee was not liable to
pay tax on purchases of cotton until the purchases acquired the quality of being the last purchase inside the State relying upon a decision of the
Supreme Court which came to be subsequently reported in State of Madras v. Narayanaswami Naidu [1968] 21 STC 1. The Revenue challenged
the same before this Court contending that the Tribunal was not justified in allowing the assessee to agitate the dispute regarding the sum of Rs.
1,33,858.18 which was never in challenge before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the first appellate authority and that unless the point was
agitated before the first appellate authority, the point could not have been the subject-matter of a dispute before the Appellate Tribunal. In a
connected tax case also, which was dealt with in common, a similar issue arose for consideration and Sethuraman, J., came to the conclusion that
the assessee could not raise any point for the first time before the Appellate Tribunal without raising it before the authorities below and an appeal of
such a nature would not be competent at all and the Tribunal could not have dealt with such a point raised for the first time before it. The learned
Judge relied upon the earlier decisions of this Court reported as Easun Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Government of Madras [1974] 33 STC 350, State
of Madras v. Spencer and Company Limited [1974] 34 STC 249, State of Tamil Nadu v. K. R. and P. Shanmugavel Nadar [1977] 39 STC 391
and a Full Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported as State of Andhra Pradesh v. Sri Venkata Rama Lingeshwara Rice Mill
[1977] 39 STC 57 to come to such a conclusion. Balasubrahmanyan, J., who was a party to the said Bench, differed from the view taken by
Sethuraman, J., and came to the conclusion that the Tribunal was competent to hear and decide the objection though raised for the first time before
it. The matter was, therefore, referred to for decision by another learned Judge of this Court and thereupon the matter came up for hearing before
Ramaprasada Rao, C.J., who concurred with the view expressed by Sethuraman, J., and differed from the view expressed by Balasubrahmanyan,
J. Consequently, it was categorically laid down in the said decision that the assessee was not justified in raising a dispute for the first time before the
Tribunal without raising such a dispute before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal was held to be in error in deciding such an
issue. It was also held therein that the maintainability of an appeal is one thing and moulding the relief in an appeal in accordance with the
supervening circumstances is another and that the powers of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal are not of the same amplitude as that conferred on
the Appellate Tribunal functioning under the Income Tax Act.
The decision in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Arulmurugan and Company, related to two tax revision cases which were directed to be placed before
a Full Bench for consideration. In one of the cases, though under rule 12(7) of the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957, a
declaration in form C shall be furnished to the prescribed authority up to the time of assessment by the first assessing authority, the assessee did not
produce C forms before the assessing officer. The C forms were produced before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner at the time of appeal and
the appellate authority declined to entertain the C forms at that stage. A further appeal before the Tribunal was made and the Tribunal received the
C forms, set aside the order of assessment and remanded the matter. It is in that context the matter came up before this Court for consideration as
to whether such a course was possible to be adopted. In the second on of the cases, the C forms as in the other case had not been filed by the
assessee before the assessment was concluded. The assessment was taken in appeal and at the stage of appeal before the Tribunal, the assessee
produced the C forms. On such production, the Tribunal entertained the C forms which had not been filed before the assessing authority and once
again the question arose as to whether such a course is possible. Therefore, the matter was placed before the consideration of the Full Bench
having regard to the earlier decision on the point reported in The State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Chellaram Garments (P.) Ltd., . Balasubrahmanyan, J.,
who spoke for the Bench, came to the conclusion that the real question that was before the said Bench was as to whether the appellate authority
has the same power as the assessing authority to allow further time for accepting the C forms and not how and by what process the assessing
authority itself could exercise the power after the completion of the assessment. A careful consideration of the judgment goes to show that the
entire discussions centered round the proviso to section 8(4) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, the scope of rule 12(7) of the Central Sales Tax
(Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957 and the power of the appellate authority to do in an appeal what the original authority itself could have
done. None of the earlier judgments of this Court either reported in [1980] 46 STC 341 [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar]
or those considered and followed in the said judgment, have been either referred to or considered. Apparently, that was on account of the fact that
an issue of the nature and in the form it arose before the Court which decided the case reported in [1980] 46 STC 341 [Deputy Commissioner
(C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] or the issue in the manner it is now raised before us, was never in the forefront or projected for consideration,
except making a passing reference to section 36 of the Act and an observation that the Tribunal has the power u/s 36 to set aside an assessment
either in whole or in part and direct the assessing authority to redo the assessment.
In State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Pyarelal Malhotra, , the assessee purchased scrap locally, converted the same into M.S. rods and then sold the
same locally. The local sales of M.S. rods were not taxed by the assessing authority following the decision of this Court reported in Pyarelal
Malhotra v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer [1970] 26 STC 416 which held that the local sales made out of locally purchased scrap cannot be
subjected to tax once again. Against the order of assessment, there was an appeal before the appellate authority by the assessee. The appeal
having failed, the assessee filed an appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. While the appeal was pending before the Tribunal, the Supreme
Court in its decision reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Pyare Lal Malhotra [1976] 37 STC 319 reversed the judgment of this Court reported in
[1970] 26 STC 416 (Pyarelal Malhotra v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer). Therefore, taking note of the decision of the Supreme Court, the State
filed an enhancement petition before the Tribunal contenting that the first sales of M.S. rods in the State also should be taxed. The Tribunal rejected
the enhancement petition. When the matter was challenged by the Revenue before this Court, a Division Bench, following the decision reported in
Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Panayappan Leather Industries [1981] 47 STC 88 (Mad.) held that in an appeal preferred by the
assessee u/s 36, the entire assessment is set at large before the Tribunal and the Tribunal can go into the correctness or otherwise of the order of
assessment by the assessing authority himself and that it was always open to the Tribunal to set aside the order of the assessing authority and revise
the assessment or direct him to make a fresh assessment in the light of the opinion expressed by it. This decision also turned more on the scope of
the enhancement powers, for which there is specific provision.
In The Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Another, , the court considered a batch of cases which involved a
common point relating to the same assessee. The assessee therein was a manufacturer and dealer in cement and was a registered dealer under the
Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act as well as the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The assessee sold cement to the consumers as well as stockists.
On the coming into force of the Tamil Nadu Sales Tax (Surcharge) Act, 1971, the assessing authority levied surcharge on the company from the
assessment year 1971-72 onwards up to 1975-76. When the assessee questioned its liability before the appellate authority, the appeals were
rejected and on further appeals before the Tribunal, it was held that freight charges are liable to sales tax and dismissed the appeals. So far as the
appeals preferred by the Company relating to the surcharge were concerned, the assessee moved separate applications to have the appeal
grounds amended to enable them to raise additional grounds. The move of the assessee was opposed by the State on the ground that as the
company had not raised a dispute before the authorities below as regards the higher figures sought to be brought in by means of an amendment
application, it would not be open to the assessee to raise additional grounds in that regard or even pray for an amendment. The Tribunal was of the
opinion that its jurisdiction was confined only to the subject-matter of the dispute before the first appellate authority and as the items covered by
the proposed amendment and additional grounds of appeal were not so disputed by the assessee before the assessing authority or the first
appellate authority, they could not be brought before the Tribunal properly as the subject-matter of the appeals either at the time of filing of the
appeals before the Tribunal or even at a later stage, by means of a request for additional grounds or petitions for amendment. The assessee
canvassed the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal before this Court by means of a tax case. Besides, the company also preferred writ
petitions for the issue of a writ of mandamus to refund the surcharge paid, according to the assessee, under a mistake of law. The said writ
petitions were dismissed in limine and writ appeals were filed thereon and those cases were also taken up for consideration along with the tax
cases referred to above. That apart, in respect of some other assessment years, writ petitions were separately filed and those writ petitions also
came to be heard along with the above cases. The Divisional Bench relied upon the decision reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan and
Company [1982] 51 STC 381 and also the decision under the Income Tax Act reported in Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Madras Vs.
Indian Express (Madurai) Pvt. Ltd., , and came to the conclusion that the Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that it was not open to
the assessee to raise a dispute with reference to a subject-matter which did not figure either before the assessing authority or before the first
appellate authority, that the levy of surcharge on the assessee being one not under the authority of law and the demand of surcharge was illegal, the
Revenue had a duty to refund the illegal exactions to the assessee and that the plea of limitation on the facts of the cases before the court was
misconceived. Unfortunately, the catena of cases of this Court which consistently took a contra view including that of the decision reported in
[1980] 46 STC 341 [Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) v. Govindaraju Chettiar] were neither referred to nor considered. What was considered was
only the decision of the Full Bench reported in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Arulmurugan and Company, which, as noticed earlier, has been rendered
in the context of production of C forms at a belated stage and without reference to any of the earlier decisions of this Court.
In Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu [1989] 74 STC 303, a Full Bench of this Court had an occasion
to consider the scope of section 31 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. In the said case, the assessee was a dealer in hides and skins. They
claimed exemption in respect of purchase turnover of raw hides and skins to the tune of Rs. 8,97,014.34 and the same was rejected. The assessee
appealed against the said judgment. In the memorandum of grounds of appeal, the assessee did not question the inclusion in the assessment of the
purchase turnover referred to above. However, subsequently, the assessee filed additional grounds before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner
objecting to the inclusion of the said turnover for levy of tax. When the appeal was disposed of by the appellate authority, it considered and
decided only the ground as originally raised and completely overlooked the grounds raised by way of additional grounds in respect of the turnover
referred to above. The matter was taken up on further appeal before the Tribunal and the Tribunal refused to entertain the grounds. In the view of
the Tribunal, the additional ground was in the nature of a supplemental appeal and, therefore, was incompetent besides being out of time. It is in
those circumstances, the matter came up before this Court and the matter was placed further before the Full Bench. The reference to the Full
Bench was felt necessitated on account of the decision of this Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing
Company of India Limited [1977] 39 STC 285. The Full Bench considered the question in the light of the decision reported in Commissioner of
Income Tax (Central), Madras Vs. Indian Express (Madurai) Pvt. Ltd., and The Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. The State of Tamil
Nadu and Another, and after noticing the fact that the SLP preferred by the State against the decision reported in The Associated Cement
Companies Ltd. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Another, was dismissed, considered that the view expressed in The State of Tamil Nadu Vs.
Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Company of India Limited, cannot be approved, and overruled the same.
Reference to the decision of this Court reported in Commissioner of Income Tax (Central), Madras Vs. Indian Express (Madurai) Pvt. Ltd.,
becomes necessary inasmuch as in some of the decisions, particularly State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Arulmurugan and Company, , The Associated
Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Another, and Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited Vs. State of Tamil
Nadu, a reference has been made to this case which arose under the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. That was on a reference to this
Court and the point raised was about the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal functioning under the said Act.
The assessee was a newspaper publisher having in its labour force as well as staff of a number of employees. Year after year, provision was being
made towards its possible gratuity liability for its workmen. Since payment was to be in future on the happening of an event, the assessee showed it
as a regular outgoing in its books of account. But, the assessee did not claim any deduction of the said amount and the deduction was restricted to
the actual payments, if any, made in any particular year. The Income Tax Officer also, when considering a return filed by the assessee on that basis,
had no occasion to grant any deduction in respect of provisions made for future liabilities on this account. The assessee merely objected to certain
calculations of income and additions made and even in an appeal filed the assessee did not raise the issue before the first appellate authority. When
a further appeal was filed before the Tribunal, the same grounds were raised but at the time of hearing of the appeal, an application was filed to
raise an additional ground relating to the provisions made towards gratuity liability also claiming deduction. When an objection was raised, the
Tribunal overruled the same and viewing the matter as one within its discretion, allowed the assessee to raise the new grounds, but sent the case
back to the Income Tax Officer for going into the factual details and other considerations on the new point. The reference, therefore, to this Court
was at the instance of the department. This Court held that the assessee was not precluded from raising a new ground and the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal was not precluded from examining and determining that issue merely because it was not put forward at the earlier stages during
assessment and in the first appeal. The court followed and applied the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax,
Madras Vs. Mahalakshmi Textile Mills Ltd., and Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras Vs. S. Nelliappan, Reference has been also made to
[1982] 51 STC 381 (State of Tamil Nadu v. Arulmurugan and Company) of this Court. It could be seen from the above catena of decisions that,
Balasubrahmanyan, J., was consistently persisting in his view even at the risk of overlooking the earlier decisions and whenever there was an
occasion, the learned Judge was voicing his theory that the Tribunal shall not be precluded from entertaining even a plea which the assessee did not
raise before the assessing authority or the first appellate authority. It is pertinent to notice at this stage that the Bench which decided Deputy
Commissioner (C.T.) Vs. G. Govindaraju Chettiar, specifically referred to Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras Vs. Mahalakshmi Textile Mills
Ltd., and held that the ratio in the cases decided under the Income Tax Act, 1961, in respect of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, has no
relevance or application to the case under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, in construing the scope of the powers of the Tribunal
functioning under the State Act.
A careful analysis and consideration of the various case laws referred to would go to show that when an issue arose directly, as it has now
arisen before us, it was held in earlier series of cases as well as in Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) Vs. G. Govindaraju Chettiar, that the Tribunal
cannot entertain and deal with a plea which was never in issue or raised before the authorities below and what could be raised or agitated before
the Tribunal at the second appellate stage was only those points or grounds or challenge that were raised before the authorities below and in
respect of issues kept alive at subsequent stages and points or questions arising incidentally out of, or as a further elaboration of a challenge already
made. A new ground in respect of a turnover which was already the subject-matter of challenge before the authorities below and before the
Tribunal was held to be permissible. Notwithstanding certain observations made in the two decisions of the Full Bench of this Court reported in
[1989] 74 STC 303 (Tamil Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu) and [1982] 51 STC 381 (State of Tamil Nadu v.
Arulmurugan and Company), it should not be overlooked that the issue in the above two Full Bench judgments never directly arose in the form in
which it arose in Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) Vs. G. Govindaraju Chettiar, or is now being raised before us. There was no occasion for the court
therein to consider the consequence of an appeal filed before the Tribunal raising a new ground in respect of a liability never agitated before the
hierarchy below, be it in respect of a part of a turnover or its other liability. As a matter of fact, in State of Madras v. Voltas Ltd., Madras : No. 2
[1963] 14 STC 861, a Division Bench of this Court has held that it is not open to a revision petitioner before this Court u/s 38 of the Tamil Nadu
General Sales Tax Act, 1959, to seek permission to raise questions of law relating to a turnover not comprised in the petition by filing a
miscellaneous petition after the period of limitation for filing the revision expired and that if such a plea or petition is only an application for leave to
raise additional grounds, there can be no objection. The court in that case further held that once a revision petition is filed and that embraced only
some of the points decided against the petitioner, it would not be unjust or improper to infer that the petitioner has waived or abandoned his rights
to challenge the other portions of the order which are against him and that there cannot be a challenge of a particular turnover not included in the
original memorandum of revision. Even this case has not been referred to in any of the subsequent decisions which struck a different view.
The decision in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Arulmurugan and Company, is concerned the consideration of the scope of the power of the appellate
authorities to permit the filing of C forms even at a subsequent stage during the pendency of an appeal and further appeal. The decision in Tamil
Nadu Small Industries Corporation Limited Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, also concerned the raising of a new ground, no doubt, in respect of a
turnover which was not in dispute in the memorandum of appeal filed initially, but did not deal with a case where a plea sought to be raised at the
second appellate stage was not raised before the first appellate stage or before the original authority nor regarding the consequences of such a
lapse on the part of an assessee. The scheme underlying the determination of net liability and the procedure prescribed therefore having regard to
the peculiar method of calculation of the net taxable income radically differs from the one relating to sales tax law in their basic concepts, scheme,
design and purport and it may be open to further discussion and deliberation as to whether there can be any comparison at all between the powers
of those authorities operating in their respective fields with distinct and different purpose and aims assigned to them in the relevant law concerned.
But, be that as it may, it is not necessary to go into those aspects and it will be enough if we notice, as done supra, the vital difference between the
issues which arose in those cases and the issue substantially in issue before us. So far as the decision in The Associated Cement Companies Ltd.
Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Another, is concerned, the Division Bench, which decided the said case, did not advert to or consider the catena
of earlier decisions directly on the point taking a different view including the one reported in Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) Vs. G. Govindaraju
Chettiar, . The mere fact that a SLP filed before the Supreme Court has been rejected and leave to appeal was not granted, does not have the
effect of elevating the decision of this Court to the status of a decision of the Supreme Court or a declaration of law by the Supreme Court itself
within the meaning of article 141 of the Constitution of India. We are of the view that having regard to the fact that the decision in The Associated
Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and Another, was rendered without reference to the several decisions of the Court striking
a different note rendered by the Benches of co-ordinate jurisdiction, it cannot be considered to be a precedent authoritatively binding on us and the
same is only a judgment rendered per incuriam and as such has no authority of a binding precedent. [Vide Syed Mohideen Vs. Government of
Tamil Nadu and Another, .
We are of the view that the decision reported in Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) Vs. G. Govindaraju Chettiar, has considered the questions at
length and with reference to all the relevant earlier case laws on the subject and lays down propositions reasonably and fairly and the ratio of the
said decisions commends our acceptance rather than the ratio in The Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu and
Another, and consequently we refer to follow the said decision and apply the same to the facts of the present case. As a matter of fact, the
Tribunal also rejected the plea of the petitioner relying upon and applying the ratio of the decision reported in Deputy Commissioner (C.T.) Vs. G.
Govindaraju Chettiar, . That being the position, we are unable to hold that the Tribunal committed any error of law in so doing and the plea of the
petitioner, therefore, fails and shall stand rejected.
So far as the jurisdiction for addition and the correctness of the quantum of additions are concerned, the authorities below including the
Tribunal properly adverted to those aspects and as a matter of fact, the Tribunal also gave relief in part to the petitioner. The conclusions rendered
otherwise on merits being not only concurrent and pertain to the arena of appreciation of facts mainly depending upon the nature and sufficiency of
the materials available, we are unable to find anything palpably wrong in the reasoning of the Tribunal or other legal infirmity in the conclusions
warranting our interference in the scope of our revisional jurisdiction.
For what has been stated above, the revision fails and shall stand dismissed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
Petition dismissed.
After the judgment was pronounced, learned counsel for the petitioner sought a certificate of fitness to file an appeal to the Supreme Court. No
question of law of general importance which has not been settled by the Supreme Court and which may require consideration by the Apex Court is
involved in this Case. The judgment has been delivered on the basis of the law settled by the various High Court and the Apex Court. The
certificate prayed for is refused.