Special Commissioner of Land Revenue, A.P., Hyd. and others vs Devendra Mohan

S.B. Sinha, CJ.

Aggrieved by a judgment dated 6-8-1999 passed by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal in OA No.8310 of 1998 this writ petition has been filed by the Special Commissioner of Land Revenue, A.P., Hyderabad and others against the original applicant, allowing his application. The first respondent herein was appointed as Village Administrative Officer. On or about 17-6-1997 a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the original applicant and as many as 11 charges were framed which are:

"1. The penalty of Rs. 100/- imposed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Chittoor vide proceedings 4347/93, dated 14-8-1996 has not been remitted.

That he was in possession of eight house-site pattas;

That he misappropriated an amount of Rs.1512/- for the Fasli 1404 under NALA.

That he misappropriated an amount of Rs.3645/- under NALA for the Fasli 1405.

That he recommended Ediga Certificate to Balija people.

That lie himself delivered house-site pattas 5A/94/I404, dated 11-8-1994 to two persons near District Judge Bungalow, which are not entered in the VHS Register at Mandal Revenue Officer, Chittoor leads to suspicious that these house-site patlas are bogus.

That he recommended Dudekula caste certificate to some Muslim people.

That he did not attend to videography programme during 1996.

That he without applying any leave has left for Nellore and Bangalore from 15-9-1996 to 27-9-1996.

That he without distributing photo identity cards to the concerned voters, kept as many as 36 photo identity cards with him.

The village Administrative Officer has been directed to collect the photographs from poor women so as to sanction old age pension by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Chittoor about two months back i.e., during April, 1997. But so far he did not attend it."

An order of dismissal was passed against him on 17-9-1998 upon holding a departmental proceeding therefor. An appeal preferred there against by the delinquent officer was also dismissed.

The original application was filed by the 1st respondent herein before the Tribunal questioning the said order. The learned Tribunal went into all the charges and arrived at a finding of fact that the important documents like NALA register were not supplied to him as a result whereof he was gravely prejudiced. The explanation of the disciplinary authority was the NALA challan register for fasli 1404 as also DCB were not handed over by the Village Administrative Officer to the office through the Mandal Revenue Inspector while handing over charge. It appears that attempts for retaining copies of such register were made even before the enquiry was started but such a plea had not been taken. The learned Tribunal held:

"We have examined charge by charge explanation of the applicant and findings of the Enquiry Officer. We have noticed that the explanation offered by him in all these charges was not properly rebutted. Misappropriation of funds is not established. Regarding the applicant''s absence from Headquarters, his explanation was accepted and. salary for that period was also paid. His request of perusing the NALA Registers was not complied with on the ground that the register was not seized by the MRO.

The charge on the delinquent is that he did not properly account for the amounts collected by him under the NALA. Surprisingly the Jamabandi Officer never raised this objection at the final Jamabandi and the Jamabandi Officer accepted the statements of the VAO."

It was held that by reason of non-supply of the said document the respondent was gravely prejudiced regard being had to the fact that an order of dismissal was proposed for commission of grave misconduct. The learned Tribunal in this connection relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, Vs. Karunakar, etc. etc., .

The learned Tribunal furthermore came to the following conclusion:

".....We have at length discussed that Jamabandi Officer never questioned the DCB collections. The delinquent officer submitted his explanation and wanted a copy of the Registers to be given to him to substantiate his innocence. The charge of misappropriation of Government money was levelled against him basing on the above records and they are not furnished to him for defending his case. We are, therefore, of the considered view that it causes prejudice to him."

Ms. Desai, the teamed Government Pleader for Services appearing on behalf of the petitioners herein inter alia submitted that a copy of the enquiry report had been supplied to the delinquent officer. As regards non-furnishing of the NALA register our attention has been drawn to the fact that the same was with the delinquent officer and in this connection our attention has also been drawn to the following defence of the petitioners which has been noticed by the learned Tribunal in the following terms:

".....Regarding non-supply of copies of NAT challan Register for Fasli 1404 and also DCB submitted, it is stated that those records were not handed over by the VAO to the office, through the Mandal Revenue Inspector while handing over the charge. Therefore, there is no question of non-supply of these documents."

It was, therefore, submitted that no prejudice was caused to the delinquent officer by reason of the alleged non-supply of the said register.

Mr. Naidu the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent on the other hand submitted that not only such a demand for supply of the register had been made at the initial stage but also made a representation to the said effect when second show-cause notice had been served upon the delinquent but the same was not supplied. It was pointed out that even no adequate opportunity had been given to the delinquent officer to file his representation although an application in that regard had been filed by him stating that some time be granted to file such representation as he had been suffering from fever. The learned Counsel would also contend that the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal without assigning any reason whatsoever.

It is not in dispute that Village Administrative Officer holds a civil post. Having regard to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Rana Ratna Rao Vs. State of A.P., , there cannot be any cavil of doubt that the procedures laid down in the A.P. Village Administrative Officers Service Rules, 1990 are required to be followed before imposition of a punishment against a delinquent officer.

It is a well settled principle of law that principles of natural justice must be complied with before punishment can be imposed upon an employee.

It is not in dispute that the enquiry officer based his finding with regard to misappropriation of fund on the basis of the registers maintained under NALA Act. The learned Tribunal has arrived at a finding of fact that the said Register had not been supplied to the delinquent officer.

It would appear from a bare perusal of the impugned judgment that the contentions raised by the petitioners herein as regards non-handing over of the said register to the office had not been accepted by the learned Tribunal. If such a register had not been handed over, we fail to understand as to on what oasis the charges were framed and sought to be proved. It has not been disputed by Ms. Desai that the contents of the said register were used against the respondent.

No doubt it is true that the extent of compliance of the principles of natural justice would vary from case to case. In Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Limited v. Girja Shankar Pant AIR 2001 SC 24, Banerjee, J., speaking for the Division Bench observed:

" 1. Since the decision of this Court in Kraipak''s case, A.K. Kraipak and Others Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, one golden rule that stands firmly established is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. What, however, does this doctrine exactly mean? Lord Reid about four decades ago in Ridge v. Baldwin (1964) AC 40 very succinctly described it as not being capable of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances -who then is a reasonable man - the man on the clapham omnibus? In India, however, a reasonable man cannot but be a common man similarly placed. The effort of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin (supra) in not attributing a definite meaning to the doctrine but attributing it to be representing a fair procedure still holds goods even in the millennium year. As a matter of fact this Court in the case of The Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, upon reliance on the attributes of the doctrine as above stated as below (at pp. 393 and 394 of AIR):

''8. The second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justice that should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer. We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a straight jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. See, for instance, the observations of Lord Parker in Re. HR (an infant) (1967) 2 QB 617. It only means that such measure of natural justice should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin case (1964 AC 40) (supra) as "insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances." However, even the application of the concept of fairplay requires real flexibility. Every thing will depend on the actual facts and circumstances of a case. As Tucker, LJ., observed in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk (1949) 1 All ER 109:

"The requirement of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth."

In Managing Director, ECIL v. Karunakar (supra), it was held:

"The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just right. They are not incantations to be invoked nor rights to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequences would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty."

Thus the question as to whether the delinquent officer has been prejudiced by non-supply of the document or not is essential a question of fact.

While exercising the power of judicial review the jurisdiction of this Court is limited. No illegality, irregularity or procedural impropriety has been shown in the decision making process of the Tribunal. Furthermore, it appears that on the basis of the findings arrived at by the enquiry officer the joint Collector asked the respondent to appear before him on 11-6-1998. The matter was adjourned to 14-10-1998. On 10-8-1998 the respondent submitted a petition for adjournment. On 24-8-1998 an order proposing a punishment of dismissal from service was issued. The impugned order was passed on 17-9-1998 without informing the respondent as to whether his application for adjournment was allowed or not. The petitioners in this writ petition had not annexed a copy of the order passed by the appellate authority. The same has been supplied to us by Mr. Naidu from a perusal whereof it appears that no cogent or sufficient reason has been assigned in support thereof. In Ram Chander v. Union of India, it was held that the appellate authority is obligated to assign reasons in support of its order. Even such minimal requirement of natural justice had not been complied with. Hence, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned order.

For the reasons aforementioned there is no merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.