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Judgment
P. Jyothimani, J.—The writ petitions are directed against the orders passed by the respondent rejecting the ''C'' forms filed by the dealer in
respect of assessment made for the years 2006-07, 2007-08 and 2008-09 respectively on the ground that the ''C'' forms were filed belatedly by
the dealer and the same is against Rule 12(7) of CST (R & T) Rules, 1957, which contemplates the furnishing of ''C'' forms to the Assessing
Authority within 3 months after the end of the period to which the declaration relates.
As correctly submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioners, even as per the circular issued by the Assessment Commissioner of
Commercial Tax, Chepauk, Chennai dated 01.02.2000, it is instructed as follows:
the first original assessment order is to be passed with the maximum available ''C'' forms. However, where the party subsequently produces ''C''
Forms from other States invoking the provision that he(assessee) had tried his best, but it was beyond his control, because ''C'' Forms were either
not readily available or not readily issued in those States, the Assessing Officers have to be liberal in reopening the reassessing of such cases.
Further the High Court of Madras has held in the case of Arulmurugan and Co. (1984) reported in 51 STC 381 that the proviso to Section 8(4)
does not insist that the assessee should establish before the prescribed authority that he has prevented by sufficient cause from filing the ''C'' Forms
in time. ''Sufficient Cause'' spoken of the Section 8(4) is sufficient cause which appeals to the mind of the authority concerned and which enables it
to allow further time without bothering about any onus on the assessees. Following the decision, this facility must be extended without fail. Instead
of driving the assessee to go on appeal for this simple matter and getting case remanded by the appellate forum for reopening and considering the
''C'' forms filed at the time of nearing the appeal, the Assessing Officers themselves may reopen the cases, admit the new ''C'' forms, check on their
correctness and genuineness, and pass revised assessment orders, as long as the period does not exceed the period of limitation.
Thus the instruction insists that ''Sufficient Cause'' spoken of the Section 8(4) is sufficient cause which appeals to the mind of the authority
concerned and which enables it to allow further time without bothering about any onus on the assessees. Hence, even if the dealer fails to explain
the reason for the delay, the respondent has to independently apply his mind and decide about the ''C'' forms, without insisting the onus on the
assessee.
The said circular itself has been based on the Full Bench judgment of the High Court of Madras in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v.
Arulmurugan and Co. (1982) reported in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Arulmurugan and Company, . This decision of the Madras High Court was
approved by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh, etc. Vs. M/s. Hyderabad Asbestos Cement Production Limited etc. etc.,
.
The above said judgment has been specifically followed by this Court in Vispro Foundry Engineers Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer, Adyar
Assessment Circle, Madras reported in 1991 (81) STC 169, wherein this Court has held that there is a apparent contradiction between Section
8(4) CST Act and Rule 12(7) of the CST (Registration and Turn Over) Rules, 1957 and the ''sufficient cause'' has been construed to mean to
decide independently the cause for the delay in filing of ''C'' Forms on the basis of doctrine of implied and ancillary powers and the reading of the
said judgment also shows that the Assessing Officers have to be liberal in reopening the reassessing of such cases. This factum has been followed
in paragraph 6 of the judgment cited supra.
Learned Counsel for the State has, however, pointed out that the observations in the Full Bench decision that the assessing authority has the
statutory power of rectification of mistakes and other observations about these provisions are obiter dicts, and if accepted, as a doctrine of implied
or ancillary powers, would mean recognising in a statutory authority a power to review a final assessment order, which power shall always operate
as a weapon to undo any assessment order. I would have given some thought to this objection as it is sell settled that no statutory authority or
Tribunal can have the power to review its order unless such power is conferred by a statute, but, I am, however, not required to examine in this
case, the extent of the ancillary powers that may be availed to the assessing authority. Section 8(4) itself has recognised the power of the assessing
authority to permit filing of the declarations and forms referred to in Clause (a) thereof, within such further time as that authority may, for sufficient
cause, permit. I have already noted that Rule 12(7) has prescribed the time-limit for filing the declaration referred to in Clause (a) of Section 8(4)
of the Act and that the assessee can file the declaration referred to in Clause (a) of Section 8(4) or in Rule 12(7) until the time of assessment by the
first assessing authority. The expression �first assessing authority� under Rule 12(7) indicates that the appellate authorities also are recognised
as assessing authorities. It means that the first assessing authority, as well as the appellate authority can for sufficient cause extend the time for filing
the declaration. The Full Bench was considering whether an appellate authority has the same power as the assessing authority to allow further time
for accepting C forms and not how and by what process the assessing authority himself could after the completion of the assessment extend the
time for filing the form. I am of the opinion that the power which has been noticed to exist the appellate authority will be available to the assessing
authority also to allow further time for accepting C forms or other forms mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub-section (4) of Section 8 of the Act.
In such view of the matter, when the law is well settled in respect of filing ''C'' forms, authorities shall independently decide irrespective of the
fact assessee has explained the reasons for the delay or not. Hence, on the face of it, the impugned order of the respondent is unsustainable and is
liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 12.01.2010 is set aside with liberty to the respondent to pass appropriate orders
taking into consideration the legal position and such orders shall be passed within a period of twelve week from the date of receipt of a copy of this
order.
The writ petitions stand allowed on the above terms. No costs. Consequently, connected M.P. Nos. 1 to 1 are closed.
