Sreevadhu Yerranna vs Pontiva Kannamma and Others

In S.A. No. 1569 of 1909 the plaintiff (appellant) was the vendee of the 5th defendant and 6th defendant''s deceased husband, who held the

plaint lands as Service Inam. They mortgaged the lands to defendants 1 and 2 in 1893 and in 1898 Government resumed the mam and imposed

full assessment. On the strength of his sale-deed patta was transferred in plaintiff''s name.

Two main questions are raised in this appeal. It is first contended that the resumption by Government put an end to all prior eucumbrances and

that the issue of a ryotwari putta amounted to a re grant. Admittedly Government have actually resumed possession of the land, which was in the

possession of the mortgagees from the date of mortgage We think, therefore, that the so-called resumption did not operate to extinguish prior

incumbrances. In a somewhat similar case of resumption by a zemindar the Privy Council remarked : ""The resumption consists in putting an end to

the grant, remitting the services and requiring them to pay the full ''assessment."" It does not appear that an absolute dispossession was either

attempted or intended in Umade Raja Raja Bommaranga Bahadur v. Pemmaswabmi Venkatadri Naidu (1858) 7 M.I.A. 128 . A similar view was

taken Gunnaiyan v. Kamatchi Ayyar ILR (1902) M. 339 and by the Full Bench in Lakshmipati v. Bommireddipalli Chelamayya ILR (1907) M.

434 in the case of enfranchised inam. The case Ekambara Iyer v. Meenatcki Ammal ILR (1903) M. 407 is only an authority in cases of forfeiture

by a tenant and is inapplicable here. We must accordingly find this point against the appellant.

The second contention is that the mortgage to defendants 1 and 2 was invalid, the inam being inalienable u/s 2 of Regulation VI of 1831. This

point was-not taken in the first court, but was raised in the lower appellate court, because first defendant had proved in the trial that the original

grant had been made for Jadaba (bearer) service and also for Kattakalva (repairs of channels) service. This plea had been put forward as an

argument against the validity of the resumption by Government, and the applicability of Regulation VI of 1831 does'' not appear to have beer

considered in that court. It has been found that the original giant of the plaint inam, which was before the Inam Settlement was for both services,

and no doubt Kattakalva service partakes of the nature of a public service. In recent times, however, we find that the inam has been treated as one

purely for Jadaba, service. It was so treated by Government on resumption and it was so treated by plaintiff in his plaint Section 2 of Regulation VI

of 1831 runs as follows : ""All emoluments derived from lands which have been annexed by the State of hereditary village and, other officers of

Revenue and Police Departments * * * are inalienable."" Even if it can be said that the Kattakalva service is rendered by the holder of such an

office, which is very doubtful, the Jadaba service is undoubtedly a personal service and outside the Regulation, and in this case the emoluments

were originally granted for both services and have recently been treated as belonging to the Jadaba service alone. In our opinion, therefore, plaintiff

has failed to prove that the plaint land comes within the provisions of Regulation VI of 1831. We may remark that this is not surprising as no

evidence was let in on the point, which did not form part of plaintiff''s original case.

In view of the above it is unnecessary to decide whether plaintiff''s claim is barred by limitation as the alienation to defendants 1 and 2 is valid

and binding on plaintiff.

The appeal is dismissed with costs.