Sri Arun Kumar Agrawal vs The Bihar State Financial Corporation, Patna and others

Nagendra Prasad Singh, J.—The petitioner in this writ Application has challenged the legality of the exercise of the power by the respondent Bihar State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as ''the Corporation'') u/s 29 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The petitioner owns and possesses an industry in the name and style Kishanganj Re-Rolling Mills'' (hereinafter referred to as the ''Mill''). In connection with the said Mill, the petitioner was granted a loan of Rs. 4,75,000/-by the aforesaid Corporation sometime in the year 1971. The petitioner executed a mortgage deed in favour of the said Corporation on 30.11.1971. A copy of the said mortgage deed is Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent Corporation. As there was default in the re-payment of the instalments of the loan advanced to the petitioner, the respondent Corporation Served a notice dated 20.8.1976, calling upon the petitioner to discharge the full liability amounting to Rs. 4,75,200/-, failing which the mortgage security would be advertised for sale by public auction and shall be sold in accordance with section 29 of the Act. A copy of that notice is Annexure-B to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Corporation. Again on 19.12.1977 the petitioner was asked to make payment of the dues by 31.12.1977, failing which action would be taken u/s 29 and section 30 of the Act. A copy of that notice is Annexure-1 to the writ application. The Board of Directors of the Corporation passed a resolution dated 12.1.1978, directing advertisement of the mortgaged security of the petitioner, for sale. The sale notice was; published in the newspapers in February, 1978 in which the last date for receiving the offers was fixed as 28.2.1978. Some offers were received from different persons, but the matter of sale was for the time being postponed considering the application of the petitioner for allowing him some further time to re-pay the dues.

A letter dated 29.5.1978 was addressed by the petitioner to the Chairman of the Corporation making reference to the earlier communications and saying that the properties which have been mortgaged to the Corporation are much in excess in value than the loan granted to him. It was asserted that the total investment was about Rs. 9,500,00/- including the loan advanced by the Corporation. A request was made in the said letter chat before taking any action against the petitioner "the Corporation should take into consideration the current valuation of the properties which exceeds Rs. 13. lacs". He also requested for more time to re-start the industry, failing which he shall sell the properties at the current market rate to re-pay the entire dues of the Corporation. A copy of that letter is Anne-xure-2 to the writ application. In the meeting of the Board of Directors held on 11.8.1978, the offers received from different parties were placed and it was resolved that negotiations be made with the three persons, whose offer was the highest. One of such offer was of Shri K. C. jain, respondent no. 4. By a letter dated 20.10.1978 the petitioner requested the Corporation for easy instalments saying that the working of the industry had to be stopped because the electric line had been disconnected by the Bihar State Electricity Board illegally on 7.9.1977, and thereafter, the petitioner had to file a writ application before this Court against the Electricity Board which was numbered as C.W.J.C. Mo. 3777 of 1978 for the restoration of the line and after an order passed by this Court the factory has started production on its re-opening on 18.10.1978. It was further asserted that the present value of the plant and machinery was Rs. II, 68,559/-, details thereof were given in a chart annexed to that letter. A copy of that letter is Annexure-3 to the writ application. On 9.11.1978, however, the Corporation, after a meeting of the Board of Directors, accepted the offer of respondent no. 4. Respondent no. 4 had offered to purchase the undertaking of the petitioner by paying the entire outstanding dues of about Rs. 5, 50, 000/-; Rs. 1, 50,000/- in cash and rest in instalments. The petitioner was informed about the same by the Corporation under letter dated 20.11.1978, a copy whereof is Annexure-5 to the writa-pplication. On 23.11.1978, the petitioner addressed another communication requesting for reasonable instalments for payment of taking the outstanding dues and not to sell the undertaking to respondent no. 4. It was also asserted that if a Government valuer was appointed to make the valuation of the assets of the factory, the valuation of the factory shall not be less than Rs. 15 lacs. A copy or this letter is Annexure-6 to the writ application. Before any sale deed could be executed by the Corporation in favour of respondent no. 4, this writ application was filed and it was admitted on 5.12.1978. At the time of admission itself this Court stayed the operation of the order of the Corporation as contained in the letter dated 20.11.1978 (annexure-5) and after hearing all the parties concerned on 31.1.1979, the respondents were injuncted from selling the factory.

Conter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of the respondent Corporation as well as on behalf of respondent no. 4 justifying the purported action u/s 29 of the Act to sell the undertaking of the peritioner for realisation of the loan in question. The Corporation is a statutory body and as such will be demeed be a State within the nathing of Article 12 of the Constitution of India has not been disputed.

According to the petitioner, the Corporation in the facts and circumstances of the ease had no authority in law to take steps for the sale of the undertaking of the petitioner and, according to him, even the procedure adopted for the sale, lacked bonafide and good faith vitiating the whole transaction.

The object of the Act appears to be to make provision for establishment of Financial Corporations in the different States to provide medium and long term credit to industrial undertakings and to make provisions for realisation of the said dues. u/s 3, the State Government has been vested with the power to establish Financial Corporation by notification in official Gazette which shall be a body corporate. Section 29 of the Act is as follows :--

(1) Where any industrial concern, which is under a liability to the Financial Corporation under an agreement, makes any default in repayment of any loan or advance or any instalment thereof or otherwise fails to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Financial Corporation the Financial Corporation shall have the right to take over the management of the industrial concern, as well as the right to transfer by way of lease or sale and realise the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated or assigned to the Financial Corporation. (2) Any transfer of property made by the Financial Corporation, in exercise of its powers under sub-section (1), shall vest in the transferee all rights in or to the property transferred as if the transfer had been made by the owner of the property.

(3) The Financial Corporation shall have the same rights and powers with respect to goods manufactured or produced wholly or partly from goods forming part of the security held by it as it had with respect to the original goods.

(4) Where the management of an industrial concern is taken over by the Financial Corporation or any property is transferred and realised by it under the provisions of sub-section (1), all costs, charges and expenses which in the opinion of the Financial Corporation have been properly incurred by it as incidential to such management, or transfer and realisation shall be recoverable from the industrial concern and the money which is received by it from such management or transfer and realisation shall, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, be held by it in trust to be applied firstly, in payment of such costs, charges and expenses, and, secondly, in discharge of the debt due to the Financial Corporation and the residue of the money so received shall be paid to the person entitled thereto.

(5) Where the Financial Corporation takes over the management of an industrial concern under the provisions of sub-section (1), the Financial Corporation shall be deemed to be the owner of such concern) for the purposes of suits by or against the concern, and shall sue and be sued in the name of the concern.

Section 31 of the Act provides that when an industrial concern, in breach of any agreement, makes any default in the payment of any loan or advance, the Financial Corporation without prejudice to the provisions of section 29 of the Act and section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act, may apply to the District Judge, within the limits of whose jurisdiction the industrial concern carries on its business for an order for sale of the property pledged, mortgaged or hypothecated, or for transferring the management of the industrial concern to the Corporation, or for an ad Interim induction restraining the industrial concern from transferring or removing any machinery or plant. Section 32 contains the procedure wheat such an application is made before the District lodge and as to how the claim of the Financial Corporation is to be investigated, Section 46B, which is relevant for the present case, is as follows:--

The provisions of this Act and of any rules or orders made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the memorandum or articles of association of an industrial concern or in any other instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than this Act, but save as aforesaid, the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any other law for the time being applicable to an industrial concern.

Under section 48, the Board of any such Financial Corporation has been vested with the power of making regulations for the purposes mentioned therein.

On a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is apparent that this Act has made specific provisions for realisation of the dues by the Corporation, apart from the right Such Corporation may have under the provisions of the Transfer of Properly Act. Even in the Act itself two procedures have been prescribed. u/s 29, the Corporation has a tight to take-over the management of the industrial concern or to transfer by way of lease and sale the property which has been pledged or mortgaged. It is also open to the Corporation to apply to the District Judge for an order for sale of the pledged or mortgaged property u/s 31. The stand of the Corporation appears to be that once there has been a default in the payment of the loan or any instalment thereof, it is for the Corporation to decide as to whether it shall immediately proceed in accordance with section 29 for the sale of the property mortgaged or it shall make an application in accordance with section 31 before the District lodge. According to them, power u/s 29 has an overriding effect and it even extinguishes the right, a mortgagor may have under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, on the other hand, has urged that although the mortgage bond, which was executed by the petitioner (a copy whereof is Anne-xure-A to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Corporation) is in the form of an English mortgage, hypothecating all lands, buildings, plants and machinery saying that for the amount received, it was conveying to the Corporation all those pieces and parcels of lands, buildings, structures etc. absolutely on the condition that on payment of the principal sum along with the interest, the Corporation shall re-transfer those lands, buildings, structures etc. to the petitioner, it can never be held to be a sale outright in favour of the Corporation vesting those properties in the Corporation, so that the Corporation may sell it for the realisation of its dues. According to the learned counsel, even in such mortgages interest of the mortgagor in the mortgaged property subsists in the form of equity of redemption and it cannot be held to be out and out sale. Reference in this connection was made to the cases of Ram Kinkar Banarjee and others v. Satya Charan Srimani and others (66 Indian Appeals. 50) and Jagadamba Loan Company Limited v. Raja Shiba Prasad Singh and others (68 Indian Appeals 67). Before the decision in Ram Kinkar Banerjee''s case (66 Indian Appeals 50), there was a controversy in the Indian courts about the nature of the right of a mortgagor when he executes an English mortgage, but in that case it was held that an English mortgage is not an absolute transfer of the property. It was also pointed out and that section 58 (e) deals with form and not substanee. The substantial rights are dealt with in sections 58 (a) and 60 of the Transfer of Property Act, and, as such, even in such mortgages right of redemption subsists. Reference in this connection was also made to the cases of Abraham Ezra Issac Mansoor v. Abdul Latif Usman (AIR 1944 Bombay 156) and Abraham Ezra Issac Mansoor v. Abdul Mahomed Alibhai (AIR 1949 Bombay 154). Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner pointed out that the petitioner has arranged and is prepared to pay off the mortgage dues of the Corporation upto date, forthwith and Corporation should be directed to accept the said tender. On behalf of the respondent Corporation, it was urged that instead of filing writ application before this Court, the petitioner should have filed a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property in the civil court after maxing deposit of the dues. On behalf of respondent no.4, however, it was urged that because of the overriding provision of section 29 read with section 46B, the rignt of equity of rademption in English mortgage ''does not survive, and the Corporation is at liberty to lease or sell the same as an owner for realisation of the dues. Learned Advocate General appearing on be-half of the Corporation, however, did not go to this extent, that the provision of section 29 extinguishes the rights of the mortgagor in an English mortgage and vests the properties completely in the mortgagee Corporation. In my opinion, even if it is assumed that the right of the petitioner to redeem the mortgage subsists, still that right cannot be enforced by a writ. For that relief, petitioner should have approached the civil court.

It was then submitted that even if it is held that the Corporation can exercise its power of selling the mortgaged property in accordance with section 29 of the Act, it has to exercise that power in a bona fide manner It is well settled that the mortgagee while selling the property which had been pledged to IT shall not sell in a manner lacking bona fide or good faith. In the case of Warner v Jacob [1881-2 (20) Chancery Division 220], it was pointed out by (sic) J.,:

The result seems to be that a mortgagee is strictly speaking not a trustee of the power of sale. It is a power given to him for his own benefit, to enable him the better to realize his debt. If he exercises it bona fide for that purpose, without corruption or collusion with the purchaser, the Court will not interfere even though the sale be very disadvantageous, unless indeed the price is so law as in itself to be evidence of fraud.

Again, in the case of John Kennedy v. Mary Annette De Trafford and others (1897 Appeal Cases 180) it was pointed out that if a mortgagee in exercising his power of sale exercises it in good-faith "without any intention of dealing unfairly by his mortgagor", it would be difficult to establish that he was guilty of breach of duty towards the mortgagor. It was at the same time pointed out:--

It is very difficult to define exhaustively all that would be included in the words ''good faith'', but I think it would be unreasonable to require the mortgagee to do more than exercise his power of sale in that fashion. Of course, if he wilfully and recklessly deals with the property in such a manner that the interests of the mortgagor are sacrificed, 1 should say that he had nor been exercising his power of sale in good faith.

In the case of Felix A. Mc. Hugh v. Union Bank of Canada [(1913) Appeal Cases 299], it Was said:

It is well settled law that it is the duty of a mortgagee when realizing the mortgaged property by sale to behave in conducting such realization, as a reasonable man would behave in the realization of his own properly, so that the mortgagor may receive credit for the fair value of the property sold.

In Farwell on Powers (Third Edition), Chapter XVI, at page 620 it has been stated:--

But every mortgage confers on the, mortgagee the right to realize his security and find a purchaser if he can; and if in the exercise of his power he acts bona fide and takes reasonable precautions to obtain a proper price, the mortgagor has no rederess, even although more might have been obtained for the property if the sale had been postponed. A mortgagee cannot sell for just enough to pay his own debt in entire disregard of the real valve of the estate.

It may be mentioned that in most of the cases, referred to above, mortgagee was exercising a statutory right u/s 19 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881 to sell the properties mortgaged and in that connection the aforesaid observations were made. The Privy Council in the case of Chabildas Lalloobhai v. Dayal Mowji and others (34 Indian Appeals 179) had to consider the sale by a mortgagee under an English mortgage and they approved the setting the aside of the sale saying that the mortgagees, by themselves or their agents, had so conducted themselves with reference to the sale in question that would be bidders were induced to leave, and, as such, the sale was not a bona fide action. Reference in this connection may be made also to the cases of Pichai Moideen Rowther v. Chathurbuja Das Kushal Das and Sons and others (AIR 1933 Madras 736), A. Batcha Saheb v. Nariman K. Irani and another (AIR 1955 Madras 491), Clara Mookerjee alias Smt. Mathuri Devi and another v. Surendra Manilal Mehta and others (AIR 1963 Madras 20K) and P.L. Chakrapani Naidu v. T. Gopal Mudatier and others (AIR 1973 Madras 8). In the aforesaid cases it was emphasised that while selling the property, the mortgagee has to act in a bona fide manner, which is the essence of the matter; any oblique motive, any underhand dealing or anything not consistent with the honest realisation of the secured money, on the part of the mortgagee would sufficiently be destructive of all pretentions of bona fides.

It was urged on behalf of respondent no. 4 that u/s 29 of the Act no limitation has been prescribed over the power of the Corporation to sell the mortgaged properties and the Corporation can sell it to any person for any amount for the realisation of its dues. The merit of this submission can be examined by an illustration. A mortgages his property worth more than rupees 5 lacs for a loan of rupees 5 lacs. Out of that, the substantial amount is repaid and a balance of rupees 25 thousand remains. Then, there is a default on _the part of the mortgagor to pay that amount. Can the Corporation in exercise of the power u/s 29 sell the mortgaged properties to a person who offers to pay only the dues of rupees 25 thousand ? In my opinion, the answer is in negative. First, the Corporation has to make an effort to sell the properties at the best price available. Of course, under some compelling situation where there is no higher offer in spite of advertisement, it can be sold even for the amount due. In my view, the burden imposed on the mortgagee under the general law while selling the properties mortgaged, is also on the Corporation while exercising power of sale u/s 29.

On behalf of the petitioner, it has been asserted that the respondent Corporation while taking a decision to sell the undertaking to respondent no. 4, has not acted in a bona fide manner. As the Corporation is exercising its (sic) power under the Act, of selling (sic) properties in question, in my view, this Court can examine the materials on record for the purpose of finding out as to whether they have acted in the manner which is enjoined on them by law. Of course, this Court for the purpose of arriving at that conclusion cannot investigate the facts like a civil court, but if on admitted facts a finding one way or the other can be recorded, then, in my opinion, it will not be proper exercise of discretion to direct the parties to go to Civil Court.

It is an admitted position that when a legal notice dated 25.9.1976 (Annexure-B to the counter-affidavit was issued to the petitioner, there had been default in the payment of the dues by the petitioner. Thereafter, it is said that on 6.1.1977 the petitioner made some payment. It is also an admitted position that on 12.1.1978, when the Corporation took a decision to advertise the properties for sale in purported exercise of the power u/s 29, the petitioner was a defaulter. But from the memorandum itself (Annexure-C to the counter-affidavit of the Corporation), which was placed in the meeting of the Board of Directors on 9.11.1976, it appears that after the aforesaid advertisement in February, 1978 "The matter of sale was for the time being postponed, considering the application of the concern for allowing it some further time to re-pay the overdues of the Corporation. After discussions with the Manager Partner of the concern, it was decided that the concern should be given time till May 1978 to re-pay the dues." It has been mentioned in that very memorandum that in the Board''s meeting held on 11.8.1978, the different offers were placed. Then it is stated therein :--

It was desired by the Board that the market value of the security be assessed and the negotiations be made with the three highest bidder.

It was then mentioned that "So far inspection by a technical officer to evaluate the security has not been made". In that memorandum names of three persons, including the respondent no. 4, were mentioned. Against serial nos. 2 and 3 names of one Jamuna Lal Pradip Kumar and M.L. Arya, and Sons were mentioned. Against the name of Jamuna Lal Pradip Kumar it was mentioned that he had offered Rs. 5,75,000/- and M.L. Arya Rs, 6.00,000/-where as against respondent no. 4 it was mentioned that he had offered to pay entire outstanding dues, till that day, which was Rs, 5,53,458,50. The memorandum further recites that so far persons against serial nos. 2 and 3, were concerned, they had been requested to come to the Head Office for further negotiation and letters were sent to them for further discussion, but none of them had turned up for further negotiation, and only respondent no. 4 had turned up and as he had agreed to pay the entire dues of the Corporation till that date, the Board should take a decision for sale of the unit. On that very date the Corporation decided to sell the unit to respondent no.4. In this connection it has been stated on affidavit on behalf of the petitioner that from the records of the case it will appear that really no serious steps whatsoever, were taken by the Corporation for getting higher offer and even the two other persons who had offered much higher amount than respondent no. 4, were not duly informed about the negotiations. In that connection our attention was drawn to the fact that a letter dated 16.9.1978 was issued to those two persons asking them to come from Kishanganj for negotiation on 19.9.1978 at Patna. However, these letters were despatched en 18.9.1978 which could not be received (sic) them. The photostat copies of original envelopes were produced in support of this contention. The petitioner has also produced a copy of letter dated 21.9.1978 written by the aforesaid M.L. Arya to the Corporation saying that negotiation had been fixed on 19.9.1978, but the letter intimating that itself was received on 21.9.1978. Copies of these communications are Annexures 7 to 7/3 to the affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner. Thereafter, no other date for negotiation was fixed by the Corporation. The aforesaid assertions were not challenged on behalf of the Corporation. On these materials it was urged that the offer of respondent no. 4 to pay the dues of the Corporation has been accepted, keeping only the interest of the Corporation, and the property worth Rupees 15 lacs is going to be sold to him for dues of only about Rs. 5,50,000/-. In my view, on the basis of aforesaid circumstances it can be said that the respondent Corporation, while agreeing to sell the undertaking to respondent no. 4, have not acted in a manner which can be held to be. As was pointed out in the aforesaid case of John Kennedy (1897 Appeal Cases ISO) that if the property under mortgage is dealt with by the mortgagee in such a manner that the interests of the mortagor are sacrificed, then it can be said that the power to sell has not been exercised in good faith. Sub-section (4) of section 29 of the Act itself conceives that the residue of money on sale after adjusting the dues, shall be paid to the person, meaning thereby the mortgagor.

On behalf of the Corporation it was pointed out that generally, whenever a property is put on sale for realisation of the dues, it cannot fetch the real market value. That is true, because it all depends as to how many persons turn up to purchase the property, in question and sometimes valuable properties are sold for a very low amount and that by itself cannot be a ground for holding that the sale was invalid. But, then the Court should be satisfied that the sale was conducted in a manner which did not lack good faith and bona fide. Here, admittedly the Board had directed to first (sic) valuation of the property which was not done. The Board was informed that two out of the three highest bidders had not appeared to negotiate, when the factual position was that the letters were despatched on 18.9.1978 to them at Kishanganj informing them that negotiation shall take place on 19.9.1978 at Patna. It has not been asserted that any other date for negotiation was fixed. There is no specific counter assertion on behalf of the Corporation, that the value of the property at the relevant time was not about rupees 13 to 15 lacs, although it is going to be sold to respondent no. 4 only for the outstanding dues on that day. In my view, although section 29 does not say as to how the Corporation shall negotiate for the sale of the undertaking when there has been default on the part of the mortgagor, but nonetheless it requires it to be done in good faith, also keeping in view that the property should fetch the maximum price. Of Course, in many cases in spite of best efforts it may not fetch the actual price. But, 1 am of the view that in the instant case no such effort was made on behalf of the Corporation and the petitioner can make legitimate grievance that there has been breach on the part of the Corporation while exercising the statutory power u/s 29 of the Act. It need not be impressed that more extraordinary the power is, more cautiously it should be exercised. The Act as I have already pointed out above, has prescribed two modes for sale of the property, one through the intervention of the court and the other without the intervention of the court. The Corporarion has preferred to exercse the power without the intervention of the court. EVen if it may be permissible, still it has to act in a manner from which it should appear that not only it has looted to its own interest, but it was also conscious of the fact that the interest of the mortgagor was not being secrificed.

Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned council appearing for respondent no. 4, whose offer was accepted by the Corporation, has urged that once it is established that there has been default in the payment of the instalment by the petitioner, the Corporation was at liberty to sell the property to any person in any manner and this Court should not examine those questions in exercise of the writ jurisdiction, and in that connection reference was made to the case of Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others, and The Vice-chancellor, Utkal University and Others Vs. S.K. Ghosh and Others, where it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the power to issue writ is circumscribed by the limitations prescribed and this Court should not act as a Court of appeal substituting its own judgment for the judgment taken by the statutory authorities. In my opinion, in the facts and circumstances of present case, there is no question of acting as a court of appeal so far as the questions involved in this writ application are concerned. On the admitted facts I have held that the decision to sell the undertaking of the petitioner has not been taken in a bona fide manner which is likely to cause substantial injury to the petitioner. The petitioner has moved this Court before actual transfer has taken place in favour of respondent no. 4. In such a situation, it will not be a proper exercise of discretion to reject the application filed on behalf of the petitioner.

Accordingly, this application allowed. The respondent Corporation is directed to apply its mind afresh on the question of the sale of undertaking in accordance with section 29 of the Act in the light of the observations made above. As I have held that the acceptance of the offer of respondent no 4 was not consistent with the requirement of law, it will be open to the Corporal ion to again consider as to whether after payment of the entire dues by the petitioner, by a date fixed by the Corporation, the decision to sell the properties should be recalled. In the circumstances of the case, however there will be no order as to costs. P.S. Sahay, J.--I agree but I would like to add a few words of my own. The transaction entered into between the petitioner and the Corporation was in the nature of English mortgage and in case of default, to pay the money, the mortgagee Corporation u/s 29 of the Act had absolute power to sell the property. But, at the same time, it is abso lutely clear from the various authorities which have been cited at the bar and discussed in great detail by my learned brother that the mortgagor has interest in the land till the sale is not completed. Therefore, in the instant case, the transaction having not been finalised the right of the mortgagor cannot be said to have been extinguished. But can the petitioner get a relief in this Court by an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India even if he tenders the entire amount which is found due and also undertakes to pay the balance, if any, to be determined after final adjudication ? The answer must be in the negative. Such power can, only be exercised by Civil Court in a properly constituted suit. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner should get relief in this Court has to be rejected. The Corporation has no doubt wide powers u/s 29 of the Act but the said powers must be exercised in accordance with law, otherwise it may occasion failure of justice. This Court in such a situation will certainly exercise its power to undo the wrong. The manner in which the sale has been conducted and discussed in great detail by my learned brother leaves no manner of doubt that the interest of the mortgagor petitioner has been overlooked. But, at the same time, I am not prepared to accept that the Corporation has acted in a mala fide manner. At best it can be said that adequate precautions had not been taken by the Corporation. I am also in complete agreement with mylearned brother that there being an alternative remedy, this petition should not be dismissed. That alternative remedy may not be efficacious and expeditious, when the petitioner has made out a case for the issuance of a writ by this Court.