Sri. B.S. Yeddyurappa vs Sri. Sirajin Basha

Anand Byrareddy, J.—Heard the learned Senior Advocate, Shri Ashok Harnahalli, appearing for the counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent, Shri Nitin. The, present petition is filed in the following circumstances: The petitioner is a former Chief Minister of the State of Karnataka. The respondent, along with another had sought sanction for prosecution of the petitioner by a representation made to the Governor of Karnataka, dated 28.12.2010. Sanction was sought to prosecute the petitioner u/s 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Hereinafter referred to as the ''PC Act'' for brevity) as well as u/s 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Hereinafter referred to as the ''Cr.P.C.,'' for brevity), for alleged offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Hereinafter referred to as the ''IPC for brevity). Sanction is said to have been accorded by the Governor, by an order dated 21.1.2011, for prosecution of the petitioner for offences u/s 405 IPC and Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

The complainant - respondent herein, had however, chosen to lodge five private complaints on the basis of the sanction accorded, before the XXIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge, Bangalore. The said complaints were numbered as PCR No. 2 of 2011, 3 of 2011, 4 of 2011, 5 of 2011 and 6 of 2011. The present petition is confined to PCR No. 5 of 2011. The said complaint is in respect of the following instances. The first instance alleged was that a private limited company promoted by the close relatives of the petitioner, M/s. Davalagiri Property Developers Private Limited, had received a sum of Rs. 2 crore during the financial year 2007-08, from M/s. Trishul Developers, a partnership firm and again a sum of Rs. 75 lakh, during the year 2008-2009 from the same firm. It is stated that Davalagiri had received monies from Shri Balaji Krupa enterprises, a proprietary concern of S.N. Krishnaiah Setty and also from one Praveen Chandra. It was alleged that being a private limited company, it could not accept deposits u/s 38A of the Companies Act, 1956. It was alleged that the monies deposited were apparently illegal gratification received by the said company on behalf of the petitioner.

In alleging as above, it is elaborated that one Venkata Gowda was the khathedar of land bearing survey no. 6/2A and 6/2C of Hebbala Amanikere, measuring 1 acre 36 guntas and 23 guntas, respectively. One Ramaiah was said to be the khathedar of land bearing survey no. 6/2B of the same village, measuring 23 guntas. These lands were notified for acquisition vide preliminary notification dated 9.7.1990 for formation of HBR III Stage Residential Layout. A final notification had been issued on 20.1.1995. An award was also said to have been passed and approved by the Bangalore Development Authority (Hereinafter referred to as the ''BDA'' for brevity), on 11.10.2005. In spite of the entire land having been acquired, the above said Trishul Developers had purchased the said lands under three registered sale deeds, dated 30.10.2004. The firm then challenged the acquisition proceedings by recourse to a writ petition in W.P. No. 25702 of 2005, unsuccessfully. It was thereafter there was transfer of the deposits of money in favour of Davalagiri Properties, simultaneously an application seeking de-notification of the lands in question - it is alleged that the petitioner, in his capacity as the chief minister, had dealt with the matter and had ultimately directed the withdrawal of the acquisition proceedings in respect of the said lands.

It was also alleged that the petitioner had also directed the withdrawal from acquisition proceedings of another extent of land measuring 33 guntas in land bearing survey no. 21/3 of Kempapura village. And that the petitioner as Chairman of a High Level Committee had cleared a project permitting the above mentioned Trishul Developers to construct commercial units in the land so. de-notified.

The second instance alleged was that the sons and son-in-law, were the promoters of M/s. Davalagiri Properties Private Limited, along with M/s. Besto Ice Cream Private Limited. And at their behest, the petitioner had fraudulently de-notified 11 acres 25 guntas of Srirampura, Yelehanka Hobli, in respect of which acquisition proceedings had attained finality and the land had vested in the State. The erstwhile land owner, Dr. B.R. Shetty, a non-resident Indian, had filed objections to the preliminary notification in the first instance, but had not taken any further steps to challenge the acquisition proceedings. But in the year 2008, much after the acquisition proceedings had attained finality, had approached the petitioner with a claim that he had purchased the lands to establish a super specialty hospital. Acting on the request, the petitioner is said to have passed an order dated 14.5.2010 withdrawing the land from acquisition proceedings. Immediately thereafter, the very land had been sold in favour of M/s. Davalagiri Properties under a registered sale deed dated 4.8.2010 by Dr. Shetty, for a sum of Rs. 3.50 crore against a market value of Rs. 54.45 crore. It was therefore alleged that the petitioner was instrumental in engineering the transaction at the cost of the exchequer and had committed breach of trust in enabling his progeny to acquire land vested in the state.

The third instance alleged was that the petitioner, as the Chief Minister of the State had misused his official position to allot a house site measuring 66 feet by 61 feet in the RMV II Stage, Bangalore, in favour of his son under the G category, when he was already the owner of a site. And that the site itself which was non-existent had been culled out of land already allotted to a house building society, was usurped by pressurizing the BDA, to facilitate the said process.

The trial court had taken cognizance of the complaint on 26.2.2011. Process was issued to the petitioner as on 23.2.2012, for offences punishable u/s 13(2) of the PC Act and under Sections 405, 406, 420, 463, 465, 468 and 471 IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the Karnataka Land (Restriction and Transfer) Act, 1991 read with Section 120B IPC. It is this which is under challenge in this petition.

The learned Senior Advocate would contend that a significant question of law is sought to be canvassed in this petition, namely, - Whether a private complaint can be filed u/s 190 read with Section 200 Cr.P.C., against a public servant for the offences alleged to have been committed under the provisions contained in the PC Act?

It is contended that this question assumes importance in view of the Karnataka Lok Ayuktha Act, 1984 (Hereinafter referred to as the ''KL Act'' for brevity), operating independently in respect of the same subject matter. The predominant objective of the said Act is to make enquiries into administrative actions of public servants including any omissions and commissions. It is a State enactment that has received the assent of the President and is a comprehensive Code relating to the prosecution of a public servant. It is an ad-mixture of adjective and substantive law and even affords protection to public servants from vexatious prosecution.

It is hence contended that the Cr.P.C. being a general legislation and the KL Act being a special law, in terms of Section 4 and Section 5 of the Cr.P.C., the special law providing for a different procedure, it is the procedure prescribed under the special law that would prevail.

It is contended that under the Cr.P.C., any person can set the criminal law into motion by filing a complaint u/s 200 thereof, whereas under the KL Act, the complaint could only be filed to the Lok Ayuktha, who would in turn, initiate proceedings u/s 14 of that Act.

It is contended that when a later statute again describes an offence created by an earlier statute and imposes a different punishment or varies the procedure, the earlier statute is repealed by implication. In this regard reliance is placed on the following authorities:-

a) T. Barai Vs. Henry Ah Hoe and Another,

b) Mitchell vs. Brown Lord Campbell, (I El. & El. 267, 274)

c) Zaverbhai Amaidas Vs. The State of Bombay,

d) Smith vs. Benabo, (1937) KB 518

It is contended that the conflict between the two legislations can also be addressed applying the test of repugnancy. In Deep Chand Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, it is laid down that in order to ascertain whether there is repugnancy or not, the following principles would have to be applied:

-Whether there is a direct conflict between the two provisions.

-Whether the legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the earlier.

-Whether the two laws occupy the same field.

It is also contended that the following passage from Crawford on Statutory Interpretation is of the same tenor:

All laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with full knowledge of all existing cases on the same subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the legislation, in passing a statute, did not intend to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable. Bowen v. Lease. It is a rule, says Sedgwick that a general statute without negative words will not repeal the particular provisions of a former one. Unless the two acts are irreconcilably inconsistent. And, as we have already suggested, it is essential that the new statute cover the entire subject matter of the old; otherwise there is no indication of the intent of the legislature to abrogate the old law. Consequently, the latter enactment will be constructed as the continuation of the old one.

The learned Senior Advocate would contend that in the above background, the following questions would also arise:

i. Whether after the promulgation of the Lokayuktha Act in Karnataka, there is a substantive alteration by implication of Section 200 Cr.P.C. and allied provisions?

ii. Are certain provisions contained under the Lok Ayukta Act repugnant to the provisions contained under the Cr.P.C. and the PC Act?

The variance as between the PC Act, the KL Act and the Cr.P.C., as highlighted by the learned Senior Advocate is indicated in tabular form hereunder:

It is contended that if the provisions contained under the KL Act are construed to be repugnant to the provisions of the Cr.P.C., under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India the KL Act would prevail over the Cr.P.C.

It is urged that if it is to be held that there is no implied alteration of the KL Act by Cr.P.C., then the existence of both remedies would result in two procedures, in respect of the same class of persons would be thrown open - with the complainant being able to choose from one of them. This would not be in consonance with the dictum of the apex court in the case of Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others, to the following effect:

If there are two available procedures, one more drastic or prejudicial to the party concerned than the other which can be applied at the arbitrary will of the authority. They thought that as Section 5 conferred an additional remedy over and above he remedy by way of suit leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Collector to resort to one or the other by picking and choosing some only of those in occupation of public properties and premises for the application of the more drastic procedure u/s 5 that Section laid itself open to the charge of discrimination and as being violative of Article 14, and in that view held that section void. (Paragraph 4)

The learned counsel would summarize his contentions thus:

That the Lokayukta Act is a special and local legislation, being a comprehensive Code, relating to investigation against public servants for any of the offences including offences under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1984.

That by virtue of Section 4 and 5 of Cr.P.C., 1973, such a construction and interpretation is perfectly legal and justified. Sections 4 and 5 recognize a different procedure of investigation by a local or special law.

That several provisions contained under the Lokayukta Act are "repugnant" to the provisions contained under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and that the State enactment having received the assent of the President of India, by virtue of the Article 254(2) of the Constitution, it would prevail over and upon the provisions contained under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, in the event of there being a conflict.

It is not uncommon to find several legislation, having a special investigation procedure, different from what is contained under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, with power of the prosecution being vested with the Authority itself viz.,

i) Section 187A of Customs Act, 1878.

ii) Section 97 of Gold Control Act, 1968.

iii) Section 6 of Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947.

iv) Section 271 and Section 279 of Income Tax Act, 1961.

v) Section 61 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973.

vi) Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956.

vii) Section 77 of the Electricity (Supply) Act.

That in the State of Karnataka, by virtue of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, after promulgation of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984, the provisions contained under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 more particularly the provisions for filing a private complaint u/s 190 read with Section 200 stand impliedly altered.

That by virtue of Section 14 of Lokayukta Act, the only person to file a complaint against a public servant is the Lokayukta.

That in the alternative, if it is held that both the enactments are to co-exist together, it would patently lead to a situation, wherein the accused could be subjected to two parallel procedures, with the complainant having a right to choose one of them.

As held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Maganlal Chhaganlal (P.) Ltd., Vs Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others reported in Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and Others, cited supra, the provisions contained under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 being more drastic in nature and cannot be invoked against the public servants.

Criminal proceedings could be set into motion either upon furnishing of information to the police u/s 154 of Cr.P.C. or by filing a Complaint to the Magistrate u/s 200 read with 190 of Cr.P.C. The Magistrate can look into the set of facts constituting an offence upon a complaint and either take cognizance of the offences or refer the matter for investigation u/s 156(3) of the code. As regards the offences against a public servant under P.C. Act or IPC, no cognizance can be taken unless there is a valid sanction accorded by the competent authority to prosecute the public servant. Criminal Procedure Code is a central enactment and general in nature. Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 is a State enactment but is a self contained code dealing with a specific field i.e., allegations of corruption or otherwise alleged against public servants. If a complaint against a public servant is filed before the Lokayukta then there will be a preliminary inquiry, the public servant will have an opportunity to refute the allegations in the investigation conducted by Lokayukta, a Report will thereafter be filed before the competent authority and if the Report is accepted, it is only thereafter that an FIR would be registered against such a public servant. On the other hand, if a complaint is filed before the Special Judge/Magistrate and the same is referred for investigation u/s 156(3) of the Code then immediately an FIR will be registered against the public servant thereby depriving him of the safeguards as available under the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984. This will amount to discrimination. By the aid of the legal principle ''Generalia specialibus non derogant'' i.e. a General law should always give way to a special law if both of them cover the same filed of law, the provisions of Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 should prevail over the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereby, in the State of Karnataka there is no scope for filing a private complaint u/s 200 read with 90 of the Code against a public servant. In the present case, the private complaint has been filed before the Special Judge u/s 200 of Cr.P.C. and as such the same is not maintainable. The Trial Court ought not to have entertained the complaint. Therefore, the entire proceedings before the Special Judge is vitiated and deserves to be quashed.

Apart from the above issue of law, the learned Senior Advocate has pressed into service other grounds, such as the complainant having made only a single comprehensive complaint in seeking sanction before the competent authority, however, had chosen to file five independent complaints and therefore it could not be said that the sanction pertained to any single complaint that is actually filed.

That the complaint does not disclose as to how the petitioner may have benefited by the de-notification of land which was the subject matter of acquisition proceedings and that the same cannot be linked to any commercial transactions carried on by his sons in their own right.

That the administrative decisions taken by the petitioner are in the usual course of business and in his official capacity and are informed decisions amply supported by official records justifying the same. Such decisions cannot be characterized as criminal acts. That the allegations in the complaint do not fulfill the ingredients of the offences defined under the various provisions of the IPC, that are invoked. Further the sanction had been accorded only in respect of Section 405 IPC read with 13(1)(d), 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the PC Act, hence cognizance having been taken in respect of other alleged offences is clearly without jurisdiction.

The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, would contend that there is no substance in the legal questions sought to be raised in the present petition. The premise that there is repugnance between the provisions of the KL Act and the PC Act, for the reason that the two operate in different domains having regard to the objects sought to be achieved under the respective legislation It is erroneous to proceed under the presumption that there is a legislative intent to substitute criminal procedure in the enactment of the legislation. The respective legislation are clearly sui generis. The legislation can only be read in aid of each other and certainly not in derogation of the one or the other.

It is also contended that the PC Act is a later central legislation vis-�-vis the KL Act. The court of Special Judge is notified under the PC Act and is independent of the KL Act. It is further contended that in so far as the objection that the complainant could not bring five independent complaints in respect of the allegations against the petitioner which were the subject matter of a comprehensive complaint and sanction having been obtained in respect of such a consolidated complaint, is concerned, there is no legal prohibition in this regard and on the other hand it would render the proceedings less cumbersome and would be more conveniently tried.

The contention that the administrative acts of the petitioner in his capacity as the Chief Minister and that the commercial transactions carried on by his sons or son-in-law are sought to be projected as inextricably linked, is in fact the underlying basis of the complaint and the same cannot be ignored and overlooked.

The argument sought to be canvassed that the court of the special judge could not take cognizance of the complaint in the absence of a valid sanction - is an incorrect proposition. The complaint was itself accompanied by a sanction order, it is the endeavour on the part of the petitioner to contend that a single sanction order could not support five independent complaints which is not a tenable objection.

In the light of the above contentions, the primary question for consideration in this petition is - Whether it would not be competent for a private complaint to be filed u/s 200 of the Cr.P.C., against a public servant for offences punishable under the provisions of the PC Act ?

The argument canvassed is that with the promulgation of the KL Act there is a substantive alteration by implication of Section 200 Cr.P.C. and allied provisions thereto and that the provisions contained under the KL Act are repugnant to the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and the PC Act. To wit, it is contended that the predominant object of the KL Act is to make enquiries into administrative actions of public servants including any omissions and commissions. The Lokayukta has been given wide powers such as the power to issue search warrants, to record evidence, to initiate prosecution and to punish for contempt, et al. Any person can file a complaint before the Lokayukta thereby setting the criminal law in motion. The KL Act prescribes an elaborate procedure in making an enquiry in respect of any such complaint and if the complaint is found to be false and motivated the same could be closed.

Further, the KL Act is a special and a State enactment that has received the assent of the President and is a comprehensive self contained code in relation to the prosecution of a public servant. This is indicated above in tabular form vis-�-vis the Cr.P.C. and the PC Act. It would hence prevail over the Cr.P.C. in terms of Section 4 and 5 of the Cr.P.C.

We may note the exact words of the Preamble to the KL Act. It reads thus:

PREAMBLE

An act to make provisions for the appointment and functions of certain authorities for making enquiries into administrative action relatable to matters specified in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, taken by or an behalf of the Government of Karnataka or certain public authorities in the State of Karnataka (including any omission or commission in connection with or arising out of such action) in certain cases and for matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto.

Whereas, it is expedient to make provision for the appointment and functions of certain authorities for making enquiries into administrative action relatable to matters specified in List II or List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution taken by or an behalf of the Government of Karnataka or certain public authorities in the State of Karnataka (including any omission) or commission in connection with or arising out of such action) in certain cases and for matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto;

It would also be useful to note the tenor of the following Sections of the KL Act, Section 9 providing for the manner in which any complaint is dealt with and investigated by the Lokayukta. Section 12 which prescribes the content of the report or reports that shall be made by the Lokayukta, to the competent authority for further action after completion of the investigation. And Section 14 that provides for initiation of prosecution, if after investigation into any complaint the Lokayukta is satisfied that the public servant had committed any criminal offence.

Provisions relating to complaints and investigations.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, any person may make a complaint under this Act to the Lokayukta or an Upa-lokayukta:

[Provided that in case of a grievance, if the person aggrieved is dead or for any reason, unable to act for himself, the complaint may be made or if it is already made, may be prosecuted by his legal representatives or by any other person who is authorized by him in writing in this behalf.]

(2) Every complaint shall be made in the form of a statement supported by an affidavit and in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed.

(3) Where the Lokayukta or an Upa-lokayukta proposes, after making such preliminary inquiry as he deemed fit, to conduct any investigation under this Act, he.-

(a) shall forward a copy of the complaint [and in the case of an investigation initiated suo motu]

XXX

Reports of Lokayukta, etc. - (1) If, after investigation of any action [xxxxx] involving a grievance has been made, the Lokayukta or an Upa-lokayukta is satisfied that such action has resulted in injustice or undue hardship to the complainant or to any other person, the Lokayukta or an Upa-lokayukta shall, by a report in writing, recommend to the Competent Authority concerned that such injustice or hardship shall be remedied or redressed in such manner and within such time as may be specified in the report.

(2) The Competent Authority to whom a report is sent under sub-section (1) shall, within one month of the expiry of the period specified in the report, intimate or cause to be intimated to the Lokayukta or the Upa-lokayukta the action taken on the report.

(3) If, after investigation of any action [xxxxx] involving an allegation has been made, the Lokayukta or an Upa-lokayukta is satisfied that such allegation [is substantiated] either wholly or partly, he shall by report in writing communicate his findings and recommendations along with the relevant documents, materials and other evidence to the Competent Authority.

(4) The Competent Authority shall examine the report forwarded to it under sub-section (3) and within three months of the date of receipt of the report, intimate or cause to be intimated to the Lokayukta or the Upa-lokayukta the action taken or proposed to be taken on the basis of the report.

(5) If the Lokayukta or the Upa-lokayukta is satisfied with the action taken or proposed to be taken on his recommendations or findings referred to I subsections (1) and (3), he shall close the case under information to the complainant, the public servant and the Competent Authority concerned; but where he is not so satisfied and if he considers that the case so deserves, he may make a special report upon the case to the Governor and also inform the Competent Authority concerned and the complainant.

[(6) The Lokayukta a shall present annually a consolidated report on the performance of his functions and that of the Upa-lokayukta under this Act to the Governor.]

(7) On receipt of the special report under subsection (5), or the annual report under sub-section (6), the Governor shall cause a copy thereof together with an explanatory memorandum to be laid before each House of the State Legislature.

(8) The Lokayukta or an Upa-lokayukta may at his discretion make available, from time to time, the substance of cases closed or otherwise disposed of by him which may appear to him to be of general, public academic or professional interest in such manner and to such persons as he may deem appropriate.

XXX

Initiation of prosecution.- If after investigation into any complaint the Lokayukta or an Upa-lokayukta is satisfied that the public servant has committed any criminal offence [and should be prosecuted] in a Court of law for such offence, then, he may pass on order to that effect and initiate prosecution of the public servant concerned and if prior sanction of any authority is required for such prosecution, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any law, such sanction shall be deemed to have been granted by the appropriate authority on the date of such order.

It is not evident that there is any express exclusion of the operation of any alternative measure available to set the criminal law in motion. The principle that a special provision on a matter excludes the application of a general provision on that matter, has not been applied when the two provisions deal with remedies. Validity of plural remedies if available under the Law cannot be doubted. Where two or more remedies are available, the principle of election would apply. Even if the two remedies happen to be inconsistent, they continue for the person concerned to choose from, until he elects one of them commencing an action accordingly. (See: The Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Ltd. Vs. Uma Shankar Sharan and another,

Assuming that the complaint in so far as the petitioner was concerned could only be made through the medium of the Lokayukta, in respect of any offence punishable under the PC Act, the end result would be that the proceedings would yet be initiated only before the Special Judge designated under the PC Act It should hence be held that there is no repugnancy in the application of the provisions of the respective legislation, notwithstanding the elaborate procedure adopted under the KL Act in respect of a complaint thereunder. But insofar as the initiation of criminal prosecution in respect of any offence committed is envitably in accordance with the provisions of the PC Act, albeit with or without sanction for prosecution.

Further, it is the PC Act that is the later Act and not the KL Act, in order to assert that the said KL Act having received the assent of the President would prevail over the other. In any event there is no warrant for any such presumption - in the light of the above view of this court.

In the case of M. Karunanidhi Vs. Union of India and Another, an almost identical challenge was made on the same ground of a State Act being repugnant to the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The appellant before the apex court in that case, M. Karunanidhi was a former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu State. It transpires that on 15.6.1976, the Chief Secretary to Government of Tamil Nadu had addressed the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CBI requesting him to make a detailed investigation into certain allegations against the appellant and others, who were alleged to have abused their official position in the matter of purchase of wheat from Punjab. A First Information Report was accordingly recorded and four months later, sanction u/s 197 of the Cr.P.C. was granted by the Governor of Tamil Nadu for the prosecution of the appellant under Sections 161, 468, and 471 of the IPC and Section 5(2) read with 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Thereafter, the Police had submitted a charge sheet against the appellant for offences mentioned above and a case was registered before the Special Judge and the appellant had appeared before the Special Judge and filed an application seeking discharge u/s 239 of the Cr.P.C., on the ground that the prosecution against him suffered from various legal and constitutional infirmities The application was rejected. The appellant therefore approached the High Court seeking quashing of the proceedings. The High Court in turn rejected the application, but granted a certificate for leave to appeal to the apex court and the appeals were before the apex court.

It is to be noticed that in the year 1973, the Madras Legislature had passed an Act known as the Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973. This had received the assent of the President of India and was brought into force from 8.5.1974. According to the allegations made against the appellant, the acts said to have been committed by him were between the period Nov ember 1974 to March 1975. In January 1976, President''s rule was imposed in the State of Tamil Nadu and the Ministry headed by the appellant was dismissed. The High Court decided the petitions of the appellant on 10.5.1977. Subsequently, however, the aforesaid State Act was repealed and the President''s assent to the repealing of the State Act was given on 6.9.1977. Though by the time the appeal reached the apex court, the State Act no longer existed. The Counsel for the appellant did seek to raise two issues. Firstly, that though the State Act was repealed during the time that it was in force, it was wholly repugnant to the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and by virtue of Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, the provisions of the aforesaid Central Act, stood repealed and could not revive after the State Act was repealed.

It was contended that even though the State Act was repealed, the provisions of the Central Acts having themselves been pro tanto repealed by the State Act, when it was passed could not be pressed into service for the purpose of prosecuting the appellant unless those provisions were reenacted by the appropriate Legislature.

Dealing with the question of repugnancy, the apex court expressed that repugnancy may result from the following circumstances:-

Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy.

Where however, a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254.

Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of the State List and entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential.

Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 254.

After examining the provisions of the State Act, the Supreme Court held that a careful analysis of the various provisions of the State Act indicates that it was passed with a view to afford sufficient protection to a public man by enjoining a summary inquiry or investigation by a high and independent Tribunal to instill confidence in the people and to prevent the public man from being prosecuted on false, frivolous and vexatious litigation. Although the ingredients of criminal misconduct, as defined under the Prevention of Corruption Act, are substantially the same in the State Act, but it was manifest that the State Act did not contain any provision which was repugnant to the Central Act, but is a sort of complementary Act which runs pari passu the Central Acts. Further, the apex court found that, just as in the case of the KL Act in the present case on hand, the State Act in that case also provided that where as a result of any detailed investigation in respect of a complaint of criminal misconduct against a public man, the investigating authority was of the opinion that it was expedient in the interest of justice that the public man, against whom the criminal misconduct has been alleged, should be prosecuted and tried. The apex court, therefore, concluded that far from there being any inconsistency, the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, under which a public man was to be prosecuted, directly applied to a public man by the State Act after the preliminary investigation by the investigating authority is over and therefore, the State Act did not overrule any provisions of the Central Act and the apex Court laid down that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the onus lies on the person assailing the Act to prove that it is unconstitutional. Prima facie, there did not appear to be any inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Acts and further held that before repugnancy could arise, the following conditions must be satisfied:-

That there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act.

That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable.

That the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such a nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other.

Insofar as the further contentions as to the complaint not being maintainable on account of a consolidated complaint having been sanctioned and then split into five in bringing the same before the court is not an objection that would vitiate the proceedings in any manner, as the law itself contemplates such/segregation.

And in regard to the contention that the petitioner''s acts in his capacity as the Chief Minister and the independent conduct of business of his sons and son-in-law as being totally unrelatable is at best a defence that may be set up at the trial and is not an objection to the maintainability of the proceedings Consequently, the writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.