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Sri. Chaitanya Educational Committee vs Commissioner of Central Excise, Guntur

Supreme Court Of India · Decided on 6 January 2012 · Citation: (2012) 25 STR 513 : (2012) 34 STT 484

HON’BLE JUDGES
D.K. Jain, J · Anil R. Dave, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Finance Act, 1994 — Section 86
RESULT
Allowed
CASE NUMBER
Civil Appeal No. 230 of 2012
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Judgment

7 paragraphs · 349 words
1.

Taken on board.

1.1 Leave granted.

This appeal is directed against order dated 19th October, 2011, passed by the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Central Excise Appeal No. 110 of 2011. By the impugned order, the High Court has directed the Appellant to deposit 1/3rd of the amount of service tax and penalty, which comes to about Rs. 80 crore as a condition precedent for entertainment of their appeal, preferred u/s 86 of the Finance Act, 1994. Since the issue raised in the present appeal pertains only to the question of the amount of pre-deposit, which the Appellant may be required to make, with the consent of Learned Counsel for the Revenue, who is on caveat, we have taken up the appeal for final disposal at this stage itself.

2.

Mr. V. Lakshmi Kumaran, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant, submits that the Appellant is a registered charitable society, running the classes without any Government aid, it has no resources to comply with the afore-stated condition imposed by the High Court, with the result that it will be deprived of its valuable right of appeal against the illegal demand created by the Adjudicating Authority.

3.

Mr. R.P. Bhatt, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Revenue, on the other hand, submits that in view of the fact that the society is charging very high amount of fees from the students, the impugned direction cannot be said to be onerous or unreasonable. He asserts that the Appellant should be directed to deposit at least 5096 of the demand towards the service tax.

4.

Having considered the matter in the light of the material on record, we are of the opinion that the ends of justice would be subserved if the Appellant is directed to deposit 1/3rd of the demand raised against them towards the service tax. If the said deposit is made on or before 15th March, 2012, their appeal shall be heard by the Tribunal on merits.

The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.