Sri K.N. Anandarama Reddy and Others vs The Commissioner, Bangalore Mahanagara Palike, Now called as Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike and The Assistant Executive Engineer, Department of Horticulture

Ashok B. Hinchigeri, J.—This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree, dated 11.11.2009 passed by the Court of the IX Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore (CCH-5) in O.S. No. 86/2004. The advertence to the facts of the case may not be necessary, as the appeal is being disposed of based on a question of law.

The suit schedule property measuring 1.14 acres forms part of the land at Sy. No. 83/3 of Madivala Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk (presently situated in B.T.M. layout II Stage). The entire land at Sy. No. 83/3 was acquired for the purpose and benefit of Bangalore Development Authority (''B.D.A.'' for short) vide preliminary notification, dated 19.09.1977 and final notification, dated 07.02.1978. As per the notification issued u/s 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, B.D.A. took possession of the suit schedule property on 20.1.1983.

It is trite that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete code in itself and the cognizance of the suit of civil nature is impliedly barred. The civil court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to try any dispute in respect of the acquired land. The only right that an aggrieved person can exercise is to approach the constitutional courts-High Court and the Supreme Court under the plenary power conferred by Articles 226 and 136 respectively of the Constitution of India. In saying so, I am fortified by the Apex Court''s judgments in the case of Laxmi Chand and others Vs. Gram Panchayat, Kararia and others, and State of Bihar Vs. Dhirendra Kumar and others, . The consistent view is reiterated in the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of The Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority and Another Vs. Brijesh Reddy and Another, . It has this to say in paragraph Nos. 18 and 19 of its judgment:

It is clear that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. By necessary implication, the power of the civil court to take cognizance of the case u/s 9 CPC stands excluded and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification u/s 4, declaration u/s 6 and subsequent proceedings except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is thus clear that the civil court is devoid of jurisdiction to give declaration or even bare injunction being granted on the invalidity of the procedure contemplated under the Act. The only right available for the aggrieved person is to approach the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 136 with self-imposed restrictions on their exercise of extraordinary power.

No doubt, in the case on hand, the plaintiffs approached the civil court with a prayer only for permanent injunction restraining defendants 1 and 2 i.e., BDA, their agents, servants and anyone claiming through them from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the schedule property. It is true that there is no challenge to the acquisition proceedings. However, in view of the assertion of BDA, in their written statements, about the imitation of acquisition proceedings ending with the passing of award, handing over possession and subsequent action, etc. the said suit is not maintainable. This was rightly concluded by the trial court. For proper compensation, the aggrieved parties are free to avail the statutory provisions and approach the court concerned. All these aspects have been clearly noted by the trial court and ultimately it rightly dismissed the suit as not maintainable. On the other hand, the learned Single Judge of the High Court though adverted to the principles laid down by this Court with reference to acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act and Section 9 CPC committed an error in remanding the matter to the trial court on the ground that the plaintiffs were not given opportunity to adduce evidence to show that their vendor was in possession which entitles them for grant of permanent injunction from evicting them from the scheduled property without due process of law by the defendants. In the light of the specific assertion coupled with materials in the written statement about the acquisition of land long ago and subsequent events, suit of any nature including bare injunction is not maintainable, hence, we are of the view that the High Court is not right in remitting the matter to the trial court for fresh disposal.

(emphasis supplied)

In view of the declaration of the legal position by the Apex Court in the afore-mentioned cases, I hold that the instant suit itself is not maintainable at all. The dismissal of the suit by the Trial Court is upheld for the said additional reason.

Needless to observe that the appellant, if he is so advised and subject to the appellant explaining the delay, laches, etc. to the satisfaction of the writ Court, may exercise the liberty of filing the writ petition invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.