Sri Manohar Patil vs Sri Murlidhar Havalanache

A.S. Bopanna

The petitioner herein is the respondent in HRC No. 15/2009 and the petitioner in HRC Revision Petition No. 3/2011. Since the parties are arrayed differently in the petition before the Courts below and in this petition, the petitioner herein would be referred to as the ''tenant'' and the respondent would be referred as ''Landlord'' for the purpose of convenience and clarity.

The landlord herein filed an eviction petition u/s 27(2)(r) and 27(2)(a) of the Karnataka Rent Act (for short the ''Act'') to hand-over the vacant possession of the petition schedule premises against the tenant. The same was registered in HRC No. 15/2009. The Eviction Court by its order dated 30.11.2010 has allowed the petition and directed the respondent therein to hand over the actual vacant possession. Insofar as the claim for arrears of rent, the Eviction Court directed the respondent to pay the same from March 2006 at the rate of Rs. 70/- per month to the petitioner. The tenant being aggrieved by the same had filed the revision petition before the Revisional Court in HRC Revision Petition No. 3/2011. The Revisional Court after considering the contentions before it has rejected the petition by its order dated 07.09.2012. The said concurrent orders passed by the Eviction Court and the Revisional Court are assailed by the tenant in this petition.

Learned counsel for the tenant while assailing the orders would mainly contend on two aspects of the matter. Firstly, with regard to the nature of the premises, he would contend that the Act would not be applicable to the premises since the landlord himself had indicated in the notice that the premises is being used for commercial purpose and the measurement being more than 145 sq. mts., the proceedings under the Act would not be maintainable. Secondly, certain dispute is also raised with regard to the jural relationship of landlord and tenant. In that regard, it is contended that the Eviction Petition itself was not maintainable before the Courts below and the order is liable to be set aside. However, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the tenant that the payment of arrears of rent as ordered has been deposited by the tenant.

Learned counsel for the landlord would however seek to sustain the orders passed by the Courts below.

In the light of the rival contentions, having noticed that both the Courts below have rendered concurrent findings on these aspects of the matter and keeping in view the limited scope available to this Court, at the outset, I have perused the reasoning adopted by the Courts below. Though the learned counsel for the tenant points out that there was an indication in the notice issued by the landlord that the premises was commercial premises, the Eviction Court in fact has referred to the documents which had been marked before it, more particularly at Ex.P6 and in that regard has discussed the matter in the light of the oral evidence which had been tendered to arrive at the conclusion that, it is admitted in the written statement in O.S. No. 360/2006 that the premises is used for residential purpose. This aspect of the matter in any event has been noticed by the Revisional Court as well and in that regard, a finding of fact has been rendered to state that the premises is a premises which would fall within the Act and therefore, the petition was maintainable. I do not find any perversity in the reasoning adapted by the Courts below so as to call for interference.

Even with regard to the jural relationship of landlord and tenant, the Revisional Court has referred to the same in detail with regard to the documents which had been produced and has taken note of the same to arrive at the conclusion that there cannot be any dispute with regard to the jural relationship. Therefore, insofar as the Courts below arriving at the conclusion that it had the jurisdiction to entertain the petition as the premises was amenable to the Act and that there was jural relationship, I do not find any error so as to interfere with the orders of the Courts below.

At this juncture, since this Court has arrived at such conclusion, learned counsel for the tenant would state that the tenant be granted time to voluntarily vacate the premises. Though the time as sought by the tenant is not acceded to by the respondent-landlord, keeping in view the fact that building is being used for residential purpose and since the tenant in any event would have to make appropriate arrangement by securing a suitable premises, I am of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the tenant should be granted time of one year from this day to vacate.

Considering that this Court is granting the time, the interest of the landlord at least to a certain extent has to be kept in view and since the rental being paid is only Rs. 70/- per month, during the said period of one year, the petitioner-tenant shall pay the sum of Rs. 500/- (Rupees Five Hundred only) for the remaining part of the period. The period of one year shall be computed from 1st of November 2012 and the tenant shall vacate the premises voluntarily. The benefit of the extended time is allowed to the petitioner-tenant subject to the condition that if the tenant accepts this order as final and he shall file an undertaking in the Registry of this Court within a period of four weeks, undertaking to voluntarily vacate the premises without driving the landlord to seek possession by executing the order. Further, the benefit of time granted could be availed by the tenant only if the said rental is paid promptly on or before 5th of every month. It is made clear that if there is default for even one month, time granted by this Court would not enure to the benefit of the tenant and the landlord would be entitled to execute the order. It is further made clear that if the tenant fails to vacate tire premises voluntarily at the end of one year which is granted, in addition to the landlord executing and taking possession of the premises, the tenant would expose himself for being tried for contempt of Court for violating the undertaking.

In terms of the above, the petition stands disposed of. No order as to costs.