Sri. R. Shankaran vs The State of Karnataka

Anand Byrareddy, Advocate

These petitions are heard and disposed of together having regard to certain common issues that arise for consideration.

The petitioners are aggrieved by the proposed acquisition of their lands for the formation of a residential layout known as ''Nada Prabhu Kempe Gowda Layout''. The acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (Hereinafter referred to as the ''BDA Act'', for brevity) spans lands spread over 12 villages. A preliminary notification, issued u/s 17 of the BDA Act was issued on 21.5.2008, proposing to acquire an extent of 4814 acres and 15 guntas of land. However, the extent was confined to 4043 acres and 27 guntas of land as per the final notification, issued u/s 19 of the BDA Act dated 18.2.2010.

The extent of land sought to be acquired in each of the 12 villages is as follows:

The reasons assigned for exclusion of lands, which found place in the preliminary notification, but which were not included in the final notification, were that the particular lands could not be integrated with the layout to be formed because of the fact that the same were either found to be outside the residential zone under the Zonal Regulations and were reserved for development under varied zones (Green Belt, Forest, Hi-tech etc.) or were found to be occupied by a temple or other place of worship, or was government land reserved for a particular scheme, housed educational institutions, were on the periphery of the proposed layout and consisted of farm land with farmers residing therein, or were completely built up, or were otherwise inconveniently situated on the edge of other non-residential zones and certain lands having been parallelly acquired by the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (KIADB).

The petitions are brought by persons, who may be broadly grouped under the following heads, namely:

(a) Agriculturists who claim that they are cultivating the land and residing therein and wholly dependant on the land for their livelihood.

(b) Persons engaged in rearing milch cattle and vending milk for their livelihood.

(c) Nurserymen, who have well developed nurseries and are also said to be cultivating the land for other purposes.

(d) House owners, who have built pucca houses well before the initiation of the acquisition proceedings.

(e) Persons who have established small scale industries including brick factories.

(f) Others claiming that the land in question is most inconveniently located for being integrated in the formation of the layout. This is also a common ground urged by several of the above petitioners as well.

Even during the pendency of these petitions, the BDA having been called upon by this court to re-examine the claim of the petitioners, as it was their uniform claim that they were subjected to arbitrary treatment in other lands, which were either similarly situated or were being similarly utilized, having been identified by the BDA for deletion from the acquisition process, while overlooking the case of the petitioners - and on the BDA reporting to this Court, after having re-examined the lands in question, that it would recommend to the State for withdrawal from acquisition, as the lands involved in particular petitions were indeed similarly placed as those lands which were given up from the acquisition proceedings before the issuance of the final notification, several petitions were disposed of, recording the submission of the BDA that the lands involved therein would not be acquired. The following tabular statement provides brief particulars of those petitions.

Before referring to the contentions urged by the several counsel for the parties, the particulars of lands and other properties of each of the petitioners herein are briefly stated hereunder:

Shri C.M. Nagabushana appearing for the several petitioners in the petitions in W.P. 2211/2013, W.P.1753/2013, W.P.14913 & 914/2013, W.P. 12969-972/2010, W.P.17369/2010, W.P.29668/2010, W.P.28722/2010, W.P.31121/2010, W.P.35629/2010, W.P.35628/2010, W.P.35625-27/2010, W.P.31120/2010, W.P.9842-44/2010, W.P.I 1025/2010, W.P.42138/2012, W.P.10650-653/2011, W.P.9830-37/2010, W.P.50027/2013, W.P.32653-656/2010 and W.P. 15705/2013, would contend that having regard to the fact that the BDA has withdrawn from acquisition in respect of large tracts of land after being appraised of the nature and situation of the same, it is inexplicable that the lands of the several petitioners concerned, who are similarly placed as those land owners, having been ignored, as being patently arbitrary.

It is contended that there are instances where the BDA has sought to acquire a portion of the land belonging to a land holder, while leaving out another portion making it economically unviable to utilize the land in any manner. It is also claimed that the BDA has acquired land in the midst of lands which are not the subject matter of acquisition, virtually creating an island of the acquired land. It is pointed out that almost 800 acres of land had not found place in the final notification, though the same were found in the preliminary notification - the reasons assigned for giving up those lands are perplexing. In that, it is claimed that the same are found in zones other than residential zones as indicated in the zonal regulations and that the same are built up, consisted of nurseries and farm land, or were found with places of worship, etc., etc., are glaring circumstances which would have been evident even before formulating any scheme preceding the acquisition. That the same has been noticed by the BDA only after objections having been raised would indicate that the acquisition proceedings have been initiated without regard to ground realities. This is further fortified by the fact that the BDA has continued to find that other lands were all similarly situated and has chosen to drop the lands from acquisition, even during the pendency of these proceedings. This would indicate a total lack of diligence and application of mind, in satisfying itself of the viability of acquisition of the lands in question. This is also apparent from the fact that while fertile irrigated lands are sought to be acquired, barren and dry land adjacent to such profitably cultivated lands - are significantly not notified for acquisition.

Shri Nagabushana seeks to highlight a disturbing and striking feature pointing to probable mischief and mala fides on the part of the powers that be in initiating the grandiose acquisition proceedings. That proceedings were initiated for acquisition of land for the formation of the Sir M. Visveshwaraiah Layout vide preliminary notification dated 24.1.2002 proposing to acquire over 930 acres of land. A notification dated 9.4.2003 was then issued for the proposed acquisition of over 773 acres of land for the further extension of Sir M. Visveshwaraiah Layout. Yet another notification was issued on 3.2.2003 proposing to acquire 3,839 acres, for the formation of the Arkavathy layout. However, a final notification was issued restricting the acquisition to 3,329 acres. It is pointed out that even after a decade of formation of sites and allotment of the same in the Sir M.V. Layout and the further extension of the layout, an aerial survey would show that there are only a few houses constructed. This is for two apparent reasons, firstly, that people are discouraged to construct houses for want of proper civic amenities and other facilities, especially water - it is pointed out that the entire quantity of water supplied from the river Cauvery does not exceed 1200 MLD, whereas the present need of the City is over 1800 MLD it is well neigh impossible to meet further demands. Secondly, because the sites are allotted to, or held by persons only as an investment, at the cost of farmers who have been paid a paltry compensation of less than Rs. 20/- per sq.ft. for their land whereas, the allottees of sites either have sold, or are in a position to sell the sites, at not less than Rs. 2,000/- or more per sq.ft. The net effect of the entire exercise of the acquisition proceedings is to deprive the original owner of the land - which was the source of his very livelihood and to enable unscrupulous persons to engage in profiteering at the cost of the helpless land owners, all in the name of serving a larger public interest. It is hence canvassed that the present acquisition apart from further enhancing the urban sprawl - which is not encouraged any where in the world by town planners- is a repeat performance of the shameless and gory drama by bureaucrats and politicians - as in respect of the several residential layouts formed, which are all embroiled in one or the other controversy of large scale fraud and intrigue.

Shri M. Sreenivas, counsel appearing for the petitioners in WP 12927-935 & WP 19807/2010 would contend that the petitioners in these petitions are related to each other and have jointly developed the combined extent of land measuring over 55 acres into a lush green nursery and orchards consisting of over a hundred variety of trees, and certain varieties such as coconut, mango, areca etc., are in their thousands and are carrying on multi-purpose farming, apart from floriculture, dairying & sheep rearing. The marked feature of the activity is the employment of latest technologies in all the areas of activity.

It is sought to be demonstrated that the continued activity in the past decades is duly certified even by the Forest Department, the Department of Animal Husbandry, Coconut Development Board and a Nurserymen Co-operative Society. This is apart from nationalized banks and other financing bodies of the State having actively assisted the development. The discrimination in not considering the deletion of the subject lands from acquisition is sought to be demonstrated with reference to the circumstance that the lands are adjoining forest land. Secondly, lands of others - abutting the subject lands have been dropped from acquisition, even though the same were dry land and garden land, while the plea and objections of the petitioners have been repeatedly overlooked. Thirdly, that the area falls within the green belt area as per the Master Plan prepared by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, and which has prohibited the lands in the zone from being utilized for any non-agricultural activity all these years. Fourthly, the subject lands are on the periphery of the proposed layout. Fifthly, as per a Government Circular dated 1-1-1987, well developed lands capable of growing two crops a year and nurseries cannot be the subject matter of acquisition proceedings. The learned counsel has also urged the contentions canvassed by Shri Nagabushana, as above. The above is an example of prima facie material being available to indicate that the lands in question ought to have been considered for deletion from the acquisition proceedings, if other lands of the same nature were dropped from the acquisition proceedings.

The several counsel, appearing for the respective petitioners, Shriyuths D.L. Jagadeesh, M.R. Rajagopal, R. Bhadrinath, N. Manohar, Megharaj M, A.V. Srinivas, B. Srinivas, T.S. Amarkumar, S. Vivekananda, G.M. Srikanth, J.M. Rajanna Shetty, Agnihotri Associates, Ganapathi Bhat, S. Chennaraya Reddy, M. Shivaprakash, H.P. Leeladhar, N. Hariprasad, Uday Kumar H.B., M.G. Shukuve Kamal, N. Sharada, Shanmukhappa, Shwetha Anand, G. Papi Reddy, A. Nagarajappa, T.M. Naik, H.S. Santosh, Saritha M for H. Kantharaj, G. Krishnamurthy, B.S. Nagaraj, M.C. Basavaraj, A.G. Shivanna, M. Raviprakash, N. Hariprasad and K.K. Thayamma, have similarly taken this court through the particulars of each of their petitions to demonstrate that the BDA has stubbornly refused to acknowledge that their lands and the particular user of the lands or the location of the land and in some cases, even an earlier recommendation by the concerned for deletion - fully qualified for deletion from the acquisition proceedings. It is urged that the complete absence of transparency in the manner in which the exercise of verification of the ground reality is carried out, in selectively withdrawing from acquisition in respect of certain lands while summarily rejecting the claim of the petitioners with cryptic comments, indicating a totally whimsical and laconic attitude to suit the designs of the BDA, smacks of arbitrariness and mala fides.

Shri M.G.S. Kamal appearing on behalf of several petitioners, contends that in terms of the BDA Act, any housing Scheme propounded by the BDA is required to be approved by the State Government. But this approval of the State Government is contemplated only after a notification u/s 17 of the BDA Act is issued and after the objections if any, received in respect of the same has been considered by the BDA and such modifications as may be warranted are made to the Scheme. However, it is to be noticed that the preliminary notification recites that the State Government had accorded its approval to the Scheme before hand, which has reduced the exercise of inviting objections to the acquisition if any, an empty exercise. Further, the Act does not contemplate "a prior approval" by the State of any scheme propounded by the BDA. Hence the same can only be viewed as a veil intended to cloak what is apparently a prior "sanction" of the Scheme. This is without authority of law and hence vitiates the proceedings.

It is contended that the BDA as a statutory body is established for the development of the City of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto. It is not an authority exercising the right of eminent domain, which power vests exclusively with the State. Therefore, the caveat in the Preliminary Notification issued u/s 17 of the BDA Act, warning owners and others interested not to obstruct or interfere with any surveyor or other person employed upon the said land, is beyond the power available to the BDA. The further requirement that any contract for disposal of the land notified, in any manner would require the sanction of the Land Acquisition Officer, BDA, is also beyond the scope of any such power. The declaration in the notification, to the effect, that in accordance with Section 36 of the BDA Act, the Additional Land Acquisition Officer, BDA, his staff and workmen being authorized to exercise powers conferred u/s 4(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is unsustainable. This is for the reason that Section 4(1) of the LA Act contemplates a notification being issued by the State proposing to acquire lands for a public purpose and after such a notification is issued Section 4(2) would come into play. By recourse to Section 36 of the BDA Act, the Authority cannot clothe itself with power that is inconsistent with the power available to the BDA at the stage of issuance of a preliminary notification, when it is the State that would exercise its power of eminent domain at the time of issuance of the final notification u/s 19 of the BDA Act.

It is further contended that the preliminary notification has indicated the percentages of land reserved for civic amenities, the extent earmarked for formation of housing sites and the extent of area to be offered as compensation to the land holders whose lands are the subject matter of acquisition. It is urged that this is wholly out of place and would indicate a predetermination to acquire the notified lands against all odds. For any such allocation of percentages could be contemplated only after ascertainment of the viability of acquiring the entire extent notified. As seen in the present circumstances a large percentage of the lands having been dropped from the acquisition proceedings - the projected percentages have gone awry, which is not even taken note of by the BDA or the State government.

More significantly, the determination of compensation in kind, to be offered to the land holders, irrespective of the location and the user to which such lands are put and the value thereof, apart from other relevant factors, under the preliminary notification by the BDA, which is not the acquiring authority is itself illegal and without jurisdiction. There could not be a commitment to payment of compensation even before the Scheme as notified had been sanctioned by the Government.

It is also inexplicable that the preliminary notification contemplates the redelivery of possession of 40% of the land to the "farmers", out of the 55% to be formed as sites. It is fallacious to presume that all the land holders, whose lands are proposed to be acquired are "farmers". This proposal to redeliver developed land would also be patently illegal as it would tantamount to allotment of sites outside the provisions applicable to allotment of sites by the BDA.

It is pointed out that the proposed acquisition envisages one half of the development being returned to the land owners. This would mean that out of over 4,000 acres of land set out in the final notification only about 2,300 would be actually allotted and over a 1,000 sites would be handed over to the original owners, who may or may not be interested in building a home for themselves. It is hence contended that the elaborate exercise is wholly unwarranted and results in a negative development rather than a development for the better.

Shri M.R. Rajagopal counsel appearing for several petitioners apart from questioning the acquisition proceedings on various grounds and providing factual particulars has raised a significant point of law, which is also voiced by Shri Ravi Prakash appearing for some of the petitioners. It is contended that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been repealed by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-settlement Act, 2013, which has come into effect from 1-1-2014. It is urged that as no further proceedings were taken after the final notification in the present acquisition proceedings, in terms of Section 36 of the BDA Act, further proceedings contemplated are with reference to the provisions of the repealed Act, in so far as they may be applicable. Exercise of any such power as on date, under the provisions of the repealed Act, is unworkable. It is also impermissible to invoke the provisions of the 2013 Act, as it is settled law that unless there is an amendment to Section 36 of the BDA Act, there is no machinery available to the BDA to determine and pay compensation. If on the contrary it is to be held that the 2013 Act could impliedly be pressed into service, it may be said that the proceedings have lapsed in terms of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, or in the alternative it would require the complete benefit of the provisions of the 2013 Act being extended to the land owners.

Shri Jayakumar S. Patil, Senior Advocate appearing for the counsel representing the BDA has sought to justify the acquisition proceedings and has pointed out that the BDA has gone out of its way to examine and reexamine the case of each petitioner scrupulously and has filtered those lands that could be left out of the acquisition proceedings. There is no warrant to characterize such deletion as being warranted since the same had passed muster before the issuance of the final notification, on account of non-application of mind on the part of the concerned. It is only those border line cases that have been reconsidered for deletion though strictly speaking the same could be even now integrated into the layout. The liberal approach of exempting lands at the instance of this court and on a sympathetic consideration of the plight of the land owners ought not to be castigated as careless and wanton action on the part of the BDA being sought to be corrected.

It is declared that apart from those lands that have been recommended to be withdrawn from the acquisition proceedings no other lands could be so considered and the factual assertions of the petitioners are dismissed as being self serving and not wholly correct. It is contended that the acquisition proceedings are otherwise in accordance with law and procedure and does not warrant interference only on the ground that the petitioners would suffer hardship. The acquisition of land in the instant case being for a greater public purpose of the public at large, the need of the petitioners should give way.

It is to be noticed that Statement of objections are not filed in most of the petitions and the few petitions in which such pleadings are filed are restricted to denying the petition averments generally, while asserting that the proceedings are in accordance with law.

As already noticed the several petitioners have placed material on record to prima facie demonstrate that their lands are similarly situated or in many cases it is canvassed they are more deserving to be considered for withdrawal from acquisition, as has been done by the BDA, in respect of other lands, after the initiation of the proceedings. And the BDA on the other hand remaining firm in its stand that the petitioners and their lands are not similarly situated. It would be a vexed point for consideration by this court, namely, if there is indeed arbitrary exclusion of lands of some and an unfair inclusion of lands of others, some of whom are petitioners herein. The circumstance that the BDA had of its own motion recommended the withdrawal from acquisition of about 800 acres of land after issuance of the preliminary notification and recommended several hundred acres of lands for such withdrawal during the pendency of these petitions, is significant. The further fact that there were more petitions which were being filed challenging the acquisition on the same grounds- but which petitions were deliberately not considered along with this batch of petitions, - and the opaque manner in which the BDA has chosen to proceed with the process of reexamining the claim of the land owners and the absence of details of, the why and how the BDA chose to differentiate various lands for such selective deletion from the acquisition process - when it would be expected that the BDA would place before this court the complete details and particulars of every single acre of land, if not every square metre, that is sought to be acquired. Though several multi-coloured maps indicating areas under acquisition, areas dropped from acquisition and areas under litigation are produced, no cohesive picture is given of whether the proposed layout would yet emerge from the mosaic of coloured areas of the maps. There is no attempt to justify and explain its actions in the face of the serious allegations of arbitrary and unfair treatment.

Be that as it may, it is significant that there are legal contentions raised in some of the petitions which address the very legality of the acquisition proceedings and which if found to be tenable, the entire acquisition proceedings may have to be set at naught and therefore the same are addressed presently-without having to consider the course of action in respect of the factual controversies, aforementioned.

The legal issues that arise for consideration in the light of the contentions put forth and which have been hardly met by the BDA are:

a. Whether the procedure adopted by the BDA in initiating the acquisition proceedings is in accordance with law and within its jurisdiction.

b. Whether the repeal of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, has the effect of frustrating any proceedings with reference to Section 36 of the BDA Act.

c. Whether the acquisition proceedings can be said to have lapsed by virtue of the 2013 Act having come into force.

Point a. : We may firstly notice the language and tenor of the provisions of Chapter III of the BDA Act, especially Sections 15 & 16 in considering whether the notification issued u/s 17 is in consonance thereof. The said Sections are reproduced hereunder for ready reference.

"15. Power of Authority to undertake works and incur expenditure for development, etc.--(1) The Authority may,-

(a) draw up detailed schemes (hereinafter referred to as "development scheme") for the development of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area; and

(b) with the previous approval of the Government, undertake from time to time any works for the development of the Bangalore Metropolitan Area and incur expenditure therefor and also for the framing and execution of development schemes.

(2) The Authority may also from time to time make and take up any new or additional development schemes,-

(i) on its own initiative, if satisfied of the sufficiency of its resources, or

(ii) on the recommendation of the local authority if the local authority places at the disposal of the Authority the necessary funds for framing and carrying out any scheme; or

(iii) otherwise.

(3) Notwithstanding anything in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the Government may, whenever it deems it necessary require the Authority to take up any development scheme or work and execute it subject to such terms and conditions as may be specified by the Government.

Particulars to be provided for in a development scheme.--Every development scheme u/s 15,

(1) shall, within the limits of the area comprised in the scheme, provide for,-

(a) the acquisition of any land which, in the opinion of the Authority, will be necessary for or affected by the execution of the scheme;

(b) laying and re-laying out all or any land including the construction and reconstruction of buildings and formation and alteration of streets;

(c) drainage, water supply and electricity;

(d) the reservation of not less than fifteen percent of the total area of the layout for public parks and playgrounds and an additional area of not less than ten percent of the total area of the layout for civic amenities.

(2) may, within the limits aforesaid, provide for,-

(a) raising any land which the Authority may consider expedient to raise to facilitate better drainage;

(b) forming open spaces for the better ventilation of the area comprised in the scheme or any adjoining area;

(c) the sanitary arrangements required;

(3) may, within and without the limits aforesaid provide for the construction of houses.

Procedure on completion of scheme.--(1) When a development scheme has been prepared, the Authority shall draw up a notification stating the fact of a scheme having been made and the limits of the area comprised therein, and naming a place where particulars of the scheme, a map of the area comprised therein, a statement specifying the land which is proposed to be acquired and of the land in regard to which a betterment tax may be levied may be seen at all reasonable hours.

(2) A copy of the said notification shall be sent to the Corporation which shall, within thirty days from the date of receipt thereof, forward to the Authority for transmission to the Government as hereinafter provided, any representation which the Corporation may think fit to make with regard to the scheme.

(3) The Authority shall also cause a copy of the said notification to be published in the official Gazette and affixed in some conspicuous part of its own office, the Deputy Commissioner''s Office, the office of the Corporation and in such other places as the Authority may consider necessary.

(4) If no representation is received from the Corporation within the time specified in sub-section (2), the concurrence of the Corporation to the scheme shall be deemed to have been given.

(5) During the thirty days next following the day on which such notification is published in the official Gazette the Authority shall serve a notice on every person whose name appears in the assessment list of the local authority or in the land revenue register as being primarily liable to pay the property tax or land revenue assessment on any building or land which is proposed to be acquired in executing the scheme or in regard to which the Authority proposes to recover betterment tax requiring such person to show cause within thirty days from the date of the receipt of the notice why such acquisition of the building or land and the recovery of betterment tax should not be made.

(6) The notice shall be signed by or by the order of the Commissioner, and shall be served.

(a) by personal delivery or if such person is absent or cannot be found, on his agent, or if no agent can be found, then by leaving the same on the land or the building; or

(b) by leaving the same at the usual or last known place of abode or business of such person; or

(c) by registered post addressed to the usual or last known place of abode or business of such person."

It is seen that the BDA need not obtain any previous approval of the Government in drawing up any development scheme. (Whether the same is necessary by virtue of Section 3(f)(vi) or (vii) of the LA Act, is however, not examined and the question is left open). There is no explanation forthcoming as to the need for having obtained such approval when the scheme of the Act contemplates that after the publication of the scheme and service of notice as provided in Section 17 of the BDA Act and after consideration of representations, if any, received, the authority shall submit the scheme, making such modifications as it may think fit, to the Government for sanction, furnishing such details as prescribed u/s 18 of the Act. It is not contemplated that the Government may consider and "approve" any Scheme even before the BDA has gathered particulars of the lands to be acquired pursuant to the notification u/s 17 of the Act. Therefore the "approval" said to have been conferred on a nascent development scheme of the BDA by the State Government dated 2.4.2008 is out of place and premature. The presumption is that the State Government and the BDA were proceeding on the footing that the proposed acquisition of the several lands notified u/s 17 of the Act were available for acquisition, even without any of the stake holders having had their say on the viability of the said acquisition in respect of their lands.

It is also to be noticed that the notification u/s 17 of the Act is issued by the Commissioner, BDA, in exercise of power conferred thereunder. The BDA is not the acquiring authority, the State Government is. It is therefore impermissible for the BDA to authorize the Additional Land Acquisition Officer, BDA and his staff to exercise power conferred u/s 4(2) of the LA Act. This is evident from the fact that the State Government exercises its power under clause (c) of Section 3 and Section 7 of the LA Act read with Section 36 of the BDA Act to appoint the Additional Land Acquisition Officer, BDA, to perform the duties and functions of the Deputy Commissioner (Land Acquisition) under the LA Act, only after according sanction to the Scheme and while issuing the notification u/s 19 of the BDA Act. Any acts performed by the Addl. LAO, BDA and his staff, prior to the issuance of the notification u/s 19 of the Act, is wholly without jurisdiction and illegal.

The following declaration in the preliminary notification dated 21.5.2008 is a further curiosity:

"...45% of the land covered under the Scheme would be used for civic amenities, playgrounds, roads, etc., and the residential sites would be formed by utilizing the remaining 55% developed residential area, 40% of 55% will be offered as compensation to the farmers as specified in the Scheme and the remaining 60% of 55% will be the share of the BDA. The farmers are also given option to accept the developed eligible residential land or opt for compensation/both...."

The BDA was clearly off bounds in even suggesting that compensation in kind, would be offered and even to specify the percentage of the acquired land that would be compensated by returning developed land of any particular extent. This initiative of the BDA is not contemplated u/s 16 of the BDA Act, which specifies the particulars to be provided for in a development scheme. The BDA would hardly be in a position to determine percentages of land use without completing the process of addressing representations pursuant to the notification u/s 17 and the sanction by the State government in respect of the extent of land ultimately covered under the notification issued u/s 19 of the Act. It may also be said that even at that stage the quantum of compensation is hardly capable of being determined. It is the State Government which would, in the eye of law, acquire the land and determine the compensation to be paid. As is evident, large swathes of land have been given up from the acquisition proceedings and it is not clarified whether the percentages declared as above are any longer valid and tenable. It is also not that all the land holders are "farmers", nor is it to be taken that all the 4,000 acres, and more of the land, is of a uniform nature and of the same value. It is therefore shocking that the State Government had even approved such a "Scheme".

In so far as the second point for consideration is concerned, we may first notice the language of Section 36 of the BDA Act. The same is reproduced hereunder for ready reference.

"36. Provisions applicable to the acquisition of land otherwise than by agreement.-

(1) The acquisition of land under this Act otherwise than by agreement within or without the Bangalore Metropolitan Area shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

(2) For the purpose of sub-section (2) of section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Authority shall be deemed to be the local authority concerned.

(3) After the land vests in the Government u/s 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Deputy Commissioner shall, upon payment of the cost of the acquisition, and upon the Authority agreeing to pay any further costs which may be incurred on account of the acquisition, transfer the land to the Authority, and the land shall thereupon vest in the Authority."

We may usefully refer to decided cases wherein the apex court and this court have dealt with the interplay of the provisions of the LA Act vis-�-vis the provisions of the BDA Act.

In the case of Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and Others Vs. The State of Karnataka and Others, , a division bench of this court meticulously analyzed the provisions of the BDA Act and the LA Act with reference to the primary contention raised therein, namely, that the LA Act as amended by Mysore Act 17/1961, was no longer in force in view of Act No. 68 of 1984, amending the provisions of the LA Act and that, that LA Act alone was applicable. Hence a preliminary notification published in the Gazette on 12.1.1989, u/s 17 of the BDA Act and the Notification u/s 19 having been published on 27.7.1991 in the Gazette, was beyond the period of one year provided under proviso (2) to Section 6(1) of the LA Act.

In addressing the above it was expressed thus:

"8. We shall now examine the provisions of BDA Act and L.A. Act with reference to contentions raised on either side. Chapter III of the BDA Act provides for developmental schemes. Section 15 empowers the Authority to undertake a development scheme. Section 16 requires the particulars, to be provided in such a scheme. Sub-section (1)(a) thereof refers to stating the land which is required for acquisition for the purpose of the scheme or which may be affected by the scheme. After preparation of a scheme, u/s 17, the authority will have to draw up a notification stating the fact of a scheme having been made which shall also contain specifications of the land proposed to be acquired and on such a notification being published and a notice thereto is served upon the owners of the land, they may file objections to the same. Those objections are processed and reference is made to the Government which is thereafter sanctioned u/s 18 by the Government with such modification as it may deem fit. u/s 4 of the L.A. Act, a preliminary notification is issued setting out the lands required for acquisition for a public purpose and objections thereto can be filed and there is a provision for hearing the objections and the same may be referred to the Government and ultimately, the Government makes a final notification u/s 6 of the L.A. Act. The two sets of provisions under Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the L.A. Act are comparable with the provisions of Sections 17 and 18 of the B.D.A. Act. Under the provisions of the L.A. Act, if the final notification is not issued within the period mentioned therein and if any award is not made within the time prescribed u/s 11-A of the Act, the acquisition proceedings would lapse. In the case of schemes covered by the B.D.A. Act, the authority has to execute the schemes with in a period of 5 years and if the authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative. Thus in substance there are provisions under the B.D.A. Act to indicate the proposals for acquisition, considering the objections thereto, sanctioning the proposal for acquisition on consideration of such objections and if such acts do not take place within a period of 5 years the proceedings would lapse. The Supreme Court in several decisions where questions of delay in the implementation of the proposals made under the L.A. Act for purpose of completion of the acquisition proceedings occurs, has taken the view that if the same is unreasonable, the acquisition proceedings could be quashed, prior to the introduction of Section 6 and 11-A of the L.A. Act prescribing limitation on the powers and the time within which such action should be taken. It would be a matter of policy for the Legislature to indicate the time within which such acts should be taken. In the case of B.D.A. Act, considering the nature and complexity of the implementation of the scheme, a period of 5 years has been fixed for purpose of completion of the scheme from the date of issue of the notification u/s 19 of the B.D.A. Act on sanction of the scheme. Therefore, when the Legislature itself has taken note of within what period the schemes have to be implemented and prescribes an authority thereto and also provides for as to what consequence would follow on non-implementation of the scheme within that period, we do not think this Court can take a view that such implementation of the scheme is in any way discriminatory when compared to the provisions of the L.A. Act. In substance, both the provisions provided for identical situation - may be in case of L.A. Act more details are set forth such as the period within which final notification has to be issued and the period within which award has to be passed. But in case of the B.D.A. Act implementation of the scheme has been limited to a period of 5 years as provided in Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act.

Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act provides that where within a period of 5 years from the date of the publication in the official gazette of the declaration u/s 19(1), the authority fails to execute the scheme substantially, the scheme shall lapse and the provisions of Section 36 shall become inoperative. In the L.A. Act certain period has been fixed which is considered to be reasonable within which the final notification will have to be issued and award has to be passed and if such acts are done beyond the time prescribed therein, the acquisition of land will lapse. To the same effect is Section 27 of the B.D.A. Act. If the B.D.A. Act provides for 5 years to be reasonable period for substantial compliance with the scheme, we cannot state that the said provision is unreasonable or not proper. Thus the scheme of the L.A. Act as modified by the B.D.A. Act would be applicable by reason of the provisions of Sections 17, 18, 27 and 36 of the B.D.A. Act.

The City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 (herein-after referred to as the Improvement Act) was applicable to the Bangalore area prior to coming into force of the B.D.A. Act. The Supreme Court in The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board Vs. H. Narayanaiah and Others, examined the various provisions of the Improvement Act and observed thus:--

"4. The Bangalore Act, as its preamble states, is really concerned with the "improvement and future expansion of the City of Bangalore, and for the appointment of a Board of Trustees with special powers to carry out the aforesaid purposes". As an incident of this improvement and expansion it provides for acquisition of land also. It does not, however, contain a separate code of its own for such acquisitions. But, Section 27 of the Bangalore Act lay down:

Provisions applicable by the acquisition of land otherwise than by agreement. The acquisition other than by agreement of land within or without the City under this Act shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and by the following further provisions....."

In that decision, the words "so far as they are applicable" appearing in Section 27 of the Improvement Act were examined. It was stated that the intention was to exclude only those provisions of the acquisition Act which became inapplicable because of any special procedure prescribed by the Improvement Act corresponding with that found in the Acquisition Act u/s 4(1). These words bring in or make applicable, so far as this is reasonably possible, general provisions such as Section 23(1) of the Acquisition Act. They cannot be reasonably construed to exclude the application of any general provisions of the Acquisition Act. They amount to laying down the principle that what is not either expressly, or, by necessary implication, excluded must be applied.

It is only for purpose of determining the compensation, the provisions of the L.A. Act can be looked into and not for other purposes. The application of the L.A. Act is only in so far as it is applicable that is, wherever there are provisions made in the Act itself, in other cases the provisions of the L.A. Act would not be applicable. Therefore, when the Act provides that if the scheme is not implemented substantially within a period of 5 years, the same would lapse, the other provisions in the L.A. Act would not be attracted to the present case at all because L.A. Act is made applicable to schemes under the Act as modified by the Act. The L.A. Act is not independently applicable to the schemes framed under the B.D.A. Act. Otherwise, it would become impossible for the authority to implement the schemes in terms of the L.A. Act. Thus, we find no substance in the first contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners nor do we find any substance in the contention that the procedures prescribed under the two enactments are so different as to result in discrimination.

We shall now consider the contention as to whether there are no provisions akin to L.A. Act regarding acquisition. in the Special LAO, The Special Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Mysore Vs. P. Govindan, it was noticed that although the procedure laid down in Section 16 of the Mysore Act (i.e., Improvement Act) is more elaborate than the procedure prescribed u/s 4(1) of the Acquisition Act, yet, the purpose of Section 16 of the Mysore Act is same as that of Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act. We have also now drawn similar comparison between the provisions of the B.D.A. Act and the L.A. Act. Therefore, we must hold that the provisions of Section 36(1) of the BDA Act provides an identical situation in so far as they are applicable. In view of the decisions in Narayanaiah''s case and Govindan''s case by the Supreme Court in identical context, it must be held that the provisions of LA Act to the extent as are made applicable in BDA Act are attracted. Separate provisions are made regarding the issue of preliminary notification and the final notification as well as the period within which the proceedings under the B.D.A. Act would lapse when notified for acquisition as is clear from Chapter III of the B.D.A. Act r/w Section 36 thereof. What is therefore either expressly provided or necessarily excluded must be taken out of consideration. We hold therefore that the provisions of the Section 6 and Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act which provide for the period of limitation within which final notification can be made and award could be passed are excluded from application to acquisition made under B.D.A. Act by necessary implication. The rest of the provisions other than those relating to the issue of preliminary notification, final notification or period within which the award should be passed and lapsing of proceedings under the B.D.A. Act, or the L.A. Act would certainly be applicable.

The argument that the L.A. Act would be applicable as amended, is advanced only with reference to the applicability of the provisions of Section 6 of the L.A. Act where the period of limitation is prescribed for issue of the final notification and Section 11A of the L.A. Act the period within which the award is to be passed. We have just now held that these two provisions are not applicable on the basis of interpretation adopted by us. In that view of the matter the general question whether reference to the L.A. Act in the BDA Act amounts to legislation by reference or incorporation or the effect thereof is not necessary to be examined or decided in this case."

The above decision has been approved by the Apex court in the case of Munithimmaiah Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, . In the said case the Apex court was dealing with an appeal against a judgment of a division bench of this court, which was rendered following the decision in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. case.

The point canvassed was that having regard to the provisions contained in Section 11A of the LA Act, the award passed beyond the stipulated period of limitation is illegal and that after the expiry of the stipulated period of limitation is illegal and that after expiry of the stipulated period u/s 11A the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed.

It was observed thus with reference to paragraph 12 of Khoday Distilleries Ltd. case:

"Thus, a decision as to the inapplicability of the provisions of Section 6 and 11-A where the period of limitation is prescribed respectively for the issue of final notification and for passing the Award, in relation to proceedings for acquisition under the B.D.A. Act came to be rendered on a mere construction of the relevant provisions in the light of the very principles laid down by this Court in the earlier decisions, noticed supra, even without reference to the general question as to whether the reference in the B.D.A. Act to the provisions of the L.A. Act amounts to legislation by reference or incorporation. We are in entire agreement with the reasoning and also affirm the ultimate conclusions arrived at by the High Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd case (supra) which, in our view also, is squarely in conformity with the ratio of the earlier decisions of this Court specifically noticed and relied upon, in support thereof."

And it was held as follows:

"15. So far as the B.D.A. Act is concerned, it is not an Act for mere acquisition of land but an Act to provide for the establishment of a Development Authority to facilitate and ensure a planned growth and development of the city of Bangalore and areas adjacent thereto and acquisition of lands, if any, therefor is merely incidental thereto. In pith and substance the Act is one which will squarely fall under, and be traceable to the powers of the State Legislature under Entry 5 of List II of the VIIth Schedule and not a taw for acquisition of land like the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 traceable to Entry 42 of List III of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution of India, the field in respect of which is already occupied by the Central Enactment of 1894, as amended from time to time. If at all, the B.D.A. Act, so far as acquisition of land for its developmental activities are concerned, in substance and effect will constitute a special law providing for acquisition for the special purposes of the B.D.A. and the same was not also considered to be part of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It could not also be legitimately stated, on a reading of Section 36 of the B.D.A. Act that the Karnataka legislature intended thereby to bind themselves to any future additions or amendments, which might be made by altogether a different legislature, be it the Parliament, to the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The procedure for acquisition under the B.D.A. Act vis-�-vis the Central Act has been analysed elaborately by the Division Bench, as noticed supra, and, in our view, very rightly too, considered to constitute a special and self-contained code of its own and the B.D.A. Act and Central Act cannot be said to be either supplemental to each other, or pari materia legislations. That apart, the B.D.A. Act could not be said to be either wholly unworkable and ineffectual if the subsequent amendments to the Central Act are not also imported into consideration. On an overall consideration of the entire situation also it could not either possibly or reasonably stated that the subsequent amendments to the Central Act get attracted or applied either due to any express provision or by necessary intendment or implication to acquisitions under the B.D.A. Act. When the B.D.A. Act, expressly provides by specifically enacting the circumstances under which and the period of time on the expiry of which alone the proceedings initiated thereunder shall lapse due to any default, the different circumstances and period of limitation envisaged under the Central Act, 1894, as amended by the amending Act of 1984 for completing the proceedings on pain of letting them lapse forever, cannot be imported into consideration for purposes of B.D.A. Act without doing violence to the language or destroying and defeating the very intendment of the State Legislature expressed by the enactment of its own special provisions in a special law falling under a topic of legislation exclusively earmarked for the State Legislature. A scheme formulated, sanctioned and set for implementation under the B.D.A. Act, cannot be stultified or rendered ineffective and unenforceable by a provision in the Central Act, particularly of the nature of Sections 6 and 11-A, which cannot also on its own force have any application to actions taken under the B.D.A. Act. Consequently, we see no infirmity whatsoever in the reasoning of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. case (Supra) to exclude the applicability of Sections 6 and 11-A as amended and inserted by the Central Amendment Act of 1984 to proceedings under the B.D.A. Act. The submissions to the contra on behalf of the appellant has no merit whatsoever and do not commend themselves for our acceptance."

It is evident from a reading of the above opinions that the general question whether the reference to the LA Act in the BDA Act amounts to legislation by reference or incorporation or the effect thereof, was found not necessary to be examined or decided.

Keeping the above decisions in view if we are to address the question whether on the repeal of the LA Act with effect from 1.1.2014, the provisions of that Act, in so far as they may be applicable to the BDA Act would be deemed to remain in force, by virtue of Section 36 of the BDA Act, in order to complete the process of acquisition - is to be examined.

As to which are the provisions of the LA Act that would regulate the acquisition proceedings under the BDA Act and would be applicable, has been incidentally considered in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. at paragraphs 10, 11 & 12 of the report extracted above. The further question which would require to be answered however, is whether the relevant provisions of the LA Act which would be applicable to the acquisition proceedings under the BDA Act, should be considered as legislation by reference or by incorporation.

In the case of Mariyappa and Others Vs. State of Karnataka and Others, , the Apex court was dealing with the issue whether Section 11-A of the LA Act was applicable and was attracted to proceedings under the Karnataka Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 1972. (Karnataka Act, 1972, for brevity). After observing that the Karnataka Act, 1972 contains only seven sections and that it did not contain any independent machinery or provisions for the purposes of inquiry, reference, award and apportionment and payment of compensation, and that Section 5 of the said Act specified that the provisions of the LA Act shall:

"..mutatis mutandis apply in respect of enquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, the reference to court, the apportionment of amount and the payment of amount in respect of lands acquired under this Act"

proceeded to examine whether the amendments brought to the LA Act in the year 1984 could be read into the Karnataka Act 1972.

It was held thus:

"18. The words "mutatis mutandis" have been explained by this Court in Ashok Service center and Others Vs. State of Orissa, . It was stated by Venkataramiah, J, (as he then was): (SCC p.93, para 17)

"Earl Jowitt''s The Dictionary of English Law (1959) defines ''mutatis mutandis'' as ''with the necessary changes in points of detail''. Black''s Law Dictionary (Revised 4'' Edn., 1968) defines ''mutatis mutandis'' as ''with the necessary changes in points of detail, meaning that matters or things are generally the same, but to be altered when necessary, as to names, offices, and the like...''...Extension of an earlier Act mutatis mutandis to a later Act, brings in the idea of adaption, but so far only as it is necessary for the purpose, making a change without altering the essential nature of the things changed, subject of course to express provisions made in the later Act.",

If, therefore, the words "mutatis mutandis" merely permit the application of the Central Act, 1894 (as modified by Karnataka Act, 1961) with necessary changes and without altering the essential nature of the thing changed then the said principle is applicable to the Central Act, 1894 as it stood in 1972 with the amendments brought about the Karnataka Act, 1961. Therefore the contention for the appellant that subsequent changes made in the Central Act after 1972 also get into the Karnataka Act, 1972, cannot be accepted. That question again depends upon whether the Central Act, 1894 has been "incorporated" into the Karnataka Act, 1972 or falls within the exceptions to the said principle or whether Section 5 is to be treated as a piece of "referential legislation ".

Incorporation of referential legislation and exceptions to Incorporation - "supplemental legislation "

As the case before us, as we shall presently show, falls within the "exceptions" to the rule of "incorporation", we shall refer to the relevant rulings in this behalf.

The leading case in which the broad principles were laid down is the one in The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. M.V. Narasimhan, . On a consideration of the case-law, it was stated by Fazal Ali, J. as follows:

"Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act, then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases:

(a) Where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other.

(b) Where the two Acts are in pari materia.

(c) Where the amendment in the previous Act, is not imparted into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and

(d) Where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act."

(emphasis supplied)

In that case, the position was that the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 adopted the definition of public servant from Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. The question was whether the subsequent amendments made in 1958 and 1964 to section 21 of the Penal Code enlarging the definition of "public servant", could be read into the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Though it was held that the 1947 Act dealt with a specific offence of "criminal misconduct", while the Penal Code dealt with ''bribery'' and were not in pari materia still, it was held that having regard to the preamble and object of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the Penal code, there could be no doubt that the former Act was undoubtedly a statute supplemental to the latter. Hence it was held that the amendments of 1958 and 1964 in the I.P.C. should be read into the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, as the case fell within one of the exceptions to the principle of "incorporation ".

Similarly, in Western Coalfields Limited Vs. Special Area Development Authority, Korba and Another, , Section 69(d) of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam (Act 23 of 1973) stated that the Special Area Development Authority under that Act would, for the purpose of taxation, have the powers which a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council has under the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 or the M.P. Municipalities Act, 1961, as the case may be. Chandrachud, C.J. gave two reasons as to why the subsequent amendments made in the 1956 and 1961 Acts could be read into the 1973 Act. One reason was that the Act of 1973 did not, in Section 69(d), incorporate any particular provision of the 1956 and 1961 Acts but said that for the "purposes of taxation" the Authority shall have the powers which a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council would have under the 1956 and 1961 Acts respectively. It was not therefore a case where merely some provisions of one Act were bodily lifted into another. The other reason was that the 1973 Act did not provide for any independent power of taxation or any machinery of its own for the exercise of the power of taxation. Further, the three Acts were supplemental to each other.

Ujagar Prints Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others etc. etc., is again a similar case. u/s 3(3) of the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 it was said that the provisions of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and rules made thereunder - including those relating to refunds and exemptions from duty - shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of the additional duties as they apply in relation to the levy and collecting of the duties of excise on the goods specified in sub-section (1). Now section 3(1) provided for levy and collection of additional duties in respect of goods described in the First Schedule to the 1957 Act which were produced or "manufactured" in India. It was held that the definition of the term "manufacture" enacted in the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 - as enlarged by Amendment Act 6 of 1980 -had to be read into the 1957 Act. It was observed that the Additional Duties Act, 1957 was merely supplemental to the 1944 Act. While the 1944 Act imposed a general levy of excise duty on all goods manufactured and produced, the aim of the 1957 Act was to supplement the levy by an additional duty of the same nature on certain goods. Unlike the Finance Act, the 1957 Act was incomplete as to the basis of the charge and its provisions would become totally unworkable unless the concepts of "manufacture" and "assessable value" as determined under the 1944 Act were carried into it.

Yet another case where the legislation was held by itself to be "unworkable" and supplemental to another Act is the one in State of Kerala v. M/s. Attesee (Agro Industrial Trading Corpn.) [1989 suppl. (1) SCC 733]. It was there held that the scope of exemption under the head "cotton fabrics" in schedule III item 7 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 would depend upon the definition in item 19 of Schedule I to Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 with reference to its amendments upto the relevant date. Hence it was held that the amendments to the Central Act were to be read into the Kerala Act.

Two other rulings of this Court relating to land acquisition and which arose from Karnataka are relevant in this context. In the State of Karnataka, there are two statutes, - the Mysore Improvement Act, 1903 and the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945. In each of these Acts there is a provision (Section 23 in the former and Section 27 in the latter) stating that the acquisition under the Act "shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894" and also by certain other provisions of these Acts. (The Mysore Act of 1894 and the Central Act 1894 are almost identical). Now both these Acts of 1903 and 1945 contained provisions which require compensation to be paid with reference to the second notification which publishes the "declaration" (i.e. corresponding to Section 6 of the Central Act, 1894) and not the one which corresponds to Section 4 of the Central Act. However in 1927, the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was amended by directing compensation to be paid with reference to the first notification (corresponding to Section 4(1) of the Central Act). The question arose in two cases, one under each of these Acts, as to whether the said amendment of 1927 would have to be read into the said Acts.

Now so far as the Bangalore Act of 1945 is concerned, the case was decided in The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board Vs. H. Narayanaiah and Others, . This case presents no difficulty because the said Act was passed in 1945 and by that, the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 already stood amended in 1927. The reference in Section 27 of the 1945 Act to the Mysore Act of 1894 therefore obviously included all the amendments made to the Mysore Land Acquisition 1894 by 1945 including the one made in 1927 and, therefore, compensation was to paid only as per the first notification (i.e. the one corresponding to Section 4(1) of the Central Act).

The case more in point is the one in The Special Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Mysore Vs. P. Govindan, which dealt with the Mysore Act of 1903 because the question there was whether the subsequent amendment of 1927 to the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shifting the relevant date for fixing compensation from the corresponding Section 6 notification to Section 4(1) notification, would have to be read into the Mysore Act, 1903. It was held that it should - notwithstanding certain obiter observation to the contrary in Naravanaih''s case. The provision in section 23 of the Mysore Act, 1903 read as follows:

"23. The acquisition, otherwise than by agreement of land within or without the city under this Act, shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act 1894 and by the following further provisions, namely,....."

(emphasis supplied)

It was held by this Court that the amendments in 1927 to the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 have to be read into the Mysore Act, 1903. The decision of the Full Bench of the Mysore High Court to the contrary in Venkatamma and Others Vs. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Mysore, was overruled. In that context Beg J. (as he then was) observed: (SCC p.700, paras 6 &&)

"If Section 23(1) of the (Mysore) Acquisition Act (1903) lays down, as we think it does, the only procedure for award of compensation it has to be followed as it exists at the time of acquisition proceedings. No one has a vented right in a particular procedure. It is a fair interpretation of Section 23 of the Mysore Act of 1903 to hold that it means that whichever may be the procedure there, with regard to matters regulating compensation under the (Mysore) Acquisition Act (1894) at the time of acquisition proceedings, will apply to acquisition under the Mysore Act, (1903)"....

It was enough to lay down, as Section 23 of the Mysore Act (1903) does, that the general procedure found in the Acquisition Act (1894) will apply except to the extent it was inapplicable. This means that amendments of the procedure in the Acquisition Act, (1894) will apply if it is capable of application "

(emphasis supplied)

From the above passage emphasis supplied, it is clear that when the Mysore Act, 1903 adopted the procedure under the Mysore Act, 1894, the provisions of the latter Act as they stood "at the time of acquisition" had to be applied for "regulating" the acquisition of land under the Mysore Act, 1903. This was because the Mysore Act, 1903 said that the "general procedure" under the Mysore Act, 1894 applied except to the extent it was inapplicable.

In our view, the above rulings of this Court are more in point and are directly applicable to the Karnataka Act, 1972. But, before we draw our final conclusions, it is necessary to refer to three more rulings, one decided by the Privy Council and two decided by this Court recently and state why, in our opinion, those decisions are distinguishable.

The decision of the Privy Council is the one in Secretary of State v. Hindustan Coop. Society Ltd. [AIR 1931 PC 148]. There the provisions of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 (Act 13/1911) fell for consideration. That Act coupled with its schedule contained provisions not only for issuing relevant notification in regard to acquisition but also for reference to a Tribunal for passing an award relating to compensation. By Act 18 of 1911 a right of appeal was given to the High Court against the Award of the Tribunal. Under the Act, there was no further right of appeal to the Privy Council. In 1921, the Central Act, 1894 was amended in two respects, one by introducing Section 26(2) which deemed the award of the reference Court a "decree" and the reasons a "Judgment" and the other an amendment in Section 54 of the Central Act, 1894 giving a right of appeal to the Privy Council from any decree passed by the High Court from an award of the reference Court. Now the Calcutta Act, 1911 contained a provision in Section 69 that the "Board may acquire land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for carrying out the purposes of the Act". Section 70 related to the constitution of a Tribunal - as detailed in Section 72 -for the purpose of performing the functions of the Court in reference to the acquisition of land for the Board under the land Acquisition Act, 1894. However, Section 71 modified the Central Act, 1894 as follows:

"Section 71: Modification of Land Act, 1894: For the purpose of acquiring land under the said Act for the Board-

(a) the Tribunal shall (except for the purpose of Section 54 of that Act) be deemed to be the Court, and the President of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the Judge, under the said Act;

(b) the said Act shall be subject to the further modifications indicated in the Schedule;

(c).....

(d) the award of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the award of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894."

The modification made by section 71(a) was crucial to the case.

Section 77 referred to the passing of the award'' by the Tribunal under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, for determining the compensation, apportionment, etc.

The appellant, the Secretary of State, contended that the appeal to the Privy Council lay because the amendment to the Central Act in 1921 by substituting Section 26(2) which deemed the "award" a "decree" had to be read into the Calcutta Act, 1911 and if that was done, then an appeal would lie, u/s 54 of the Central Act, 1894 to the Privy Council. The respondents contended that such a telescoping of Section 26(2) of the Central Act, 1894 into the Calcutta Act, 1911 would be repugnant to the express words in Section 71(a): "except for the purposes of Section 54 of the Act". The said contention of the respondents was accepted by the privy Council. Their Lordships also Lord Wrenbury in Ex parte St. Sepulchre (1864) [33 L.J. Ch. 372] to the effect that it will not be possible to read the provisions of an earlier Act into a latter Act, if the earlier Act "gives in itself a complete rule on the subject matter"

It was also observed that the provision in Section 70(a) of the Calcutta Act, 1911 deliberately excluding Section 54 of the Central Act, 1894 was "an indication of the local legislature''s intention that there should be, under the special Code applicable to the Improvement Trust, no appeals beyond the High Court".

In other words, two reasons were given by their lordships as to why section 26(2) of the Central Act, 1894 could not be read into the Calcutta Act, 1911. One was that reading Section 26(2) of the Central Act, 1894 into the Calcutta Act, 1911 would be repugnant to Section 70(a) of the Calcutta Act, 1911 which expressly excluded Section 54 of the Central Act, 1894 from the purview of the Calcutta Act. The other was that such telescoping would not be permissible if the latter statute which, in certain respects, referred to an earlier statute, was otherwise a complete Code by itself. This is clear from the fact that the Calcutta Act, 1911 Contains 177 sections and a schedule, Chapter III relates to schemes and publication of notifications in that behalf and Chapter TV deals with acquisition and disposal of land containing sections 68 to 81; among these, section 70 deals with reference to the Tribunal: Section 77 deals with passing of award by the Tribunal; Section 71(b) and the Schedule to the Act (which contains 14 clauses) deals with various matters relating to notifications as well as fixation of market value. On the other hand, we have no such elaborate machinery provided in the Karnataka Act, 1972 and the Act has only seven sections. The Karnataka Act does not contain any separate procedure for inquiry, award nor does it constitute a Tribunal in the place of the reference Court as done by the Calcutta Act of 1911. That is why we are of the view that the Privy Council decision is clearly distinguishable.

The other two recent decisions of this Court in Gauri Shankar v. State of up [1994 (1) 92] and U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Jainul Islam and Another, , both relate to acquisition under the UP Avas Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam 1965. We shall refer to the scheme of the UP Act, 1965 Chapter III of that Act deals with formulation of schemes and issue of notifications (sections 15 to 49); Chapter V deals with land acquisition etc. Sections 55 to 63, Chapter VI with constitution of Tribunal and its purposes, section 55 of the Act reads as follows:

"55(1): Any land or any interest therein required by the Board for any of the purposes of this Act, may be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of 1894) as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh, which for the purpose shall be subject to the modifications specified in the schedule to this Act".

(emphasis supplied)

Section 64(I) says that the Tribunal shall perform the functions of the reference Court under the Central Act, 1894 as modified by the Schedule, in the matter of determining the compensation. Section 66 says that the Award of the Tribunal shall, in case of land acquisition under Central Act, 1894 as modified by the Schedule, be deemed to be an award of the Court under the Central Act and shall, subject to section 54 of that Act, be final. Section 67 says award of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a decree and the grounds, a "judgment". In other words, the UP Act, 1965 contains an elaborate machinery like the Calcutta Act, 1911.

In Gauri Shankar Gaur and Others, etc. Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , decided by K. Ramaswamy & Sahai, JJ. the notifications for acquisition u/s 28(1) were of the year 1973 while the notifications u/s 32(1) were of 1977. Before 1948, the Allahabad High Court had taken the view that the notification u/s 32(1) corresponding to declaration u/s 6(1) of the Central Act need not be issued within 3 years of the notification u/s 28(1) corresponding to section 4(1) of the Central Act. In cases arising after 1948, it was also held by the Allahabad High Court that Section 11-A was not applicable to the UP Act. Gauri Shankar''s case related to the 3 year rule in the proviso to Section 6 of the Central Act. K. Ramaswamy, J. held (para 8) that the principle of incorporation'' applied and that the provisions of Section 28, 32 of the UP Act, 1965 were a separate and complete code, that Section 55 read with clause (2) of the Schedule, which contained the need for issuing the preliminary and final notification under sections 28 and 32 of the UP Act, formed an integral scheme (para 25). The Schedule amended Sections 4, 6, 17 and 23 of the Central Act, 1894. It was pointed out that Section 28(2) and Section 32(1) related to the publication of notifications without prescribing any limitation and that the UP Act 1965 was "a complete code in itself. It was also held that the Act was not otherwise unworkable or ineffectual, though it may be incompatible with the provisos to Section 6(1) of L.A. Act (para 33). On the other hand, sahai, J. held that the principle of "incorporation" did not apply but that of facts, it was not a fit case for interference inasmuch as the Parishad had already taken possession. In that view of the matter, both the learned Judges directed compensation as on the date when the notification corresponding to Section 6 declaration was issued. We shall next to refer to the recent judgment in Jainul Islam''s case where the opinion of K. Ramaswamy, J. was accepted.

The question which arose in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Jainul Islam and Another, under the same UP Act. 1965 was whether Section 23(1-A), Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the Central Act, 1894 as amended in 1984, were attracted to the UP Act. Approving the view of K. Ramaswamy, J. in Gauri Shankar Gaur and Others, etc. Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , Agrawal, J. held that the principle of incorporation'' applied and therefore the above amendments of 1948 to the Central Act, 1894 did not apply. Reference was also made to the Privy Council Judgment in AIR 1931 149 (Privy Council) . After considering the various provisions of the UP Act, 1965, it was held (para 21), that provisions of Section 55 and Schedule to the Act were "on the same lines" as the provisions of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 and that the principles laid down by the Privy Council were equally applicable. Adverting to the exceptions referred to in The State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. M.V. Narasimhan, , it was observed that the UP Act, 1965 and the Central Act, 1894 did not come within the exceptions and that the provisions of the UP Act, 1965 were not supplemental'' to each other, nor was the UP Act in pari materia with the Central Act because it dealt with other matters which did not fall within the ambit of the Central Act. The UP Act was self contained and complete, Agrawal, J. observed (para 23) as follows:

"The Adhiniyam and the L.A. Act cannot be regarded supplemental to each other. The Adhiniyam contains provisions regarding acquisition of land which are complete and self- contained. Nor can the provisions in the Adhiniyam be said to be in pari materia with the L.A. Act because the Adhiniyam also deals with matters which do not fall within the ambit of the L.A. Act".

In our view, these three ridings, namely AIR 1931 149 (Privy Council) , Gauri Shankar Gaur and Others, etc. Vs. State of U.P. and Others, and U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Jainul Islam and Another, , are clearly distinguishable. As pointed out earlier the Karnataka Act, 1972 has only 7 Sections which deal with the issuance of notification corresponding to Sections 4 and 6, and 9 of Central Act and certain other minor modification relating to acquisition and payment of compensation. The Act has no provision for a separate inquiry or award or reference to a Tribunal, or a machinery for payment of compensation of apportionment. The Central Act, 1894 alone is to apply in so far as it related to "inquiry and award, the reference to Court, the apportionment of amount and the payment of amount in respect of lands acquired under the Act". There are no detailed provisions as in the Calcutta Act, 1911 or as in the UP Act, 1965.

We are of the view that the Karnataka Act, 1972 clearly comes within the exceptions stated in M.V. Narasimhan''s case for the following reasons:

Firstly there being no detailed machinery whatsoever in the Karnataka Act, 1972, that Act cannot be treated as a self-contained or complete Code. Secondly, the Karnataka Act, 1972 and the Central Act, 1894 (as amended by the Karnataka Act, 1961) are supplemental to each other for unless the Central Act supplements the Karnataka Act, the latter cannot function. Thirdly, these acts are in pari materia because the karnataka Act, 1972 - unlike the Calcutta Act, 1911 and the UP Act, 1965 - does not deal with any other subject but deals with the same subject of land acquisition which otherwise would have fallen within the ambit of the Central Act, 1894. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the amendments made in 1948 to the Central Act, 1894 including Section 11-A have to be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972, so far as enquiry, award, reference to Court, apportionment of amount and the payment of amount in respect of land acquired under the Act.

Admittedly, the prescribed period u/s 11-A has elapsed and it is stated that even now, the award is not passed. Therefore, it is clear that the conditions of section 11-A are violated, and accordingly, the entire land acquisition proceedings including the notifications u/s 3(1) and 3(4) of the Karnataka Act, 1972 lapse. We declare accordingly.

Before parting with the case, we may say that in this appeal we are concerned only with the question whether section 11A as introduced by the Amendment in 1984 to the Central Act 1894 could be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972 and we have held that it should be read into the Karnataka Act, 1972 because there is not such provision in the Karnataka Act, 1972 as amended by the Karnataka Act, 1961. The question as to the telescoping of other amendments brought to the Central Act, 1894 by the 1984 amendment and the consequential impact thereof is not before us and we should not be understood as deciding any such matter. If the question of applicability of any other amendment brought by the Central Act in 1984 to the Karnataka Act, 1972 arises in Karnataka, such a question may have to be decided separately.

Further, in the impugned Judgment, certain rulings under the Bangalore Development Act, 1976 have been followed. We have gone by the provisions of the Karnataka Act, 1972. We are not to be understood as having said anything with regard to the Bangalore Development Act, 1976. We are in fact told that some that some appeals are pending in this Court in regard to the said Act of 1976.

In the result, the appeals are allowed and it is declared that the notifications issued under the Act u/s 3(1) and Section 3(4) have lapsed."

However, in Munithimmaiah''s case, supra, the following observation is made:

"The decision in Mariyappa and Others case (supra) has no relevance or application to the case on hand for more than one reason. In SCC p.291 para 40 of the report it is found stated: "We are not to be understood as having said anything with regard to the Bangalore Development Act, 1976". That apart, this Court, on an analysis of the provisions of the Karnataka Acquisition of Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 1972 in contrast to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, observed that not only the Karnataka Act, 1972 had a skeleton of only seven sections without any full machinery for being treated as a complete code without depending on the Central Act, 1894, for being functional so far as the inquiry, passing of Award, seeking reference and apportionment and payment of compensation, etc. is concerned, but the Karnataka Act, 1972 and the Central Act, 1894 are supplemental to each other and both the Acts are in pari materia since the subject-matter of the 1972 Act could have otherwise also come within the ambit of the Central Act and, therefore, the Karnataka Act, 1972 cannot be considered to deal with any subject other than acquisition of land."

This observation was apparently made as the opinions expressed as regards the applicability of Section 11-A of the LA Act was directly in question in both the sets of cases - and the contrary view expressed, in context, in Mariayappa''s case was stated to be not relevant. This need not be implied as being a view expressed that any interpretation given therein should be overlooked or ignored - when the discussion and the case law cited therein would be very relevant to addressing the points for consideration in the present case on hand. The reference to and reliance on the decision in the case of The Special Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board, Mysore Vs. P. Govindan, , is especially pertinent.

In Bondu Ramaswamy Vs. Bangalore Development Authority and Others, , the position of law and the extent of applicability of the provisions of the LA Act to the BDA Act has been succinctly spelt out thus:

"80. The BDA Act contains provisions relating to acquisition of properties, up to the stage of publication of final declaration. The BDA Act does not contain the subsequent provisions relating to completion of the acquisition, that is, issue of notices, enquiry and award, vesting of land, payment of compensation, principles relating to determination of compensation etc. Section 36 of the BDA Act does not make the LA Act applicable in its entirety, but states that the acquisition under the BDA Act, shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable, of the LA Act. Therefore it follows that where there are already provisions in the BDA Act regulating certain aspects or stages of acquisition or the proceedings relating thereto, the corresponding provisions of the LA Act will not apply to the acquisitions under the BDA Act. Only those provisions of the LA Act, relating to the stages of acquisition, for which there is no provision in the BDA Act, are applied to the acquisitions under the BDA Act.

The BDA Act contains specific provisions relating to preliminary notification and final declaration. In fact the procedure up to final declaration under the BDA Act is different from the procedure under the LA Act relating to acquisition proceedings up to the stage of final notification. Therefore, having regard to the Scheme for acquisition under sections 15 to 19 of the BDA Act and the limited application of LA Act in terms of Section 36 of the BDA Act, the provisions of Sections 4 to 6 of the LA Act will not apply to the acquisitions under the BDA Act. If section 6 of the LA Act is not made applicable, the question of amendment to section 6 of the LA Act providing a time limit for issue of final declaration, will also not apply."

And further, in so far as the scope of Section 36 of the BDA Act is concerned, it is stated thus:

"89. Section 36 of the BDA Act provides that the "acquisition of land under this Act", shall be regulated by the provisions, so far as they are applicable of the LA Act. In view of the categorical reference in section 36 of the BDA Act, to acquisitions under that Act, there cannot be any doubt that the acquisitions for BDA are not under the LA Act, but under the BDA Act itself. It is also clear from Section 36 that the LA Act, in its entirety, is not applicable to the acquisition under the BDA Act, but only such of the provisions of the LA Act for which a corresponding provision is not found in the BDA Act, will apply to acquisitions under the BDA Act. In view of sections 17 to 19 of the BDA Act, the corresponding provisions -Sections 4 to 6 of the LA Act-will not apply to acquisitions under the BDA Act. We therefore reject the contention that the BDA Act does not contemplate acquisition and that the acquisition which is required to be made as a part of the development scheme, should be made under the LA Act, applying sections 4, 5A and 6 of LA Act."

Therefore, the general question whether the reference to the LA Act in the BDA Act and the provisions of the LA Act that would be applicable in regulating the acquisition proceedings under the provisions of the BDA Act, can be construed as legislation by reference or by incorporation is to be answered.

A constitution bench of the Apex Court in the case of Girnar Traders Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, has expounded on the doctrines of "legislation by reference" and "legislation by incorporation", while prefacing the reason for examination thus:

"4. Amongst others, doctrines of "legislation by reference" and "legislation by incorporation" are the creation of judicial pronouncements. One of the earliest instances, where the Privy Council, then responsible for Indian Judicial system, accepted the plea of "legislation by incorporation" and interpreted the statute accordingly in the case of AIR 1931 149 (Privy Council) . This judicial pronouncement was followed in different subsequent judgments and these doctrines were analyzed in greater depth for bringing out the distinction between them. The judgment of the Privy Council was referred with approval by this Court in different judgments including Chairman of The Municipal Commissioners of Howrah Vs. Shalimar Wood Products and Another, ; Bolani Ores Ltd., ; Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another, ; Ujagar Prints Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others etc. etc., ; U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vs. Jainul Islam and Another, ; Nagpur Improvement Trust Vs. Vasantrao and Others and Jaswantibai and Others, and Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, ].

The principle that was enunciated by the Privy Council in the case of Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. (supra) stated,

"... where certain provisions from an existing Act have been incorporated into a subsequent Act, no addition to the former Act, which is not expressly made applicable to the subsequent Act, can be deemed to be incorporated in it, at all events, if it is possible for the subsequent Act to function effectually without the addition ".

Though this principle has been reiterated from time to time, with the development of law, still certain doubts were reflected in the judicial pronouncements of the courts as to the application of this principle as an absolute proposition of law. On the contrary, this principle received criticism from various quarters. The critics said that it was causing impediments in smooth operation of the later law as well as abdication of legislative power by the legislative constituent concerned.

Another criticism and argument which, in fact, was even advanced before us is that while approving the principle stated by the Privy Council, the subsequent Benches have not taken into consideration the impact of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in B. Shama Rao Vs. The Union Territory of Pondicherry, . A pertinent constitutional aspect that ought to have been brought to the notice of different Benches was that the federal structure of the Constitution had come into force which controlled governance of the country and therefore the principles, inter alia, stated by the Privy Council could not be adopted as law of universal application without appropriately modifying the stated position of law to bring it in complete harmony with the constitutional mandate.

In Gauri Shankar Gaur and Others, etc. Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , one member of the Bench of this Court, relied upon the principle stated in Hindustan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd. (supra) and held that in a case of legislation by incorporation, subsequent amendment or repeal of the provisions of an earlier Act adopted cannot be deemed to have been incorporated in the adopting Act which may be true in the case of legislation by reference. This judgment was relied upon by another Bench of this Court in State of Maharashtra and another Vs. Sant Joginder Singh Kishan Singh and others, .

The amendments in various relevant laws and introduction and application of newly enunciated principles of law resulted in varied opinions. A Bench of this Court in Girnar Traders Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (hereinafter referred to as "Girnar Traders-(1)") expressed certain doubts on the correctness of the law stated in Sant Joginder Singh (supra) and referred the matter to a larger Bench. The Bench in Girnar Traders-I (supra) felt that there were good reasons for reading the provisions introduced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the "Central Act 68 of 1984") into Chapter VII of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short, "the MRTP Act" or "the State Act") and Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, "the Land Acquisition Act" or "the Central Act") is one of such provisions. Thus, the Constitution Bench is called upon to examine whether the MRTP Act is a self-contained Code or not, if so, to what effect? Further, whether, in any event, all the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, as amended by Central Act 68 of 1984 with emphasis on Section 11A can be read into the provisions of the MRTP Act?"

The Apex Court has held thus:

"87.... These principles have been applied by the courts for a considerable period now. When there is general reference in the Act in question to some earlier Act but there is no specific mention of the provisions of the former Act, then it is clearly considered as legislation by reference. In the case of legislation by reference, the amending laws of the former Act would normally become applicable to the later Act; but, when the provisions of an Act are specifically referred and incorporated in the later statute, then those provisions alone are applicable and the amending provisions of the former Act would not become part of the later Act. This principle is generally called legislation by incorporation. General reference, ordinarily, will imply exclusion of specific reference and this is precisely the fine line of distinction between these two doctrines. Both are referential legislations, one merely by way of reference and the other by incorporation. It, normally, will depend on the language used in the later law and other relevant considerations. While the principle of legislation by incorporation has well defined exceptions, the law enunciated as of now provides for no exceptions to the principle of legislation by reference. Furthermore, despite strict application of doctrine of incorporation, it may still not operate in certain legislations and such legislation may fall within one of the stated exceptions.

(emphasis supplied)

In this regard, the judgment of this Court in M.V. Narasimhan (supra) can be usefully noticed where the Court after analyzing various judgments, summed up the exceptions to this rule as follows:

"(a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other;

(b) where the two Acts are in pari materia;

(c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual; and

(d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act."

Applying the above test, it may safely be said that the provisions of the LA Act that are made applicable to the BDA Act are in the nature of legislation by reference. It would then follow that the only procedure to be followed in respect of proceedings - post Section 19 of the BDA Act - would be that which exists at the time of acquisition proceedings. It would be a fair interpretation of Section 36 of the BDA Act to hold that it means that whichever may be the procedure therein, with regard to matters regulating acquisition under the LA Act, in so far as they are applicable, at the time of acquisition proceedings will apply to acquisition made under the BDA Act.

In view of the repeal of the LA Act and the coming into force of the 2013 Act, during the pendency of these proceedings, it would be the corresponding provisions under the 2013 Act, in so far as they are applicable, that would regulate the acquisition proceedings.

It may hence be concluded that the repeal of the LA Act and the coming into force of the 2013 Act would not frustrate further acquisition proceedings under the BDA Act. For even without an amendment to Section 36 of the BDA Act, the provisions of the 2013 Act, in so far as they are applicable, would operate to regulate the acquisition proceedings under the BDA Act - according to settled principles as enunciated in the authoritative decisions referred to above. The second point framed for consideration is accordingly answered.

In considering the question whether the acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed in terms of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, is concerned, it is to be observed that the further proceedings were stayed by this court by an interim order of stay of all further proceedings. The effect of that order would have to be kept in view. It is settled law that any restraint imposed by the courts on any ongoing acquisition proceedings would extend to all aspects of the process. If therefore the acquisition proceedings were kept in abeyance altogether by virtue of the interim order, the application of the provisions of the 2013 Act which have seamlessly replaced the provisions of the LA Act, in so far as they are applicable, to the BDA Act would also be kept in abeyance. It cannot therefore be said that by virtue of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the proceedings stood lapsed.

Yet another aspect that would be material is the question whether the acquisition proceedings could be resumed, by a deeming fiction, from the date the proceedings were stayed and if the procedure as applicable on that date, to wit, the procedure prescribed under the LA Act would be applicable. This would be impermissible for two reasons, firstly, that the change in the law is an independent development and in terms of the changed legal position, with reference to Section 24 of the 2013 Act, as no award was passed at the time the interim order was passed by this court, it is the provisions of the 2013 Act that shall apply in the determination of compensation and other reliefs that would have to be granted. Secondly, on principle it would be impermissible. In respect of acquisition of land as on date the determination of compensation cannot be contemplated under two different sets of procedure. It is immaterial whether it is one Acquisition Act or another Acquisition Act under which the land is acquired. If the existence of two Acts could enable the State to give one owner different treatment from another equally situated, the owner who is discriminated against, can claim the protection of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (See : Nagpur Improvement Trust and Another Vs. Vithal Rao and Others, ).

However, in the light of the opinion expressed, on the first point for consideration above, the acquisition proceedings are held to be bad in law and consequently the impugned notifications are hereby quashed.