Sri Rajah Yenumula Suryanarayanamurthy Dora Garu vs Sri Chitrapu Buchi Venkayya Pantulu

Govinda Menon, J.—This is an appeal u/s 47 of the Guardians and Wards Act against the order of the learned District Judge of

Rajahmundry appointing the appellant herein guardian of his minor brother and directing the delivery of possession of the family properties to him

on certain conditions imposed upon by the learned District Judge. The order was that it was only on the fulfilment of those conditions by the

petitioner that he is entitled to recover possession of the properties, or to act as the guardian of his minor brother. The learned Judge held that as

the elder brother has furnished security as ordered, he was to be appointed � as guardian of the property of the minor on usual conditions. O. P.

No. 92 of 1935 was an application for the appointment of a property guardian for the petitioner and his minor brother on the ground that both of

them were minors and that a guardian should be appointed, because the joint family consisted only of these two minors and there was no adult

major member at all. Accordingly, the respondent to this appeal Mr. Buchi Venkayya Pantulu, a legal practitioner, was appointed as guardian and

he managed the estate of the petitioner and his minor brother. The petitioner became a major on the 15th October, 1945 and thereafter applied for

recovery of possession of joint family properties u/s 39(a) and Section 41(2)(c) and Clause (3) of the Guardians and Wards Act. The learned

Judge passed the order, which is the subject of appeal adverted to above.

It is clearly established that where all the members of a joint family are minors, the Court has power under the Guardians and Wards Act to

appoint a guardian in case there are no adult male members. At page 299 of Mayne''s Hindu Law (10th Edition), the learned author states as

follows:

When all the coparceners of a Mitakshara joint family are minors, the Court can appoint a guardian of the property of the minors, though in such a

case as soon as the eldest member of the family attains majority, the guardianship is ipso facto determined as regards all the members.

Bindaji v. Mathurabai I.L.R.(1905) Bom. 152, Ramachandra v. Krishna Rao ILR (1908) Bom. 259. Shaminath Sahi v. Laljichaube ILR (1913)

All. 150. L. Jagannath Prasad and Others Vs. Chunni Lal and Others . Chandrapal v. Sarabjit ILR (1935) Luck. 67 are cited in support of this

view. To the same effect are the statements of law in Mulla''s Hindu Law, page 589, Section 519. It is stated there that if all the sons are minors,

the Court may appoint a guardian for the whole of the joint property until one of them attains majority and the authority cited is Bindaji v.

Mathurabai1 and Khikar Lakshmu v. Marudevi (I.L.R. 1908) Mad. 139. These decisions were considered and followed by this Court by

Ramesam and Jackson, JJ., in C.M.A. No. 268 of 1928 where the learned Judges went further and said that if in addition to the minors there is an

adult member, who on account of unsoundness of mind is incapable of managing the property, then a property guardian can be appointed for the

minor''s share. It is now well settled that a guardian cannot be appointed for the property of the minor members of a joint family. Sham Kuar v.

Mohanunde Sahoy ILR (1891) Cal. 301 Virupakshappa v. Nilgangava ILR (1894) 19 Bom. 309 and the decision of the Privy Council in

Garibulla v. Khalak Singh ILR (1894) 19 Bom. 309 (P.C) authoritatively lay down the above proposition. Therefore the appointment of guardian

was justified; but when once one of the minors becomes a major, he is ipso facto entitled to the resumption of the entire property in his favour and

he could act as the natural guardian of the minor, not as the certificated guardian. That proposition is well settled by the statement of the law in

Mayne''s Hindu Law and the cases which have been quoted thereunder. Such being the case, the learned District Judge was wrong in directing the

petitioner to furnish security before he recovered possession of the joint family properties. Probably the attention of the learned Judge was not

specifically invited to the position of law, which is by this time very well settled. In these circumstances, the order of the lower Court being

unsustainable cannot be maintained and is therefore set aside. The appeal is allowed and the appellant is entitled to get possession of the entire

properties of the joint family without any conditions being attached whatever. As the respondent did not appear and as he himself is a legal

practitioner; who has not objected to the surrender of possession of the property, we direct that the appellant do pay his costs in Court.