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Judgment
Lalit Mohan Sharma, J.—In the present application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners are challenging the order dated the 9th August, 1973, as contained in Annexure ''II'' to the writ application passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna, Respondent No. 2 in the case.
The petitioners along with three other persons were workmen employed in the Vishamitra Press, Respondent No. 1, an industrial establishment within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') in 1957, they were dismissed by the management and in 1958 a reference was made by Respondent No. 3 State u/s 10 of the Act to the Labour Court, Patna, Shri Ali Hassan was its Presiding Officer. In November, 1959, Shri Ali Hassan submitted his Award in favour of the management and the workmen challenged the same under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court in M.J.C. 306 of 1960. The writ application was allowed on 9.11.1962 and the High Court passed an order remanding the case to the Labour Court. In the meantime, Shri Ali Hassan retired and, according to the case of the petitioners, Shri Kedarnath Singh, who was the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court at Muzaffarpur was appointed as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court at Patna in addition to his duties at Muzaffarpur. The management, Respondent No. 1, challenges the appointment of Shri Kedarnath Singh. However, the case was taken up by Shri Singh in pursuance of the High Court''s order and by his Award dated the 2nd May, 1964, he held that the dismissal order was illegal. Some of the workmen were held entitled to re-instatement as well as wages for the entire period, some other were entitled to reinstatement, but only portion of the back wages and the remaining workmen were held to be entitled to compensation only. The management, this time, came to the High Court in writ jurisdiction and the case was registered as M.J.C. 994 of 1964. The writ application was dismissed in limine on 3.8.1964. On the management making an application, a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court was granted, but as no appeal was actually lodged, leave was later on, cancelled. In the meantime, the management directed the workmen to join by certain orders passed in Nevember and December, 1965, but none of them actually joined their posts. On the 2nd of August, 1966, the petitioners filed an application u/s 33C(2) of the Act before the Labour Court for appropriate reliefs in terms of the Award. They, of course, could not and did not make any claim in regard to the period after they failed to join their posts. The application was registered as Misc. Case No. 3 1966. In the meantime, Shri Haribanshi Sahay was appointed Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Patna and had taken over charge from Shri Kedarnath Singh. Shri Sahay was succeeded by Shri S.S. Dayal. who by his order dated 17.7.1968 dismissed Misc. Case No. 3 of 1966 on the ground that the award of Shri Kedarnath Singh was without jurisdiction and inoperative. The petitioners challenged the judgment in C.W.J.C. 1044 of 1968. This application was allowed by the High Court on 13.1.1971 and the matter was remanded with a direction that the Labour Court would determine all the contentions raised by the parties including any objection. The management, thereafter, filed a fresh application raising several objections. By the order impugned in the present case, Shri G.S. Verma, the next Presiding Offlcer of the Labour Court, again rejected the petitioners application.
In view of the points raised on behalf of both the parties, only three of the objections raised in the court below are required to be stated. They are:
(a) The application u/s 33C(2) of the Act was not maintainable.
(b) The Award given by Shri Kedarnath Singh was without jurisdiction and, therefore, unenforceable in law.
(c) Shri G.S. Verma, the present Presiding Officer of the Labour Court was not legally authorised to deal with the applications u/s 33C(2) of the Act.
Dealing with the third point mentioned above, the Respondent No. 2 who is admittedly the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Patna, held that by a notification dated 10.2.73, the Labour Court has been authorised to entertain and decide applications u/s 33C(2) of the Act and he is, therefore, legally empowered to deal with the application. Both the other questions were decided against the petitioners and, as a result thereof, the application was dismissed.
The learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the judgment of the Presiding Officer, so for it goes against the petitioners, is entirely illegal. A single application was filed on behalf of all the petitioners before the Labour Court and it was contended by the management that the application was not by workmen themselves. It was asserted that the petition had been filed by the General Secretary of the Bihar working Journalist''s Union. It is, however, admitted that on that application, there were signatures purporting to be in the hands of the petitioners. From the statement in paragraph 11 of the impugned order, it appears that the management did not accept the genuineness of the purported signatures of 13 or 14 of the workmen, One of them, namely, Sukhdeo Singh did not accept his signature. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contended before us that all the signatures appearing on the application before the Labour Court are genuine and the statement of Sukhdeo was as a result of confusion. He also said that in view of the signature on the application, it should be treated by them personally and the fact that the General Secretary of the Bihar Working Journalist''s Union was also helping them, did not render the application defective. Relying on Sub-section (2) and (5) of Section 33C of the Act, it was further argued that a single application was maintainable. Unfortunately, however, Respondent No. 2 has not recorded his clear finding on the genuineness of the disputed signatures of the petitioners. It has been held that assuming in favour of the petitioners that the application was a joint one on behalf of all the petitioners, it was not maintainable in as much as a joint petition under Sub-section (5) could not lie, as no rules contemplated therein have been framed by the Bihar Government. The relevant Portion of Sub-section (1) of Section 33C of the Act is as follows:
Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an Award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignees or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.
The learned Advocates appearing before us have made elaborate arguments on question of interpretation of Sub-section (2) to (5) of Section 33C of the Act, which are in the following terms:
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government.
(3) For the purpose of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner who shall after taking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case.
(4) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the appropriate Government and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided for in Sub-section (1).
(5) Where workmen employed under the same employer are entitled to receive from him any money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, then, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, a single application for recovery of the amount due may be made on behalf of or in respect of any number of such workmen.
The words "subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf" have been referred to by Mr. T.K. Prasad, appearing for Respondent No. 1 with great emphasis. He argued that a joint application could be maintainable only after rules were framed in that regard. Admittedly, the Bihar Rules framed under the provisions of the Act are silent so far this matter is concerned. Respondent No. 2 has held that in absence of any rule permitting a single application, the provisions of Sub-section (5) cannot be availed of for filing such an application. Supporting this view, Mr. T.K. Prasad contended that the applicability of the relevant provision of Sub-section (5) is dependent on a rule being framed permitting a single joint application. On a perusal of the language of Sub-section (5), the argument does not appear to be sound. The sub-section unconditionally allows the filing of a single application, but permits any rule to be framed either prescribing any procedure or modifying the provision or even depriving the parties of the right to file a joint application. If such a rule is framed, it will over ride the provision of Sub-section (5) but so long there is no rule in existence, the applicants are entitled to file a single application as allowed by Sub-section (5). The provision is not dependent on any rule being framed, it is only subject to any rule, if framed. I, therefore, hold that the view taken by Respondent No. 2 on this point is entirely illegal and must be set aside.
The next question, however, arises as to whether the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 33C of the Act are applicable to an application under Sub-section (2) of Section 33C. Mr. T.K. Prasad urged that Sub-section (5) is applicable only to an application under Sub-section (1) and is not attracted to an application under Sub-section (2). A joint application is contemplated" for the recovery of the amount due" and it is said that Sub-section (2) could not be in contemplation. Under Sub-section (1), an application can be made to the appropriate Government by a workman or by an authorised agent" for the recovery of the money due to him. So far as Sub-section (2) is concerned, it entitled a workman to "receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money." In case of a dispute as to the amount due, a Labour Court subject to any rule can decide the controversy. As mentioned in Sub-section (3) the Labour Court may appoint a Commissioner for computing the money value of the benefit. The decision of the Labour Court in this regard has, under Sub-section (4) to be forwarded to the appropriate Government and the amount may, thereafter, be recovered in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (5) It is contended by Mr. Prasad that only at this stage, the provision of Sub-section (5) regarding single application can be applied.
The interpretation put by Mr. Prasad does not appear to be correct. After the Labour Court decides any question as to the amount of the money due or as to the amount at which the benefit under an Award should be computed it has to forward its decision to the Government for recovery, and the word ''shall'' in the sub-section indicates that the Labour Court has no discretion in the matter. The workman is not required to move the Court by filing an application. Under the statutory mandate itself, the Labour Court will have to act. It must, therefore, follow that the provision in Sub-section (5) regarding a single application cannot for the purpose of any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, apply at the stage contemplated in Sub-section (4). The Sub-section (5) in express terms applies not only to a case where a workman is entitled to receive any money, but also where he is entitled to any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money. The operation of the sub-section cannot, therefore be confined to applications under Sub-section (1) only. It is true that Sub-section (2) does not mention specifically any application by the workman, but it must be assumed that by the very nature of the situation, an application is impliedly under contemplation. It is not expected of the Labour Court to go on making a comprehensive enquiry as to whether any Award has remained unexecuted. It will have to depend upon the assistance of the interested parties in this regard. The party who can take advantage of the provision for reaping the benefits under an Award must be deemed to have a right to move the appropriate authority in this regard. The provision of Sub-section (5), therefore, must apply to an application at this stage. Both the Sub-sections (1) and (2) had been similarly dealt with in Sub-section (5) for the question of maintainability of a joint application and I hold that the Labour Court in the impugned order was not correct in dismissing the application of the petitioners on the ground that there was a joint application on their behalf before it.
Mr. Prasad relied upon the decisions In U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Meena Chatterji (1969) 36 F.J.R. 308 and Vad Ram v. Labour Court, Delhi (1974) 45 F.J.R. 292 The question was whether on the death of a workman, who has made an application u/s 6H (2) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, similar to Section 33C(2) of the Central Act, his heirs could be brought on the record by way of substitution. The Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court deciding the case held that the right was given to the workman alone and not to his heirs and assignees. The learned Judge reached the conclusion without any discussion on the point. A similar question arose before the Delhi High Court in Yad Ram v. Labour Court (supra). The Delhi High Court also took a similar view. This decision appears to be mainly founded on the Central rules framed under the Act which applied to Delhi. It has been admitted by the parties before us that there are no relevant rules applicable in Bihar. As has been observed earlier, the provisions of Sub-section (2) are subject to any rules framed under the Act and it cannot, therefore, be suggested that the rules, if applicable have no part to play in finding out the correct position. The decision of the Delhi Court based upon the rules applicable there, cannot be relevant in Bihar. Besides, it was also pointed out by the Delhi High Court that the Labour Court was not expected to go in to the intricate question of title and succession which might arise on an application by the heirs of the deceased workman. This aspect of the matter is not applicable to the case before us where the benefit is to go to the workman himself who continues to be alive. In circumstances similar to those in cases before the Allahabad and Delhi High Courts, the Bombay High Court in Sitabi Naruna Pujari v. Auto Engineers (1971) 40 F.J.R. 124 took a contrary view. However, it is not necessary for me in this case to express any opinion as to whether the heirs of a deceased workman can file and continue an application u/s 33C(2).
On behalf of the petitioners, it has not been argued before us that the application before the Labour Court had been filed by a duly authorised agent of the petitioners. The stand which the petitioners have taken is that they had personally joined in filing a single application. As pointed out above, there is no clear finding of the Labour Court on the factual aspect, but from the discussion in paragraph 11 of the judgment, it appears that it cannot be denied that the petitioners, excepting those whose signatures were challenged by the management, had in fact signed the application personally. The relief prayed for by them in the application cannot be refused on the erroneous view that a joint application was not maintainable. So far as the other petitioners are concerned, the question has to be decided by the court below, unless the matter can be settled finally by a decision on the other points. If, after a decision on all these points, the writ application has to be allowed the matter will have to be sent back to Respondent No. 2 again on remand. I am fully conscious of the fact that it is an old case which came to this Court earlier on several occasions and should not be prolonged any further, if possible, but in the circumstances, it cannot be helped.
The other finding recorded by Respondent No. 2 against the petitioners is that Shri Kedar Nath was not legally appointed as Presiding Officer of the Labour Court and, consequently, his Award being without jurisdiction is void. The argument which has prevailed before Respondent No. 2 is that for a valid appointment of Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, it is essential that there should be a notification under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. On the retirement of Shri Ali Hassan, a vacancy arose in place of the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court atPatna and an order appointing Shri Kedar Nath Singh in that place was passed on the 28th August, 1962, as quoted in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment, in the following terms:
Muzaffarpur Shram Nyayalaya ke Pithasin Padadhikari Shri Kedar Nath Singh agle adesh tak apne kartavyon ka atirikt Pithasin Padadhikari, Shram Nyayalaya Patna ka karya karne ke liye niyukt kiye jate bain. Unka mukhyalay Muzaffarpur hi rahega.
Pithasin Padadhikari Sharm Nyayalay Muzaffarpur saptah may do ek din Patna akar Shram Nyayalay Patna me mamley ki sunwai karenge.
The order states that Shri Kedar Nath Singh, Presiding Officer of the Muzaffarpur Labour Court was being appointed in addition to his existing duties to function as to Presiding Officer of the Labour Court at Patna, his head office would be at Muzaffarpur, and that he would come to Patna for one or two days in a week and would hear the cases. The Respondent No. 2 has held that a Notification of the appointment in the Official Gazette was not made and the omission is fatal. To appreciate the paint, it is necessary to consider Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 7, which is in the following terms refers to the mode of constitution of a Labour Court.
Labour Court (1) The Appropriate Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Court for the adjudication of industrial dispute relating to any matter specified in the second schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act.
As has been held in East Indian Pharmaceutical Work Ltd. v. G.S. Verma this sub-section is self-contained so far the constitution of the Labour Court is concerned. As soon as the notification under this sub-section is issued, a Labour Courtis constituted. The Government may take time to appoint a person as the Presiding Officer, but that appointment cannot be held to be a part of the constitution of the Labour Court. Sub-section (2) says that a Labour Court shall consist of only one person and Sub-section (3) lays down the qualification of the Presiding Officer. The language of Section 7(1) would clearly show that it does not relate to the appointment of another person as the Presiding Officer, if a vacancy arises. This matter is dealt with in Section 8. There is no challenge to the valid constitution of the Patna Labour Court. If Shri Ali Hassan had continued in office it is not Suggested that he could not have dealt with the matter. The objection is to the appointment of Shri Kedar Nath Singh. In this context, the provision of Section 8, quoted below, may be examined.
Filling of vacancies--If, for any reason a vacancy (other than a temporary absence) occurs in the offices of the presiding Officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal or in the office of the Chairman or any other member of a Board or Court, then, in the case of a National Tribunal, the Central Government and in any other case, the appropriate Government, shall appoint another person in accordance with the provisions of this Act to fill the vacancy, and the proceeding may be continued before the Labour Court Tribunal National Tribunal, Board or Court, as the case may be from the stage at which the vacancy is filed.
It will be observed that unlike Section 7, a notification in the Official Gazette is not required for appointment u/s 8. Mr. Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No. 3, referred to Rule 5 of the Industrial Disputes (Bihar) Rules, 1961 framed u/s 38 of the Act, which is in the following terms:
Notification of appointment of Board, Court, Labour Court or Tribunal-Constitution of Board, Court, Labour Court or Tribunal and the appointment of persons to preside over such Board, Court or Tribunal or the appointment of persons to the Office of Chairman; or any other member of the Board or Court shall be notified in the Bihar Gazette.
He argued that the requirement of notification of the appointment in the Bihar Gazette, as mentioned in the rule, has not been fulfilled and, for that reason, Shri Kedar Nath Singh must be held to be not a legally appointed Presiding Officer of the Patna Labour Court. Although the Act itself has made a clear distinction between the constitution of a Labour Court and appointment of a Presiding Officer in a case of vacancy, the argument proceeds that there is no such distinction so far as the rules are concerned. On a perusal of the language of the rule, the contention does not appear to be correct. While the rule deals with the constitution of (i) Board, (ii) Court, (iii) Labour Court and (iv) Tribunal, it excludes the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court, when it comes to deal with the appointment of the officers. The persons to preside over the Board, Court or Tribunal are clearly mentioned and the presiding Officer of a Labour Court is omitted. Mr. Prasad urged that the word ''Court'' in the second portion of the rule refers to ''Labour Court'', but this does not appear to be correct. The terms ''Court'' and ''Labour Court'' are distinctly separable and refer to different authorities and cannot be confused with each other. The ''Court'' is defined in Section 2(f) of the Act as a Court of enquiry constituted u/s 6 of the Act, while the ''Labour Court'' is defined in Section 2(kka) as one constituted u/s 7. They function in different fields and the procedure, authority and jurisdiction are all separately dealt with in the Act. It is, therefore, not permissible to read the word ''Court'' as meaning ''Labour Court''. Mr. Prasad argued that on a comparison of Sections 5, 6 and 7, it will be seen that the term ''Presiding Officer'' is applicable only to a Labour Court and not to a Court of Enquiry or Board and this suggests that when the latter portion of Rule 5 mentions the presiding Officer of a Court, it must be understood to refer to [he presiding Officer of the Labour Court. There are several fallacies in this argument. The Rule 5 does not mention ''presiding Officer'' the relevant portion of the rule mentions appointment of "persons to preside over such Board, court or Tribunal." (Emphasis is mine). The drafting of the rule is in artistic, but its meaning can be, nonetheless, undetstood without any difficulty. By the term persons to preside is meant every person on the Board of Conciliation or the Industrial Tribunal. The plain grammatical meaning of Rule 5 is free from any ambiguity and must, therefore, be interpreted accordingly and it does not refer to the appointment of the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Mr. Prasad urged that if Sections 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Act and Rule 5 of the Bihar Rules be interpreted in the light of the object of the legislature, they would lead to an inference in favour of the management. He said that there could not be any reason as to why in Rule 5, the presiding Officer of the Labour Court would be left out. It was suggested that the Government must have, while framing Rule 5 intended to include the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court also, but by an inadvertent omission, it has been left out. There are two difficulties in accepting the point of view of the employer respondent. The language of the Act and the Rule does not to my mind admit of such vagueness which can pemit a Court of law to add words which are not there. Besides there does not appear to be reason for adopting a rule of interpretation, which would frustrate the decision of an authority given on a valid reference by the state Government after hearing the parties. The Industrial Disputes Act is a welfare statute and is aimed at ameliorating the economic and improving working condition of a working people. It is well established that in interpreting the provisions of a welfare legislation, courts should adopt a beneficient rule of construction. I would therefore, be reluctant to put an interpretation either on the statutory provisions or on the order of appointment of Shri Kedar Nath Singh, which would prejudice the rights and welfare of the workman or would render the Award a nullity. It is significant to mention in this regard that when Shri Kedar Nath Singh took up the hearing of the matter, his jurisdiction was not challenged by the employer. His award was challenged by Respondent No. 3 by a writ application in M.J.C. 994 of 1964 and it is stated by Mr. Prasad that the point was taken there. The High Court, however, dismissed the case in limine. After Considering all the relevant materials, I hold that the appointment of Shri Kedar Nath Singh did not suffer from any defect on account of absence of a notification in the official Gazette.
Mr. Prasad further contended that the language of the order appointing Shri Kedar Nath Singh indicates that the appointment was not made u/s 8. It was a case of casual filling up of the place of the Presiding Officer authorising Shri Kedar Nath Singh to do the day to day administrative work of the Patna Labour Court and he could not hear and decide cases. According to the learned Councel, this amounted to an arrangement for the continuity of the Labour Court and its normal routine work. He emphasised on the fact that Section 8 was not mentioned in the order of appointment, nor was the nature and duration of vacancy indicated. He has, however, not indicated any other section or any other provision of law under which the order of appointment could have been passed. So far as duration is concerned, Section 8 excludes a temporary absence of the Presiding Officer. Admittedly, Shri A. Hassan had retired and here was a substantive vacancy. The section does not require that the filling up must be on a permanent basis only. I, therefore, do not find any defect on these two points. I also do not agree that the order of appointment will not be effective in law unless the provision under which it is made is mentioned in the order itself the order, in the present case, does not cut down or limit the functions of Shri Kedar Nath Singh as the Presiding Officer of the Patna Labour Court. Instead, it is mentioned that he would also hear the cases at Patna one or two days every week. Mr. Prasad relied upon the decisions in The United Commercial Bank Ltd. Vs. Their Workmen, Fedders Lloyed Corporation (pvt.) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor Delhi through Under Secretary (Labour) Delhi 170 L.I.C. 421 and Blue Stat Engineering Co. (Bombay) Private Ltd. v. The Labour Court 1975 L.I.C. 1171 In the case of the United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen. Mr. Chandra Shekhar Aiyar, one of the members of the Industrial Tribunal was nominated a member of the Indo Pakistan Boundary Disputes Tribunal and his services ceased to be available the other two members of the Industrial Tribunal held sittings and dealt with certain issues of the case. After Mr. Chandra Shekhar Aiyar was relieved from the Boundary Disputes Tribunal, he again started sitting on the Industrial Tribunal. The two questions debated before the Supreme Court were (i) whether after Mr. Chandra Shekhar ceased to be available, the remaining two members had to be re-appointed to constitute a Tribunal and (ii) whether after Mr. Chandra Shekhar Aiyar again started sittings, it was imperative to issue a fresh notification. By a majority view, it was decided that after the service of a member ceased to be available the remaining members by themselves could not act as the Tribunal without the Government reconstituting the Tribunal as a Tribunal of the remaining members, and that the absent member could not sit again with the other members form the Tribunal in absence of a fresh Notification. This case was governed by the Act before it was amended in 1956. The old Section 7 was substituted by the present Section 7, 7A, 7B and 70, and the decision has to be appreciated in the back ground of the old section. Section 8 of the old Act was also quite different. These Sections have been quoted in parahraph 3 of the reported judgment and clearly show that the case was not concerned with the question which arises in the present writ application. In Fedders Lloyed Corporation (pvt) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi through Under Secretary (Labour) Delhi, Mr. R. K. Baweja, Presiding Officer of the Labonr Court went on leave and for that period Mr. Desh Deepak was appointed as the Presiding Officer. It was held that an appointment u/s 8 could not be made to fill up a vacancy due to a temporary absence. It has been pointed out that in the present writ case, Shri A. Hassan had retired and it was not a case of temporary vacancy in which Shri Kedar Nath Singh was appoioted. Siinilar was the situation in Blue Star Engineering Co. (Bombay) Private Ltd. v. The Labour Court. None of the cases relied upon by Mr. Prasad, therefore appears to be relevant. For all these reasons, I reject the contention raised on behalf of the management and bold that the order of appointment of Shri Kedar Nath Singh as the presiding Officer of Patna Labour Court was validly made and he was fully empowered to decide the case.
Mr. Prasad also attempted to support the decision by challenging the finding of Respondent No. 2 on the last point mentioned in paragraph 3 above. The Notification which empowered the Labour Court in Bihar to entertain and decide application u/s 33C(2) of the Act has been quoted in parpgraph 7 of the judgment and runs as follows:
In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 33C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (XIV of 1947) the Governor of Bihar is pleased to specify within their respective jurisdiction the Labour Courts constituted in the Labour and Employment Department Notification III/Dl 1204/67 1 & E-635 dated the 30th January, 1967, and read with Notification No. 963 dated 26.10.71 as the Labour Courts for determining the amount of money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money which any workmen is entitled to receive from the employer in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 33C of the said Act.
In Bihar, there have been these Labour Courts at Patna, Muzaffarpur and Ranchi. The above order was passed vesting them with powers u/s 33C(2) of the Act. Mr. Prasad contended that the quoted notification entitled the Labour Court to determine the amount of money only in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 330, as mentioned towards the later part of order. This interpretation cannot be accepted firstly, for the reason that Sub-section (2) is expressly mentioned towards the beginning of the order and secondly because the words "or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money" mentioned in the order cannot refer to Sub-section (1). Mr. Prasad strenuously contended that the general rule of interpretation of a statutory provision of a private document cannot be applied to an order passed by the Governor. Unless Sub-section (2) is not specifically mentioned, the Labour Courts cannot pass any order thereunder. The argument does not appear to have any force. The result of accepting the construction pressed on behalf of the respondent would be to ignore the words for determing the amount of money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money in the above quoted Government notification. At the highest, the respondent can say that by using Section 33C(1) towards the end of the notification, there has crept in an ambiguity which must be resolved. By obstinately sticking to Section 33C(1) mentioned in the order, one would fail to attribute a sensible meaning to the contents of the order and this would defeat its real object. If the language of document leads to a manifest contradiction not intended by its author and may result in frustrating its very purpose, it should be so construed to avoid the contradiction and make it effective. There is no reason for limiting this principle which is based on common sense to statutory provisions only and for depriving executive orders of its benefits. In the present case, there is no difficulty in finding out the purpose of the relevant notification. The Government is undoubtedly empowered to pass the order which would authorise the Labour Court to determine the benefits to which a workman is entitled to, as mentioned in Sub-section (2) of Section 33C. The only error appears to be in mentioning Sub-section (1) instead of Sub-section (2) towards the end of the order. In Hukumchand Mills Ltd. Vs. The State of Madhya Bharat and Another, . It was held that the impugned notification was not vitiated for the mere mistake in the notification in reciting the source of power. In Lekhraj Satramdas, Lalvani Vs. Deputy Custodian-cum-managing Officer and Others, . The Supreme Court rejected the argument challenging an order on the ground that wrong provision of law had been mentioned. In that case, reliance was placed on the decision in P. Balakotaiah Vs. The Union of India (UOI) and Others, . Where it was held that validity of an order should be judged on a consideration of the substance and not its form and that the reference of a wrong rule should be disregarded as due to a mistake. I therefore, hold that the order passed in the above-quoted notification under the provision of Section 33C(2) of the Act effectively authorised Respondent No. 2 to dispose of the matter in the present case. Besides, the question appears now to be of academic importance, as the matter has to go back to the Labour Court, Patna, for a fresh decision. It has been stated at the bar that with a view to remove any misapprehension, a fresh notification has been issued in more clear terms authorising the Patna Labour Court to deal with such application. If that is the position, there cannot be any objection of the Respondent No. 2 in considering and deciding the dispute after remand.
For the reasons stated above, I allow this application and quash the order as contained in Annexure 11 to the writ application. The matter will now go back to the Labour Court Patna, for reconsideration and decision in accordance with the observations made above. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.