Sri Veerana Konar vs Sri Kattapuliambalam

Jagadisan, J.—This civil revision petition is filed by the plaintiff in S. C. S. No. 13 of 1959, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Melur,

who was non-suited on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. The defendant in S. C. S. No. 13 of 1959, District Munsif''s Court,

Melur, executed a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 100 on 7th July 1951. He paid a sum of Rs. 2 on 30th May 1954 and

made an endorsement of payment on the promissory note. The suit was laid for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 139-11 nPs., alleging that the

defendant was an agriculturist under the provisions of Madras Act IV of 1938, Madras Ordinance No. V of 1953, Madras Act V of 1954 and

Madras Act I of 1955. The plaint was presented on 2nd January 1959 in the District Munsif Court, Melur. The plaint averred that the Court was

closed for Christmas Holidays between 26th December, 1958 to 2nd January, 1959 and that the suit was instituted in time taking into account the

period of exclusion of time permitted under Madras Ordinance V of 1953 and Madras Acts V of 1954 and I of 1955.

The defendant pleaded discharge of the suit promissory note and also contended that in any event the suit was barred by limitation.

The learned District Munsif of Melur held that the suit was clearly barred by limitation and dismissed the suit on that ground without recording

any finding on the alternative plea of discharge put forward by the defendant.

It is contended on behalf of the petitioner, the plaintiff in the suit, that the decision of the learned District Munsif on the question of limitation is

erroneous in law and in view of the decisions of this Court in Narayana Moppanar v. Viswesa Nadar 71 L.W. 531, and Sayada Gounder v.

Veerappa Gounder 72 L.W. 140. The learned Counsel for the petitioner urged that the total period of exclusion of time prescribed under the three

enactments referred to above was a period of one year, six months and 26 days and that the petitioner will not merely be entitled to have three

years from 30th May 1954, the date of endorsement upon the promissory note, but also be entitled to add to that period the period of one year six

months and 26 days, and that by such addition the last date for instituting the suit will be 26th December 1958, and that date being a holiday for

the Court the presentation of the plaint on the reopening day, namely, 2nd January, 1959 was proper and in time.

In Narayana Moopanar v. Viswesa Nadar 71 L.W. 531, one of the promissory notes was dated 16th December 1950 and the suit was filed on

foot of that promissory note on 25th January 1956. In the same case there was another promissory note dated 14th January 1951 on foot of which

another suit was filed on 17th January 1956. The question for consideration was whether the two suits were filed in time taking into account the

period of exclusion contained in Madras Ordinance V of 1953, Act V of 1954 and Act I of 1955. Dealing with the first promissory note

Ramaswami J. observed at page 531 as follows:

This period of one year six months and 26 days has got to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. In other words the plaintiff can file a

suit on the suit promissory note within one year six months and 26 days from 16-12-1953 namely on or before 12-7-1955. But this suit has been

filed on 25-1-1956, which is plainly barred by limitation.

The promissory notes forming the subject matter of the decision referred to were both executed before the coming into force of Madras

Ordinance V of 1953 itself. At a time when the three year period prescribed under the law of limitation for enforcing the said promissory notes

expired there was a statutory bar operating against the promisee which disentitled him to file suits for the recovery of the amounts due on them. The

statutory bar actually disappeared only on 1st July 1955. Thereafter there was no legal impediment to file suits on the said promissory notes. But

inasmuch as the Ordinance V of 1953, Madras Acts V of 1954 and I of 1955 specifically provided that the time during which there was a bar in

the matter of instituting suits should be excluded in computing the period of limitation governing the institution of the suits on the promissory notes.

The total period of one year six months and 26 days covered by the three enactments had to be excluded. Therefore in cases where the

promissory notes or debts came into existence before the advent of the first of the three enactments the creditor will have the benefit of adding a

period of one year six months and 26 days to the normal three years period which the law allows him. This is the principle laid down by

Ramaswami, J., in the decision in Narayana Moopanar v. Viswesa Nadar 71 L.W. 531.

In Savada Gounder v. Veerappa Gounder 72 L.W. 140, the promissory note was dated 22nd April 1951. On 23rd June 1955 there was an

endorsement of payment on the back of the promissory note. The suit was filed on 14th June, 1956. The defendant in the suit raised the plea of

limitation and contended that as the acknowledgment evidenced by the endorsement of payment was made three years after the date of the

promissory note, it could not avail the creditor for the purpose of saving limitation. The plaintiff in that case resorted to Ordinance V of 1953, and

Madras Acts V of 1954 and I of 1955, and contended that the endorsement on the back of the promissory note was a valid acknowledgment.

The only question which arose for decision in that case therefore was whether"" the acknowledgment which was admittedly made three year after

the date of the promissory note could save limitation. It must be noted that the suit itself in that case was filed on 14th June 1956 within one year

after the date of endorsement, namely, 23rd June 1955. The learned Judge, Ramachandra Iyer, J., held that the period prescribed in S. 19 of the

Limitation Act was not limited to the period of the First Schedule of the Act and that in computing the period prescribed the period which a party is

entitled to exclude under any law for the time being in force should be taken into account. He referred to the decision reported In Nagarpur

Sambayya Vs. Nagarpur Pedda Subbayya, , and the decision in Firm Kamta Prasad Jagannath Prasad Vs. Gulzari Lal and Another, , and

followed the principle laid down by those decisions. At page 142, the learned Judge observed thus:

The object of the legislature is that the acknowledgment should have been made before the claim was barred by limitation; and under Madras Act

V of 1954 and Act I of 1955, the claim had not become barred by limitation by reason of the extension of time allowed by the enactments by

excluding certain period. Any acknowledgment within the period of the extended time would be a valid acknowledgment within the meaning of S.

19 of the Limitation Act.

While I agree, with respect, with the two decisions In Marayana Moopanar v. Viswesa Nadar 71 L.W. 531 and Savada Gounder v. Veerappa

Gounder 72 L.W. 140, I am of opinion that the present case cannot be governed by the principle laid down in those decisions. It is inconceivable

that the plaintiff, the petitioner before me, can compute a period of three years from 30th May 1954 and then add to that period a further period of

one year six months and 26 days. It may be open to the petitioner to ignore the endorsement on 30th May 1954 and file a suit within 4 years 6

months and 26 days commencing from 7th July 1951, the date of the promissory note, in which case the suit should have been instituted on 3rd

February.1956. Alternatively, the petitioner might well have relied upon the endorsement of payment on 30th May 1954 made upon the

promissory note and computed a period of 3 years from that date under S. 19 of the Limitation Act in which case he must have instituted the suit

on or before 30th May 1957. A third possibility is said to enable the petitioner to exclude the period between 30th May 1954 and 1st July 1955,

the period of statutory exclusion under Madras Act V of 1954 and Act I of 1955, which aggregates to one year one month and one day and add

this period of exclusion to 30th May 1957, the last date of limitation, computing from the date of endorsement, in which case he must have filed the

suit on 1st July 1958. There is absolutely no basis for the petitioner to add a period of one year six months and 26 days to the three year period

commencing from 30th May 1954 the date of endorsement upon the promissory note. If a creditor lands money to another who is an agriculturist

within the mining of the aforesaid enactments during the period of the bar he will not certainly be permitted to add to the normal period of limitation

any period of statutory exclusion prior to the date of his lending. Such mode of computing the period of limitation will certainly be startling and

anomalous. I hold that the suit is clearly barred by limitation. The decision of the learned District Munsif is correct. The civil revision petition fails

and is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs.