Sriramulu vs Anasuyamma and Others

Viswanatha Saatri, J.—The 3rd Defendant is the Appellant in this Second Appeal. The question raised in this Second Appeal relates to the construction of the will Ex. A-l, dated 24-5-1941 executed by Sangavarapu Lakshrai Narasimham. Lakshmi Narasimham died in or about July 1941. The 1st Defendant is his widow. The Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant are his daughters. He had yet Anr. daughter, who was alleged to be a simpleton and in whose favour there was legacy given by the testator under his will.

The question turns upon the nature of the interest which the widow of the testator took under the will. The testator gave specific properties in favour of each of his three daughters. The Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendant were given the lands with all rights including the right of disposition by way of gift transfer or sale. The testator gave the properties trans-gave the properties to the 1st Defendant which he had not disposed of specifically in favour of his daughters and directed that the widow.

shall after my life-time enjoy the income that may be got there from, and after the death of my wile, such of my second and third daughters as may live in my house shall enjoy the property with absolute rights of gift and sale.

The of Defendant alienated item 2 of the plaint IS Schedule in favour of the 3rd Defendant, Appellant herein. The Plaintiff claimed that this alienation was not binding upon her interest in the property after the death of the 1st Defendant. In other words, the Plaintiff asserted that the 1st Defendant had only a life-estate in the properties bequeathed to her under Ex. A-l.

The trial Court found that the 1st Defendant took a widow''s interest in the properties bequeathed to her under Ex. A-l and not merely a life-interest. It further found that the alienation of item 2 of Schedule B made by the widow in favour of the 3rd Defendant was not supported by legal necessity. Treating the Plaintiff as a reversioner under the Hindu Law, the trial court granted a decree declaring that the alienation made by the limited owner, the 1st Defendant, would not be binding on the-reversion. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge held that the widow took only a life-interest in the property under the terms of Ex. A-l and declared that the alienation under Exs. B-l and B-2 would not be valid or binding beyond the life-time of the widow.

In this second appeal, it was argued by the learned Advocate for the Appellant that on a true construction of Ex. A-l, the interest taken by the 1st Defendant, the widow of the testator, was a Hindu widow''s estate rather than a life-estate. He pointed out that the properties bequeathed under the will to the widow were so insignificant in value that it could not have been the intention of the testator to deprive her of the powers of alienation in case there was a justifying necessity for the sale.

He also referred to the presumption laid down in certain earlier decisions of the Judicial Committee like Mahomed Shumstool v. Shewukram, 2 Ind App 7 14 and 15 (PC) (A). According to the later decisions of the Judicial Committee and of Madras High Court, which are binding upon me, there is no presumption that a gift or bequest by a husband in favour of his wife is only of a limited estate. It all depends upon the terms of the gift or will. The primary duty of a Court is to ascertain from the language employed by the testator what were his testamentary intentions and give effect to them. It is only where the terms of the will are of uncertain import that resort may be had to the presumed intention of a Hindu testator, the circumstances of the family of the testator the claims of various relations upon his bounty and similar matters.

In the present case, the testator was quite alive to the fact that he was conferring an absolute estate on his daughters and he had been careful enough to use words appropriate to confer an absolute estate in them. In describing the gift in favour of the wife, he stated that she shall be entitled to enjoy only the income from the lands and that after the death of the wife, the daughters should enjoy the property with absolute lights. I assume that the gilt of the income of a property to be enjoyed for the life-time of the donee, carries with it a life-interest in the property itself. Even so, the wife of the testator would only have a life-interest in the property.

If the testator had merely gifted the lands in favour of his wife and provided that on the death of the wife the daughters would be entitled to succeed to the property, there would .be room for the application of the presumption that the testator had intended to confer upon the wife that estate which she would have taken under the ordinary Hindu Law of inheritance. Here, however, the, testator specifically bequeaths only the income of the property to be enjoyed by his wife during her life-time and in my opinion, the testator conferred only a life estate on the widow. When the language of the will is clear, it is not permissible for me to give a different meaning to the dispositive clause by resorting to the presumed intentions of Hindu testat Ors.

The learned Advocate for the Appellant relied upon a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ramu Vs. Kashi and Others, where the learned Judges observed as follows:

There seems to be in fact, as has been said in the latest Edition of Mayne, (Hindu Law) only two alternative constructions in the case of property gifted or devised by a husband to his wife,, namely, the property in the hands of the wife is either her Stridhan in every sense or she has nothing more than a Hindu Widow''s estate in respect of it.

The learned Judges also referred to Mulla''s Hindu Law, I Xth Edition, page 135, paragraph 144. In my opinion, this statement is not quite accurate. It is open to a Hindu husband to confer either an absolute estate or a life-estate or widow''s estate upon his wife by using appropriate expressions to denote the nature of trio estate conferred. If the husband intends that his wife should have life-estate in the Immovable property, no rule of Hindu Law comes in. It is open to any testator Hindu or otherwise, to confer a life-estate upon his wife.

It is only when the words of the will are such as to leave it doubtful whether a Hindu testator intended to convey a widow''s interest or an absolute interest in the property that the presumptions as to the intentions of Hindu testators come into play. To the present case, I am of the opinion, on a construction of the will that what was given to the 1st Defendant under the will was only a life-estate.

4a. I may mention that the lower appellate Court has not considered the question whether if the grant was of a widow''s estate, the alienation would be justified by necessity. I might also further observe in view of the right of the widow so strongly pressed upon me by the Appellant, that a Hindu testator cannot, by his will, so dispose of his property as to defeat the legal right of his wife or any other person to maintenance out of his estate. If the widow satisfies the Court that the provision made for her under the will is meagre or inadequate, she would no doubt, be entitled to get a proper rate of maintenance fixed by the Court after taking into account the income derivable from the properties bequeathed to her. under the will to be enjoyed by her during her life-time.

For these reasons, I hold that the decision of the lower appellate Court is correct and that this second appeal should be dismissed with costs.