High CourtsDivision Bench(1936) 09 MAD CK 0025

Srireddi Venkatraju and Others vs Allam Gangaraju and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 24 September 1936 · Citation: AIR 1937 Mad 113 : 166 Ind. Cas. 648 : (1936) 44 LW 805 : (1936) 71 MLJ 808

HON’BLE JUDGES
Cornish, J

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Judgment

14 paragraphs · 338 words

Cornish, J.—the appellants are the legal representatives of the decree-holder. He obtained his decree on 15th October, 1918. On 7th

November, 1929, the appellants made an application to have the decree transmitted to another Court for execution. In the meanwhile there had

been a protracted attempt to serve the third defendant with notices. First defendant had been served and fifth defendant had been served; but first

defendant, the father and guardian of the third defendant, refused service on his behalf, and when the appellants got third defendant''s mother

appointed his guardian, that woman was never at the address to which the notice was sent. At long last on 30th October, 1930, a Court clerk was

appointed guardian. By that time of course 12 years from the date of the decree had passed. The Court'' to which the decree was transmitted

returned it to the transmitting Court to determine the question of limitation. And upon this both the lower Courts have held that the execution

application is barred. It was not barred unless it was in the nature of a fresh application after the 12 years'' limit laid down by Section 48. The

application itself, having been made on 7th November, 1929, was within the prescribed time-limit, and it seems to me that the notice required to go

to somebody representing the third defendant was only ancillary to that application and could not be treated as a fresh application. It is settled that

an application made within the 12 years'' limit does not preclude an order being made on it after that period. Virarama v. Annasami ILR (1883) 6

Mad. 359. In my opinion, therefore, Section 48 did not bar the application. On this conclusion it is not necessary to consider the question of fraud.

The appeal is allowed and the matter will be remanded for disposal. But in view of the dilatoriness of the appellants in pursuing their remedies I

make no order for costs in this appeal. The appellants will have their costs in the lower Courts.