St. Stephen's Teacher Training Institute vs The Director of Government Examinations

S.S. Subramani, J.—Contempt Application No. 323 of 1998 is to initiate action against Respondent for alleged wilful disobedience of

Order in W.P. No. 7411 of 1998 dated 26.5.1998.

As per my Order dated 26.5.1998, in W.P. No. 7411 of 1998, I directed the Respondents therein to publish the result of those students who

appeared for Second Year Diploma in Teacher Education 1994 96 batch bearing Registration No. 67251-290 and first and second year

examination of 40 students admitted during 1995-97 batch with registration No. 9673241-280 and first year examination results of 50 candidates

admitted during 1996-98 batch bearing registration Nos. 9773252-9773301 for the examination held in August 1997 and the Supplementary any

examination held in November 1997 within a period of two weeks from the date of my Order, and I further observed that I was giving that

direction only because the Government did not publish the results in spite of various repeated representations. I also said in my Order that in case if

any student had failed, the Respondents shall permit those candidates to remit the fees within a period of ten days thereafter, i.e., from the date of

publication of the result. The grievance of the Petitioner herein is that though the Order was communicated by registered post and the same was

received by the Authorities on 30.5.1998, results have not been published. In spite of the fact that the Petitioner Institute sent a telegram on

17.6.1998. Respondents have not published the results, and according to Petitioner, they have wilfully disobeyed the Orders of this Court.

In Contempt Application No. 337 of 1998, the contempt alleged is disobedience of Order of this Court dated 2.6.1998 passed in W.P. No.

624 of 1998. In that writ petition, Petitioner wanted a direction for publication of results of the students of the Petitioner Institution viz., (1) 1991-

93 batch of 40 students for second year Diploma in Teacher Examination held in July/August 1993; (2) 1992-94 batch of 40 students for First

Year Diploma in Teacher Education Examination held in July/August 1993; (3) Arrears candidates appeared for Diploma in Teacher Training

Examination held in July/August 1993; (4) 1992-94 batch of 40 students for II Year Diploma in Teacher Education held in February 1996; (5)

1993-95 batch of 40 students for First and Second Year Diploma in Teacher Education held in February 1996; (6) 1994-96 batch of 40 students

for First Year Diploma in Teacher Education Examination held in February 1996. I directed the Respondents to publish the results within three

weeks from the date of production of a copy of my Order. I further directed that an opportunity should be given to failed candidates to write the

ensuing examination. So I directed the Respondents to give 15 days'' time to them to remit the examination fees, after the publication of the result.

Contempt Application No. 403 of 1998 is to punish the Respondents for alleged wilful disobedience of Orders of this Court dated 26.5.1998 in

W.P. No. 7427/98 and pass such further or other orders as this Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.

In that writ petition, namely, W.P. No. 7427 of 1998, Petitioner sought for issuance of writ of mandamus, directing the first Respondent therein

to permit 239 students of 1991-93 batch of the Petitioner-Institution to write their II year and arrear papers of the I year Examination of Diploma

in Teacher Training commencing from July/August 1998 or on any subsequent date or dates, by receiving examination fee, issuing hall tickets,

publish their results, and also to issue Diploma Certificates. A direction was given as prayed for. After my Order, the applicant herein remitted the

Examination fee for 239 candidates for the Second year Diploma in Teacher Education Examination and also paid the examination fee for arrear

papers for those who were having arrears in the First Year Examination, amounting to Rs. 31,548/- and nominal rolls for the 239 candidates were

submitted to Respondent through registered post on 2.6.1998, and the same was received by Respondent before the last date, i.e., 5.6.1998. The

first Respondent, by order dated 27.6.1998, directed the applicant to get counter signature from the Principal. D.I.E.T., in the nominal rolls, and

the applicant submitted one copy of the nominal rolls to the Principal, D.I.E.T. Therur on 13.7.1998. The Secretary of the first Respondent, by

proceedings Rc. No. 001831/C1/98, dated 18.7.1998, assigned Register Numbers for the 239 candidates commencing from 9840001 to

9840239. However, the candidates were not permitted to write the first year arrear papers and hall tickets issued were also taken back from the

applicant by the Secretary of 1st Respondent on 19.7.1998 along with other hall tickets for First year and Second year. The First and Second

year students of Petitioner-Institute were also not given permission to write the Examination, and so, the applicant was compelled to file W.P. No.

10294 of 1998, and as per direction of Court, on 22.7.1998 hall tickets for First and Second year students were issued. It is the further case of

the Petitioner that candidates having arrears were not permitted to write the Examination as per instruction issued by the Principal of the D.I.E.T.,

Therur. It is said that the 239 candidates were not given hall tickets for writing the examination commencing from 31.7.1998, in spite of specific

direction given by this Court. Therefore, according to the applicant, Respondent herein has wilfully disobeyed the Order of this Court. It is said that

as against the Respondent, two Contempt Applications, namely, Contempt Application Nos. 332 and 337 of 1998 are already pending. It is

further averred that the Petitioner, through its Counsel, has also sent telegrams to the Respondent on 21.7.1998 and 23.7.1998 informing the

Respondent that failure to permit the 239 candidates is an act of contempt, and requested the Respondent to permit the students of the Petitioner-

Institution to write the examination. But permission was not given by Respondent. It is under these circumstances, Petitioner has come to this Court

for initiating contempt.

Detailed counter affidavits have been filed by Respondent for all these Contempt Applications. A common counter affidavit is filed for Contempt

Application Nos. 332 and 337 of 1998. An additional counter-affidavit has also been filed in Contempt Application No. 337 of 1998. Similarly, a

detailed counter-affidavit has been filed in Contempt Application No. 403 of 1998.

In the common counter-affidavit filed in Contempt Application Nos. 332 and 337 of 1998, it is said that N.C.T.E. granted affiliation to the

Petitioner-Institute for 1997-98 only. In view of that, the Government decided to permit the students who were admitted for the year 1997-98 to

write the examination. But, in view of the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 929 of 1997, holding that the Petitioner-

Institution has to be treated as a deemed recognised Institution, an undertaking was given that it will strictly implement the directions of this Court.

It is further said that if such an under taking was given, the Respondent will publish the results as directed by this Court in W.P. No. 624 of 1998.

It is further said that in so far as the failed candidates are concerned, Respondent will not be in a position to hold the examination on the date

already announced, but a separate examination for the failed candidates will be held within a reasonable time and after giving sufficient time for the

students to get ready for the examination.

In the additional counter-affidavit filed in Contempt Application No. 337 of 1998, it is said that in W.A. No. 929 of 1997, a Division Bench of

this Court has held that the Petitioner-Institution has to be treated as ''deemed recognition institute'' and the Bench also directed the Respondent to

hold supplementary examination in accordance with Rules, and it was also made clear that the Respondent will be at liberty to check the

credentials and eligibility of the students alleged to be taking training in the Petitioner-Institution. Before issuing the Certificate, the Principal,

D.I.E.T. Thenar. Kanyakummari district was instructed on 20.8.1998 to visit the Institute and peruse the admission and other records of the

Petitioner-Institute and submit a Report as to whether the admission criteria/procedure stipulated for admission of students to Recognised Teacher

Training Institutes had been strictly followed during the relevant periods in the Petitioner-Institute also. The procedure that is to be followed is, that

the students have to be admitted subject to eligibility such as minimum marks, age and group wise (Higher Secondary) distribution, the details of

which have been given in the additional counter-affidavit. It is said that before the Examination, the nominal roll will be sent by the Institute and it

will be countersigned by the Principal, D.I.E.T. and only there after all the eligible candidates will be permitted to take up the examination. But in

the instant case, the eligibility of the students to the Training Course was not approved by the Principal since they wrote the examination by orders

of Court. Therefore, it necessitated the Department to ascertain the eligibility of candidates and publish the results and issue Certificates to those

who satisfied the norms prescribed by the Government. It is further said that the Government has already issued G.O. Ms. No. 661, Education,

dated 12.6.1991, stipulating a condition that the Teacher Training Institute is entitled to admit only 40 students per batch. This Government Order

was challenged by various Institutes, including the Petitioner, but it was held to be valid by this Court as well as by the Honourable Supreme Court.

It is said that if the Petitioner had exceeded the limit, the said admission is irregular. When the Principal, D.I.E.T. wanted to verify the credentials of

the students and also the admission procedure, there was objection from the Petitioner. But he was persuaded to submit the records for perusal. It

was found that though the students who had been admitted satisfied the minimum educational qualification and age, the Institute had not followed

the percentage of allocation of students in Science, Arts and Vocational Groups (Higher Secondary) properly. Once it had been declared that the

Petitioner is an existing Institute, it has to follow the conditions prescribed for admission of students in the other Existing Institutes. In W.P. No.

624 of 1998, out of which Contempt Application No. 337 of 1998 arises, Petitioner had submitted a list of candidates purported to have

undergone the studies in the Petitioner-Institute. According to Respondent, the list contained many candidates who did not belong to the Petitioner-

Institute at all, and many students appeared as private candidates, and the purpose of including their names was only to overcome the decision in

P.M. Joseph v. State of Tamil Nadu 1993 Writ L.R. 604. It was also found that the Petitioner has violated the norms of admission, and it has

admitted more than 240 students, whereas it could admit only 40 students in a batch. It is said that the Orders of this Court could not be complied

with, only because verification had to be done as per the decision of the Honourable Division Bench of this Court. The Principal, D.I.E.T. was

directed to peruse the records and submit the Report, and after verification, the order of this Court will be complied with, and the same will take

some time for implementation. It is said that there is no intentional or wilful or deliberate violation of Orders of this Court. It is only because the

Petitioner has suppressed material facts before this Court, in the Writ Petitions and also obtained Orders from this Court, the necessity of filing the

additional counter-affidavit arose, and only at the point of time, they could peruse the records.

In Contempt Application No. 403 of 1998, a detailed counter affidavit has been filed, wherein it is stated that the Petitioner is not entitled to

initiate contempt since the very Order obtained by Petitioner-Institute from this Court was on the basis of fraud played by it, and the Order passed

by this Court is to be reviewed. It is said that the very same Petitioner moved before this Court in Writ Petition Nos. 14509, 14510 of 1991 and

also W.P. No. 9168 of 1998. In all these cases, a common Order was passed by a Honourable Division Bench of this Court. In regard to 239

students, an application was moved in W.M.P. No. 14078 of 1992, seeking permission to write the examination. A learned Judge of this Court,

on 22.7.1992, permitted all those students to take up the examination at their own risk and responsibility and without prejudice to the rights and

contentions of the Department raised in the main writ petition. It was further declared by the Honourable Judge that his Order will also be subject

to the ultimate result of the writ petition. Subsequently, all the three writ petitions were dismissed by common detailed Order by M. Srinivasan (as

he then was) and A. Thangamani, JJ., dated 29.4.1993. The Division Bench also held that in case the Petitioner had admitted more students than

allowed by law, it cannot get protection on the basis of interim Order passed by this Court, and it will not be entitled to any benefit on that basis. It

was also found that G.O. Ms. No. 661 dated 12.6.1991, which fixed the number of students as 40, is also binding on the Petitioner-Institution. It

is said that none of these facts were disclosed in the writ petition, and if only these facts had been disclosed, the writ petition itself would have been

dismissed as not maintainable. When the Division Bench has already declared that the 239 students are not entitled to write the Examination,

because, they were illegally admitted, or when they had taken up the Examination at their own risk and responsibility, there cannot be any question

of publication of result or issuing Diploma. It was found that those 239 students were not eligible to write the Examination. It is said that there is a

fraud played on Court and, therefore, the Contempt Application is liable to be dismissed.

I will first deal with Contempt Application No. 403 of 1998, which pertains to Writ Petition No. 7427/98.

In W.P. No. 7427 of 1998, I passed the Order on 26.5.98, directing the 1st Respondent therein to permit 239 students of 1991-93 batch of

the Petitioner-Institution to write their second year and arrear papers of the first year Examination of Diploma, in view of the declaration already

given by this Court and confirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court.

Now let us consider the allegations in the writ petition, since one of the main reasons for non-compliance of my direction, according to the

learned Additional Advocate-General is, that the writ petition itself was filed suppressing material facts, and there had been adjudications earlier in

regard to the very same 239 students, which fact was not alleged in the writ petition.

In W.P. No. 7427 of 1998, Petitioner-Institution has only stated that the Government have issued G.O. Ms. No. 661 dated 12.6.1991, and

the Government Order must be confirmed by this Court. It is further said that even though the Government Order is dated 12.6.1991, the same

was communicated to the Petitioner only on 31.8.1991, and even before that, admission was completed on 15.7.1991. It is further said that the

lapse on the part of the Department cannot be put against the Petitioner, and it will not bind the Petitioner. It was also said that G.O. Ms. No. 661

was never gazetted and, therefore, the only way in which the information could be obtained was by communication. By the time the communication

was received, admissions were already over. Thereafter, in the writ petition, the entire narration is about the withdrawal of recognition by the

Government, and about the subsequent writ petitions, which ultimately ended in W.A. No. 929 of 1997, and confirmed by the Honourable

Supreme Court, wherein it was declared that the Petitioner-Institute is a deemed recognised Institute. Nowhere the Petitioner has stated about the

filing of the earlier other writ petitions concerning the 239 students, in respect of whom W.P. No. 7427 of 1998 was also filed.

It is also not disputed that the Petitioner itself filed W.P. No. 9168 of 1988 and 14509 and 14510 of 1991 before this Court. A Division

Bench disposed of the said writ petitions on 21.4.1993. But all those writ petitions were regarding the validity of G.O. Ms. No. 661, and G.O.

Ms. I.D. No. 3. Education (OI) dated 4.6.1991. In W.P. No. 7427 of 1998, Petitioner has not stated that G.O. Ms. No. 661 was challenged by

it. The only reason to hold that the said G.O. was not applicable to it is, that the same was communicated belatedly, and by the time the Petitioner

received the communication, all the admissions were over. While disposing of the writ petitions by a common Order, the Division Bench had also

dealt with the same. Before referring to the final Order passed by the Division Bench, the very same Petitioner moved W.M.P. No. 14078 of

1992, seeking permission from this Court that 279 students who were admitted during 1991-93 batch be allowed to write the First Year

Examination in Diploma in Teacher Education to be held on 27.7.1992 and also for the Second Year Public Examination to be held in May 1993.

Justice Lakshmanan, as per Order dated 22.7.1992, gave the following directions:

Hence I direct Respondents 2 and 3 to permit the students of the Petitioner-institution, namely 120 boys comprising of 3 sections and girls

comprising of 4 sections in all 279 students of the Academic years 1991-93 batch Diploma course in Teacher Education who had undergone the

course of study and training in the St. Stephen Teacher Training Institute, to write the Public Examinations for the Diploma in Teacher Education

(Revised Scheme) for the first Year alone to be held by the Respondents either from 27.7.1992 or from any future dates, by issuing Hall Tickets,

Nominal Rolls, Record Books and other necessary papers, Documents, etc. to the said students, pending disposal of the main Writ Petition. It is

made clear that the students of the Petitioner-institution are permitted to take up their examinations only subject to their own risk and responsibility

and also without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the Department in the main Writ Petition. The Order now passed will also be subject to

the ultimate result of the Writ Petition.

The aforesaid Order makes it clear that the learned Judge did not consider the eligibility criteria or the qualification of the students, and the learned

Judge only directed that the students will take up the Examination at their own risk and responsibility, and even if they are permitted to write the

examination, even that permission will also be subject to the ultimate result of the writ petition. This Order is also not disclosed in the writ petition.

When the matter was finally disposed of, the Division Bench said that the Petitioner cannot get the benefit of the interim Order when the

admission has been made against the Statutory Rules. It was further found by the Division Bench that the recognition itself was granted to the

Petitioner subject to the condition that it will comply with all the Rules and Regulations and Orders issued by the Government from time to time,

and that the Petitioner has to comply with the Tamil Nadu Private Schools (Regulation) Act and Rules. It was further found that G.O. Ms. No. 661

was binding on the Petitioner and it cannot admit more than 40 students in a batch. At this juncture, learned Additional Advocate-General also

brought to my notice that even before G.O. Ms. No. 661 was issued, there was G.O. Ms. No. 906 dated 16.6.1987 and also another proceeding

of the Director of Government Teacher Education, Ref. No. 76439/M4/91 dated 10.6.1991, and the same was sent to the Petitioner by registered

post with acknowledgment due. In the communication, Petitioner was permitted to admit only 40 students. Hence it is submitted that even though

G.O. Ms. No. 661 is not gazetted, in view of the judgment of the Division Bench and also the personal communication through the Director''s letter

dated 10.6.1991, the Petitioner was bound to admit only 40 students. The Division Bench has categorically stated that the Petitioner cannot take

shelter under any interim Order passed by this Court, and it cannot take advantage of its own fault and claim any benefit on that basis. I find force

in the said contention. When G.O. Ms. No. 661 dated 12.6.1991 was held to be binding on the Petitioner, and when the Division Bench has

declared that the Petitioner cannot admit more than 40 students, the admission of 279 students for 1991-93 Batch was improper. This fact was

also not disclosed in W.P. No. 7427 of 1998. In respect of the very same students, concerning the very same batch, there was already

adjudication. Learned Counsel for Petitioner submitted that there was no writ petition in respect of 1991-93 batch, and all the writ petitions

concern only with students admitted during some other period. It is true that W.P. No. 9168 of 1998 cannot be a writ petition regarding admission

for 1991-93 batch. But the Petitioner sought permission regarding the very same students and got an adverse order, when the writ petition was

dismissed.

The Petitioner was duty bound to disclose these materials before this Court before filing this writ petition. (W.P. No. 7427 of 1998). Petitioner

has obtained an Order and availed its advantages, by playing fraud on Court. In such circumstances, I do not think that the Petitioner will be

entitled to any relief. I need rely only on the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court.

In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, , paragraphs 5 and 6, Their Lordships have held

thus:

The High Court, in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was, whether in the facts and circumstances of this

case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court. The High Court, however, went hay wire and made observations

which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that ""There is no legal duty cast upon the Plaintiff to come to Court with a true

case and prove it by true evidence."" The principle of ""finality of litigation"" cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an

engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between parties. One who comes to the Court,

must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-

evaders, bank loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-

gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who''s case is based on falsehold, has no right to approach the Court. He can be

summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court. A fraud is an

act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by

another''s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage....

A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a

vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.

(Emphasis supplied)

The principle enunciated in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, was reiterated in

Gowrishankar and Another Vs. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust and Others, , and the same was little more explained in the decision reported in

Indian Bank Vs. M/s. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., . Relevant portion of the judgment reads thus:

...This plea could not have been legally ignored by the Commission which needs to be reminded that the authorities, be they constitutional, statutory

or administrative, (and particularly those who have to decide a list) possess the power to recall their judgments or orders if they are obtained by

fraud as fraud and justice never dwell together (Fraus et jus nunguam cohabitant). It has been repeatedly said that fraud and deceit defend or

excuse no man (Fraus et dolus neminipatrocinari debent).

In Smith v. East Elloe Rural Distt. Council the House of Lords held that the effect of fraud would normally be to vitiate any act or order. In another

case, Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley QB at p.712. Denning, L.J. said:

No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything.

The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially u/s 151, CPC to recall its judgment order if it is obtained by fraud on Court. In the

case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree

obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all Courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from

legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure

obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the

orderly administration of the Court''s business.

Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court,

the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an Order obtained by fraud practised upon that Court. Similarly, where the Court is

misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its Order. See: Benoy

Krishna Mukerjee v. Mohanlal Goenka; Gajanand Sha v. Dayanand Thakur; Krishnakumar v. Jawand Singh; Devendra Nath Sarkar v. Ram

Rachpal Singh; Saiyed Mohd. Raza v. Ram Sarop; Bankey Behari Lal v. Abdul Rahman; Lekshmi Amma Chacki Amma v. Mammen Mammen.

The Court has also the inherent power to set aside a sale brought about by fraud practised upon the Court Ishwar Mahton v. Sitaram Kumar or to

set aside the Order recording compromise obtained by fraud. Bindeshwari Pd. Choudhary v. Debendra Pd. Singh; Tara Bai v. V.S.

Krishnaswamy Rao.

(Emphasis supplied)

In view of the above settled legal position, when it is found that an Order has been obtained by playing fraud on Court, or by suppressing material

facts, and when the Petitioner has obtained an advantage by misleading the Court, the Court is duty-bound to recall that Order. On the basis of the

above decisions, I set aside the Order dated 26.5.1998 passed in W.P. No. 7427 of 1998, and restore the writ petition to file. Once it is found

that the Petitioner has played fraud on Court, and it is very clear that it is an abuse of process of Court, the same is liable to be dismissed, and I do

so. Consequently, Contempt Application No. 403 of 1998 is dismissed with exemplary costs, since I feel that the contempt application and the

sub-application therein have been filed only with an intention to harass the Respondent. I direct the applicant in the Contempt Application to pay an

exemplary cost of Rs. 7,500/-. Likewise, W.P. No. 7427 of 1998 is also dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 7,500/- .

After the argument in Contempt Applications was over, I heard learned Counsel for Petitioner whether he has got anything to say in Writ

Petition No. 7427 of 1998 in case if it is found that the Order passed by me on 26.5.1998 in that W.P. is liable to be set aside. He submitted that

he has nothing to argue in that writ petition, and requested this Court to dispose of the writ petition also. Hence I have passed the Order as

indicated above.

Coming to Contempt Application No. 323 of 1998, it is represented by learned Additional Advocate-General that after the filing of the

Contempt Application before this Court, for the very same relief in respect of the very same candidates, Contempt Application No. 434 of 1998

was filed before Division Bench. That is also stated in the additional counter affidavit in Contempt Application No. 337 of 1998. This fact is not

denied. When the Petitioner has taken other proceedings, though it is subsequent to the filing of the Contempt Application, I cannot encourage

such attitude on the part of the Petitioner. Apart from the same, I also do not find that any ground has been made out for initiating contempt for

alleged violation of my order in W.P. No. 7411 of 1998. It is further found that there has been substantial compliance of my Order. The results

have been published, and at any rate, I feel that the Contempt Application is filed without any bona fides, and, therefore, the same is also

dismissed.

Contempt Application No. 337 of 1998 is also another instance where the Petitioner has played fraud on Court. Even though in the writ

petition, he has mentioned about Writ Appeal No. 929 of 1997, nowhere it is said that the Division Bench has given liberty to the Respondent to

check the eligibility of the students who have taken training in the Institute. Petitioner wanted a blanket order, and if this direction of the Division

Bench had been incorporated in the writ petition, the Order in W.P. No. 624 of 1998 would have been different. From the counter-affidavit, it is

seen that on the basis of my Order, they wanted the results of certain candidates to be published, and also to issue Diploma and Mark sheet. Some

of them are not even students of the Petitioner-Institute. It is also found on verification that most of the students were not eligible to be admitted

since the admission procedure was violated. The details'' are given in the additional counter affidavit filed in Contempt Application No. 337 of

1998. The intention seems to be to perpetuate fraud, i.e., names of many students of unrecognised institutes have been included in the list submitted

to the Principal, D.I.E.T. He found that those students cannot be permitted to write examination or their result cannot be published. This Court

never permitted the Petitioner to include the names of students who are not qualified to write the Examination or who have undergone course in

unrecognised Institutes. This Court also did not say that the students are entitled to the benefits who were admitted violating the admission rules. It

is to overcome all these difficulties, Petitioner has come to this Court, suppressing material facts. I really appreciate the Director of Government

Examinations in filing the additional counter affidavit and placing the truth before Court. If this fact was not made known to this Court, students

who had been illegally admitted or students who were not qualified to write examination also would have been given Diploma and mark sheets

under seal of Court. The Director of Government Examinations has prevented such fraud being committed. By filing the affidavit and disclosing the

fraud, he has done a great service to the Society and also to the Institution as a whole.

In the result, I do not find any ground to initiate contempt, and Contempt Application No. 337 of 1998 is also dismissed with exemplary costs

of Rs. 7,500/-. I hold that Shri Paramasivan, Director of Government Examinations is entitled to get this exemplary costs of Rs. 7,500/- and also

the costs ordered in W.P. No. 7427 of 1998 personally. If the costs of Rs. 15,000/- mentioned above is not paid to him or deposited by the

Petitioner-Institute within a period of one month from to-day, he is entitled to execute the Order in his individual capacity and realise the same from

the Petitioner, in accordance with law.