State and Others vs Muhammad Ismail Mir

Y.P. Nargotra, J.—The petitioners/appellants seek condonation of delay of 334 days in filing civil 2 appeal against the judgment and degree

dated 14.10.2000 u/s 5 of Limitation Act. In the application the petitioners in order to explain the causes which led the delay in filing the appeal,

have stated that as soon as they came to know about the dismissal of their appeal they immediately approached the concerned Chief Prosecuting

Officer vide letter dated 17.10.2000 for providing certified copy of the judgment, pursuant to which the petitioners received photostat copy of the

judgment. The petitioners by the letter dated 21st of October 2000 submitted the case to the Additional Director General of Police. The Additional

Director General of Police vide his letter dated 24th of October 2000 approached Director General of Police for permission for filing appeal. The

petitioners Commandant 7th Battalion again approached Additional Director General of Police vide his letter dated 9th of November 2000 for

early action in the matter and on 18th of Nov. 2000 sent a wireless message also. ADGP Armed in turn approached Director General of Police by

his letter dated 18th of November 2000. On 27th of November 2000 a wireless message was flashed. In the meanwhile Director General of

Police by his letter dated 18th of November 2000 approached the Home department for obtaining necessary sanction from the law department

and meanwhile Additional Director General of Police had deputed an official for following the case in Secretariat vide his letter 28th of November

2000. Then again on 19th of January 2001 another letter and wireless message were sent to Additional Director General of Police Armed and

10th of February 2001 again DGP was approached through a letter from the Commandant. DGP received a memo from Home Department vide

letter dated 4th of January 2001 asking for specifying the grounds for filing appeal. DGP by his letter dated 13th of January 2001 approached the

Home Department in this behalf and a legible copy of Judgment was provided and again on 17th of February 2001 ADGP by his letter

approached Director General of Police for grant of sanction at an earliest. The Director General of Police vide his letter dated 22nd of June 2001

again requested for early sanction for filing the appeal, which was followed by a communication from under Secretary of Government to specify the

grounds vide letter dated 20th of August 2001 which was replied by DGP by his letter dated 25th of August 2001. Finally the matter was referred

to the Law Department for grant of sanction on 18th September 2001. Senior Additional Advocate General was engaged to conduct the case who

by his letter dated 19th of September 2001 asked the concerned department to provide the necessary record and Additional Director General of

Police by his letter dated 10th of October 2001 asked the Commandant petitioner to provide the necessary record to him. Meanwhile the

department applied for the copy of the judgment and degree which was issued on 18th of October 2001 and the same was sent to Senior

Additional Advocate General alongwith the file. On receipt of the said material the Senior Additional Advocate General sought the documents by

his letter dated 19th of September 2001 followed by reminder dated 15th of November 2001. Thereafter he held discussion with the petitioner

Commandant as well as Chief Prosecuting Officer and finally the available material was provided vide memo dated 27th of November 2001 issued

by Commandant 7th BN and on the said basis the appeal was drafted and presented before the court.

Condonation of delay is in the discretion of the court but Section 5 of the Limitations Act enjoins a duty upon a person who seeks for invoking

such discretion in his favour to show that he had sufficient cause for not seeking the remedy within the time prescribed by law. Law of Limitation

prescribes limits of time within which a legal remedy for enforcement of a legal right can be availed. It may be argued that courts of law are meant

to enforce legal rights of litigating parties and thereby to do justice then why should there be a restriction in terms of time for obtaining justice; why

delay alone should be allowed to defeat the legal right of a party ?

In N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy, Supreme Court has held:

Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek

there remedy promptly. The object of proving a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a

life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux

of time never causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life-span must be fixed for

each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus

found on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium ( it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation

). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek

their remedy promptly The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay

in approaching the court is always deliberate. This court has held that the words "" Sufficient cause"" u/s 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a

liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah

Municipality.

In Eastern Chemical and Minerals Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, the Apex Court held:

Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed and the courts

have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.

Now keeping in mind the above laid principles we have now to address, the question whether the petitioners have shown sufficient cause, which

prevent than to prefer the appeal within statutory cause, and if there was such sufficient cause then whether the disability continued till the filling of

the appeal? There will be no gain saying that the law requires that the person seeking condonation of delay has not only to explain the cause which

prevented him from filing the appeal within the statutory period but also to explain what prevented him from presenting the appeal during the

subsequent period until he actually filed the same.

The petitioners have accounted for the delay upto 27.11.2001 by explaining that time was consumed by various agencies of the State involved

in the process for taking a decision to the filing of the appeal. Law does not require a special treatment for the state when it is litigating a cause. As

a litigant state also is bound by the rules of procedure in the same manner as an ordinary litigant is bound. The provisions contained in limitation Act

do not make any distinction between state and an ordinary litigant. Both are governed alike by the rules of limitations. State acts through its

functionaries which include legal experts who are supposed to be well conversant with the requirements of law but somehow an impression seems

to have developed with the functionaries of the state that they are entitled to a special treatment at the hands of law which has resulted into causing

of delay at every level of decision making process. Thus files move from table to table and office to office in snail's pace and in the process the

seriousness of the matter becomes the causality. A matter which deserves to be considered promptly keeping in view the interest of the state which

is the interest of the society itself receives attention only when it is too late.

In the present case the judgment which is sought to be appealed was passed on 14.10.2000 and the decision that appeal should be filed was

made after about one year and Sr. Addl. Advocate General could be provided with relevant material and instructions for filing appeal on

27.11.2001. Thus a matter which required to be concluded by filing appeal within 90 days under law was finalised on 27.11.2001. i.e. after about

a year. This is how the State has made the decision of filing appeal against the judgment and now the state is seeking the indulgence of this Court

for condoning the delay.

The delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act can be condoned if the petitioner satisfies the court that there was sufficient cause which reasonably

prevented him from filing the appeal in time. The term 'sufficient cause' must of course receive liberal construction but it does not mean that court

should become so liberal that rules of limitation are rendered nonexistent. In every case of delay there can always be some lapse on the part of the

applicant but that alone will not be sufficient to close the doors for him. However where a litigant is grossly negligent and unreasonably slack and

slow and takes the rules of limitation in a most casual nature he would not be entitled to the exercise of discretion in his favour.

From the explanation put forth by the petitioners it cannot be accepted that they acted with promptitude and expected seriousness. The

explanation put forth cannot be deemed to be a sufficient cause so as to be a justifiable ground for condonation of delay. As per the petitioners

own showing, Sr. AAG sought the documents by his letter dated 19.9.2001 and followed by reminder dated 15.11.2001 and held discussions in

this behalf with Commandant 7th BN as well as Chief Prosecuting Officer of the Armed Police Mr. A.K. Zarger and finally the available material

was provided vide Memo dt. 27.11.2001. So the exercise was complete on 27.11.2001 and, therefore, the appeal and application should have

been filed on 27.11.2001 or within reasonable time therefrom but the appeal and application for condonation of delay has been filed on

11.12.2001 and there is absolutely no explanation given for explaining the delay between 27.11.2001 to 11.12.2001. In the absence of reasonable

explanation in this behalf the delay caused does not deserve to be condoned.

For the reasons given above the application of the petitioners is found to be having no merit and a such the same is dismissed. Consequently the

appeal is also dismissed as time-barred after its registration.