State vs Bal Krishan and Another

J.P. Singh, J.—Madhu Sharma had died an unnatural death on October 10,1996 within seven/eight months of her marriage with respondent

Bal Krishan. Suspecting foul play, her father had lodged a complaint in Police Station, Akhnoor. After conducting proceedings u/s 174 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, a case u/s 306/498A RPC came to be registered against the respondents, who were challaned and subsequently

tried by learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, whereafter the case was transferred for disposal to learned Additional Sessions Judge

(Fast Track) Jammu.

The prosecution had examined PWs Chajju Ram, Bimla Devi, Sukhdev Raj, Yash Paul, Rajinder Sharma, Dr. Gafoor Ahmed, Dr. R. K. Gupta

and S.K. Razdan, as its witnesses whereas the respondents had examined DWs Bhim Sen, Yash Paul, Ganesh Dass, Thakar Dass and Balak Ram

as their defence witnesses.

The trial Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove that the respondents had treated the deceased with cruelty and in

that view of the matter presumption u/s 114C (wrongly mentioned as 113A in the judgment) of the Evidence Act, was not attracted in the case. It

accordingly acquitted the respondents.

Learned Counsel for the State Mr. Salathia submitted that the trial Court had erred in holding that the provisions of Section 114-C of the

Evidence Act were not attracted in the case because once the commission of suicide was established, a presumption would arise that the same had

been abetted by the husband or any other relative of the husband.

I have considered the submission of learned State counsel and do not find any substance in it because perusal of Section 114-C of the Evidence

Act indicates that the presumption under the Section would arise against the husband or any of his relatives only if it had been proved that the

husband had subjected his wife to cruelty as defined in Section 498A of the State Ranbir Penal Code Samvat, 1989.

Perusal of the definition of 'cruelty' as it so appears in Section 498A of the State Ranbir Penal Code, demonstrates that mere harassment of a

woman may not amount to cruelty in terms of Section 498A of RPC unless such harassment; was with a view to coercing her or any other person

related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or was on account of failure by her or any person related to her

to meet such demands.

No such case as contemplated by the definition of Section 498A of RPC has been proved by the prosecution in this case.

None of the prosecution witnesses had spoken about respondents having ever treated the deceased with cruelty. The only evidence which had

been led by the prosecution was regarding respondents demand of Rupees 40/50 thousand and that too just a few days before her death. Barring

a mild mention in the statements of the prosecution witnesses that the deceased would complain of some taunts by her in-laws, there is absolutely

no evidence on records on the basis whereof it may be said that the respondents had maltreated or harassed the deceased because of her parents

not meeting the demand of Rupees 40/50 thousand alleged to have been made by her in-laws.

A judgment of acquittal is not required to be interfered with if two views are possible. Presumption of innocence of an accused becomes

stronger with his acquittal by the court of first instance. Strong and overwhelming evidence is thus required before a judgment of acquittal may be

interfered with.

Appellate Court is thus required to interfere with the order of acquittal only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so and

the judgment of acquittal was found to be unreasonable and not based on relevant and convincing material.

The view taken by learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) Jammu in acquitting the respondents, is certainly a view which could be

taken in the case in view of the nature of the evidence which the prosecution had led in the case.

The view taken by learned trial Court that presumption u/s 114-C of the Evidence Act was not attracted in the case does not suffer from any

error of law.

For all what has been said above, I do not find any merit in learned State counsel's submission that the trial Court had erred in drawing

presumption and acquitting the respondents. Judgment of acquittal passed by the trial Court, therefore, does not need any interference.

The acquittal appeal, therefore, lacks merit. It is, accordingly, dismissed.