State vs Rama Chandra Mohapatra

G.K. Misra, C.J.—There is no dispute about, facts. Rama Chandra Mohapatra (opposite party)(hereinafter to be referred to as the contemner) is the husband of Labani. In 1967, the wife filed Crl. Misc. Case No. 17 of 1967 in the Court of the S.D.M. (Judicial), Keonjhar (hereinafter to be referred to as the S.D.M) claiming maintenance u/s 488, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. The S.D.M. granted maintenance of Rs. 30/- per month. As the contemner did not pay maintenance, the wife filed Misc. Case No. 65 of 1972 to enforce the order passed u/s 488, Code of Criminal Procedure. The S.D.M. allowed the petition. The contemner filed Crl. Revision No. 4 of 1973 in the Court of the Sessions Judge, Mayurbhanj, Keonjhar, against the order of enforcement. On 8-5-1974 the learned Sessions Judge remanded the case. On 25-5-1974 and 3-5-1974 orders were passed by the S.D.M. to inform the advocates of both the parties to come ready for hearing on 12-6-1974. The contemner''s advocate noted the fact of intimation on 1.6.1974. On 12-6-1974 the case was adjourned to 18-6-1974 on the prayer of the contemner advocate. On 18-6-1974 neither the contemner nor his advocate took any step. Accordingly the objection filed by him for opposing the prayer of the wife for recovery of arrear maintenance was rejected.

During the pendency of Crl. Revision No. 4 of 1973 in the Court of the Sessions Judge the contemner filed a petition u/s 488(5), Code of Criminal Procedure in Misc. Case No. 27 of 1973 before the S.D.M. to recall. the order granting maintenance. Therein he alleged that his wife was openly living In adultery with one Purna Chandra Mohapatra. After taking evidence of the parties the contemner''s petition was rejected by the S.D.M. on 25-1-1974. On 5-7-1974 the contemner sent the impugned petition to the Sessions Judge, Mayurbhanj, which was received in his office on 8-7-1974. This petition constitutes the subject-matter of contempt of the Court of the S.D.M. After receiving this petition the Sessions Judge examined the contemner to test whether he was the author of that petition and as it was a complaint against a subordinate officer he wanted also to know whether the contemner could substantiate his allegations. The statement of the contemner on oath was taken on 24-7-1974. He admitted to have sent the impugned petition and stated on oath that whatever he had alleged against the S.D.M. he had seen with his own eyes and some of the statements were based on hearsay. The learned Sessions Judge asked for the comments of the S.D.M. on the contents of the petition. The S.D.M. submitted his report on 25-7-1974 and said that the allegations made in the petition against him were utterly false and malicious as he had decided the cases against the contemner in favour of the wife and that the petition amounts to gross contempt of his Court. The learned District Judge by his letter dated 25-7-1974 sent a report to the High Court for taking action against the contemner under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) for having committed contempt of the Court of the S.D.M.

Relevant portions of his report may be extracted:

The Petitioner was noticed to appear before me to find out If actually he has made the application making such allegations. He appeared before me and also gave a statement on oath asserting his personal knowledge to the effect that he saw the Petitioner in the house of the Magistrate. The allegations, in my view, are not only scandalous, but false and contemptuous. The Magistrate concerned IS an able officer and his integrity and character are unquestionable. The allegations undermine his prestige and thus affects the judicial administration.

In the circumstances, I would request the Hon''ble Court to initiate proceedings for contempt and punish the Petitioner suitably.

The report of the District Judge with all relevant papers was considered by the Full Court which took a unanimous'' decision that proceedings in contempt should be started against the contemner and this is how this proceeding was initiated.

Notice was personally served on the contemner. Relevant portions of paragraphs 3 to 8 and 10 of the petition were specifically brought to the notice of the contemner in the notice issued to him. It is not necessary to extract the entire petition. It would be sufficient to notice some of the most objectionable paragraphs. They are extracted hereunder in English though the petition is in Oriya.

Paragraph 3 of the petition : Purna Chandra Mohapatra who has kept Labani as his concubine is declaring everywhere that by influencing the S.D.M. he got the contemner''s case dismissed and t he contemner cannot get any further relief.

Paragraph 4 : After this the date of adjournment was not intimated to the contemner''s advocate. Two dates of hearing at close intervals were fixed and by a conspiracy the Misc. Case was dismissed.

Paragraph 5 : Some gentlemen of Keonjhar town and the Sub-Inspector in charge of Sadar Police Station gave evidence in favour of the contemner. When the Officer-in-charge wanted to speak copiously about the corruption of Labani the S.D.M. gave him threat and being so insulted the Officer-in-charge could not narrate the true facts.

Pamgraph 7 : Four to five days before Misc. Case No. 27 of 1973 was dismissed the contemner saw his wife sitting on the residential verandah of the S.D.M. When she saw the contemner she went inside the house of the S.D.M. The contemner discussed this matter with some outsiders. One of them said that that lady always goes to the house of the S.D.M. during night.

Paragraph 8 : For the aforesaid reasons the contemner is convinced that. the S.D.M. has got seme illicit connection with Labani.

Paragraph 10 : In the manner in which the S.D.M. has adopted the principle of suppressing persons who are not guilty, he has created an atmosphere by which the movable and immovable properties of the contemner would be attached or otherwise he would undergo imprisonment.

The essence of the allegations made in the petition by the contemner to the District Judge is that the S.D.M. does not mete'' out impartial justice. He dismissed the cases of the contemner maliciously being in collusion with the contemner''s wife. He decided cases in favour of Labani being in illicit connection with her.

The contemner filed his show-cause petition on 11-11-1974. In paragraph 7 thereof he stated that on 20-1-1974 while he was returning from Sunday Hat at Keonjhar Garh he saw his wife Labani Mohapatra sitting on the residential verandah of the S.D.M. and she went inside after seeing him. The neighbours informed him that his wife was often seen coming to the residence of the S.D.M. He did not give much importance to the presence of Labani and the statements of the neighbours. The last statement is a departure from what he had stated in the impugned petition.

In paragraph 8 he stated that after the final rejection of his objection in Misc. Case No. 65 of 1972 on 18-6-1974 he was completely frustrated and was mentally upset and was depressed and after spending a lot of money over the litigation in a depressed mind he wrote the letter in question to the Sessions Judge, Keonjhar, by way of petition for redress without meaning any contempt against any Court. This was due to his ignorance of the ways of the Court and he could not conceive that the allegations would amount to scandalisation or contempt of the S.D.M.

In paragraph 10 he tendered unqualified apology thus:

That the Opposite Party feels extremely sorry for his letter to the District and Sessions Judge, and he hereby tenders his unqualified apology further said unintended allegations and prays that he may kindly be excused for his unintended and accidental mistake committed out of his sheer ignorance and due to unbalanced mind caused by the circumstances narrated above.

Mr. Rao for the contemner conceded that by the impugned petition the contemner committed gross contempt of the Court of the S.D.M. He urged that in the facts and circumstances stated by the contemner in the show-cause petition the unqualified apology tendered by him should be accepted and the notice for contempt should be discharged. The question for consideration is whether the unqualified apology should be accepted.

In this regard the following sections of the Act require examination and may be extracted:

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,

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(c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which

(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any Court; xx xx xx xx

Complaint against presiding officers of subordinate Courts when not contempt. A person shall not be guilty of contempt of Court in respect of any statement made by him in good faith concerning the presiding officer of any subordinate Court to

(a) any other subordinate Court, or

(b) the High Court, to which it is subordinate.

Explanation-In this section, "subordinate Court" means any Court subordinate to a High Court.

Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate Courts. Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself:

Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1960).

Punishment for contempt of Court. (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of Court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both:

Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.

Explanation-An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no Court shall impose a sentence in excess to that specified in Sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a Court subordinate to it.

xx xx xx

Con tempts not punishable in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained In any law for the time being in force, no Court shall impose a sentence under this Act for contempt of Court unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of Justice.

Though Mr. Rao conceded that the contemner has committed gross contempt of the Court of the S.D.M. by the impugned petition he raised the following contentions:

(i) The impugned petition was a representation in good faith to the District Judge to whom the S.D.M. is subordinate and as such the contemner is protected by Section 6 of the Act.

(ii) The allegations In the impugned petition constitute libel and defamation which are offences under the Indian Penal Code. By virtue of Section 10 of the Act no action in contempt should taken against the contemner.

(iii) The contemner has tendered unqualified apology and in the facts and circumstances of this case the same should be accepted and the notice for contempt should be discharged.

(iv) No sentence should be imposed upon the contemner for contempt of Court as prescribed in Section 13 of the Act as it is of such a nature that it does not substantially interfere with the due course of justice.

Each of these contentions requires careful examination. The scope and ambit of Section 2(c)(i) of the Act was fully explained in Shri Baradakanta Mishra Vs. The Registrar of Orissa High Court and Another, . In paragraph 35 their Lordships extracted the following passage from Halsbury''s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 8, para 9:

Scandalous attacks upon Judges are punished by attachment or committal upon the principle that they are, as against the public, not the Judge, an obstruction to public justice; and libel on a Judge, in order to constitute a contempt of Court, must have been calculated to cause such an obstruction .... The punishment is (sic), not for the purpose of protecting either the Court as a whole or the individual Judges of the Court from a repetition of the attack, but of protecting the public, and especially those who either voluntarily or by; compulsion are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the tribunal is undermined or impaired.

Approving the aforesaid passage they laid down the law in the following terms:

Sub-clause (i) embodies the above concept and takes in cases when by the publication or the act the administration of justice is held to ridicule and contempt. This is regarded as an "obstruction" of public justice whereby the authority of the Court is undermined. Sub-clause (i) refers to one species of contempt of which "obstruction" is an important element.

In view of the aforesaid observation Mr. Rao rightly conceded that the several passages in the impugned petition brought to the notice of the contemner in the notice for contempt constitute gross contempt.

The next contention is that the impugned petition was a representation in good faith to the District Judge to whom the S.D.M. is subordinate. The law of contempt as it prevailed prior to the enactment of the Act did not countenance good faith as a defence to contempt. In Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. The State of Madras, , their Lordships made the following observation:

...If the allegations were true, obviously it would be to the benefit of the public to bring these matters into light. But if they were false, they cannot but undermine the confidence of the public in the administration of justice and bring judiciary into disrepute. The Appellant, though he took sole responsibility regarding the publication of the article, was not in a position to substantiate by evidence any of the allegations made therein. He admitted that the statement was lased on hearsay. Rumours may have reached him from various sources, but before he published the article it was incumbent upon him as a reasonable man to attempt to verify the information''s he received and ascertain, as far as he could, whether the facts were true or mere concocted lies. He does not appear to have made any endeavour in this direction. As the Appellant did not act with reasonable care and caution, be cannot he said to have acted bona fide even if good faith can be held to be a defence at all in a proceeding for contempt...(see para 12 ).

Section 6 of the Act expressly saves complaints made in good faith against subordinate Courts to superior officers as constituting contempt. In this case the impugned petition was sent by the contemner to the District Judge to whom the S.D.M. is subordinate. The only question for consideration is whether the same was made in good faith.

The expression "good faith" has not been defined in the Act. The definition of "good faith" in Section 62 of the Indian Penal Code is applicable to this case, as would appear from Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. The State of Madras, . Section 52, Indian Penal Code defines "good faith" by saying that nothing is said to be done or believed in "good faith" which is done or believed without due care and attention. It is not open to a person to make a hasty complaint on vague information received from irresponsible sources. The degree of care requisite will vary with the degree of danger which may result from the want of care. Where the peril is the greatest, the greatest caution is necessary. In paragraph 7 of the show-cause petition the contemner admits that he did not give much importance to the presence of Labani on the verandah of the S.D.M. and the statements of the neighbours that Labani used to frequently Visit the house of the S.D.M. during night. On his own affidavit now the contemner''s allegation, in the impugned petition that he was convinced that the S.D.M. has got some illicit connection with Labani and that is why he decided cases against the contemner stands falsified. The imputation was recklessly made without making any enquiry with due care and attention. Similarly the allegation that the cases of the contempner were dismissed due to conspiracy of the S.D.M. has not been supported by any plausible facts. It was purely a reckless inference merely because the contemner lost his cases against his wife. It is always open to a person to bring to the notice of the superior officers legitimate grievances. It is the duty of the superior officers to look into the grievances and redress them if they are genuine. But it is not open to a defeated litigant to make reckless allegation without any foundation to vindicate his defeat in litigation. There is no substance in the contention that the impugned petition was made in good faith and does not constitute contempt within the ambit of Section 6. We respectfully approve the observations made in paragraph 10 in State v. Sri S.N. Dikshit 1973 ALJ 180.

The next contention is that the alleged contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code and as such the High Court shall not take cognizance of such a contempt under the proviso to Section 10 of the Act. Section 10 corresponds to Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (hereinafter to be referred to as the 1952 Act) and Section 2(1) and (3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1936 (hereinafter to be referred to as the 1926 Act. There is no substantial difference in the provision regarding the power of the High Court to punish contempt''s of subordinate Courts in all the three Acts. The scope and ambit of this provision is no longer res integra. A similar argument had been repelled in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy Vs. The State of Madras, . In that case a contention was raised that the allegations made in the article in question amounted to an offence of "defamation" as defined in Section 499. Indian Penal Code and consequently the jurisdiction of the High Court was barred u/s 2(3) of the 1926 Act. Negativing this contention their Lordships observed thus:

It seems, therefore, that there are offences which are punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code and as subordinate Courts can sufficiently vindicate their dignity under the provisions of criminal law in such cases the legislature deemed it proper to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 2(j), Contempt of Courts Act, but it would not be correct to say that the High Court''s jurisdiction is excluded even in cases where the act complained of, which is alleged to constitute contempt, is otherwise an offence under the Indian Penal Code.

In Brahma Prakash Sharma and Others Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, , the distinction between a libel and a contempt was clearly indicated. Their Lordships observed thus:

...The position therefore is that a defamatory attack on a Judge may be a libel so far as the Judge is concerned and it would be open to him to proceed against the libellor in a proper action if he so chooses. If, however, the publication of the disparaging statement is calculated to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by such Court, it can be punished summarily as contempt. One is a wrong done to the Judge personally while the other is a wrong done to the public. It will be an injury to the public if it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the public regarding the integrity, ability or fairness of the Judge or to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing complete reliance upon the Court''s administration of justice, or if it is likely to cause embarrassment in the mind of the Judge himself in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is well-established that it is not necessary to prove affirmatively that there has been an actual interference with the administration of justice by reason of such defamatory statement; it is enough if it is likely, or tends in any way, to interfere with the proper administration of law.

We, therefore, find no substance in the contention that the High Court has no jurisdiction to take notice of the impugned petition as constituting contempt.

It is then contended that the contemner has tendered unqualified apology which should be accepted. In paragraph 10 of the show-cause petition he has explained the circumstances in which he sent the impugned partition and why the apology should be accepted. Section 12 of the Act corresponds to Section 4 of the 1952 Act and. Section 3 of the 1926 Act. The Explanation to Section 12(1) is a new provision. The reason why such a new provision was made would be found in the comments of Rama chandran in his treatise. ''The contempt of Court'' (3rd Edition). The prior law did not countenance such conditional apology. The new provision is to lessen the hardship caused to the contemner. There are many border line cases where it is not easy to know if there is a contempt at all. The Legislature considered it fair that in such cases the contemner apologizes on the condition that if the Court finds that there is a contempt his apology may be accepted. At page 882 the author gives his view as follows:

In the matter of apology, while a sincere and unqualified apology without reservations should be the rule, Courts must also recognise that in certain border line cases it may be difficult for a reasonable man or even a Judge to come to a conclusion that a certain act or words are contempt. In such cases you must not force an abject apology amounting to a confession of guilt, on a matter which may turn out to be no contempt or at any rate no actionable contempt. In such cases a qualified apology should be permissible. The contemner must be free to plead that he is not guilty of any contempt on the facts stated but that, should the Court consider it to be contempt, he tenders a sincere apology for its acceptance. This is not justification and surrender. It is only bona fide alternative plea.

We accept the aforesaid passage as correctly expressing the meaning of the Explanation newly added to Section 12(1) of the Act. The Explanation has, however, not been relied in this case as gross contempt was committed. It will, therefore, be wholly academic to examine its applicability to the present case. The proviso to Section 12(1) has not been altered. It is as it stood in the 1952 Act and 1926 Act.

As has already been indicated, the impugned petition constitutes gross contempt. It was an injury done to the public as it tends to create an apprehension in the minds of the people regarding the integrity and fairness of the S.D.M. It has the tendency to deter actual and prospective litigants from placing reliance upon the S.D.M.''s administration of justice. It has also the tendency to cause embarrassment in the, mind of the S.D.M. in the discharge of his judicial duties. It is, therefore, gross contempt.

The question for consideration is whether the unqualified apology tendered in this case should be accepted in such cases of gross contempt. As the law on the question has not been altered it will be desirable to notice some of the relevant decisions on the point.

In State of Hyderabad v. C. Natarajan AIR 1954 Hyd. 180, one C. Natarajan, an advocate, had sent a communication dated 2-12-1953 to the Hon''ble Chief Justice entitled "Dictators" forwarding copies of the communication to the Prime Minister, Home Minister, Government of India, Rajpramukh, Hyderabad State and Chairman of the Anti-corruption Committee, Hyderabad-Deccan. Notice was issued under the 1952 Act. The advocate filed a petition tendering an unqualified apology for writing such a letter. Therein he stated that at the time he wrote the letter he did not realise that the said letter would amount to contempt of Court and he had no desire to bring the High Court down in public esteem. Their Lordships held that the communication constituted gross contempt. The unqualified apology was not accepted with the following observation:

... It is not our design or purpose either to be vindictive or unreasonable. But we must keep in mind the greater interest of the judiciary and the public not so much of the personal affront to individual Judge or Chief Justice as the public wrong that a contempt of this nature involves. It is our duty to see that such attempts are suppressed in the interests of the judiciary Their lordships extracted the weighty words of Kent C.J. in Yates v. Lansingh (1809) 5 Johnson''s Reports 282 as follows:

We subdue their importance and destroy their authority. Instead of being venerable before the public, they become contemptible; and we thereby embolden the licentious to trample upon everything sacred in society and overthrow those institutions which have hitherto been deemed the best guardians of civil liberty.

In The State of Bihar Vs. Ranglal Sharma, . the contemner handed over a closed envelope to the Bench Clerk of the District Judge of Manbhum which was handed over by the latter to the District Judge. In the letter he made a complaint against the Subordinate Judge of Jamshedpur alleging against him black marketing and bribery. The Subordinate Judge was alleged to be taking undue advantage from the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. the contemner was found guilty of contempt as scandalising the Subordinate Judge. He offered an unqualified apology which was rejected with the following observation:

...There is no doubt that this Court has the power to discharge the contemptor after accepting such an apology, but the question is whether in the circumstances of the present case this procedure should be adopted by this Court. In my opinion, it should not be. Here is a case where there was a definite suggestion and allegation made against the integrity of the Subordinate Judge, and a person who, makes such a suggestion or allegation must not be permitted to assume that he can do so and then plead immunity from punishment by expressing an apology for his offence, owing to the scandalous nature of the allegations made against the Subordinate Judge, I am of the opinion that not only some punishment but a deterrent punishment should be awarded to the opposite-party. Allegations against judicial officers have become too frequent and it is necessary that a stop should be put to making such false, scandalous and ),pose statements and allegations against the Subordinate Judiciary.

A sentence of two months simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 250/- was imposed on the contemner.

The same view was taken in The State of Bihar v. S.M. Abdul Samad AIR 1959 Pat. The allegation was that the Judge had taken a bribe and illegal gratification from the other party. The unqualified apology tendered in that case was rejected with the observation that to accept an apology of this nature would encourage persons to cast aspersions and make false allegations against judicial officers. The punishment imposed was simple imprisonment for one month.

In The State of Bihar v. Gorakh Prasad Srivastava AIR 1961 Pat. 860, the aforesaid two cases were referred to. Wide and reckless allegations of bribery were made against a District Judge and a Judge of the High Court. The unqualified apology was not accepted and the contemner was sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month.

In Sukh Raj Vs. Hemraj and Others, ; a Bench of that Court observed that whether an apology should be accepted or not as purging the contempt in any particular case must depend on the circumstances of each case and that the chief of these factors must inevitably be the nature or character of the contempt made. The contempt committed in that case was considered to be of very gross nature and the unqualified apology was not accepted. It was observed that an unconditional or unreserved apology could not be accepted in a case of serious and gross contempts and that an apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilt under all circumstances. In that case the subject-matter of the contempt was that the Judges of the High Court in delivering the judgment allowed themselves to be influenced by recommendations which had been made to them by rich and powerful quarters. It imputed both lack of integrity and impartially to the Judges of the Court.

In Marthi Venkata Subbarao and Ors. v. Krnthiventi Kutumba Rao and Anr. (1970) 2 S.C.W. 220 an unconditional apology was submitted during the course of hearing of the appeal before the Supreme Court. No such apology had been tendered in the High Court. The Supreme Court was of the view that the unconditional apology tendered did not make out a case of complete exoneration from contempt. The apology was, however, accepted in view of the fact that the other side also agreed that the apology might be accepted. Yet the contemner was not wholly exonerated but the sentence was reduced to the period of imprisonment already undergone, He had been convicted for contempt of the Court of the District Munsif of Vijayavada and had been sentenced to two months simple imprisonment.

In Shri C.K. Daphtary and Others Vs. Shri O.P. Gupta and Others, , the contemner tendered unreserved, unqualified and unconditional apology to the Court. The unqualified apology was not accepted, and the contemner was sentenced to simple imprisonment for two mouths. The contemner had grossly scandalised one of the Hon''ble Judges of the Supreme Court.

In Amrik Singh v. State (Delhi Admn. (1971) 1 S.C.W.R. 581, gross and scandalous allegations were made against the Judges of the Supreme Court. In that case no unqualified apology had been tendered and the contemner was sentenced to simple imprisonment for six months.

In Mulkh Raj Vs. State of Punjab, , their Lordships made the following observation:

Apology is an act of contrition. Unless apology is offered at the earliest opportunity and in good grace apology is shorn of penitence. If apology is offered at a time when the contemner finds that the Court is going to impose punishment it ceases to be an apology and it becomes an act of a cringing coward. The High Court was right in not taking any ''notice of the Appellants'' expression of apology "without any further word". The High Court correctly said that acceptance of apology in the case would amount to allow the offender to go away with impunity after having committed gross contempt.

This authority is a complete answer that in case of gross contempt unqualified apology should not ordinarily be accepted.

The contempt committed in this case is one of the grossest nature. Simply because the Magistrate decided cases against the Petitioner in favour of his wife the contemner chose to scandaliese the Magistrate. The allegation has completely undermined or at any rate has the tendency to undermine the dignity of the Magistrate in the eye of the public. Litigants would tremble to appear before the Magistrate and would not expect any fair trial from him. The unqualified apology tendered in this case is merely a device to escape punishment and we would not accept the same.

Section 13 of the Act provides that even if a contempt is committed, in certain cases no sentence should be imposed unless the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice. 1 he expression "to interfere with the due course of justice" does not occur in any of the three clauses in Section 2(c) and is of much wider import. It would govern each of the clauses u/s 2(c). It has already been stated that the contempt committed in this case is of gross and serious nature and it substantially interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of Justice which takes within its sweep scandalising or tending to scandalise or lowering or tending to lower the authority of any Court within the meaning of Section 2(c)(i) and also cases which interfere or tend to interfere or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner within the meaning Section 2(C)(iii).

We have given our anxious consideration to the question of sentence. The contemner has grossly scandalised the Magistrate being aggrieved by his judgments delivered against him in favour of his wife. He gave out that the Magistrate is a man without character and on account of the Magistrate''s illicit connection with the contemner''s wife the case was decided against him. Times have changed. Indiscipline and moral degradation are gradually developing in society. Unless substantial punishment is imposed the growing tendency to scandalise the judiciary from the lowest status right up to the Supreme Court cannot be arrested. At the close of the argument we had expressed the view in Court that a minimum sentence of three months" imprisonment should be imposed on the contemner. On later consideration we have somewhat relented and we consider that one month''s simple imprisonment would meet the ends of justice this being the first contempt committed by the Opposite party. We hope that contempts of this character would not recur again.

In the result, we hold that the opposite party is guilty of contempt u/s 2(c)(i) and (iii) of the Act. He is sentenced to simple imprisonment for one month. Registrar to take steps for issue of necessary warrant.

N.K. Das J.

I agree.