State vs Subramanian (A-1)

Padmini Jesuddurai, J.—The above appeal by the State is directed against the judgment of the Judicial First Class Magistrate, Myladuthurai

in C.C. 180 of 1981 convicting the respondent herein for an offence under S. 406, I.P.C. instead of under S. 409, I.P.C. holding that the

respondent, who is the President of the Co-operative Agricultural Credit Society, is not a Public Servant under the I.P.C.

The respondent and another were tried by the above court for an offence under S. 409, I.P.C. in that the respondent, being the President and

his co-accused since acquitted, being the Secretary to the Anathandavapuram Co-operative Agricultural Credit Society and being public servants

and being entrusted in that capacity with the sum of Rs. 8826-40 criminally misappropriated the same.

During trial, on behalf of the prosecution P.Ws. 1 to 6 were examined and Exs. P. 1 to P. 20 were marked. The respondent and his co-accused

denied the occurrence. They had no evidence to offer.

The trial court, finding that the entrustment of the amount was only with the respondent, acquitted the second accused. The trial Court also found

that the respondent could not be described as a public servant within the definition of Section 21, I.P.C. and hence there could be no conviction

for an offence under S. 409, I.P.C., and convicted the respondent for an offence u/s 406, I.P.C. and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 200/-, in

default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month. The State aggrieved with the finding that the respondent would not come

under S. 409, I.P.C. has preferred the present appeal.

In the grounds of appeal, it is stated that the respondent is an agent within the meaning of Section 409, I.P.C. and that, therefore, the respondent

ought to have been convicted for an offence u/s 409, I.P.C. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant, reiterated the same point.

Per contra, Thiru Jayaseelan, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the charge as framed by the trial Court, was to the effect that

the respondent was a public servant and in that capacity had been entrusted with the funds of the Society and since the trial Court had found that

the respondent was not a public servant it would not be open to the prosecution to shift the stand and contend that the respondent is an agent and

hence would come under S. 409, I.P.C, Learned Counsel submitted that to do so would cause substantial prejudice to the respondent who had

not been given any opportunity to meet this new case put forth by the prosecution.

The question that arises for consideration is whether it would be open to the appellant to put forth this new stand and contend that the

respondent is an agent coming u/s 409, I.P.C. ?

As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, the charge reads that the respondent, as President and the co-accused (second

accused) as Secretary, were entrusted with cash as a public servant and had misappropriated the same. The prosecution, therefore, ought to have

substantiated the ground that the respondent was a public servant within the meaning of S. 21, I.P.C. That stand has now been given up by the

appellant. Instead, it is stated that the respondent is an agent. The question as to whether there is relationship of agent and principal between the

two persons is a question of fact. That has to be established by evidence and an inference drawn and a finding given on the basis of the legal

principles connected therewith. In the instant case, it is stated by P.W. 5, who was the Co-operative Sub Registrar, Mayuram during the relevant

period, that the respondent was responsible for the cash and the property of the Society and that it was the duty of the Secretary-second accused

to collect the amounts paid to the Society, after issuing receipts, and to deposit the same in the Bank. He has also stated that for the cash on hand,

the respondent and the second accused are jointly responsible. It is these questions that have been put to the respondent when questioned under S.

313, Cr.P.C. The respondent has answered that he is not so responsible. Apart from this evidence, I am unable to see anything in the evidence of

any witness to indicate that the respondent was the agent of the Society. Whatever that be, as already stated, by me earlier, the question whether

one is an agent or not is a question of fact. The accused has to be put on notice and an opportunity must be given to him to rebut the evidence or

any inference to be drawn from any such evidence. The respondent had been merely made to face the case that he is a public servant. It would not

be open to the prosecution now in the stage of appeal to shift the stand and contend that the respondent is an agent within the meaning of Section

409, I.P.C. Prejudice is bound to be caused to the respondent. In the absence of a charge describing the respondent as an agent and in the

absence of any evidence to indicate that the respondent is an agent of the Society, I am unable to accept the contention of the appellant that the

respondent ought to be brought within the definition of an agent under S. 409, I.P.C. On the evidence available, the conviction of the respondent

for an offence u/s 406, I.P.C. alone could be sustained.

In the result, the State appeal fails and is dismissed

Appeal dismissed.