State vs Velagapudi Venkatramaiah

Ramachandra Rao

These two revision petitions are filed u/s 21 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973, (Hereinafter referred to as the Act); the first one by the Government and the second by the declarant against the order of the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal, Guntur, in L.R.A. No. 42/1976. In the C.R.P. 1676/1976 filed by the Government, the only question that arises for consideration is, whether 0-25 cents in Survey No. 821/4 of Dhoolpudi Village, can be treated as "land" within the meaning of Section 3(j)of the Act.

In the C.R.P. 2002/1976 filed by the declarant, the question that arises for consideration is, whether an extent of 0-40 cents in survey Nos. 821/6, 821/7-A and 821/7-B or Dhoolpudi village, which is used as a drainage channel, can be treated as "land" within the meaning of section 3(j) of the Act.

The learned Government Pleader contends that both the lands covered by the tank and the drainage channel are registered as ''wet lands'' in the revenue records and land revenue is being paid for the same, that water in the tank and drainage channel is used for agriculture or for purpose ancillary thereto, that the said lands are held under ryotwari settlement and that therefore they should be treated as ''land'' and included in the holding of the declarand.

Sri G.R. Subbarayan learned counsel for the petitioner in C.R.P 2002/1976 and the respondent in C.R.P-1676/1976 on the other hand contends that in both the lands covered by the tank and the drainage channel, actually no agricultural operations are carried on, nor is it possible to carry on any agricultural operations on the said landsunless some agricultural operation is done on the land itself for the land directly used for an agricultural purpose, it would not constitute, ''land'' within the definition of section 3(j) of the Act. The learned counsel relies upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in The Nayagarh Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. and Another Vs. Narayan Rath and Another, and Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta Vs. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, Meenakshamma v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax AIR 1979 A.P. 189 in support of his contention.

In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to notice the definition of ''land'' in section 3 (j) of the Act, which reads as follow;--

3 (j). ''land'' means land which is used or is capable of being used for purposes of agriculture, or for purpose ancilliary thereto, including horticulture, forest land, pasutre land, waste land, plantation and tope; and includes land deemed to be agriculture land under this Act;

Explanation I:-- Where any land is held under ryotwari settlement it shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to be land under this Act;

Explanation II:-- ''Land'' shall not include the land appurtenant to a building

Under this definition, the following are treated as ''land'';--

Land which is used for purposes of agriculture;

Land which is capable of being used for purposes of agriculture;

3 Land which is used or is capable of being used for purposes ancillary to agriculture;

Land which is used for horticulture, forest land, pasture land, waste land, plantation and tope; and

Land which is deemed to be agricultural land under the Act.

Under the Explanation 1, where any land is held under ryotwari settlement, it shall be deemed to be land under the Act unless the contrary is proved.

In the instant cases what is contended for the Government is that the land is used for purposes ancillary to agriculture viz; the water in the tank is used for drinking purposes of cattle, and the land occupied by the channel issued for drainage purposes which is required for irrigated cultivation and therefore the extents covered by the tank and the drainage channel fall within the purview of the definition of, land'' in section 3(j) of the Act.

On the order hand, Sri G.R. Subbarayan, contends that water in the tank is used only for drinking purpose by cattle and is not used for any agriculture operations or purposes ancillary therefor, that the drainage channel is used for draining off the excess water after crops are irrigated and therefore it cannot be paid that the land, occupied by the tank and the drainage channel are used for agriculture purposes ancillary thereto.

The question, where a particular land is used for agriculture or is capable of being used for purposes of agriculture or for purposes ancillary thereto, has to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. The evidence in these cases shows that the water in the tank is used mainly for drinking purposes. The Land Reforms Tribunal found on the material on record that the tank was being used for drinking purposes of cattle, and this was confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal.

It is contended by the learned Government Pleader that water in the tank was also being used for irrigation purposes.

But the evidence on record does not support it and therefore the Tribunals rightly held that the water in the tank was being used solely for drinking purposes of cattle, and I do not find any grounds for interfering with the same in revision.

So far as the drainage channel is concerned, it cannot be said that drainage is not a purpose ancillary to agriculture. Drainage is necessary for irrigated cultivation. The land occupied by the channel for drainage purposes can be said to be used for purposes ancillary to agriculture. This is also a finding of fact based on relevant evidence and I do not find any error in the said finding.

It is contended by Sri Subbarayan, that unless basic agricultural operations are performed or are capable of being performed on the land itself, it could not be said that the land is used or is capable of being used for agricultural purposes. In Support of this contention, he relies upon the decision in Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta Vs. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, where their Lordships observed at page 772, as follows:-

The terms "agriculture" and "agriculture purpose" not having been defined in the Indian income tax Act, we must necessarily fall back upon the general sense in which they have been understood in common parlance, "Agriculture" in its root sense means cultivation of field which of course implies expenditure of human skill and labour upon land. The terms has, however, acquired a wider significance and that is to be found in the various dictionary meanings ascribed to it.

It may be permissible to look to the dictionary meaning of the term in the absence of any definition thereof in the relevant statutes.

Again their Lordships observed at page 789 as follows:--

If the term "Agriculture" is thus understood as comprising within its scope the basic as well as subsequent operations in the process of agriculture and the raising on the land of produce which have some utility either for consumption or for trade and commerce, it will be seen that the terra "agriculture" receives a wider interpretation both in regard to its operations as well as the results of the same.

Nevertheless there is present all throughout the basic idea that there must be at the bottom of it cultivation of land in the sence of tilling of the land, sowing of the seeds, planting, and similar work done on the land itself. This basic conception is the essential sine quo non of any operation performed on the land constituting agricultural operation. If the basic operations are there, the rest of the operations found themselves upon the same.

But if these basic operations are wanting the subsequent operations do not acquire the characteristic of the agricultural operations.

These observations were referred to with approval by the Supreme Court in the later decision in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Andhra Pradesh Vs. Officer-in-charge (Court of Wards), Paigah, The learned Judges observed at page 116 as follows :--

We think that this must be land which could be said to be either actually used or ordinarily used or meant to be used for agricultural purposes. In other words, "agricultural land" must have a connection with an agricultural user or purpose. It is on the nature of the user that the very large number of definitions and authorities discussed by this court in Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta Vs. Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, having direct bearing. In that case, this Court held that the wider meaning given to agricultural operations, such as breeding and rearing of, live stock, poultry farming, or daily farming will not be applicable. It held that the correct test to apply would be to find out whether human labour had been applied to the land itself, in order to extract from its natural powers, added to or aided by other natural or artificial sources of strength to the soil, a product which can yield an income

Again their Lordships observed at page 121 as follows:-

We agree that the determination of the character of land'' according to the purpose for which it is meant or set apart and can be used, is a matter which ought to be determined on the facts of each particular case. What is really required to be shown is the connection with an agricultural purpose and user and not the mere Possibility of user of land, by some possible future owner or possessor, for an agricultural purpose. It is not the mere potentiality, which will only affect its valuation as part of "assets" but its actual condition and intended user which has to be seen for purposes of exemption from wealthtax.

In the instant cases, land is defined under the Act, whereas in the Wealth Tax Act, "agricultural land" has not been defined. The question whether a particular extent of land falls within the definition of ''land'' under the Ceiling Act, has to be determined with reference to the meaning given to it by the Act and also with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. It has been found by the Tribunals tint the tank is being used solely for drinking purpose of cattle and the enamel is being used for drinking purposes which is necessary for irrigated cultivation and that therefore it is being used for purposes ancillary to agriculture. There fore the findings of both the Tribunals are correct and I do not find any ground for interfering with the same. In the result, both the revision petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocate�s fee Rs. 100 in each.