State Bank Of India vs Navin Kumar Sinha And Ors

Heard learned counsel for the appellant Bank and learned counsel for the writ petitioner respondent No.1.

The appellant Bank is aggrieved by the impugned Judgment dated 6.9.2016, passed by the Writ Court in W.P.(S) No.3446 of 2014, whereby the

writ application filed by the respondent writ petitioner, challenging the punishment order dated 7.3.2012 of his dismissal from service of the appellant

Bank, which was upheld up to the Reviewing Authority, has been allowed, setting aside the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate

Authority and the Reviewing Authority.

Sans unnecessary details, the necessary facts of this case are that the writ petitioner initially entered in the service of the State Bank of India on

8.6.1973 as a Clerk Typist. He was given due promotions from time to time, and on completion of 30 years of service, he was made to superannuate

in the year 2003, as per the State Bank of India Officers' (Determination of Terms and Conditions of Service) Order, 1979. Vide order dated

5.08.2003 issued by the competent authority, the writ petitioner was given the extension of service from 27.12.2003 to 1.10.2010, subject to the usual

terms and conditions. It is the case of the appellant Bank that according to the applicable service rules, i.e. the State Bank of India Officers' Service

Rules, 1992, as amended from time to time, the age of superannuation of the officers of the Bank was extended to 60 years, which admittedly the writ

petitioner was going to complete on 30.10.2012, and according to the learned counsel for appellant Bank, the writ petitioner continued in service of the

Bank, even after 1.10.2010, till the termination of his service on 7.3.2012.

The respondent writ petitioner was subjected to a departmental proceeding for some alleged misconducts committed during his postings from

19.01.2006 to 29.10.2008 and again from 23.01.2009 to 22.08.2009. The memo of charges have neither been discussed in the impugned Judgment

passed by the Writ Court, nor are very relevant for the purpose of this Court, in view of question of law involved in the case. The admitted position is

that the departmental proceeding was initiated vide letter dated 18.03.2011, containing the articles of charges, and after completion of the departmental

proceeding, the punishment of dismissal from service was imposed upon the writ petitioner on 7.03.2012 by the Disciplinary Authority. The Appellate

Authority rejected the appeal of the respondent writ petitioner vide order dated 29.10.2012, whereas the Reviewing Authority rejected the review

petition of the petitioner vide order dated 16.01.2014.

The Hon’ble Single Judge, while adjudicating the writ application has held that on completion of 30 years of service in the year 2003, the

services of the respondent writ petitioner was extended till 1.10.2010, and there was no order or any material on record to show that the services of

the writ petitioner was ever extended after 1.10.2010, on which date the writ petitioner was deemed to have been superannuated from service. The

Writ Court has also held that no Rules had been brought to the knowledge of the Court showing the effect of the departmental proceeding after

retirement. Accordingly, the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the order of the Appellate Authority as well as the order of the

Reviewing Authority, were quashed on the sole ground that no departmental proceeding could be initiated after the superannuation of the writ

petitioner on 1.10.2010.

The Hon’ble Single Judge has also taken one another ground that since the appellant Bank had not suffered any monetary loss due to the

alleged misconduct committed by the writ petitioner, the punishment of dismissal from service was harsh, and shockingly disproportionate to the

proved misconduct, so as to prick the conscience of the Court. Since the articles of charges have not been discussed in the impugned Judgment, there

appears to have no basis for coming to that conclusion.

We accordingly, without entering into this aspect, keep ourselves confined to the first ground, i.e., the disciplinary proceeding could not have been

initiated after the superannuation of the petitioner.

Learned counsel for the appellant Bank has submitted that the impugned Judgment passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge cannot be sustained in

the eyes of law, inasmuch as, the service of the respondent writ petitioner was extended after 1.10.2010 up till the completion of 60 years of age of

the writ petitioner, as per Rule 19.(1) of the State Bank of India Officers’ Services Rules, 1992, as amended from time to time, which was going

to complete on 30.10.2012. In support of this submission, learned counsel for the appellant Bank also placed reliance upon an application submitted by

the respondent himself, in which, he had stated that he was to superannuate on 30.10.2012. Learned counsel for the appellant Bank accordingly,

submitted that the Hon'ble Single Judge has given a wrong finding that the departmental proceeding was initiated and the punishment order was

passed, after the superannuation of the writ petitioner on 1.10.2010, and accordingly, the impugned Judgement passed by the Writ Court cannot be

sustained in the eyes of law.

Learned counsel for the respondent writ petitioner on the other hand has opposed the prayer and has submitted that there is no illegality in the

impugned Judgment passed by the Writ Court, inasmuch as, all the actions in the departmental proceedings had been taken after the superannuation of

the respondent writ petitioner, which were not permissible in law.

Having heard learned counsels for both the sides, we find that the submission of learned counsel for the appellant Bank that the respondent writ

petitioner on his own saying superannuated on 30.10.2012, is neither convincing nor acceptable to us. An employee cannot be allowed to continue in

service after attaining the age of superannuation on the basis of his own submission, that he is actually to superannuate on a particular date, which is

beyond the actual date of superannuation. The superannuation of an employee is to take place in accordance with the extant service Rules and law

governing the service conditions.

The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant Bank that as per the Rule 19.(1) of the State Bank of India Officers’ Service Rules,

1992, the respondent writ petitioner was to superannuate on completion of 60 years of age, is again, not in consonance with the Rules. The relevant

portion of Rule 19.(1) of the aforesaid Rules reads as follows:-

“19.(1) An officer shall retire from the service of the Bank on attaining the age of sixty years or upon the completion of thirty years’

service or thirty years’ pensionable service, if he is a member of the Pension Fund, whichever occurs first.â€​

A bare perusal of the Rule clearly shows that if an officer of the State Bank of India, completes thirty years of service prior to attaining the age of 60

years, he is to superannuate from service, on completion of thirty years of service, irrespective of the fact that he has not attained the age of 60 years.

In the case of the writ petitioner, he was made to superannuate on the date of completion of 30 years of service in the year 2003 itself, and he was

again given an extension of service from 27.12.2003 to 1.10.2010. As such, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that even in case of extension

of service given to the respondent writ petitioner beyond the period of 30 years of service, he was to continue in service till he attained the age of 60

years. No other Rule has been brought on record, or to the notice of this Court to show that even after completion of 30 years of service, the officer

of the Bank shall continue in service, till he attains the age of 60 years. Rule 19(1) of the State Bank of India Officers’ Service Rules, 1992, is

absolutely clear, without any ambiguity, wherein there is no scope of accepting the submission of learned counsel for the appellant Bank.

Thus, the only conclusion that can be drawn in the present case, is that the writ petitioner could not have been allowed to continue in service after

1.10.2010, in absence of any further extension of service, which admittedly was not done in the present case. In that view of the matter, we find that

the departmental proceeding had been initiated and the punishment order was passed after the superannuation of the petitioner on 1.10.2010, as the

initiation of the departmental proceeding was done on 18.03.2011, and the punishment order was passed by the Disciplinary Authority on 7.03.2012,

i.e., after the date of superannuation, which was not permissible in the eyes of law, in absence of any disciplinary Rules. Admittedly, no such Rules

were brought to the notice of the Writ Court, or to the notice of this Court.

As such, we find no illegality in the impugned Judgment dated 6.9.2016, passed by the Writ Court in W.P.(S) No.3446 of 2014, holding that the

departmental proceeding could not have been initiated and continued after the superannuation of the respondent writ petitioner, and allowing the writ

application, quashing the order of dismissal from service passed by the Disciplinary Authority, as well as the orders of the Appellate and the

Reviewing Authorities, worth any interference in exercise of the LPA jurisdiction.

For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this Letters Patent Appeal, which is accordingly, dismissed.