State Bank of Patiala vs Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court and Another

Rajiv Narain Raina, J.—This labour matter arises out of enquiry proceedings initiated by issuing charge-sheet against the respondent workman. The facts: The 2nd respondent was a Cashier/Clerk with the State Bank of Patiala - petitioner before this Court impugning the award dated 24.04.2010 passed by the Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-1, Chandigarh in Industrial Reference No. 25 of 1999. The charge against the Clerk was that he withdrew an amount of Rs. 1500/- from the Saving Bank account of one Beant Singh. The second charge was that he claimed Leave Travel Concession benefit for his mother in spite of the fact that his mother was drawing Government pension @ Rs. 750/- per month. At the enquiry, both the charges were proven. Beant Singh from whose account Rs. 1500/- was allegedly withdrawn by the workman was not produced as a witness at the enquiry nor his statement was recorded during the enquiry proceedings. On consideration of the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority imposed penalty of compulsory retirement from Bank''s service in terms of Clause 19.6(B) of the Bipartite Settlement dated 19.10.1966 read with the provisions of the Sastri/Desai/Awards and subsequent Settlements. Compulsory retirement imposed as punishment had the effect to termination and, therefore, qualified as retrenchment. It appears mat when one of the charges was of withdrawal of money from the account of stranger Beant Singh normally the Bank should have produced Beant Singh as a witness in the inquiry but that was not done for whatever reason.

In the present case, there is a fact which stands out. After punishment was imposed a statutory appeal was filed by the workman. He produced Beant Singh before the appellate authority. Beant Singh made statement before the appellate authority that he had put his signatures on both the vouchers and had received the amounts on the day itself. This statement of Beant Singh was not relied upon by the appellate authority and no reason was recorded for not doing so, even though it was a relevant and material fact in favour of the charged official. The workman had requested the enquiry officer to summon Beant Singh and to record his statement by giving his name and address for summoning as he could have no control over him to secure his presence. It therefore became the duty of the enquiry officer if it acted fairly to ensure the presence of the witness in the absence of any effort on the part of the Bank to summon him during the enquiry proceedings. Beant Singh had not lodged any complaint against the workman either before the Bank or with the police. Be that as it may Beant Singh appeared before the Tribunal as a witness and cleared all doubts with respect to the alleged banking transaction. The Labour Court could have by all means done this u/s 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act") and to covert itself to an enquiry officer on request made.

On the second charge, it is not disputed that the amount of LTC was returned. He had taken his aged mother on LTC for visiting religious places. She was dependent on him after the death of his father. The Labour Court has examined and appreciated the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 and had reached the conclusion that they had corroborated the statement of Beant Singh recorded before the Tribunal to the effect that without the presence of an account holder, the vouchers cannot be passed and they were so passed in the presence of Beant Singh.

I have heard he learned counsel for the parties at length. They have taken me to their respective stands.

Mr. Thapar submits that the Labour Court has erred in interfering with the punishment awarded. The Courts jurisdiction is extremely limited in such cases as it does not sit in appeal. The procedure laid down for holding enquiries was scrupulously followed. Neither the workman has shown any fault or occasion for prejudice having been caused to the employee. The labour court erred in interfering with the punishment awarded. The gravity of the misconduct on both counts was sufficient to uphold the punishment order.

There can be cases in which the procedure of enquiry followed is as required by law and to the tee, but there is much more to that for purposes of quasi judicial adjudication reviewing a punishment order where a host of other considerations and factors would come into play especially in exercise of jurisdiction u/s 11-A of the Act which remains a jurisdiction exclusive to the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunals which no other court possesses and to interfere in quantum to the point its judicious discretion dictates. So long as the labour Court has appreciated the evidence on record in the correct perspective it cannot remain behind the smoke screen of procedure and to simply say the since procedure was followed therefore no interference is called for. Such interpretation would defeat the ends of justice. It is open to the labour Court u/s 11-A to award lesser punishment or no punishment or to uphold punishment. Theoretically speaking it may even increase the intensity of punishment. This is for the reason that section 11A of the Act empowers it to don the robes of an inquiry officer by converting itself accordingly or to wield the pen of the punishing authority and make a choice from amongst the enumerated punishments in the rules. It has power to fit the punishment to the crime and the crime to the punishment. But this does not mean that it can act autocratically or like an unruly horse. It remains subordinate to judicious determination on known legal principles evolved by superior courts and subject to the power of superintendence this Court exercises over it under Article 226 to keep it within the bounds of its jurisdiction. The grounds on which this court can interfere in orders and awards of inferior Courts and Tribunals is spelt out by the constitution bench of the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob Vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Others, which could not be put better than in the words itself:--

The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of tact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the. Tribunal had. erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was'' insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Syed Ahmad Ishaque and Others, Nagendra Nath Bora and Another Vs. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Others, , and Kaushalya Devi and Others Vs. Bachittar Singh and Others, It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manliest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly rounded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened.

On the second charge Mr. Bal would point out that for the purposes of leave fare concession the expression "family" would mean the workman''s spouse, wholly dependent children as also parents and brothers and sisters ordinarily residing with and wholly dependent on the employee. The money was returned to the bank and therefore no loss was caused. After all he took his widowed mother on a pilgrimage. Punishment of compulsory retirement on the facts of this case appears to be too harsh for the alleged misconduct and disproportionate to the gravamen of the charges. I do not find that this is a fit case for interference in the award of the Labour Court as there is no error apparent on the face of the record and would consequently dismiss the petition.