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Judgment
8 paragraphs · 571 wordsKalyan Jyoti Sengupta, C.J.—This revision petition has been filed challenging the decision of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad, dated 21.9.2012. We have heard the learned, counsel for the appellant and gone through the impugned judgment and order of the learned Tribunal.
The point which arises for consideration in this revision is whether sugar candy and Maka Pohai (Maize Poha) can be treated as separate item of goods to attract separate tax component.
In so far as the issue as to whether Sugar Candy remains as sugar or not is concerned, the Tribunal has followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Sakarwala Brothers reported in (1967) 19 STC 24 , wherein it has been held that patasa, harda and alchidana fall within the definition of sugar and the word sugar in the entry is intended to include within its ambit all forms that is to say, sugar of any shape or texture, colour or density and by whatever name is called. The learned Tribunal did not stop there and has taken note of the decision of this Court in the case of Paro and Co. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, , wherein it has been held that the term sugar used in item 6 of Schedule V of the A.P.G.S.T. Act includes sugar candy which is but a purer form of sugar and contains no other ingredients, but sugar. The term sugar is not confined to sugar in its ordinary form, but covers sugar in all its forms provided the sugar element is wholly predominant.
It has been further held in the case of M.L. Abdul Malik and Co. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, 2nd Circle, Basavangudi, Bangalore and Others, and in the case of Vasantha and Co. Vs. The State of Madras, that sugar candy falls within the definition of sugar.
Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that since sugar candy has got a separate entry, therefore, it should be levied as such. We are unable to accept the said contention and such entry cannot be followed over looking the settled position of law laid down by the judicial pronouncements.
Similarly, it appears that the Advance Ruling Authority has clarified the rate of tax on Maka Poha (Maize Poha) is 12.5%/14.5% and a commercial product different from Maize is not entitled for exemption under Schedule I to the A.P. VAT Act. The Supreme Court in the case of Alladi Venkateswarlu and Others Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and Another, held that atukulu (parched rice) and murumara (puffed rice) are form of rice and they fall within the meaning of entry 66(b) of first schedule. Thereafter, this Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Karnatakam Govindayya Setty and Sons, relying on the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Alladi Venkateswarlu held that Vermicelli which is popularly called as shevya is a maida falls within the entry 60 of the first schedule to the APGST Act. Under these circumstances, with the parity of reasoning as above, we are of the view that the learned Tribunal has come to the correct conclusion.
As such, we do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment and order of the learned Tribunal.
Under these circumstances, the impugned judgment and order does not call for any interference. The revision case is accordingly dismissed.
