State Of Andhra Pradesh vs Chilaparapu Bhaskara Veera Swamy

T. Mallikarjuna Rao, J

This appeal, under sections 378(1) and (3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C’) is preferred by the Appellant / State against the judgment of acquittal rendered by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Tanuku (for short, ‘the Trial Court’) in Sessions Case No.410 of 2006 by its judgment dated 08.09.2008 acquitted the accused for the offence punishable under sections 509, 307 and 354 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’).

Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Trial Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence of PWs.1 to 9 and documents Exs.P.1 to P.8 and M.O.1, were marked. On behalf of the accused, Exs.D.1 to D.5 were marked.

The facts in a nutshell, which give rise to the present appeal, are as follows:

(a) The accused and the de facto complainant (PW.1- Alluri Subba Lakshmi) are residents of Tanuku. PW.1 is the accused's sister, and her husband (PW.2-Alluri Madhavarao) is an advocate at the Tanuku Bar Association. PW.3 (Chilaparapu Brahmanandam) owns Ac.3.50 cents of agricultural land situated at K.Illindaraparru village, which had been cultivated by the accused. Subsequently, PW.1 purchased the said land and has been in possession and enjoyment of it with full rights from 28.03.2006. On 11.07.2006 at about 9:30 AM, PWs.1 and 2 went to the said field, where her father, PW.3, was already present. PWs.1 and 2 stopped their vehicle and proceeded towards the cattle shed. The accused was also present there and was removing the fuses of the agricultural electrical motor. PW.1 questioned him about why he was removing the fuses and asked him who he was. At that point, the accused abused her, caught hold of her hair, pushed her down, and insulted her modesty.

(b) PW.2 ran to her rescue and pushed the accused away. The accused, who is also her brother, then threatened her, stating that he had planned to kill her that very day. He brought a knife from the cattle shed and attempted to attack her, but PW.2 intervened and saved her. The accused again approached them with the knife, forcing them to run towards the road. PW.3 stopped two auto drivers, Addala Rambabu (PW.5) and Maddalasetti Subbarao (PW.6), who were passing by. They came to their rescue, disarmed the accused, and took the knife from him. The accused continued abusing them in filthy language and threatened to kill PW.2 before fleeing the scene. The accused had pre-planned the attempt to murder PW.1. PW.1 then went to the police station and submitted a written report regarding the incident. The Sub-Inspector of Police received her report and registered a case in Crime No.59/2006 for offences under Sections 509 and 307 of the IPC at Iragavaram Police Station on 18.07.2006 at 4:00 PM, and commenced investigation.

(c) During the investigation, the Sub-Inspector visited the scene of the offence and prepared a scene observation report in the presence of mediators Kadali Venkata Satyanarayana (PW.7) and Gubbala Satyanarayana (PW.8). He secured the statements of PWs.1 to 6. On 20.07.2006, the Sub-Inspector received information regarding the presence of the accused at his field at K.Illindaraparru village. He arrested the accused at 7:45 AM at the field, seized the knife, and prepared a mediator’s report in the presence of the same mediators. The accused was then remanded to judicial custody.

The Trial Court took cognizance of the offence under Sections 509, 307 and 354 of IPC against the accused. Upon his appearance before the Court, copies of the relevant documents were furnished to him as mandated under Section 207 of the Cr.P.C. After hearing the submissions made by the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel on the question of charge, the Trial Court framed charges against the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 509, 307 and 354 of the IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

The Trial Court examined the accused as required under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to enable him to consider the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution and also appeared against him. But the accused denied the evidence adduced by the prosecution. After the conclusion of arguments and upon perusal of the material, the Trial Court found the accused not guilty and acquitted him.

The learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the Appellant / State contends that the Trial Court failed to appreciate that the essential ingredients of the offence under Sections 509, 307 and 354 of the IPC; the Trial Court erred in disbelieving the evidence of the prosecution witness, which is cogent and reliable, and the Trial Court's disregard of the prosecution evidence renders the acquittal unsustainable.

The learned counsel for the respondent/accused contends that the case has been fabricated against the respondent; PW.1's testimony lacks corroboration from other prosecution witnesses, and that the Trial Court rightly disbelieved the prosecution's version. The learned counsel accordingly supports the findings and conclusions recorded by the Trial Court.

I have heard learned counsel on both sides and carefully perused the material on record, including the oral and documentary evidence produced by the prosecution before the Trial Court.

The point for determination is:

Was the Assistant Sessions Court justified in acquitting the accused?

POINT:

Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka (2011) 6 SCC 279, at paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows:

"26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the appellate court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the judgment of acquittal of the court below if the findings so recorded by the court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the court below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that acquittal by the court below bolsters the presumption of his innocence."

In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while considering the power of the appellate court to interfere in an appeal against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this point, has concluded as under:

“16.....while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterised as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the court below. However, the appellate court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate court, in such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged with.”

With the above principles in mind, this court analyse the reasoning and ultimate conclusion of the Assistant Sessions Court in interfering with the order of acquittal.

As evident from the record, the relationships between the de facto complainant, the accused and PWs.2 to 4 are not in dispute. The accused is the brother of the de facto complainant (PW.1); PW.2 is the husband of PW.1, and PW.3 is the father of PW.1. PW.4 is the brother of the accused and PW.1.

The prosecution's case is that the de facto complainant purchased Ac.3. 50 cents of land from her father (PW.3) and younger brother PW.4 (Chilaparapu Ganeswara Rao). The prosecution contends that, since PW.1 purchased the land from her father and brother without the accused's knowledge, the accused bore a grudge against PW.1 and her husband, PW.2, who is an advocate at Tanuku. It is the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that, when they went to inspect their land at about 9.30 AM, they found PW 3 already present there, and as PWs 1 and 2 reached the motor shed, they saw the accused removing the electrical fuses of the motor; when PW 1 questioned the accused, the accused became enraged, caught hold of her tuft, threw her to the ground, beat her with his hands and outraged her modesty, and when PW 2 intervened to rescue his wife, the accused picked up a knife from the eaves of the shed and attempted to hack PW.2 on the neck, but PW.2 luckily escaped the blow.

It is the case of the prosecution that PWs.5 and 6 intervened, seized the knife from the accused, and rescued PWs.1 and 2. Following the incident, PWs.1 and 2 went to the Iragavaram Police Station and submitted a report, marked as Ex.P1, dated 11.07.2006. However, the Sub-Inspector of Police did not register the report on the same day in view of the request made by PW.3 that the matter be settled amicably between PW.1 and the accused, as they are sister and brother.

As seen from the record, PWs.1 to 3 are material and direct witnesses to the prosecution's case, while the remaining witnesses are not direct witnesses to the incident in question. It is an admitted fact that there were civil disputes between the de facto complainant and the accused. The learned defence counsel primarily contended before the Trial Court as well as before this Court that there was a considerable delay in submitting the report and registering the complaint. It is argued that Ex.P1, the complaint, was submitted with a backdated reference. Although the prosecution attributed the delay to the matter being placed before the elders, none of the alleged elders were examined to substantiate this claim. Further, PW.2, the husband of PW.1, stated that PW.9 (G.M.Syam Kumar), the Investigating Officer, acted as an elder to settle the dispute. Consequently, an unexplained and unreasonable delay of seven days in reporting the occurrence and in registering the case.

The Trial Court examined the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 and noted discrepancies regarding the exact scene of the offence. The defence argued that the testimonies of these witnesses lacked clarity as to whether the incident occurred inside the motor shed or in the area between the motor shed and the cattle shed. The evidence of the material witnesses also cast doubt on the alleged seizure of the case property.

The learned defence counsel submits that there is no specific mention of the actual words allegedly used by the accused, who is the brother of PW.1, purportedly amounting to outraging or insulting her modesty. The defence further contends that, according to the evidence of PWs.1 to 3, a major portion of the property purchased in the name of PW.1 actually belonged to her mother, and that PWs.1 to 4 colluded to create a document to show the purchase of joint family property. The charge sheet was initially filed against the accused for offences under Sections 509 and 307 of the IPC. However, during the course of the trial, on an application filed by the prosecution, Section 354 IPC was added based on the evidence of PWs.1 to 3.

According to the prosecution, immediately after the incident, PW.7, the Panchayat Secretary, and PW.8, the Bill Collector of Iragavaram Gram Panchayat, acted as mediators and proceeded to the scene of the offence, where PW.9, the Investigating Officer, seized MO.1, the knife. However, the record shows that the prosecution's case is not supported by PWs.4 to 6, who denied having made the statements attributed to them in Exs. P2 to P4. Consequently, the prosecution's version is not corroborated by PW.4, who is the brother of both the de facto complainant (PW.1) and the accused.

The evidence of PW.3 shows that his wife died intestate and that she had inherited Ac.2.00 cents and odd of land from her parents, and after the sale of that land, Ac.3.50 cents was purchased in her name. The evidence of PW.4 indicates that he had right over Ac.3.50 cents of land sold to PW.1, yet he did not receive any portion of the sale consideration. He stated that he signed the sale deed in favour of PW.1 under pressure from PW.3 and third-party creditors. His testimony further reflects that PWs.1 and 2 paid the amounts due to these third-party creditors, and that PW.1 did not pay any amount either to him or to PW.3 towards the sale consideration. PW.4 also deposed that he had signed the sale deed executed in favour of PWs.1 and 2. This evidence led the Trial Court to doubt whether the property belonged to the joint family or to the mother of PW.1, and why the accused's signature was not obtained as one of the owners of the property.

The evidence of PW.9, the Investigating Officer, reveals that he neither verified nor seized any documents relating to the sale transaction concerning the Ac.3.50 cents of land. As such, the said document was not produced before the Court. PW.9 also failed to offer any explanation for not obtaining the sale deed, except stating that his concern was with the offence allegedly committed by the accused and not with the rights of PW.1 over the land. The evidence of PW.3 further indicates that disputes existed between him and the accused, particularly regarding the land sold by him to PW.1. The accused had filed a petition against him claiming tenancy rights over the Ac.3.50 cents and alleging that PW.3 and others had illegally sold the property to PW.1. It also emerges from PW.3’s testimony that the accused instituted A.T.C.No.5 of 2006 against him, and that the disputes between them arose only after the sale of the property to PW.1.

It also emerges from the evidence of PW.3 that the accused filed a suit against him and the manager of Andhra Bank, East Vipparru, regarding the withdrawal of Rs.42,000/- from the accused’s account. PW.3, however, admitted that he had withdrawn the said amount using a withdrawal form already signed by the accused, and that the account was in the name of the accused. In cross-examination, PW.3 stated that he could not recall whether he, along with PWs.1 and 2, were granted bail in C.C.No.380 of 2016 on the file of the II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Tanuku, in connection with Crime No.60 of 2006. He further admitted that he had been attending criminal cases pending in that court's file but could not recall whether the particular case was C.C.No.380 of 2006. PW.1 also admitted in cross-examination that the accused had filed an ATC against her and their father, claiming tenancy and preemption rights, and seeking cancellation of the sale deed executed in her favour in Tanuku. She further admitted that she had obtained bail in C.C.No.380 of 2006, registered on a complaint filed by the accused against her, her father, and her husband, alleging that the incident occurred on 11.07.2006 at 8:30 AM. Additionally, she acknowledged that C.C.No.97 of 2006, filed by her against the accused, and C.C.No.562 of 2007, filed against the accused and one Kantheti Satyanarayana, were also pending on the file of the II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Tanuku.

PW.9, the Investigating Officer, admitted in cross-examination that the accused submitted a complaint on 11.07.2006 at 11:30 AM, to the then Head Constable against PWs.1 to 3. He made a G.D. entry and noted that further action would be taken after receipt of the wound certificate. In support of this contention, the defence relied on Ex.D1 – certified copy of the FIR in Cr.No.60 of 2006 and the report submitted by the accused; Ex.D2 – charge sheet in Cr.No.60 of 2006 of Iragavaram P.S. along with the wound certificate; Ex.D3 – postal acknowledgment received by the SHO, Iragavaram P.S., dated 20.07.2006; Ex.D4 – carbon copy of the general diary in the general duties register of Iragavaram P.S., dated 18.07.2006; and Ex.D5 – carbon copy of the general diary in the general duties register of Iragavaram P.S., dated 20.07.2006. PW.9 also admitted that his investigation revealed the existence of land disputes between the parties. The evidence on record, particularly Exs.D1 and D2, shows that by the time Ex.P1 was registered, an altercation had taken place between the accused and PWs.1 to 3. Although PW.9 denied receiving the legal notice sent by the accused regarding the incident dated 11.07.2006, the accused examined DW.1, the S.I. of Iragavaram Police Station, through whom Exs.D4 and D5 were marked. However, upon appreciating the evidence on record, the Trial Court concluded that, based on the testimony of DW.1 and the contents of Exs.D3 to D5, it could not be established that PW.9 had knowledge of the contents of the notice sent along with the postal acknowledgment marked as Ex.D3.

According to the evidence of PWs.1 to 3, the incident in question occurred on 11.07.2006. PW.9, however, testified that he served as S.I. of Police, Iragavaram P.S., from 04.01.2006 to 22.09.2006. He stated that on 18.07.2006 at 4:00 PM, PW.1 submitted Ex.P1, the written complaint, which he registered as Cr.No.59 of 2006 under Sections 509 and 307 IPC, and subsequently submitted Ex.P7 FIR to the Court on the same day. Thus, PW.9’s evidence is inconsistent with the testimony of PWs.1 to 3, who claimed that the complaint was lodged on the day of the incident, i.e., 11.07.2006. PW.9’s evidence, corroborated by Ex.P1, shows that the complaint was actually lodged on 18.07.2006 at 4:00 PM. Taking these facts into account, the Trial Court concluded that while PW.9 recorded in Column No.8 of the case diary that the delay in reporting occurred due to referring the matter to the elders, he was not aware of the contents of Ex.P1 before 18.07.2006 at 4:00 PM. In view of these facts, the Trial Court rightly held that the assertion of PWs.1 and 2 that the complaint was immediately lodged at the police station on the day of the incident, is not believable.

In Apren Joseph @ Current Kunjukunju and others vs. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:

"It is always better that the FIR is rendered before there in time and opportunity to embellish or before the informant's memory fades. Undue or unreasonable delay in lodging the FIR, therefore, inevitably gives rise to suspicion which puts the court on guard to look for the possible motive and the explanation for the delay and consider its effect on the trustworthiness or otherwise of the prosecution version. Effect of delay in lodging the FIR, would always depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case."

In State of M.P. vs. Kriparan (2003) 12 SCC 675, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:

"Inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the F.I.R. is fatal to the case of the prosecution particularly when the facts and circumstances of the case demonstrate such an inference".

As rightly noted by the Trial Court, the evidence of PW.9 shows that the accused submitted a complaint on 11.07.2006 at 11:30 AM to Head Constable 1300 against PWs.1 to 3 with regard to the same incident in question. A G.D. entry was made, noting that further action would be taken after receipt of the wound certificate. The record indicates that, upon receipt of the wound certificate, the complaint of the accused was registered as Cr.No.60 of 2006 under Sections 364 read with 34 IPC. Ex.D1 comprises the certified copy of the complaint, FIR, and wound certificate. PW.9 admitted that Cr.No.60 of 2006 was not mentioned in the charge sheet of the present case. The prosecution did not examine the Head Constable who received the complaint on 11.07.2006 at 11:30 AM.

The Trial Court also noted a delay in the submission of Ex.P7 FIR to the Court. The record shows that Ex.P7 was received by the II Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Tanuku, on 19.07.2006.

In State of Rajasthan V. Daud Kahn (2016) 2 SCC 607, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that:

“The interpretation of Section-157 of the CrPC is no longer res integra. A detailed discussion on the subject is to be found in Brahm Swaroop V. State of U.P., which considered a large number of cases on the subject. The purpose of the forthwith communication of a copy of the FIR to the Magistrate is to check the possibility of its manipulation. Therefore, a delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate is linked to the lodging of the FIR. If there is no delay in lodging an FIR, then any delay in communicating the special report to the Magistrate would really be of little consequence, since manipulation of the FIR would then get ruled out. Nevertheless, the prosecution should explain the delay in transmitting the special report to the Magistrate. However, if no question is put to the investigating officer concerning the delay, the prosecution is under no obligation to give an explanation. There is no universal rule that whenever there is some delay in sending the FIR to the Magistrate, the prosecution version becomes unreliable. In other words, the facts and circumstances of a case are important for a decision in this regard.”

The Trial Court recorded specific findings that the prosecution failed to provide a valid reason for the delay in forwarding the FIR to the court. It observed that the delay was not properly explained. The Trial Court also relied on the decision in YS Nanji Reddy v. State of AP 2000 (2) ALT (Crl.) 453 AP, which holds that the police must forward the First Information Report to the jurisdictional court immediately after registration, without any undue delay; and if any delay occurs, it must be reasonably and satisfactorily explained by the prosecution.

The Trial Court further observed that none of the elders were examined to substantiate the claim that the matter had been referred to them and that they were unable to resolve it. In cross-examination, PW.1 stated that she had no knowledge of whether she had visited the police station within three days of the incident or whether the S.I., of Police had come to her during that period in connection with the case. PW.1 did not state in her evidence that the matter was referred to the elders and that the delay in registering the case resulted from their inability to find a solution. As rightly pointed out by the Trial Court, PW.1’s evidence is wholly contrary to the testimony of PW.9 regarding the reasons for the delay in registering Ex.P1 and Ex.P7 FIR.

The Trial Court has extensively referred to the evidence of PW.2 at paragraph No.38 and concluded that it is wholly contrary to the evidence of PWs.1 and 9 regarding the cause of the delay in presenting Ex.P1 and its registration as Ex.P7 FIR. As the Trial Court has rightly appreciated PW.2’s testimony, this Court need not reiterate the entirety of PW.2’s evidence.

The Trial Court, at paragraph No.39, has extensively referred to and discussed the evidence of PW.9 and concluded that the testimony of PW.3 is also contrary to the contents of Ex.P1 and to the reasons given by PW.9 regarding the delay in registering Ex.P1.

The Trial Court also considered the fact that the scribe of Ex.P1 was not examined to establish that the report was prepared on 11.07.2006 and on the same day, it was submitted to the police. PW.9’s evidence indicates that he did not know where Ex.P1 had been drafted. The Trial Court observed that, in light of the admitted seven-day delay in registering Ex.P1, there was no justification for the Investigating Officer not to examine the scribe of the report.

The Trial Court, after appreciating the evidence of PWs.1, 2, 7, and 9 in paragraphs 42 to 44, concluded that the prosecution failed to establish when and where PW.9 examined and recorded the statements of PWs.1 to 6. Upon evaluating the evidence on record, the Trial Court found it difficult to believe that the accused had kept the MO.1 knife in the eaves of the motor shed and produced it before PWs.4 and 5 when PW.9 inquired about the weapon used in the commission of the offence. The Trial Court further held that the testimony of PWs.1 to 3, regarding the accused using MO.1 to attack and attempt to kill PW.2, and PWs.5 and 6 allegedly retrieving it from the accused after stopping and obstructing him while he was chasing PWs.1 and 2, was not credible. The Trial Court observed that the prosecution’s case was not supported by the evidence of PWs.4 to 6.

After referring to the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 and 9, as well as the contents of Exs.P5 and P8, this Court views that the prosecution failed to establish the precise location of the incident, whether it occurred at the cattle shed, the motor shed, or somewhere in between. These are material discrepancies in the testimonies of PWs.1 and 2 regarding the alleged hurling of the knife. According to the Investigating Officer, PW.1 had stated that the accused hurled MO.1 at PW.2, but did not mention any attempt by the accused to hack him. The Investigating Officer further deposed that PW.2 likewise did not state that the accused attempted to hack him with MO.1 on his right side, and that PW.3 also did not state that the accused attempted to hack PW.2 on the right side of his neck. Upon thoroughly considering the evidence of PWs.1 to 3, the Trial Court rightly concluded that they had altered their version from their earlier statements given to PW.9, thereby undermining the prosecution’s case. There was no evidence from any independent witnesses to corroborate the testimonies of PWs.1 to 3. Although PW.1 alleged that the accused had outraged her modesty, misbehaved with her in filthy language, and insulted her, she did not specify the exact words allegedly used. The Trial Court further noted that PW.1 is the younger sister of the accused, and that PWs.2 and 3 also failed to specifically state the words allegedly used by the accused to outrage PW.1's modesty.

A bare perusal of Section 354, IPC reveals that for it to apply, the offence must be committed against a woman; criminal force must be applied against her; and such application of force must be with the intent to outrage her modesty (Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 4 SCC 371).

Criminal force is defined in Section 350 IPC, however, what exactly does modesty means, which is an essential aspect for this Section to apply, has not been defined so as to constitute an offence u/s 354 IPC.

In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in the case of Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill (1995) 6 SCC 194, in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15, it is discussed about the meaning of the word 'modesty' and what act of a person would amount to outraging such "modesty' of woman. Their Lordships have held that from the dictionary meaning of 'modesty' and the interpretation given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab vs. Major Singh case AIR 1967 SC 63, it appears that the test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is the action of the offender as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman.

Upon re-appreciating the evidence on record, this Court views that the testimonies of PWs.1 to 3 were not corroborated by any independent witness, and that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused either insulted or outraged the modesty of PW.1. After considering the evidence of PWs.7 and 8, this Court also views that the alleged seizure of MO.1 from the accused at the scene of offence, as well as the observations recorded in Exs.P5 and P6, were highly doubtful. The disputes between the parties relate to the purchase of the property by PW.1 from PWs.3 and 4. In connection with these disputes, several cases were pending between them. Additionally, disputes remain between PW.3 and the accused regarding the withdrawal of Rs.42,000/- from the accused’s account using a form signed by the accused, and the accused has filed a suit in this regard. Upon considering the testimony of PWs.1 to 3, the Trial Court concluded that long-standing disputes existed between the parties. The Trial Court declined to rely on the testimonies of PWs.1 to 3 on the ground that they were interested witnesses, their evidence lacked mutual corroboration, and there existed a long-standing civil dispute between the parties. It also noted the absence of corroborating evidence, despite the incident allegedly occurring at around 9:30 AM in land situated near a road, surrounded by other lands and nearby houses. In light of these material contradictions in the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 and the inordinate delay in giving report Ex.P1 and the delay in forwarding the same to the Court, the Trial Court was not inclined to accept the prosecution’s evidence, particularly that of PWs.1 to 3.

It is a settled proposition of law that in a criminal trial, suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution must prove its case and establish the charge by adducing convincing evidence to ward off any reasonable doubt about the accused's complicity.

In light of these circumstances, and upon a comprehensive evaluation of the entire evidence, the Trial Court rightly concluded that the evidence of PWs.1 to 3 is not trustworthy and the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused for the offence under sections 509, 307 and 354 of the IPC beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Trial Court acquitted the accused of the said charges.

In a criminal case, the degree of proof is the standard that is required in civil proceedings, and if there is the slightest doubt in the mind of the Court regarding the involvement of the accused person, then the Court should not convict the accused person with such a doubt. Instead, it would be proper for the Court to pass a judgment of acquittal in favour of the accused. When Trial Court after adequate appreciation of the evidence of witnesses passed a judgment of the acquittal, it would not be appropriate for the appellate Court to disturb the said judgment, unless the said judgment of acquittal is unreasonable, even if two views are possible, then also, the appellate Court should not disturb the said judgment, instead, the Court should upheld the view favoured the accused.

In Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of Karnataka 2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed the scope of section 378 of the Code as under:

“Section 378 Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384 Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial Court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the Court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial Court is both a possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having seen the witnesses.

So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is well defined by now by series of decisions and the same is not to be repeated time and again, however, one of the recent decision in case of Harbeer Singh V. Sheeshpal (2017) CriLJ 169, the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down that mere fact that another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of decisions in which this Court is of the considered opinion that State has not made out any case which would permit this Court to exercise such wide powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on the part of learned Judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been rightly undertaken by the Court below and therefore when such eventuality is reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of the opinion not to interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of the aforesaid decision in paras: 10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein after:

"10. The above principle has been reiterated by this Court in a number of judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for reversing an order of acquittal.

It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the accused should be adopted.

Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out no case to establish the guilt of the respondent / accused.

The Trial Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant’s request for interference lacks merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or misinterpretation by the Trial Court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is no flaw in the findings of fact by the Trial Court. Therefore, the acquittal of the respondent cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal against the acquittal is dismissed, and the order of acquittal is confirmed, and there is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court. Accordingly, the point is answered.

In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal No.551 of 2010 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Tanuku, in Sessions Case No.410 of 2006, dated 08.09.2008, stands confirmed.

Interim orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, and all pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.